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Humphries v. Ozmint
397 F.3d 206
4th Cir.
2005
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Docket

*1 HUMPHRIES, Paul Shawn

Petitioner-Appellant, OZMINT, Director, Car- E. South

Jon Corrections; Department

olina McMaster, Attorney

Henry Dargan Carolina,

General, Re- State of South

spondents-Appellees.

No. 03-14. of Appeals,

United States

Fourth Circuit. 27, 2004.

Argued: Oct. 4, 2005. Feb.

Decided: *2 Norris, Lynn Teresa Center

ARGUED: Cоlumbia, Litigation, For South Capital Carolina, Appellant. Donald John General, Zelenka, Deputy Attorney Chief *3 Attorney Office of the General South Carolina, Columbia, Carolina, for South R. Appellees. Hag- ON BRIEF: Thomas Carolina; gard, Ridgeway, Joseph South Maggiacomo, Capital Litiga- Center for tion, Columbia, Carolina, for Appel- South McMaster, Henry Dargan Attorney lant. General, McIntosh, Deputy John W. Chief General, Columbia, Attorney South Car- olina, Appellees. WILKINS, Judge,

Before Chief WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, WIDENER, LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, TRAXLER, MOTZ, KING, GREGORY, SHEDD, DUNCAN, Judges, Circuit HAMILTON, Judge. Senior Circuit by published opinion. Affirmed Senior Judge opinion, HAMILTON wrote the Judge which and Judges Chief WILKINS WIDENER, NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, MOTZ, TRAXLER, KING, joined. and SHEDD Judge LUTTIG wrote concurring opinion. Judge a WILKINSON dissenting opinion, wrote in which a MICHAEL, GREGORY, Judges joined. DUNCAN EN BANC ON REHEARING HAMILTON, Judge: Senior Circuit On Hum- August Shawn Paul phries was convicted in the Circuit Court County, for Greenville South Carolina of murder, attempted robbery, possession of during of a firearm commission vio- crime, conspiracy. lent and criminal Fol- sentencing lowing hearing, rec- ommended sentence of death and, conviction in accordance murder with verdict, head, trial jury’s killing Meanwhile, the state court him. Blackwell Humphries slumped ground sentenced to death for that to the in the store. police exhausting conviction. After arrested Blackwell at state remedies, apprehended scene and later petition filed for a day. writ of corpus habeas the United States

District Court for the District of South Humphries, State v. 325 S.C. Carolina, § 28 U.S.C. which the dis- (1996). S.E.2d 25, 2005, July trict court dismissed.1 On 12, 1994, July On County Greenville granted the district court Humphries a grand jury charged Humphries with the of appealability, certificate 28 U.S.C. (2) murder; following offenses: at- *4 below, § 2253. For the reasons stated we (3) tempted robbery; possession of a fire- affirm the district court’s dismissal of during arm the commission of a violent Humphries’s petition. habeas crime; and criminal conspiracy. On 1, 1994, August the case went to trial and

I returned a guilty verdict of on all As found the South counts. Carolina Su-

preme appeal, Court on direct the facts of During the separate sentencing phase of this case are as follows: trial, Humphries’s proffered, the solicitor 1, 1994, January Humphries

On shot admitted, and the state trial court all of Smith, Dickie the owner of the Max- the evidence that during was admitted Saver convenience store in Fountain guilt phase of the trial. Following the Inn, South Carolina. The evidence at evidence, court’s admission of this the so- trial night established that on the before licitor called two witnesses from Dickie killing, Humphries and his friend family, Randy Smith’s his brother Smith Eddie Blackwell drinking drove around and his wife Pat Smith. These witnesses They gun beer. also stole a night. childhood, testified about Dickie Smith’s Shortly after 7:00 a.m. January ethic, upbringing, generosity, work and they entered the Max-Saver relationship young conven- close with his daughter Smith, ience store. working Ashley. who was store, Humphries asked whether he Randy Smith testified that he and Dick- hot, something Humphries

wanted and grew up ie Smith in a poor family that did gun flashed the stolen replied and not have hot water. When Dickie Smith money. he wanted nine-years old, was his father died. After There was some evidence to suggest death, his father’s Smith and the other Smith then reached under a counter to family began working support members pull gun. out a The video camera at the family. that, Randy Smith testified store recorded the shooting. When when Dickie grade, Smith was in the ninth counter, Smith reached under the Hum- job he took a after school aas meat cutter phries fired shot in Smith’s store, direction grocery a Bi-Lo until working from fled the store. The bullet 10:00 or 11:00 p.m. night. In the tenth by Humphries fired struck grade, Smith acquired Dickie Smith a full-time McMaster, Initially, Humphries Gary Maynard, Henry respectively, named po- hold these former commissioner of the respon- South Carolina sitions and have been substituted as Corrections, dents, Department 25(d)(1). and Charles Con- Fed.R.Civ.P. For ease of ref- don, erence, attorney gener- South respondents Carolina’s former we will refer to as "the al, Now, respondents. as throughout opinion. Jon Ozmint and State" trustworthy, pleasant was a job respectful, in a textile mill working second shift person. Randy continuing attend school. while community in the everyone Smith testified Humphries support strategy, good he was Dickie Smith and

liked The first called thirteen witnesses. wit- person. Humphries’s ness Albert Humphries, was paternal grandfather. He testified that Pat During testimony, her Smith de- brother, and his Richard Hum- Humphries ambitious, hard- Dickie Smith as scribed Humphries’s him phries, lived with instance, working, generous. For af- Humphries time grandmother receiving degree and ter one technical three-years Humphries old until was supervisor, Dickie Smith went becoming twelve-years old. Albert testi- get to school to his residential home back heavy drink- fied that he and his wife were building hous- began builder’s license and marijuana in grew ers that his wife Ashley in 1986. was born in 1988. es backyard. their de- Albert Dickie Smith and Pat Smith described son, father, as Humphries’s scribed his very Ashley’s close and relationship violent, that he unpredictably noting had Ashley having a hard testified prison been to several times. Albert *5 her killed time since father was and was son had Humphries testified that his cut receiving counseling. him the arm with a knife and had on testimony, in Following Humphries’s grandmother the state kicked face, knocking her out. photograph to admit of the crime false teeth moved documentary scene and evidence demon- Goode, aunt, Humphries’s Patricia testi- adjudicated strating Humphries was Humphries’s fied that father had said on in delinquent breaking 1985 for two and as occasions that never loved his numerous he in in 1989 enterings, convicted Anderson that the children and children should have County, burglary and South Carolina been aborted. larceny larceny, and conviсted of in Ala- Scott, mother, Humphries’s Carla testi- bama in 1990. that, father, Humphries’s fied after she left pregnant Humphries she became with as a in making mitigation, In terms of a case knife result his father her at raping Humphries’s strategy was four-fold. point. eventually stated that she left She First, sought he that there was to establish their paternal grandpar- children with (1) by demonstrating kill no intent to that: ents married times. and several more She panicked he in pulled trigger he after after only reunited with children she attempt to Dickie to reach reaction Smith’s who allow the chil- married someone would (2) counter; under the he did not kill dren to live with her. Donna Brashier was also the store who (3) during shooting; he drove off with- Humphries’s Scott also discussed crimi- (4) Blackwell; out Eddie he voluntari- Scott, nal Hum- According record. Next, ly Hum- killing. confessed phries was arrested in 1984 for two counts phries sought to was demonstrate he placed breaking entering and was person significant a nonviolent who had no Thereafter, probation. given on he was history engaging in violent acts. He suspended more after probation he was sought young that he was a also show for times. Af- fighting school several history man had an of emo- Humphries’s probation who extensive ter second revoca- old, tional, Fi- physical, years and substance abuse. tion he was he when fifteen was Columbia, facility nally, Humphries sought to show that he sent state South addition, placed on Satan. In Shults thirty days was testified Carolina Humphries’s again. Humphries Humphries was arrested father introduced probation drugs January breaking ages into a and alcohol 1989 for between church, looking for food be- and ten. apparently six on the street for a living he had been cause Humphries’s in mitigation case was guilty to that Humphries pled

