1 Mo. 508 | Mo. | 1825
delivered the opinion of 'the Court.
This was an action of trover, brought by Mullanphy, against Hunt, in the ‘Court below, for a stone slab and copper boiler. There was'a special verdict found, oh which a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, for the boiler, and for the defendant, as to.the slab. To reverse the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant brings his writ of error. It is only necessary, therefore, to examine the case as it respects the boilgr, and the only point to be considered, is, whether it was a fixture, the facts set out in the special verdict, are, in substance, as follows: that sometime before the commencement of the suit in the Court below, one Theodore Hunt was seized and possessed of a certain lot of grohnd in the town of St. Louis, whereon was a tan-yard and a currying shop) and whereon were also sundry articles of personal property, called the stock of the said yard and shop; that before the commencement of the said suit, Theodore Hunt mortgaged the said lot to the plaintiff in the suit below; that after the mortgage, and before the commencement of the said suit, Theodore Hunt sold and delivered all the stock of the said yard and
The case, therefoi;e, presents the naked question, whether property, personal in its character, thus affixed, becomes .prima facia a part of the realty, so as to pass by a deed of the land.
There can he np question, but tfiat a copper kettle, or boiler, abstractly considered is of a personal character. It is, in its nature, moveable, and may be used in any place where the wants or convenience of the owner .may require it, and the character of it is not changed by the manner in which the philosophy, economy, or convenience of the oyvner may .cause him, from time to time, to put it in use. It is, therefore, deemed altogether immaterial, as it respects its character as personal property, whether it is set in a furnace, suspended upon a crane, or standing upon its legs, unless there are other circumstances to connect it with the realty. Kettles set in a furnace, with “ brick and mortar,” for the purpose of making sugar at a sugar camp, as is often the case, would hardly be considered so attached to the soil as to pass by a deed of the land; hut things, personal in their nature, may become a part of the realty in two ways. First. By incorporating them with the realty, as a part thereof, for some permanent object. Second. By affixing them to the realty, for any object, in such a manner, that they cannot he severed, without dilapidation or injury to the. inheritance.
As an example under the first head: — the nails and plank which compose the door of a house, or the rails which .compose a fence, are, before their appropriation to these particular objects, of a personal character, but by their application and by the intention of the owner, they become a part of the realty, and pass with the land, notwithstanding they might be severed from it without violence or dilapidation of the inheritance. So it is in the power of the owner to annex almost every thing of a personal character to the soil, and make it a part of the realty; or, on the contrary, at his pleasure, to dissever almost every thing, and make it a part oLthe personalty.
The only remaining point to be considered, is, whether the boiler was so affixed to • the premises, that it- could' not be removed without violence or injury to the inheritance.
The special verdict finds that not only the boiler, but the furnace and flue, might be removed, without any other injury to the building than laying bare a hole already existing in the chimney. This can be no- dilapidation. Nothing, is tom or taken-from the building. The flue itself has not oven been removed.- The judgment of the Circuit Courtj in favor of the plaintiff, must1 he reversed, and defendant must recover his costs in this'Court, and in the Court below.