104 S.W.2d 84 | Tex. App. | 1937
Lead Opinion
In order that the matter under consideration may appear in its proper setting, the following statement is made: During the year 1925, C. M. Joiner owned certain oil and gas leases in Rusk county, Tex. He divided the acreage into three groups or syndicates, sold and issued to purchasers certain certificates, each evidencing an undivided interest in the acreage composing the syndicate against which the certificate was issued. On October 27, 1930, C. R. Adkins and other certificate holders instituted suit in the Forty-Fourth judicial district court of Dallas county against Joiner, seeking the establishment of their respective titles to undivided interests in the syndicates, as evidenced by their certificates, for an accounting, etc., and praying for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the properties and administer same under the orders of court. Answering the suit, Joiner filed a cross-action and also prayed for the appointment of a receiver. Accordingly, on October 31, 1930, the court appointed Ernest H. Tennant receiver, who qualified and took possession of all Joiner leasehold properties, including the 500 acres involved in the present controversy. DeBogory v. Chapman (Tex. Civ. App.)
Hunt, individually and as trustee, was a party to the original suit; Burrage became a party later by his plea of intervention. After the 500-acre tract was dismissed from the receivership, the master in chancery, after a hearing on Burrage's plea of intervention, filed his report, finding that Burrage was owner of an undivided 2-acre interest in the 500-acre tract. This report being approved, the court, on April 4, 1932, rendered judgment in favor of Burrage, establishing his title to the 2-acre interest. While the record fails to disclose that Hunt was served with notice of the hearing by the court on the master's report, we think it is disclosed with reasonable certainty that Hunt knew of Burrage's claim and plea of intervention. The testimony of Harry B. Harter, employee of Hunt and Hunt Production Company, having charge of their office and office files, testified in substance that Mr. Hunt fully understood matters pertaining to the receivership and was conversant therewith. Tom C. Clark, master in chancery, who held the hearing on Burrage's plea of intervention and approved his claim to a 2-acre undivided interest in the 500-acre tract, testified, in substance, that at the time he knew H. L. Hunt, individually and as trustee, was interested in the matter; that notice of the *86 hearing was advertised in newspapers in Dallas, Dallas county, Henderson, in Rusk county, and Tyler in Smith county, and personal notices of the hearing were addressed to all interested parties; the witness testifying that it was his custom to notify all interested parties of hearings to be had on claims pending before him. From this testimony we are of opinion, and so conclude, that Mr. Hunt knew of the pendency of Burrage's plea of intervention, and had notice of the hearing thereon by the master.
On May 1, 1932, subsequent to the rendition of judgment in favor of Burrage, Hunt and others organized and procured a charter for Hunt Production Company, and thereafter Hunt conveyed the 500-acre tract to the company, of which he personally owned four-fifths and as trustee held one-fifth, and received in lieu approximately four-fifths of the stock of the company for himself, and one-fifth in his capacity as trustee.
On May 25, 1932 (after the above-recited transactions), Hunt, individually and as trustee, filed in the receivership suit a pleading in the nature of a bill of review, praying that the judgment of April 4, 1932, establishing Burrage's claim to a 2-acre undivided interest in the 500 acres, be set aside. On trial of the bill of review, the court, on June 10, 1933, rendered judgment against Hunt individually and as trustee, denying the relief sought, reciting that: "The court farther finds that, after the granting and entering of judgment in favor of Richard W. Burrage, intervenor, H. L. Hunt, individually and as trustee, caused to be filed herein his motion to set aside said judgment and hold the same for naught, to which motion filed, the claimant, Richard W. Burrage, filed his answer, and thereupon, all parties re-introduced on May 6, 1933, all evidence heard before the Master in Chancery, as well as additional oral testimony and documentary evidence, and the court, after hearing and considering all pleadings herein, and after hearing and considering all evidence adduced upon hearings on said motion and answers, and after reviewing briefs filed by counsel for all parties herein, is of the opinion that the relief sought by the said H. L. Hunt, individually and as trustee, should, in all respects, be denied, and that the judgment entered by this court on April 4, 1932, in favor of the intervenor, Richard W. Burrage, should, in all respects, stand in full force and effect * * *."
On refusal by the court to set aside the judgment in favor of Burrage, Hunt appealed, individually and as trustee; no other interested party complained of the judgment.