week. testimony closed with the of three wit- charge placed probation. and was nesses, family two (Tammy Comp- friends Humphries charged Alabama Shaw) step-sister, ton David and his stealing an automobile. As a result with Tammy Compton Jamie Scott. testified charge, was sentenced Humphries Humphries enough she trusted to leave years’ imprisonment two followed her children with him and David Shaw years probation. four Humphries good, testified nonviolent person. Jamie Scott testified she loved Humphries, Humphries’s step- Debbie mother, step-brother her and wanted to lot see Humphries’s testified that father jury alcohol, return a life sentence. drugs, a combination of used every day fumes and had shared paint gave Before the state trial court Humphries from those substances with instructions, final its the solicitor and coun- Humphries, Hum- 1983 to 1992. Richard their gave argu- sel brother, regarding the phries’s testified argument, ments. In his closing the solici- in which he and circumstances tor broke his down into four (1) up, including: their father’s vio- grew parts, commenting tо the parents; toward his own the lack lence [y]ou things deciding look at four water; running hot water and sometimes *6 punishment. issue of You look at the (4) food; trips the lack of taken and aggravation. aggravated Is it an mur- dumpsters find school clothes.2 der? You look at the character of the that, Taylor Preston when testified he any mitigation, Defendant. You look employed Department of by was Youth statutory or other mitigation mitigation Services, he had contacts with they’ve you. numerous presented And the last Humphries, who was thirteen at the time. victim, thing you look at is the his According Taylor, Humphries to Preston uniqueness. harm to the commu- What cooperative, a pleasant, respectful, was and nity and to the family and to the victim boy. nonviolent did this Defendant cause? Those are things you the four at. look Shults, Mary expert an witness with a degree in The his sociology degree and master’s solicitor then turned attention to work, Hum- in The solicitor regarding aggravation. in social testified the evidence in history. argued social She related that that the evidence this case clear- phries’s statutory Humphries throughout ly aggravating established the had been reminded State, by product upon his life that he circumstance relied rape. was during Humphries’s stated that father was the murder was committed Shults violent, robbery kick incredibly people would in the commission of a while face, Then, deadly weapon.3 people, cut and would refer to himself was armed with a Badsen, Humphries's grandmother, 2. unfortunate circumstances of Hum- maternal Badsen, Lindsay Humphries's uncle. phries’s upbringing were further confirmed witnesses, testimony Ruby of two other presented aggrava- with one 3. The was (murder ting during circumstance committed the evi- Humphries’s charac- The solicitor then addressed the solicitor turned Hum- Humphries’s mitigation presented by ter and check- in summarized dence detail, past great stating: in phries. argued ered The solicitor to the mitigat- lack complete that there was he He’s since was 13 been trouble evidence, old, years ing arguing had years old. When he was con- breaking significant history prior he two and enter- criminal committed He that his ings, given probation. and he was victions crimes of violence and Family given relatively young (twenty-two), a chance mental age Court judge at age capacity, drug and occasional and alcohol use of no were moment. got fights He missed school. He got suspended school. He school. Finally, the solicitor turned to Dickie away. they brought He And him ran so uniqueness Smith’s individual. age probation back in at 14 on a revoca- regard, solicitor stated: tion, yet was given and he another Dickie Smith was born fourth chance, again, And stricter conditions. son, fifth child a fellow Alton named away. he school. ran Hе skipped He lady Smith and a Lottie sweet named got He disruptive sus- school. They grew up Mae Darnell Smith. pended. poor. They have water. didn’t hot at age brought So 15 he’s back in for They coming had a in and a tub spigot probation another revocation. And this stove, they next to the had a few said, Family Judge time “You of cotton. acres know, enough enough. going We’re Dickie Smith is as much about this case you send down to Columbia. We’re Paul Humphries. as Shawn When Alton going you if to send down there see [to] nine, Smith died when Dickie was he you figure we. can’t out what makes pulled up by bootstraps himself tick.” family. contributing he started they And all psychological do kind[s] got jobs all picking He kinds of odd reports things I’ll talk about penny pound, hunting cotton at a rab- just back, a moment. comes And he bits, them, out, skinning dressing them *7 truant, age at an 16 is habitual and he them selling for 50 cents. school, drops age out and at basically old, years gets job in he’s he When burglarizes 17 he church and steals at Bi-Lo in Greenville the Meat church, given proba- and he’s Department working after He’s school. tion. gone day. to school all after From Alabama, And he age goes at to and til or night school about 10:00 10:30 at there, larceny he’s convicted of down Bi-Lo, money, at working saving his jail years. and he’s sent to for two And family. a car buying for the gets age he out when he’s and at report. They he to in grade, goes fails issue warrant When he’s tenth he down probation. gets job, for him. He’s still on And at to Boenett’s and he a full-time age 22 going he a murder and at- second shift. He’s all commits to school tempted robbery. day, working midnight, armed and he’s until dant). robbery of a commission while armed was also instructed to consid- deadly weapon) statutory with a two and miti- er other circumstances it found to be (no gating significant prior circumstances mitigating. history age and criminal of the defen- grew up part al. He southern Lottie Mae Darnell Smith contributing. kids, County Simpsonville all Greenville below high them out of eight got with cotton, school, mainly farming, agricul- that was degree, some of all at least a tech ture area. through college. them watching it grew up change And he to school, high Dickie Smith finished

When industrial. he first And went to work Carbide, went to work for then he Union for one of the at industries Union Car- Kemet, stop but he didn’t there. He bide, and then he decided he going kept He went improving himself. part change, to be of that and he started Tech, got engineering degree, he and building houses down there and building supervisor, became a and then he he a business down there. back to Tech he decided went because houses, got and he he wanted build finishing portion After his Tech, got and he degree his—another concerning Dickie Smith’s his builder’s license. uniqueness, the solicitor then concluded Pat, they and fell in argument by arguing following And 1984 he met his love, they got jury: marriеd. That’s the year Shawn Paul com-

same here, Who is the victim Shawn Paul age mitted two house break-ins Humphries or is it Dickie Smith? Who a pretty 1986 Dickie makes drastic guy is this the victim? Is it over here or going quit move. He decides he’s Donna, Brashier, is it got Donna who’s full-time, go Kemet and houses build gunshot every day hear that of her out, goes building he he starts got life and who’s see Dickie Smith community grown in the he had homes every laying day on the floor of her life? year in. Shawn Paul up That’s the same is the Is it this Who victim? Defendant his up proba- is second here, momma, or lady right is his down tion violation and sent to Colum- wife, Ashley, or who only way his bia. daddy go she can is to see her visit 4th, July they Then have a grave Sunday after church? baby Ashley. girl

little named You punish- There are a lot of reasons for know, brought year in a 12 the Defense reason, is ment. Rehabilitation one said, stepdaughter- -stepsister, old proper goal rehabilitation in some — “Please don’t Paul Hum- put Shawn circumstances, you’ve got but to decide sorry the electric chair.” I’m I phries Defendant, about whether who not feel it was appropriate bring did law, at 14 is breaking breaking year Ashley parade in a six girl old law, law, breaking at 15 is at 17 is you. front of her *8 law, going breaking —is Ashley In 1988 is born. That’s the same going jail, to breaking the law and who’s year Humphries jail Shawn Paul went to every given system been chance that the in years. spring you’re for two And if going offers. You decide to 1992, believe, opens I Smith Dickie rehabilitate him. MaxSaver, building to a

doors busi- punish- What are some other reasons for community. ness down that ment? is a reason for pun- Retribution may good, You have look at the ishment. That not sound right unique- to but,- may fact, I not right, ness of the individual. would submit sound Smith, you by everybody’s part punishment, that because retribution Dickie saying you description you unique community a individu- is our have done was you I ask you mercy, and for and going and we’re asks something wrong mercy did he Paul you.... give? what Shawn punish you comes here and asks Humphries this, you a case like when look at When gave he none. mercy, for and Shawn you aggravation, when you look and Humphries Paul comes here asks mitigation, I at the total lack look life, gave Is that you and he death. for submit, you look at when would justice? That’s what Defendant, fair? that Is and when character this justice. you. Smith, you’re up for is It’s here profane at Dickie how you look you at all the circumstances when look argument, counsel for his Defendant, how of this crime and of this penalty that Humphries argued the death gift man a life give profane for was unwarranted several reasons. these under circumstances.... First, emphasized for Humphries counsel punishment you do recommend What that no of an intent to there was co-worker, defending his a man is when (1) Humphries: pulled the kill because store, defending he’s defending he’s his trigger panicked he in reаction to after built, has he’s ducking he and be- what attempt under to reach Dickie Smith’s counter, somebody hind the and takes (2) Brashier; counter; did not kill Donna him? and executes nine millimeter Blackwell; (4) and drove off without you punishment do recommend? What killing. Coun- voluntarily confessed you punishment do recommend What was argued Humphries sel also you’ve like that? got when character significant person who had no nonviolent punishment you do recommend What engaging acts. Coun- history of violent somebody like Dickie Smith is tak- when Humphries a young sel argued us? en from history man of emo- who had extensive now, If not in If not then when? a case tional, and abuse. Fi- physical, substance this, aggravated as when that’s as then nally, Humphries argued counsel you may say, do The defense do it? respectful, pleasant trustworthy, “Well, you ag- can think of all kinds of person. You can think gravating cases.” Following the state trial court’s instruc- you can of that. You look at think deliberations, the jury’s tions case. the circumstances of this for recommended sentence of death this, if aggravating If not in a as case and, in accordance with murder conviction absolutely mitiga- in a no not case with verdict, trial jury’s the state court this, like if not in a with a tion case sentenced to death this, if in a character like not case when At the post-trial conviction.4 motions taken, somebody Dickie Smith is like objected counsel hearing, Humphries’s you going when to do it? It’s then are use of between solicitor’s easy. supposed to be It’s never during Dickie Smith easy. easy in the It won’t be been trial closing argument, the state court future. objection. overruled the Paul Humphries comes into this Shawn you mercy. appeal, On direct the South Carolina asking courtroom *9 state trial Supreme Paul in here Court affirmed the Humphries Shawn comes conviction, 4. For the other counts of Hum- tences. twenty-year phries sen- received concurrent

