2 Pa. 105 | Pa. | 1845
after stating the case.' — The evidence (of receipt by Moore) was received on the supposition that it creates an equity in favour of the devisee; but how the fact of her refusal to accept paper instead of specie, can give an equity to one and prejudice the rights of the other, is not very apparent to my mind. It is enough that bank notes had no value in her eyes, that she was not bound to receive any thing but gold and silver, and that it was the executor, and not to the devisee, to whom she had to look for her money. She had nothing to do with any arrangement between the executor and the devisee, made for their own convenience; it does not appear that she took any part, or that she knew any thing about them. But granting the evidence to be pertinent to the issue, can it be proved by the declarations of the executor, a party to the suit ? He is excluded as well on the ground of policy as interest. This is an inflexible rule, which we have lately had occasion to assert, in Wolf v. Fink, 1 Barr, 435. There is no principle better settled, than that a party cannot be a witness in his own case, much less can
To the first part of the proposition we see no objection; but from the last I totally dissent. It is not a case of suppressio veri, but of suggestio falsi, and by confounding the two classes of cases, which are entirely distinct, the court has fallen into error. It is a case of gross imposition and fraud. The plaintiff was a woman certainly of weak intellect, little conversant with business, could neither read nor write, and, moreover, had reached the advanced age of eighty years; the executor a man of business, in whom she naturally placed confidence. He, taking advantage of the influence necessarily resulting from their relations, induces her to agree to the exchange, falsely, basely representing, that his real estate was encumbered to the amount of $100, whereas, the lien against him being equal in value to his whole estate, the debt is lost, or greatly endangered. If the facts be as stated, can a court of equity hold this to be a valid exchange ? And why should it be so ? Because, says the-court, it was her folly. The liens W’ere of record, and she ought to have searched for encumbrances. Can it be the law that we are to repose no confidence in each other, without being branded with the charge of folly, and losing the earnings of a lifetime ? True, says the defendant, I told you a deliberate falsehood, but you ought not to have believed one word I-said. Had you searched the records, you would have discovered, it was all untrue. It was your folly to put confidence in the truth of a neighbour or friend. I can, therefore, with calm conscience pocket my ill-gotten gains. I never can, I never will, consent that any person shall be permitted, in this sort, to take advantage of his own wrong. Had he been silent merely, perhaps this plea wrould have availed him, although even in that case a court of equity would lay hold of slight circumstances to relieve a victim to such duplicity. No honest or honourable man would have concealed the extent of the encumbrances, under the circumstances in which these parties were placed. It falls within that large class of cases denominated, in the books, die suggestio falsi. Courts of equity always grant relief where there has been misrepresentation, and
Judgment, reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.