Dеfendant was convicted of driving while under the influence óf intoxicants. He appeals contending that the trial court erred in not directing a verdict of acquittal and erred in imposing a suspension of his motor vehicle operator’s permit as apart of the adjudged sentenc e.Held:
1. Immediately after a jury was selected and sworn, defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. The contention was that on November 6, 1974, defendant mаde demand on the state for a list of the witnesses that would appear against him at trial; that since no list had been furnished no witness could be permitted to testify for the state to рrove the accusation over his objection; and therefore since the state could offer no evidence defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Defendant objected on this ground to the testimony of the two witnesses for the state, the two arresting officers. The whole purpose of Code § 27-1403 requiring the furnishing of a list of witnessеs on demand is to insure that a defendant is not confronted at trial with testimony against him from witnessеs whom he has not had the opportunity to interview prior to trial.
Hicks v. State,
232
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Ga. 393, 399 (
2. It is contended that the сourt exceeded its statutory authority in suspending the defendant’s license to operate a motor vehicle for six months, which formed a part of the adjudged sentence. Thе 1974 Uniform Rules of the Road Act amended Code Title 68A. Ga. L. 1974, p. 633. The authorized punishments for driving under the influence of alcohol under the amended Act do not include suspension of the viоlator’s license. Code § 68A-902 (c). But neither did its predecessor, Code § 68-9927, which the 1974 Act,specifically repealed. Ga. L. 1974, pp. 633, 697. But Code § 92A-9908, which was originally enacted in 1937 (Ga. L. 1937, pp. 322, 348), specifically authorized a trial court to suspend the license of a defendant оn his conviction "of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated, or driving a motor vehicle while engaged in a felony, or deliberately, wilfully or negligently violating any traffic law of this State, оr any municipality thereof,...” The 1974 Uniform Rules of the
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Road Act contains a customary genеral repealer section that "all laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are hеreby repealed.” Ga. L. 1974, pp. 633, 699. The question is whether there was a repeal by implication. Repeal by implication is not favored and if the later Act does not embrace the whole subject matter of the prior Act and is not entirely repugnant to it, the сourt should apply a construction that will give the two statutes concurrent efficaсy.
Lewis v. City of Smyrna,
Judgment affirmed.