215 9, Id. a judgment. Humphries court’s at 57. On June certificate of appealability, 28 1997, Supreme § Court U.S.C. 2253. the United States Humphries’s petition for a denied writ 3, 2004, a May panel On divided of this Carolina, v. Humphries certiorari. South court vacated Humphries’s death sentence 2441, 1268,

520 117 L.Ed.2d U.S. 138 and remanded the case with instructions to (1997). 201 solely issue the writ for purpose Ozmint, resentencing. Humphries v. 16, 1997, September Humphries On filed (4th Cir.2004). F.3d 266 The State a filed post-conviction an application for relief timely petition rehearing sug- for with a' court, he state which later amended. Fol gestion rehearing for en bane to which evidentiary lowing hearing, the state Humphries filed response. majority A court application. habeas dismissed the judges active circuit voted rehear 18, 1999, On peti June filed a banc, en this case which resulted in the tion for writ of certiorari .the South panel opinion. vacatur of the Supreme Carolina Court. On September 27, 2001, Supreme Carolina South II granted petition Court for a writ of Our standard for collateral re and requested parties pro certiorari view a state court’s decision on the briefing. through ceed Humphries, with 2254(d) § merits under U.S.C. is well- counsel, appellate following briefed the is settled. A federal court may grant petition sue in his for certiorari: “Counsel corpus writ of habeas unless the state provide petitioner did not assis effective adjudication court’s of the claim “resulted sentencing tance at they because failed to contrary to, in a decision or in object timely argu to the solicitor’s closing of, volved application an unreasonable ment suggesting petitioner de law, clearly established Federal as deter ,was served to die life because mined Supreme the United than the Supreme less victim’s.” The 2254(d)(1). § States.” U.S.C. Court of South affirmed Carolina the state law,” “clearly phrase established Federal judgment 26, August habeas court’s on id., “refers to the holdings, opposed as State, v. 351 S.C. dicta, [Supreme] Court’s deci (2002). 160, 168 570 S.E.2d as of the of the relevant sions time state- 24, 2002, Humphries On December filed Nuth, court decision.” Booth-El v. petition for a corpus writ habeas (4th Cir.) (internal F.3d quotation the United States District Court for the omitted), denied, marks cert. U.S. District of January South Carolina. On (2002). 154 L.Ed.2d 311 29, 2003, the a motion sum- State filed Further, a state “con court’s decision is mary judgment. Humphries filed his re- law, trary clearly to” established federal sponse February 2003. On Febru- Court, determined either: 25, 2003, ary Magistrate a United (1) States “if applies the state court rule that Judge reported and recommended governing contradicts law set forth Humphries’s petition habeas cases,” be denied. [Supreme ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‍“if Court] state 19, 2003, court, On June the district after court confronts a set of are facts that record, conducting a de novo review the materially from a indistinguishable deci granted summary State’s motion Supreme] sion of Court and [the neverthe judgment and petition. dismissed the On less arrives a result different from [Su 25, 2003, July granted precedent.” the district court preme Court] Williams

216 Irvin and 362, 405-06, elderly couple, of an 120 tal murders 529 U.S. S.Ct.

Taylor, (2000). 497, 2529. Finally, Rose Bronstein. Id. at 107 S.Ct. 1495, 146 389 L.Ed.2d trial, During of sentencing phase the the application’ the ‘unreasonable “[u]nder victim-impact clause, may grant prosecutor the read a state a court federal habeas compiled probation that the the ment was writ if state court identifies the of her interviews with officer on basis governing legal principle [the correct surviving family members. the Bronsteins’ decisions but unreason- Supreme] Court’s 498-500, 107 2529. The victim- of Id. at S.Ct. ably applies principle the facts 413, included all three forms impact at 120 statement prisoner’s case.” Id. S.Ct. applica- victim-impact evidence: accounts of Notably, an “unreasonable 1495. impact of the psychological from an emotional tion of federal law different law,” family, descriptions crime on application federal be- incorrect characteristics, personal application of Bronsteins’ an incorrect federal cause instances, objectively family opinions and not, in all un- the victims’ members’ law 410, crimes and Id. at 1495. characterizations S.Ct. reasonable. 499-500, 2529. defendant. Id. at 107 S.Ct. Ill Booth, held that all three In the Court victim-impact are irrele that his trial forms of evidence Humphries contends im constitutionally to a of whether to ineffective vant determination counsel were sentence, ad object portion pose death and that their they when failed to arbitrary capricious at sentenc mission thus risks the solicitor’s at penalty. death Id. According Humphries, imposition ing. State 502-03, 107 2529. The Court noted the dictates of v. Tennes S.Ct. violated 2597, that, see, in victim-impact because evidence 501 U.S. S.Ct. (1991), facts which the defendant was L.Ed.2d 720 when solicitor cludes about murder, at time it is argued jury during to the the sen unaware effect culpability. to the defendant’s tencing phase of the trial unrelated Dickie Id. 107 S.Ct. 2529. penalty deserved the death because (the victim) admitting victim-impact worthy was a individual further noted that Smith community arbitrary results yield to the while Hum evidence would be asset that, lead victim-impact not. cause evidence would phx-ies Humphries posits their only juries impermissibly for fail base decision counsel deficient object, preju also that he was on their evaluation the relative worth ing to but victim, properly capital failure as To and because the sen diced well. claim, tencing analyze Humphries’s Payne partially depend we decision would degree to fami upon look at the which victim’s must take close concerning ly the victim be precedent victim-im members —if leaves Court’s Id. pact hind—are able to articulate their loss. evidence. Moreover, 505-06, 2529. S.Ct. A victim-impact Court stated improperly jury’s shifts the focus from Maryland, In Booth U.S. victim, and, thus, yields defendant to the (1987), 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 the Su- S.Ct. death sentences based on emotion rather Eighth preme Court held Amend- 507-08, 107 than reason. Id. prohibits allowing a state from ment Gathers, 490 U.S. sentencing jury to consider victim- South Carolina v. capital 104 L.Ed.2d 876 evidence. Booth involved bru- impact