We dismissed the appeal on the idea that as Hunt, individually and as trustee, had parted with title to said leasehold (having conveyed same to the corporation), he was not an aggrieved party and had no right to an appeal. Hunt v. Burrage (Tex. Civ. App.)
After all these proceedings became final, Hunt Production Company on November 16, 1935, instituted suit against Burrage in form of trespass to try title in the district court of Rusk county, seeking recovery of the 500-acre leasehold (although as disclosed by the record, Burrage had never asserted, and was not then asserting, title to any part of the 500 acres, save and except an undivided 2-acre interest therein). After being cited to answer the trespass to try title suit, Burrage, on December 9, 1935, filed a second motion in the receivership suit, seeking therein, as in his first motion, the enforcement of his judgment, to which Hunt individually and as trustee, and Hunt Production Company, were cited; praying therein that Hunt Production Company be enjoined from prosecuting the trespass to try title suit (being cause No. 11846 on the docket of the district court of Rusk county, Tex.). The application for injunction was granted, enjoining the company from further prosecuting the suit (subject to future orders of court), from which the company appealed to this court, thus presenting for review the order of court granting the injunction.
In stating the nature and result of the question under review, we have taken the essential facts from the record before us, but in stating the original proceedings and the setting of the present controversy, we have drawn from the records of other appeals arising out of the original receivership suit, which, in our opinion, we were authorized to do. Griffith v. Tipps (Tex. Civ. App.)
A contention that runs through the discussion is that, as neither Hunt nor Hunt Production Company had his or its day in court, the judgment in favor of Burrage was not binding on either. To this we cannot agree. Hunt, individually and as trustee, had his day in court on the hearing of the issues presented in his bill of review, and Hunt Production Company (the creature of Hunt and those he represented as trustee), having been organized and becoming purchaser of the land from Hunt during the pendency of the intervention by Burrage and after he had obtained judgment, stands precisely in the shoes of Hunt. The provisions of article 7391, R.S., are in point, reading: "Any final judgment rendered in any action for the recovery of real estate shall be conclusive as to the title or right of possession established in such action upon the party against whom it is recovered, and upon all persons claiming from, through or under such party, by title arising after the commencement of such action."
That a court is charged with the duty and clothed with the power and exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its own judgments is axiomatic; and that it may issue all necessary process and employ suitable methods, legal or equitable, to accomplish that end, is undoubted. Article 2217, R.S., provides that "The court shall cause its judgments and decrees to be carried into execution." Section 8 of article 5 of the Constitution reads: "* * * and said court [district] and the judges thereof, shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction and certiorari, and all writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction." To the same effect, see article 1914, R.S. Suits and proceedings in other courts may be enjoined when the prosecution of same will delay, obstruct, or interfere with the proper enforcement of a judgment. Chapman v. DeBogory (Tex. Civ. App.)
So we conclude that, if the motion or petition filed below by Burrage constitutes an effort on his part to have the court enforce and render effective its judgment, the writ of injunction prohibiting Hunt Production Company from prosecuting the suit pending in the district court of Rusk county (subject to future orders) being ancillary, was authorized and proper, either with or without the giving of bond as a condition precedent to the issuance of the temporary writ of injunction, the statute (article 4649 R.S.) not being applicable to the situation. Neill v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.)
On the other hand, if the proceeding, in essence and legal effect, constitutes and is a separate and independent action based upon the judgment, the injunction should be dissolved; because, in the first place, no bond was either required or given as a condition precedent to the issuance of the writ, as required by article 4649, R.S. [White v. Perkins (Tex. Civ. App.)
So, reverting to the original question, that is, was the proceeding begun by Burrage simply an effort to have the court enforce its judgment, or was it the institution of an independent action based upon the judgment? In determining such a question, the Supreme Court, in Milam County Oil Mill Co. v. Bass,
We hold that the proceeding filed by him should not be considered an independent suit, but an effort to secure the enforcement of his judgment, and that the writ of injunction, being purely ancillary to the main proceeding, was authorized as a means of effectually enforcing the judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below.
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
Being unable to agree with the majority opinion herein, I am forced to file my dissent.
This is an appeal from a temporary injunction granted ex parte on the 31st day of October, 1936, enjoining appellant from prosecuting a trespass to try title suit in Rusk county.
The appellant contends that the injunction is void and should be dissolved, for the following reasons: First, because the petition for the injunction contained no prayer for a temporary injunction; second, because the injunction was granted ex parte, upon a petition which was not verified; third, because the appellee was not required to execute and did not file any bond; and, fourth, because the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the injunction staying the proceedings in the district court of Rusk county, Tex., and that such injunction, if granted, would have to be returnable to the district court of Rusk county.
