101 Wis. 556 | Wis. | 1899
Two defects in the tax deed are pointed out, which respondent contends render it void on its face. One or the other or both of such contentions were sustained by the trial court, hence the order appealed from.
First. It is said that the deed shows the tracts of land were sold to F. EL Ruger and Douglas county jointly. Such a sale is unauthorized by statute, hence void. Sprague v. Cœnen, 30 Wis. 209. If the language of the deed supports that contention the instrument is manifestly insufficient, and the demurrer was properly sustained. To support that construction of the deed, which we assume the learned trial court adopted, respondent’s counsel says the word “ respectively ” is an adverb, therefore its proper office in the sentence stating that the lands were sold to Douglas county
The phrase, “ to the county of Douglas and E. H. Ruger,” qualifies the words “ were sold ” as qualified by the adverbs “ separately ” and “ respectively.” If the intention was to express the idea that the sale was to the county of Douglas and E. H. Ruger jointly, obviously the word “ respectively ” had no office whatever to perform in the sentence. The-words “ separately sold to the county of Douglas and E. IT. Ruger ” express the idea completely. If it was used as a qualifying word as to each separate sale to both of the vendees, then the meaning is clearly not that each sale was to the county of Douglas and E. H. Ruger jointly, but to Douglas county entire and to F. H. Ruger entire. That would be absurd. After an entire, consummated sale was made to one, a sale of the same tract could not have been
Second. But it is said that there is nothing in the deed to show what particular lands were sold to Douglas county and what to F. H. Nuger, and that the deed is void on its face for that reason. Language in numerous decisions, most of them rendered early in the history of the court, is liable to be understood as sustaining that theory. In Krueger v. Knab, 22 Wis. 429, the court, quoting the opening words of the statute, “Whereas,-(or assignee of-)has deposited,” said the statute clearly contemplates that the name of the purchaser shall be stated, and that if any other person than the purchaser deposits the certificate, that fact shall appear, .and that he is the assignee of such purchasei’. But to say the deed must show, as to each particular tract, the purchaser of it, and that the assignee of the certificate took •direct from such purchaser, or, if there were a succession of assignees, that each must be named, exhibiting a perfect chain of title from the county to the demandant for the tax deed, would be going further than the decisions referred to. It would be holding that the deed must conform to the statutory form and idea with literal accuracjq while the statute, by its terms, requires only a substantial compliance; and so the court has often decided. In Cousins v. Allen, 28 Wis.
The cases referred to, and many others that might be added, showing that a literal compliance with tax proceedings is,not necessary to the validity of a tax deed, do not militate at all
The purpose of the requirement that the name of the purchaser shall appear, is that the deed shall show a legal sale as regards a vendee competent to purchase, and the requirement that the tax deed shall run to an assignee of the certificate is for the purpose of showing that the tax deed icsued
The deed in question, as set forth in the complaint; is free from any serious defect. The demurrer was improperly sustained.
By the Bowrt.— The order of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.