217 - decision, (1989), Payne the Court extended Booth In the ob the Court may served that “a prosecutor’s properly comments on the State con cover that meaning clude assess personal murder victim’s characteristics. case, fully defendant’s moral 811-12,109 culpability and Id. at S.Ct. 2207. In that blameworthiness, it should have before attempt in an to more to enable sentencing at the phase evidence of the fully comprehend the human loss involved sрecific harm caused the defendant.” mentally of a the murder unstable 825, Furthermore, Id. at 111 S.Ct. man, prosecutor made vari homeless “unfairly the Court observed that Booth ous references at trial; in a weighted capital the scales while phase the sentencing about the- victim’s virtually placed no limits are on the rele character, personality including infer mitigating vant a capital evidence defen ring from possession the victim’s reli may dant concerning introduce his own gious- registration articles and voter card circumstances, the State is barred from that the victim was a man of faith who either ‘a offering glimpse the life’ which community, reading eared about his ” extinguish,’ defendant ‘chose to at id. prayer written victim that 822, 111 (quoting S.Ct. 2597 Mills v. Ma scene, the murder noting found at -and 367, 397, ryland, 1860, 486 U.S. S.Ct. problems. victim had mental Id. at C.J., (Rehnquist, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 808-10, 109 S.Ct. 2207. The Court found dissenting)), “demonstrating loss prosecutor’s that the statements were “in family society victim’s and to which distinguishable respect relevant has resulted from the defendant’s homi and, thus, in Booth" likewise Id. Consequently, cide.” the Court con Eighth violative Id. at Amendment. that, “if the permit cluded State chooses to 811, According 109 S.Ct. 2207. to the of victim-impact the admission Court, while victim-impact evidence rele prosecutorial argument sub vant to the circumstances the crime is ject, Eighth per Amendment erects no admissible, prosecutor’s statements 827, se at bar.” Id. S.Ct. 2597. Of 811-12, beyond went far those facts. Id. n note, Payne did not alter S.Ct. 2207. holding admitting Booth’s evidence of Payne, the- Court overruled both opinions of the victims’ the crime and Booth and The in- Payne Gathers. case appropriate sentence for the defendant volved a brutal attack aof mother and her Amendment; Eighth violates the rather two small children that left the mother and Payne only of the victim’s allows evidence Payne, one of her children dead. 501 U.S. in personal characteristics and the harm 812-13, 2597. At the sentenc- upon family the victim’s flicted com trial, ing phase prosecutor pre- munity. Id. at n. 111 S.Ct. 2597. testimony sented the of the children’s Court in noted that there was grandmother, who testified about the ef- victim-impact “no reason” to treat evi now-orphaned fect of the crimes on the “differently other relevant dence than evi 814-15, Id. at child. 111 S.Ct. 2597. dence,” Ad- id. at but ditionally, prosecutor that, commented ex- cautioned the event that “[i]n evi tensively on impact of the murders on unduly prej dence is introduced that is so orphaned child and said that the child udicial that it renders the trial fundamen justice unfair, will to know type “want what tally the Due Process Clause of the provides was done” when he is older.- Id. Fourteenth Amendment mecha 111 S.Ct. 2597. nism for Id. at 111 S.Ct. 2597. relief.” *12 conduct, DeChristoforo, improper not set the the Payne Court did 1868, 645, the victim-impact 416 at 94 issuance type S.Ct. parameters of what U.S. court, the instructions from a trial fundamental- of curative evidence would render 182, 2464, Darden, 477 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. Due Process ly unfair under the Clause inviting improper the noted defense conduct Amendment. AlS the Fourteenth id., weight the earlier, response, that Payne prosecutorial did observe the Court Id.; v. Boyd vic- see also the of the evidence. should handle admission courts Cir.1998) (4th French, 319, 329 just any other 147 F.3d evidence like tim-impact 827, misconduct (holding prosecutorial 111 501 that relevant evidence. U.S. requires the to look However, only inkling in court the determination 2597. S.Ct. comments, the nature the nature of the imposed on limitations on the Payne the the of the evidence before victim-impact quantum the admission of counsel, jury, opposing Wainwright, arguments the Court’s citation Darden 2464, charge, and whether the errors 168, 91 L.Ed.2d the court’s 477 106 S.Ct. U.S. (1986). 825, Based on repeated). isolated or Payne, 501 U.S. were that both Darden precedent, it is evident S.Ct. to eases in which apply and DeChristoforo Darden, In addressed Court petitioner alleges that the defendant or guilt phase prosecutorial misconduct at victim-impact evidence admission of addressing In capital of a murder trial. victim-impact on prosecutorial comment re that his trial and argument Darden’s Due rights under the evidence violated his fundamentally un sulting conviction were Fourteenth Amend- Process Clause improper prosecutor’s fair of the because ment. the Court characterized the in argument, improper comments quiry whether B unfair as make the were so conviction habeas, Darden, In its decision on state process. denial of due 477 U.S. at Supreme first held Court South Carolina Court 2464. The Darden S.Ct. only prohibited comparisons Payne that process its standard on Donnel based due members DeChristoforo, 416 between the victim other ly v. U.S. (victims) community. (1974), pros Humphries, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 another at 167-68. Because no such considering case. In 570 S.E.2d ecutorial misconduct degree victim-to-victim was made claim that his first DeChristoforo’s case, the South Carolina process conviction violated his due murder ipso pro Payne held that did not rights, the due Court stated facto closing argument. solicitor’s analysis prohibit addresses more properly cess specifically pro- Id. did not just questionable prosecutorial Because than comparisons, vietim-to defendant conduct Id. at 94 S.Ct. 1868. hibit itself. Instead, on to making Supreme Court went process a court a due South Carolina of whether the solici- challenged question con address inquiry must consider Humphries’s sen- as a tor’s rendered proceeding duct relation to fundamentally analysis tencing proceeding unfair. process whole. Id. The of a due argu- not premised prosecutorial unfair The court did view solicitor’s claim on ren- ment as let alone may depend upon imрroper, thus numerous conduct factors, proceeding Humphries’s sentencing which include the nature dered Darden, misconduct, reaching fundamentally unfair. prosecutorial conclusion, 181-82, court the extent stated: U.S. at the solicitor’s ar- To opinion, In our reverse the PCR court’s denial relief, find, first, this Court must did render fun- gument sentencing not ineffective, and, second, counsel was damentally they unfair as [sic] did counsel’s ineffectiveness resulted The solicitor’s prejudice Petitioner. prejudice. Payne does .not prohibit comments based evidence al- were character between defen- ready wife and record. Smith’s *13 victims; and it prohibits dants compari- during penalty testified the brother suggest worthy sons that are there phase regarding each of the facts about unworthy Therefore, victims. Peti- upon Smith’s life which the solicitor tioner cannot establish either the inef- presented commented. Petitioner the fectiveness or prong prejudice the prong testimony miti- of thirteen witnesses in required of the test as to overturn the gation during sentencing phase the who PCR court’s of denial relief. attested to Petitioner’s at-risk childhood Humphries, at S.E.2d 167-68. juve- subsequent criminal acts as a adult, young providing nile and all the C evidence of character dis- Petitioner’s earlier, As noted Humphries claims that by closing. cussed the solicitor his closing argument the solicitor’s at sen- the Through testimony the of Petitioner and tencing trial, the phase of taken as members, family both simi- Smith’s the whole, in jury effect asked the to impose (the poverty larities childhood and .ad- - penalty the death because Dickie Smith (the versity) the differences manner worthy was a individual and an asset the in which Petitioner and with Smith dealt Humphries community while was not. Ac- circumstances) readily appar- their were cording Humphries, comparative such jurors, ent the before the solicitor’s arguments run afoul of dictates permitted by closing argument. As Payne Due of Process of Clause Payne, the State offered evidence of and, the Fourteenth Amendment there- “uniqueness” Smith’s as an individual fore, constitutionally his trial were counsel describing ways which successful object to. failing ineffective solici- to. adversity Smith dealt with in his life. closing argument. tor’s Likewise, Petitioner introduced evidence advancing argument, In Humphries his own “uniqueness” through his the tes- posit does not one of the solici- timony (compared of thirteen witnesses comments, alone, tor’s im- standing witnesses) regarding Smith’s two his Thus, proper factually his inaccurate. own background, difficult childhood and argument on collectivity focuses a few of thereby inviting comparison between comments, the solicitor’s con- which he respective Petitioner and Smith’s charT- tends impermissible created situation acters even before the solicitor gave his which the solicitor asked for sentence of such, remarks. As we do not solely death based relative worth of believe the solicitor’s comments so were his life and the life Dickie Smith. (if all) prejudicial prejudicial they at particular, Humphries objects to year- rendered Petitioner’s death sentence by-year history chronology, wherein fundamentally under the Due compared history his life .unfair Humphries Process Clause. Dickie Smith’s life.5 takes also (1) year-by-year chronology, ing Within the so- that: "Dickie Smith is as times, (2) Humphries Humphries”; licitor referenced four tell- much as ... about this case (1) “Dickie Smith is telling that: made three statements issue with ... case as Hum- closing argu his much about this solicitor near end (2) “committed two year- phries”; Humphries which, coupled when with ment (3) 13”; age in 1986 house break-ins chronology, allegedly rendered by-year pro- constitutionally Humphries violated the terms infirm. argument solicitor’s Columbia”; (1) down to you bation and was “sent are: look statements “[WJhen prison went to you in 1988 aggravation, when look at submit, years. of the solicitor’s I two The bulk mitigation, would total lack of was not that should character you look when than Defendant, die because his life was worth less you and when look at Dickie Indeed, Smith, the solicitor did you look at all Dickie Smith’s. how when profane “worth,” “comparative not use the words this crime and the circumstances of *14 worth,” year-by-year in give or “value” his profane how to this man Defendant, (2) Rather, ”; the bulk of the solici- chronology. gift under circumstances these of life evi- argument was devoted to the you recommend tor’s punishment do “What in lack of aggravation, Humphries’s like that? dence you’ve got a character when character, mitigating evi- you the absence punishment do recommend What case, in an how explanation the and somebody like Dickie Smith is taken dence when (3) facts, along victim-impact us?’K, “If not in a case as these with the and evidence, this, of a imposition the if not in a case warranted aggravating as with this, like if in sentence. absolutely mitigation death no this, with a character like not in case if sure, be the of the solicitor’s portion To somebody when like Dickie Smith case dealing with Dickie Smith’s argument taken, going to it?” you then when are do con- unique personal characteristics ap- in pages tained less than four conclude that the South Carolina We transcript unreasonably proximately twenty-eight page apply Court did not Supreme and, closing argument solicitor’s of the solicitor’s Payne when held clos- argument sentencing phase during segment solicitor’s at whole, trial, argument, Humphries is mentioned ing taken as a did not Further, just four times. after solici- Humphries’s sentencing proceeding render First, final to Humphries the record in tor made his referеnce fundamentally unfair. by telling year-by-year chronology simply Humphries’s claim in his this case belies in to jury Humphries “went comparison that the solicitor’s lives jail years,” the solicitor followed and Dickie Smith was for two Humphries both to argument. sentences later with the reminder centerpiece of the solicitor’s two above, to at jury right It that it had “the look was not. As set forth solici- The history uniqueness in of the individual.” tor’s life contained Smith, by essentially added that “Dickie year-by-year chronology solicitor then everybody’s you was description the manner in which the solicitor was Moreover, jury argument the solicitor present unique to the individual.” chose essentially his ask- unique Dickie was a individual. concluded Smith chronology, jury a sentence of death year-by-year ing impose Within that (1) times, aggravation Humphries solicitor referenced four because: Columbia”; (4) in 1988 Hum- Humphries "committed two house break-ins down 13"; (3) age Humphries phries prison years. at violated two went to probation was terms his "sent (2) was a overwhelming; gy following relating there com- contained the was facts evidence; (3) (1) Humphries: he mitigating lack of Hum- “committed two house plete (2) (4) 13”; age break-ins 1986 he violat- phries’s poor; character was ed probation the terms and was “somebody like Dickie Smith taken.” [was] ”; “sent down to Columbia in 1988 closing argument, The solicitor’s as out- prison years. Earlier, he went two above, simply lined did not invite the however, the solicitor had mentioned to return a sentence based on the relative had, thirteen, age “commit- worth of the lives of Dickie Smith and breaking ted two and enterings” and was Rather, Humphries. the solicitor invited placed probation. pointed solicitor to consider all of the evidence in that, out because Humphries continued to reaching record its That verdict. school, be brought disobedient he was case, being the it cannot be that the said family before the court on probation South Carolina Court unreason- violation and was released with stricter ably Payne to applied the facts of this imposed. conditions The solicitor added case. that, fifteen, at age Humphries violated Second, history the solicitor’s life com- probation the terms of his “sent parison contained in the year-by-year down Columbia.” The solicitor also upon chronology based facts estab- that, sixteen, proffered age *15 during lished the aspects trial and were of truant,” “an was who “basically habitual readily apparent the trial which to were of drop[ped] out school.” The solicitor Indeed, jury. the the of circumstances that, age seventeen, further noted Hum- impact Dickie Smith’s life and the of his phries burglarized a church. The solicitor on his were family thoroughly pre- death that, age eighteen, Humphries noted objection contemporaneous sented without to went Alabama and larceny committed a Randy through testimony the and Pat he imprisoned which was convicted and Humphries’s Smith. The circumstances of years. Finally, two the solicitor noted upbringing thoroughly explored by were that, upon release, Humphries his failed to Humphries’s the counsel thirteen wit- office, to report the a warrant probation by nesses called the defense. Because the issued, within couple years was and. history comparison life solicitor’s contained prison his release from he committed the year-by-year in the was chronology based murder at all issue. Because of the facts already jury, on evidence the before it is concerning Humphries by referred to hard to take issue with the South Carolina year-by-year solicitor in chronology his Supreme that Court’s conclusion Hum- greater were facts recounted in ear- detail phries prejudiced by was not the solicitor’s argument, lier in his it is difficult to comments. Supreme conclude that the South Carolina unreasonably Court acted when it conclud-