I think each and all of these points should be sustained.
The record in this case discloses that the temporary injunction was granted without notice to appellant and without hearing; that appellee's petition upon which it was granted contained no prayer for a temporary injunction, was not verified; that no bond was required, and that none was executed and filed.
These are all elementary matters, and regardless of the appellee's right to the injunction the trial court had no power or jurisdiction to grant such relief in the absence of these fundamental requirements.
It is well settled in this state that a court has no jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction in the absence of a prayer for such relief. Jacksonville Independent School District et al. v. Devereux et al (Tex. Civ. App.)
Article 4647, Revised Civil Statutes, 1925, provides as follows: "No writ of injunction shall be granted unless the applicant therefor shall present his petition to the judge verified by his affidavit and containing a plain and intelligible statement of the grounds for such relief."
The courts, in construing this article, have universally held that this statutory requirement is mandatory, and that a temporary injunction granted ex parte, upon an unverified petition, is void. City of Groveton v. Josserand (Tex. Civ. App.)
Article 4649, Revised Civil Statutes 1925, provides as follows: "Upon the filing of the petition and order of the judge and before the issuance of the writ of injunction, the complainant shall execute and file with the clerk a bond to the adverse party, with two or more good and sufficient sureties, to be approved by such clerk in the sum fixed in the order of the judge granting the writ, conditioned that the complainant will abide the decision which may be made therein, and that he will pay all sums of money and costs that may be made therein, and that he will pay all sums of money and costs that may be adjudged against him if the injunction be dissolved in whole or in part."
The courts have also universally held (except in a few cases where injunctions were granted under some special statute) that a writ of injunction granted without requiring a bond to be executed is void. White et al. v. Perkins (Tex. Civ. App.)
In Ex parte Coward, supra, the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Nelson Phillips, said: "Under the statute the giving of a bond is made a condition precedent to the issuance of an injunction. This requirement applies to divorce suits brought by the wife, notwithstanding Articles 4638 and 4639. Wright v. Wright,
American Rio Grande Land Irrigation Co. et al. v. Ford et al.,
Article 4656, Revised Civil Statutes 1925, provides as follows: "Writs of injunction granted to stay proceedings in a suit, or execution on a judgment, shall be returnable to and tried in the court where such suit is pending, or such judgment was rendered; writs of injunction for other causes, if the party against whom it is granted be an inhabitant of the State, shall be returnable to and tried in the district or county court of the county in which such party has his domicile, according as the amount or matter in controversy comes within the jurisdiction of either of said courts."
This statutory requirement has repeatedly been held to be jurisdictional, and not a mere venue statute. Milam County Oil Mill Co. et al. v. Bass et al.,
Under the above-quoted article and the authorities cited, the trial court was clearly without jurisdiction to grant the injunction herein. If it were conceded that appellee was entitled to the injunctive relief sought, which I do not concede under the record in this case, he would yet be required to seek such relief in the district court of Rusk county, where the proceedings sought to be enjoined are pending. I do not think that this case can be distinguished on principle from any of the above-cited authorities.
The Commission of Appeals in Switzer et ux. v. Smith, supra, said: "This is more than a mere venue statute; it has to do with jurisdiction. Its purpose is not the protection of the citizen in his ordinary right to be sued in the county of his domicile, but rather it is a law of comity, for the protection of the dignity of our courts."
The Court of Civil Appeals at Waco, in Mann et al. v. Pace, supra, in passing upon the case, where the issue is identical with the issue in the case at bar, said: "The writ of injunction when issued in *91
such cases must, except under circumstances not involved in this case, be granted by the judge of the court in which the suit in which proceedings are sought to be stayed is pending, and must be made returnable to and tried in such court. R.S. arts. 4643 and 4656. Such statutory requirements are jurisdictional. Seligson Co. v. Collins,
In Box v. Oliver, supra, the Court of Civil Appeals at Waco said: "Injunctive relief being the sole purpose of this suit, the provisions of the articles quoted apply, and the court was without authority to make the order restraining appellant from arresting or attempting to arrest appellee in Robertson county, or to make the writ returnable to the district court of Limestone county. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Asphalt Belt Ry. Co. (Tex.Com.App.)
