47 Minn. 557 | Minn. | 1891
In November, 1889, in an action in the district, court between the parties to this appeal, Conrad recovered a judgment against Hunt for $325.03, which was docketed in the office of the clerk of the court in Cottonwood county. An execution thereon
The assignment to Cray did not affect the right of set-off, for ■the reason that nothing passed by the assignment. The right of Hunt to recover damages for a merely personal tort was personal to him. His right to recover damages for the unlawful detention of his ■person, and for his mental suffering or bodily pain, he could not •transfer to another, nor upon his death would it have survived to his personal representatives. Such a right has not the ordinary .attributes of property, and is not a subject of sale and transfer. Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193; Rice v. Stone, 1 Allen, 566; People v. Tioga C. P., 19 Wend. 73; Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322; Pulver v. Harris, 52 N. Y. 73; Lawrence v. Martin, 22 Cal. 173. Nor does the rendition of a verdict upon .such a cause of action make it .assignable. Rice v. Stone, Lawrence v. Martin, supra; Brooks v. Hanford, 15 Abb. Pr. 342. Only by the rendition of a judgment is such .a personal right of action converted into a debt.
Nor does the fact that two of these defendants were in no way parties to, nor interested in, the judgment which Conrad had against Hunt, afford a sufficient reason why he should not be allowed to satisfy the judgment of Hunt by setting off against it an equal amount •of his judgment against Hunt. He was entitled to enforce his judg
We think that, in view of the fact that the ordinary legal means of enforcing payment of the judgment against Hunt had been resorted to without avail, his judgment creditor was entitled to the simple remedy of having the judgment applied as a set-off in satisfaction of the judgment against himself, notwithstanding the pendency of a suit by a receiver to reach assets alleged to be hidden under a fraudulent trust.
The order is reversed, with directions to the district court to make such further order as may be necessary to effect the set-off.