Third, the facts concerning Humphries’s ed that not in Humphries way was by character referred to the solicitor in his prejudiced portion the solicitor’s already thoroughly were re- argument unique related character greater counted detail an earlier por- of Dickie Smith. tion of the solicitor’s closing argument. date, objection,

No -being Fourth, even to this Humphries’s attack on the three concerning portion raised earlier statements made solicitor near closing argument. solicitor’s As noted end of the solicitor’s misses the above, history life compari- the solicitor’s proper argu- mark. statements were year-by-year son set forth simply chronolo- ment because the statements asked Catoe, 353, 601 360 S.C. S.E.2d jury unique- to focus on Dickie Smith’s Hall, (2004). Unquestionably, the solicitor was In the solicitor directed ness. argue Dickie entitled to Smith of Hall’s life jury weigh the worth Moreover, equally unique. the solicitor against the lives of Hall’s victims: jury “look” at was entitled ask the values, talking I am about because ask uniqueness Dickie and to Smith’s of values. jury is a statement verdict consequences to consider and talking And I am not about dollars person unique- “when” a of Dickie Smith’s two [lives cents far as what the is “taken.”6 ness worth, it is but nevertheless girls were] Fifth, the evidence in this case concern- the lives question of values. What are sentence not close. ing appropriate they Are girls of these two worth? that, after Hum- The evidence showed man, psycho- life and Eddie Blackwell entered phries path, this killer who stabs and stabs store, convenience Dickie Max-Saver kills, rapes kidnaps. Humphries whether he want- Smith asked his trial argued Id. at 339. Hall hot, Humphries something flashed ed object counsel’s allowed “the so- failure replied that he wanted gun a stolen arbitrary, charge licitor with an money. there was While analysis,” misconceived violat- sentencing under a counter as Dickie Smith reached Id. The ing right process. to due gun, though pull out shot agreed. South Carolina head, killing him. Dickie in the Smith Payne, the Applying South Carolina Su- clearly supported aggra- This evidence that the Hall case was preme Court held case, vating in the that the murder factor distinguishable from the case: during the commission of was committed recognized Humphries we *16 robbery Humphries was armed with while more for the state to com- prejudicial weapon. mitiga- in deadly a The evidence pare the worth of the life of the defen- proffered by Humphries tion to counteract his it dant with that of victim than is to aggravation carefully in the evidence compare their lives on the evi- based meticulously attacked the solicitor. and Moreover, present dence In the presented.... a unique that Dickie Smith was case, only suggested In the solicitor not subject is not to serious debate. person short, that, than his no that Hall’s life was worth less we harbor doubt notwith- victims’, arbitrary developed he an for- standing comparison the solicitor’s a Humphries objectionable, jury so sen- mula if the Hall’s life whereby finds finds victims’, tence of death would have resulted. less than his then the jury could no other conclusion reach Sixth, the reasonableness South justified. penalty than that the death Supreme Court’s decision in this Carolina Further, in while the solicitor Hum- becomes more evident when one ex- case in phries compared Hall the histories of Hum- amines that court’s recent decision family society, though Payne We and the consequence note that a is that victim’s even put the defendant can be to death for mur- defendant did not know the victim or the another, person "unique” However, der of a more than family. victim's are inevit- these is, fact, though even the defendant in unaware comparative consequences Payne's able give uniqueness. of the victim's This does us framework; we, judges framework concern, pause some as does notion court, liberty an inferior are without that, Payne, a of death can under sentence change. severity turn on the of the harm caused to the (cita- lives, in phries’s particular family.” and his victim’s the solici- and to this Id. - omitted). jury compare quotation tor in Hall asked the tion and internal marks life with that of his the worth Hall’s victim-impact Whether the evidence coun- victims’. teracts mitigating the defendant’s question, is a asking jury make a Id. at 341. comparison between victim-impact evi- view, gave prin- In our court Hall mitigating dence and the defendant’s evi- cipled- explanation why the circum- dence; case, determining In this in distinguishable stances of Hall were sentence, appropriate jury was asked those involved our case. The Hall court personal to consider Dickie Smith’s charac- that Hall indicated involved direct “val- teristics, harm family caused his and ue” between the defendant society by Humphries’s actions, Hum- victim, asking weigh to- evidence, phries’s mitigating includ- which relative worth of the defendant and the of Humphries’s personal ed evidence char- comparison, victim. This con- court acteristics, both favorable and unfavorable. cluded, fundamentally rendered trial Hall’s circumstances, Under these was reason- contrast, By unfair. the court concluded Supreme able for the South Carolina simply solicitor to conclude solicitor’s life compared the “histories” the defendant history year- comparison contained and the victim’s “based on the lives evi- by-year chronology solicitor’s oth- thus, id., presented,” dence Hum- concerning er comments Dickie Smith’s phries’s trial was not fundamentally unfair. uniqueness within the were boundaries of essence, the court in Hall evaluated the question required to consid- role that the played solicitor’s n of Humphries. er—the blameworthiness both reasonably Hall and concluded one was constitutionally proper D and the other was not. paying lip While service to the correct Finally, the reasonableness of the South review, standard of which we all seem to Carolina Court’s decision agree presents Humphries with ex- by examining case is illustrated words overcome, tremely difficult hurdle to Payne case itself. tells us *17 in simply apply dissent this case does not have a in legitimate states interest did, it. For if it assuredly it most would introducing evidence a personal of victim’s analysis reach a different result. An characteristics and evidence the harm point pellucid. the dissent makes this caused family society to the victim’s begins by characterizing the defendant’s actions to counteract The dissent