There is another reason why the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the injunction dissolved. The appellee's petition does not set forth any grounds which would entitle him to an injunction. Furthermore, this record shows that appellee has an adequate remedy at law which would, if resorted to, be as effectual as the harsh remedy of an injunction.
This record discloses that the trespass to try title suit in Rusk county was filed on November 15, 1935; that the appellee's petition herein was filed December 9, 1935. All the reference which appellee makes in his petition to an injunction, in so far as it relates to the suit in Rusk county, is as follows: "That instead of observing and complying with the judgment of this court in your petitioner's behalf and in compliance with said judgment, the said Hunt Production Company on the 15th day of November, A.D. 1935, instituted a suit in the District Court of Rusk County, Texas, as plaintiff and against your petitioner as defendant, and being numbered 11846 upon the docket of said court, and citation was issued on the 22nd day of November, 1935, and duly served upon your petitioner shortly thereafter. Said citation commanding him to appear on the 6th day of January, 1936, and answer the plaintiff's petition, which is in the form of trespass to try title to the property above described. * * * That a writ of injunction issue commanding and requiring said Hunt Production Company to immediately dismiss said suit brought by it in Rusk County District Court above mentioned and prohibiting it and the said H. L. Hunt, individually and as Trustee, and all other persons acting for and on behalf of said corporation, from further prosecuting said suit and requiring dissolution thereof and prohibiting the institution and prosecution of any other suit or suits attacking in any manner your petitioner's judgment aforesaid. * * *"
It will be readily observed from these allegations that they are not sufficient, even if properly verified or substantiated by evidence, to entitle appellee to an injunction. There is no copy of the petition in the Rusk county suit attached to appellee's petition, therefore his allegations as to the subject-matter of said suit are mere conclusions, and do not furnish the basis for the granting of an injunction. Hannah v. Russ (Tex. Civ. App.)
The appellee does not allege in what way or manner Hunt Production Company is not "observing and complying with the judgment" rendered April 4, 1932. There is nothing in the said judgment commanding Hunt Production Company, or its predecessor, H. L. Hunt, trustee, to do anything, nor forbidding them to do anything. Hence the said allegations are mere conclusions. Appellee's petition does not negative facts sufficient to show that appellant is not entitled to prosecute the suit in Rusk county, as required by the authorities. See Tex.Jur. vol. 24, p. 222, and authorities cited. Appellee nowhere alleges that Hunt Production Company has never acquired any other title to the said property, or that appellee is still vested with title to same, or that appellant is seeking to relitigate any issue which has been heretofore *92 adjudicated. He nowhere alleges that the suit in Rusk county was not filed in good faith, or that the injunction sought is to prevent a multiplicity of suits, or that the Rusk county suit was filed to vex, harass, or oppress appellee, or that the same was filed for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or frustrating the enforcement of the judgment of April 4, 1932. If his petition had contained such allegations, the record herein would refute substantially all of such allegations. He does not allege that the suit in Rusk county involves the same subject matter as the suit at bar. If he did, the record discloses that the suit in Rusk county was filed prior to the filing of this suit. Furthermore, if those were the facts, he would have his legal remedy of filing a plea in abatement in the Rusk county suit, which he would unquestionably be required to do under the authorities. Furthermore, in the absence of pleadings to that effect, this court has no authority to assume that the title put in issue in the suit in Rusk county is the same as the one involved in the judgment of April 4, 1932. The majority opinion has assumed the existence of facts which do not appear in the record.
I am also unable to agree with the majority opinion in the holding that the proceedings filed by Burrage on the 9th day of December, 1935, should not be considered as an independent suit, but was an effort to secure the enforcement of a judgment. His naming the petition a "Motion to Enforce Judgment" does not, in fact, make it such. To determine what a pleading is, its substance must be looked to, and not the name the pleader may choose to call it. It is the substance and not the shadow that controls.
The judgment sought to be enforced is purely declaratory, and does not require enforcement. It does not purport to do more than vest in appellee title to two acres undivided in the land in question. With this title and ownership go all of the rights which follow the ownership of any like property, however acquired; but there is nothing peculiar about this ownership merely because it was acquired through a judgment. The acquisition of this property through a judgment would not vest in Burrage any extraordinary remedies with reference to the enforcement of such rights. The venue of any cause of action accruing to appellee by virtue of the title vested in him by said judgment would be subject to the venue statutes in the same manner as if he had acquired the land by deed. And even though appellee has the right to sue appellant for an accounting, or for a partition of the property, or to enforce any other right with reference to said property, he should not be privileged to do so in disregard of the venue statute, and thereby, under the mere guise of enforcing a judgment, deprive appellant of the valuable right of being sued in the county of its residence. When a petition requires the service of citation to acquire jurisdiction of the defendant, and presents fact issues which either party may demand a jury to determine (as has been done in this case), and upon a determination of such fact issues by the jury a judgment is necessary to be entered, from which either party to such proceeding could appeal, such judgment would necessarily constitute a final and independent judgment, and would not constitute the enforcement of some existing judgment.
Furthermore, the appellee alleges no grounds whatever, either statutory or equitable, sufficient to warrant the appointment of a receiver in this case, and if one should be appointed the same would not in any manner constitute the enforcement of the judgment, and could serve no other purpose than to harass and oppress the appellant. The authorities cited by the majority opinion on this point furnish no support for the appointment of a receiver in this case. The cited case, to wit, Henry Shulte v. Hoffman,
Neither is the authority cited in the majority opinion in support of the injunction in point. The cited case, to wit, Neill v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.)
Furthermore, under the history of this litigation, I think that Hunt Production Company has an absolute right to prosecute the suit in Rusk county, even though such suit may call into question the judgment in favor of Burrage. Not being a party to the said judgment, it may have rights superior to it; it certainly has the right to have this judgment construed and its legal effect determined, and to do so does not constitute an interference with the jurisdiction of the court rendering such judgment. The suit in Rusk county was filed more than three years and a half after the judgment was rendered. Milam County Oil Mill Company v. Bass, supra.
I cannot agree that Hunt Production Company has had its day in court in this controversy. It is true the record in these various proceedings shows that the property in question was conveyed to Hunt Production Company subsequent to the date of the judgment in favor of Burrage. And if its grantor, H. L. Hunt, trustee, had been permitted to prosecute his appeal from the judgment overruling his petition to set the judgment of April 4, 1932, aside, I think Hunt Production Company should be held to be bound by the proceedings prosecuted by Hunt, trustee, which would have inured to its benefit. However, by the court dismissing Hunt's appeal and not permitting him to prosecute the suit to final conclusion, it would not be just to hold Hunt Production Company bound by such proceedings. Hunt Production Company had no right to prosecute the bill of review to set the Burrage judgment aside, it not having been a party to the proceedings wherein said judgment was rendered. Swift v. Parmenter et al. (C.C.A.)
Under the facts disclosed by the entire history of these proceedings, I think a manifest injustice will be done Hunt Production Company if it is not permitted in some court to contest the validity of the judgment entered in favor of Burrage on April 4, 1932. The record discloses without dispute that both Hunt and Burrage came into the suit filed in October, 1930, in exactly the same way, to wit, by plea of intervention. The record further *94 discloses that after Burrage had intervened in the suit, to wit, on the 7th day of April, 1931, both Hunt and the land in question were, on the 18th day of April, 1931, dismissed out of the suit.
The judgment of the court dismissing the 500 acres out of the suit recites:
"On this, the 18th day of April, A.D. 1931, came on to be heard the motion of C. M. Joiner, H. L. Hunt, W. B. Osborne, E. B. McDavid, W. A. Brookshire, John Malone, Mamie Smith, Chassie Buford, Leota Brannon, Mrs. Lake N. Bruce, John B. Rowland, M. R. Thomas, Alexander Smith Oil Company, G. O. Golightly, L. W. Capps, R. C. McElmurry, K. C. Miller, Leo V. Ryan, H. C. Miller, Murray Butler, Donna Buford, Ray Carter, J. W. Blanton, H. N. Lane, A. V. Lane, Vivian Duncan, R. J. Glass, to dismiss without prejudice the above styled and numbered cause, and the receivership ancillary to said cause, insofar as they effect the following described property to-wit: (Describing the 500 acres of land.)
"And it appearing to the court from the findings of the Honorable Tom C. Clark, Master in Chancery herein, and from the evidence adduced before the court, that said above named parties are the only parties of recordclaiming any right, title or interest in and to said above describedproperty (italics mine), and that said motion should be granted, and said partition suit and receivership, insofar as it applies to them and above described property should be dismissed.