the mitigating presented by evidence which argument solicitor’s as one in defendant. at a U.S. S.Ct. the solicitor asked for death sentence Payne quite explicit 2597. The was Court because Dickie Smith’s life was worth it regard Humphries’s in this when stated that more than life. The dissent legitimate “State has a interest in counter- tells us how the solicitor’s “climactical flourish,” acting mitigating “baldly evidence post compared which the in, put defendant is general entitled to remind- worth of the victim’s existence ing just the sentencer that urged the murder- with that of the defendant and individual, er jury should be as an to a impose penalty,” post considered death too victim so is an individual whose Dickie life worth because Smith’s death represents unique society Humphries’s loss to more than life. In character- holds that comparative this all argument light, specifically in

izing the solicitor’s ignores the fact improperly are unconstitutional. arguments the dissent worth Supreme interpretation the South Carolina Court The fallacies the dissent’s argument determined that the solicitor’s Payne are obvious. not involve a relative did all Court did not hold that Payne of Dickie Smith and worth of the lives arguments are uncon- comparative worth duty § our Humphries. Under most, Payne At Court dis- stitutional. first if the not to determine instance comparisons the vic- approved of between a relative argument solicitor’s involved society. and other victims of 501 U.S. tim to comparison, but rather decide worth Indeed, 2597. the Court’s Supreme South Carolina whether only comparative reference to relevant was unreasonable when deter- Court following: arguments argument mined that the solicitor’s did Payne echoes the concern voiced comparison. such a The dissent involve case that the admission of victim Booth’s carry duty. fails utterly to out jury to find impact permits evidence turning Payne, Before its attention as- that defendants whose victims were inability us for our the dissent criticizes are more de- community sets their “to to no that even point other serving punishment than whose those egregiousness pros- of this approaches perceived are to be less wor- victims no ecutor’s comments and other case however, matter, ... thy. general As has

which a court tolerated such miscon- impact is not victim offered serving up at 236. duct.” Post judgments encourage comparative critique, proceeds the dissent to discuss instance, that the killer of this kind —for several state cases which have addressed hardworking, parent deserves devoted Obviously, Payne. our review under penalty, the death but that the murderer rely § us find or require 2254 does not not. reprobate does upheld has a similar ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‍a state ease which Rather, our prosecutorial argument. stan- added). Thus, (emphasis Payne Id. simply dard of asks us to determine review careful to note that victim-im- Court Supreme South Carolina whether encourage evidence is not offered to pact unreasonably clearly applied Court estab- judgments involving comparative the vic- prec- lished United States society. More tim other victims edent.7 did not dis- importantly, Payne Court

Next, the de- approve turns between the dissent its attention dissent, this, it According to the and the victim.8 In view of Payne. fendant accept “simply if we have dis reminded the that in addition Even dissent’s life, considering should *18 defendant’s precedent than torted invitation cite other victim"; (2) the also consider life of the and clearly precedent, Supreme established Court proper "was extensiоn of the natural egregious more than the this cases one before argument concerning vic- prosecutor’s earlier example, do For State court exist. v. Ha- Thus, impact Id. the tim evidence.” Haselden selden, prosecutor the told that "[i]f the upheld argument prosecutor's the even court you walk this let this murderer out of court case, though, prosecutor ex- unlike this the you saying with life are his room his then unmistakably implored jury to plicitly and the victim’s] more than life.” [the life is worth weigh comparative the worth of the defendant 594, denied, 1, 610, N.C. 577 S.E.2d cert. his victim. 540 U.S. 157 L.Ed.2d 382 (2003). argu upheld court The Haselden the 8. In view of framework established Payne, Payne Payne argument: Court's decision to refrain ment under because the the that, Supreme that the South olina is inconceivable conclude Court conclude ap- unreasonably Carolina Court counteract Supreme Humphries’s mitigating evi- dence, the Payne. solicitor was allowed to intro- plied concerning duce evidence Dickie Smith’s also that a search of The dissent tells us uniqueness and the actions Payne opinion any indication the “for during chose to take the course of life. comparative the Court meant condone” vain.” Post “in arguments worth would be done, When all is said and the issue However, § at 242. our task under 2254 is this court unmistakably before is narrow. Payne not to determine whether condones is not issue whether we think all some, all, argu- comparative or even worth arguments comparative are uncon rather, ments; our is to determine task or only involving stitutional those victim- whether South Supreme Carolina comparisons. to-victim Nor we are called Court when it was unreasonable deter- upon to if determine there are shortcom Payne prohibit mined that did not victim- ings in the Payne Finally, framework.9 comparisons to-defendant and whether the § our application whether faithful court when it was unreasonable deter- path leads us toward “totalitari that the mined solicitor’s anism],” post is, obviously as a did Humphries’s not render trial funda- politically philosophical proposition, beside mentally unfair. We, court, point. simply as an inferior Payne Moreover, recognized liberty ignore Court are not at our solemn comparisons that some would be made constitutional responsibility faithfully be- tween 501 apply by converting applicable the defendant and victim. the law Indeed, § U.S. at S.Ct. deferential 2254 standard of review to Payne standard, the de novo dissent, Court noted that the “State has a as the legitimate counteracting legal alchemy, necessarily interest through does mitigating evidence which the defendant is throughout opinion. simply, its Put be in, by put reminding entitled to the sen- cause the South Supreme Carolina Court just tencer legal the murderer should be idеntified the correct standard from individual, Payne, Supreme considered as so too decision in Court’s we victim an individual death repre- is whose must decide whether the South Carolina society unique par- Supreme unreasonably sents loss to applied (citation Taylor, Id. family.” ticular to this decision. Williams omitted). case, quotation internal marks 1495. In Obvi- U.S. ously, it was reasonable for the South Carolina Car- South Court thor- another, commenting person "unique” on victim-to-defendant of a more than even easily was, fact, A victim- understood. though the defendant unaware of comparison pernicious to-victim is more than uniqueness victim's the time of the because, a victim-to-defendant Also, Payne, crime. under a sentence of only commentary not does invite a on col- severity death can turn on the harm properly lateral before the society, family to the caused victim’s even (the (victims) ' worthiness other members though the did defendant not know victim society), it does not counteract defen- agree family. or victim’s Whether we evidence, mitigating dant's which was one disagree consequences simply with these goals Payne. main *19 point. consequences beside the These are framework; Payne inevitable under the Arguably, Payne shortcomings. has few we, judges that as example, consequence Payne framework of an inferior For is that court, put liberty change. defendant can be to for the are without to death murder notice of pre-trial counsel did not receive why it concluded that the explained

oughly victim-impact Humphries’s the intended use of evidence life comparison solicitor’s and, trial given, had such notice been did not render to that of Dickie Smith’s tac- would have used different trial fundamentally unfair. counsel trial Humphries’s tics, things, including, among other select- Payne our know from review We jurors differently reconfiguring authority ing Supreme Court other relevant expert testimony. Humphries the defendant witness’s comparisons between comply capital suggests that the failure victim are State’s inevitable 16-3-20(B) due §with violated his federal is asked to assess in which case process rights. force of the persuasive defendant’s victim-impact mitigating evidence and reasons, For Hum several such comparisons, evidence. Some 16-3-20(B) § is mis phries’s reliance on religion, unques- on race or those based First, Humphries raising an placed. is Zant v. tionably are unconstitutional. See law, cognizable which not issue of state is 865, 103 S.Ct. Stephens, 462 U.S. on federal habeas review. Lewis Cf. (noting 77 L.Ed.2d 235 Jeffers, 497 U.S. “total- religion race are defendant’s and/or (1990) (“[Federal habeas 111 L.Ed.2d 606 ly process). the sentencing irrelevant” to corpus not lie errors of state relief does not. The South Other are law.”). Second, the statute at issue does required Court was Supreme Carolina not that notice of the use of victim- require if the solicitor’s decide impact given. South Carolina evidence be Humphries’s history life to Dickie Smith’s 16-3-20(B) provides § that at the Code history of the dictates of life was violative sentencing phase “[o]nly of the trial such thor- reviewing that court’s Payne. After has aggravation evidence in as the State opinion, simply we cannot conclude ough writing informed the before defendant Supreme the South Carolina Court the trial Ann. admissible.” S.C.Code applied decision. unreasonably 16-3-20(B). § Su The South Carolina preme appeal on direct noted that Court IV lists factors aggravating statute certain Humphries also claims that the State’s Humphries, 479 requiring notice. S.E.2d him notify prior failure to trial at 55. victim-impact Because use evi- victim-impact State’s intended factor, aggravating as an listed sentencing phase of the during dence required give State is not notice. Id. fair under right violated his to a trial trial require pre if Finally, even the statute did Due Process Clause of Fourteenth notice, trial pre-trial received appeal, Amendment. On direct South written notice that State intended rejected this Carolina includ introduce certain facts in evidence claim. ing surrounding all the com circumstances lists, of the In its posits first that his trial mission crimes. witness victim-impact wit reasonably believed that South State listed counsel 16-3-20(B) and, moreover, § entitled the nesses the State asserted Carolina Code it had defense that pre-trial written notice informed the defense receive victim-impact evidence dur aggravating present factors that would be would trial, ing sentencing phase of the trial. at the sentencing phase used certainly pre-trial evi- could implicitly victim-impact included While notice which concerning the explicit his trial have been more According Humphries, dence. *20 actual facts and the legal victim-impact ing evi- standards planned introduction I concur in the the record. dence, they appear was not unquestionably, the State 16-3-20(B) by the court and in its judgment § under to detail the reached obligated opinion. victim-impact greater speci- evidence with

ficity. pre- not Although the need should have itself, say that this is it to argument, Humphries a related sented suffice hall- rights remotely case about “the process that his due were not a even claims governments,” post because death “was marks totalitarian violated sentence J., (Wilkinson, dissenting). It not imposed, part, at least on the basis does regimes of opportunity terrifying information which he had no “the most concern Gardner, explain.” ap- or deny Century” anything the Twentieth or U.S. 362, 97 S.Ct. is not case According Hum Id. And it proaching such. he did phries, not most adequate аlongside that bears “the receive notice mention concerning the expendability.” examples introduction of victim-im of human terrible and, pact therefore, suggest could not ad Even to Id. these equately prepare his defense in advance. trivializes the historical vic- events This claim founders the simple reason of those events which the dissent tims that Humphries knew reasonably invokes reference. should have known that victim-impact evi This case not us to foot does invite “set dence during would be used State on a road recognize Americans will not sentencing phase of the trial. There our tolerate,” will Constitution id. fore, ample opportunity he had to investi by denying Humphries’ And petition on gate Indeed, and rebut that evidence. grounds majority correctly no clearly requires there law that time is not does sense whatsoever ly, specific, express notice of victim- “sanction executions on basis of ex- evidence,

impact and Humphries point can weighings tended relative human to no relevant federal authority to substan worth,” id. at or to egre- “condonfe] Thus, tiate his claim. the South Carolina gious human worth comparisons,” id. at reasonably interpreted 239, of the sort,” most “horrific id. at 238. federal law to find admission hyperbole Such only betrays the fact that victim-impact evidence did not violate (as the dissent has chosen panel, did the Humphries’s right to a fair trial under the well) mistakenly as to address itself to a Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth question of law to a set of facts Amendment. are not even arguably before the court.

V To case, decide this dowe not need to plumb the “anciently princi- established hérein, stated judg- For the reasons ples” law, of federal see id. nor court ment of the district is affirmed. must we “ascend to- register” of “sen- AFFIRMED tencing philosophy” and its “seminal con- LUTTIG, concurring: Judge, Circuit cepts” at “a high level of generality,” see ignores full en court banc the dis- id. at 243-44. And neither aré we invited question of both the sent’s caricatures or required to conduct a far-reaching “sur- facts giving and the presented law rise to vey! of] sentencing American practice” and properly decides the question, sentencing procedure,” “historic id. at govern- issue before us on basis Tellingly, 248: not even the dissent under- *21 First, analysis object. concedes, takes actual anything of the as the dissent requires sort. Strickland state court and court great to treat with deference us, instead, a have before rather We trial real-time counsel’s decisions with re- law, of straightforward question one as to Second, spect objections at trial. as the review, our of as a court of scope which 2254(d) concedes, section re- dissent also law, narrowly clearly is cirсumscribed quires us to defer to the state court’s binding by congressional enactment Thus, the application great of Strickland. precedent. Contrary to Supreme Court deference owed to trial counsel’s contem- characterization, we not dissent’s do poraneous trial implicating decisions strat- us, have as we would on direct even before review, egy on collateral compounded is appeal explicit a case in which an of to the state court’s where we are to defer made, human worth were of these highly review deci- deferential question whether it would violate the of AEDPA, Furthermore, under we sions. to resort government Constitution for judgment uphold the of the are bound to appealing comparisons to such for unless it was state court unreasonable convicted crime. higher sentence one of of of both Strickland and application its less, nothing nothing us but more Before is just not one the other. And Payne, either, an ineffective assistance of than this, top of chief upon all case which under Strickland Wash- counsel claim relies, namely Payne, the dissent does not on collateral review of a raised ington, presented address the even issue in this judgment fully that considered state court namely victim-to-defendant value such, precise question claim. As that case— making utterly im- it we are with which confronted law —thus plausible suggest that the South Car- whether, meaning of 28 within U.S.C. olina court’s case consti- treatment contrary § to or an unreason- application tuted unreasonable application clearly established able hold- holding Payne. clearly established of the United ings of the state court States for the South Carolina reviewing with substan- short, are we counsel at Humphries’ conclude that application the state court’s deference tial constitutionally inef- sentencing were clearly holdings two of the established failing to ob- fective Strickland under if, cases, Payne. Strickland and Even ject of the state solicitor’s portion to the deference, such we to conclude under were Payne v. allegedly violated argument that its court erred in under- state Tennessee, 808, 111 501 U.S. application holding standing of the and/or (1991). L.Ed.2d 720 grant Humphries’ order to Payne, pains avoid even The dissent would still have to petition we conclude articulation of this narrow as the much that, deference, under the same the state precise articula- its question because legal in its application court erred of Strick- only the focus not into stark tion draws requires which itself land— the state court question pre- exaggeration dissent’s Therefore, to trial counsel. to defer we indefensibility sented, but, ultimately, four, following separate, face plainly legal standards under of the dissent valid, grounds alternative compelling affir- of this case. disposition govern of the mance denial of Humphries’ peti- (1) it was tion: not contrary to or an of this particular posture Because application unreasonable case, required to accord extraordi- arewe South Carolina to hold that Payne erects to trial counsel’s nary deference failure against urges no four per se bar victim-to-defendant brief references *22 Payne Humphries during the value because solicitor’s narrative comparisons, does (2) all; objection- issue at of Dickie life not that even if Smith’s created an address Payne comparisons, person-to-person such able value did address it in Payne. post-conviction violation of On was not an re- application unreasonable view, the South Carolina Payne for South Carolina to conclude that held, alia, that no inter such human-worth comparison occurred victim-to-defendant (3) case; comparisons value were clearly this even if not such an uncon- were “Payne application stitutional because not Payne, unreasonable it does indi- cate would not concern about application be unreasonable be- tween the for victim and Strickland South Carolina the defendant.” to.con- State, Humphries 362, object clude 351 that counsel’s failure to S.C. 570 did (2002) II”). not S.E.2d 167 objectively (“Humphries constitute unreasonable (4) performance; Our task in habeas proceeding even if this is to failure to object determine were whether this application ruling an unreasonable state-court Strickland, to,'or was “contrary it was nevertheless not an un- involved an unreason- (rather able application holding of’ the application reasonable of Strickland for dicta) South than the of Payne. Carolina to that conclude Hum- U.S.C. § phries prejudiced 2254(d)(1); Taylor, was not Williams v. counsel’s fail- U.S. 362, 412, ure object. Each grounds of these four S.Ct. 146 L.Ed.2d 389 is that individually compelling (holding each the phrase “clearly is indi- vidually established federal law compel sufficient to section affirmance in 2254(d)(1) Because, holdings, refers ‘the consequence op- case. as a of its dicta,- posed to exaggeration, Supreme] of [the dissent fails effective- ly any of Court’s decisions as of grounds, address these four the time ”). them, much relevant less all state-court decision’ its errors are com- pounded multiple layers across re- .the not, Plainly Payne* it was' because never quired legal analysis. once even mentions victim-to-defendant comparisons. value claim Humphries’ thus