"It is therefore considered by the court, and so ordered and decreed that said above styled and numbered cause insofar as it applies to the said described property, and to that extent only, is dismissed and the receiver is directed to release said property, together with all personal property located thereon from his custody and control as such receiver, and the right of possession thereto shall revert to and vest in the various owners thereof (above owners) as their interests might appear, and said owners of said property shall be entitled to receive any and all oil taken from said land, now in storage in the tanks, and all oil and proceeds of oil run from said property since March 31, 1931, said dismissal being without prejudice to the rights of the various owners of and/or claimants to said property as among themselves, or with other parties, and without prejudice to the rights of H. L. Hunt under and by virtue of his contract with Ernest R. Tennant, as receiver * * *"
Obviously, the dismissal of the 500 acres from the suit was without prejudice to the rights of the various owners named in the judgment; it was dismissed with prejudice to the claim of Burrage. Burrage was a party to that suit, asserting some character of claim to be determined against C. M. Joiner, without specifying the kind of claim or the land to which his claim attached.
When the court dismissed Hunt and the land out of the suit, it thereby lost jurisdiction to enter any judgment adverse to Hunt without in some way acquiring jurisdiction of him. On the 5th day of April, 1932, practically one year later without any character of notice to Hunt, a judgment was entered in favor of Burrage. Hunt was not served with notice of the hearing, had no knowledge thereof, or of the judgment entered. He was not advised that Burrage was asserting any claim to the 500 acres of land, and the Hunt Production Company did not know of such claim. The majority bases its finding that Hunt knew of Burrage's claim and plea of intervention of the testimony of Harry B. Harter, employee of Hunt and the Hunt Production Company, and the testimony of Tom C. Clark, master in chancery. Harry B. Harter testified that he kept the records for Hunt, and that he knew of no such claim or plea, and on cross-examination testified:
"Q. You think Mr. Hunt is fully conversant in all matters here in this receivership? A. I am sure that he is.
"Q. That is the way he impressed you in conversation with you about the matter? A. I have never discussed any detail with Mr. Hunt; his time is valuable and I think he has always discussed it with Mr. McEntire.
"Q. What do you base your judgment on that he is familiar with it, if you have never discussed it? A. In what respect?
"O. Well, you expressed an opinion that Mr. Hunt understood all matters, now you say you never conferred with him?"
Obviously, this testimony does not convey the finding that Hunt knew of the Burrage claim. Tom C. Clark testified that he published notices in Dallas, Rusk, and Smith counties, of the hearing on Burrage's claim, and that it was his custom to send notices to all interested parties; and that he knew that Hunt was an interested party, *95
and on cross-examination testified: "I did not mail out the letters (notices) myself, but I am sure that one was mailed." I am impressed that this testimony does not show that Hunt or the Hunt Production Company had notice of the claim of Burrage. This is all the testimony bearing on the issue. Therefore Hunt Production Company, who purchased the property while the record was in that state, had the right to assume that Hunt would be permitted to prosecute a suit in its behalf to set said judgment aside. Daniel Boone Coal Co. v. Crawford,
Furthermore, to hold that Hunt was bound by an adverse judgment entered a year after he was dismissed out of the suit, and at the same time hold that a judgment entered adverse to Burrage dismissing Hunt out of the suit, at a time when Burrage was a party to the suit, was not binding on Burrage, is inconsistent. Burrage being a party to the suit at the time the judgment of dismissal was entered, the judgment, even if Burrage had no actual notice of it, would not be void, but at the most only voidable, and would be binding upon him until set aside.
The record in these proceedings further reflects that in the bill of review proceedings filed by H. L. Hunt, trustee, appellee herein filed a cross-action in which he then sued for an accounting of the oil produced from the property in question up to date, and also asked that said property be placed back in receivership. While the judgment on the bill of review did not expressly deny the accounting and the receivership, it made no mention of either, and hence they were therefore denied by implication. This would constitute res judicata of the issue of an accounting up to that date, to wit, June 10, 1933, the date of the judgment denying the bill of review, and also would be res judicata on the issue of the appointment of a receiver, since the appellee did not appeal from that judgment. A judgment which fails to grant relief sought in a petition or cross action is as much an adjudication of such issues as if the judgment expressly denied such relief. W. M. Trammell et al. v. Sam Rosen,
Therefore, under the view I take of this matter, the proceeding filed by Burrage in December, 1935, constitutes a new and independent suit, seeking, among other things, original injunctive relief, and the injunction sought is not ancillary; and by reason of the facts herein recited, the judgment of the trial court granting the injunction should be reversed and the injunction dissolved.