A. falters at first very step. its our strict On concedes, As Humphries pre- order to ly Humphries’ circumscribed- review of vail on conviction, his Strickland claim premised on state-court elementary ob object, counsel’s failure to he must first servation is dispose sufficient to of the what, establish because, that trial petition, matter, occurred at with- as a threshold objection out improper, illegal, was required or un- to show state . Appellant’s constitutional. See Br. at 12- challenged portion court that of the 13.- Humphries argues and the dissent was unconstitutional.* *Payne explicitly (though comparisons, given does state value in hold- solici- not ing) that "[i]n event that victim-impact evidence intro- tor’s use of in this unduly duced so prejudicial apparently unobjectiona- that it case was otherwise unfair, ble, fundamentally renders the trial clearly contrary an unrea- Due Process Clause of the application Fourteenth Amend- sonable of Darden for South Car- provides ment Humphries’ mechanism .relief.” olina to conclude that trial was Payne, (citing 501 U.S. at fundamentally 111 S.Ct. 2597 not rendered unfair 168, 179-83, Wainwright, Darden v. challenged portion 477 U.S. brief ar- solicitor's. (1986)). gument. II, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 Giv- See 570 S.E.2d Payne Thus, en per against erects no se bar 167-68. reasons discussed thor-

Nevertheless, reprobate designed the dissent raises three does not. It is arguments Payne show instead each victim’s flatly uniqueness untenable being.... human clearly established “the ban as an individual somehow comparisons” holding— such as its without 501 U.S. Payne, mentioning comparisons. even such Post (citation quota original) (emphasis that, First, argues dissent omitted). matter, an initial tion marks As condone explicitly because does not of this the dissent’s treatment text *23 thereby con- it comparisons, human-worth way disingenuous, is in a that exact Payne (“Notably post at demns them. See ly panel mirrors error of the vacated the any is from the Court’s discussion absent post at 242 with Hum opinion. Compare imprimatur hint for human com- of (4th Ozmint, phries v. 366 F.3d Indeed, one parisons .... searches Cir.2004). In the dissent particular, both any Payne opinion in vain for indication panel opinion introduce the “con that the Court meant to condone such compari about victim-to-victim value cern” But, course, of comparative judgments.”). concern, if sons as it were the Court’s holding we not ascertain the under law do by litigant. a instead of concern raised by is inquiring of a ease into what absent Then, quote to sentence proceed both Rather, the from the Court’s discussion. general matter” beginning out “[a]s of a case is found in what actual- holding context, omitting key word “however” ly discussion. The present the Court's the concern that denotes contrast between “negative approach inference” dissent’s litigant and the Court’s sub raised re- precedent Court would find thereby twisting the sequent remark — every error in trial versible imply the Court language Court’s slightest novelty as-yet unaddressed exрlicit disapproval of expressing turning AEDPA its Court— this comparisons passage. such value head. post (arguing the Court See Second, the fol- dissent references the incredulity” about victim-to-vic “professes lowing passage as its sole evidence from passage, comparisons tim value this Payne Payne “eon- text disapproval “signals that it thus clear for comparisons: human-worth interpersonal comparison demn[ed]” kind of here”). course, plain Of as is Payne the concern voiced occurred echoes Booth’s, above, fully pas the text quoted case that the admission victim from says something different than permits sage quite to find impact evidence sug would quotation whose as- the dissent’s tortured that defendants victims were sim community gest. key passage, to their are more de- this Court sets (1) litigant Payne that the had serving punishment ply than those whose noted worthy. comparisons, about value are less raised concern perceived victims be matter, however, normatively made a neutral victim and then general As a that, in con is not contrast this impact evidence offered encour- observation cern, gener comparative judgments impact this victim age instance, ally purposes. for such There kind—for that the killer of admitted fore, key passage only this hardworking, parent passage devoted deserves —the can Payne upon which the dissent penalty, death but that murderer from oughly by majority, Darden likewise fails relief. any provide with avenue of possibly rely clearly erroneously not “condemn” or oth- established federal law —does disapproval human- express Rather, erwise incorrectly. or that application and, all; value needless unreasonable.”); must also be see also Court, say, did through neither Nuth, Booth-El v. 288 F.3d 575-76 incredulity” at passage, “profess such com- (4th Cir.2002) C.J.) (“The (Wilkinson, Instead, simply parisons. makes that, has stressed in section general pur- neutral that the observation 2254(d)(1), Congress specifically used the pose victim-impact evidence is not to ‘unreasonable,’ word term not a like comparisons. create ” victim-to-victim (alteration ‘erroneous’ ‘incorrect.’ Moreover, even if passage omitted)). quotation Patently, marks un- Payne express disapproval did of value der in light this standard and of this evi- comparisons, it would in- nevertheless be dence, it was not unreasonable for South adequate purposes dissent’s Carolina to conclude that erected First, three further reasons. as the South *24 se per no bar to victim-to-defendant value held, Carolina passage court addresses comparisons. only comparisons, victim-to-victim value not comparisons, value Finally, in a virtual that victim-to-defendant concession and therеfore does not establish a bar Payne of language provides no basis its (or against upon) otherwise comment argument, grasps lofty the dissent at ab- II, Humphries latter. See S.E.2d in attempt an to salvage posi- stractions its (“According passage, the com- tion. Turning from its self-described “tex- parison Payne prohibited by is one be- Payne, actually tual dissection” of which tween the and other victim members virtually includes no reference to the text society; Payne any does not indicate con- Payne, appeals the dissent “an over- comparisons cern about between the victim Payne philoso- view of its sentencing defendant.”). Second, and the because phy,” admittedly “ascending regis- to th[e] apparently allegation there no in “a high generality.” ter” of level of Post Payne that victim-to-victim value com- at 243. That the dissent must reference parison made, been passage had concepts such ethereal as the “overview” dicta, clearly holding, in not in thus Payne and “sentencing philosophy” of Williams, irrelevant under AEDPA. See support its argument effectively demon- 1495; 529 U.S. at United strates, only Payne not clearly that did not 03-4867, Washington, Slip States v. No. in holding against establish rule human- (4th Cir.2005) (“[T]he op. at holding ... also, comparisons, worth but and even materially limited to sets facts that are certainly, more that it was not unreason- indistinguishable from facts before 2254(d)(1) able under section for South court in (emphasis original)). that case.” Carolina so conclude. Third, this, re- addition to all we are viewing the South Carolina court’s inter- South even ar- Because Carolina was not pretation passage of this under the defer- determining guably unreasonable ential application” “unreasonable standard Payne per did not establish a se rule 2254(d)(1). of section See Williams against compari- victim-to-defendant value Taylor, 411, 529 U.S. at S.Ct. 1495 sons, Humphries’ claim fails on Strickland (“[A] may federal habeas court not issue ground alone. simply the writ because court con- Humphries’ But claim fails on three oth- independent judgment cludes its state-court decision applied compelling grounds relevant er as well. inadvertent, they not Humphries B. were created, deliberately human- must have established, clearly had if Even contrary, comparison. On the rule victim-to- per against se holding, of the solici- apparent purpose effect (which it value defendant to def- Humphries tor’s references to not), Carolina’s determi- plainly South did Humphries’ exculpatory late the version compari- human-worth no such nation that history presented by defense— life an “un- here would not be son occurred prosecution’s which was the main task Payne. See application” reasonable sentencing hearing, a task en- openly (“We II, S.E.2d at by Payne. dorsed finding that PCR court’s agree with argument suggest does the solicitor’s far, sentencing hear- By the bulk is worth more than the life that Smith’s ing and bulk the solicitor’s original)). (emphasis in life.” Petitioner’s de- were concerned with the argument challenged portion attempt present exculpatory of the solicitor’s fense’s primarily story Humphries’ culpability consists follow- for the about sentences, interspersed in the ing portraying hardships three murder of Dickie Smith’s life life. The at- Humphries’ past solicitor’s summation defense year history: Humphries’ “That’s same Shawn moral tempted show guilt Paul committed two house murder was attenuated due age 13.... That’s *25 past: poverty, pa- break-ins same the misfortunes of his Humphries up abuse, alcohol, his year drugs juve- Paul is for Shawn rental and and end, violation and sent down To probation punishment. second nile crimes and year to Columbia.... That’s the same presented the defense thirteen witnesses jail Paul went to for Humphries mitigation Shawn to the two vic- compared —as years.” J.A. 107. The solicitor thus tim-impact prosecution two that the witnesses juxtaposed positive happy argument, events the so- offered. his his marriage, victim’s life—his decision of issue Hum- licitor’s discussion business, homebuilding to phries’ start a and the culpability spans pages twelve full birth of his with daughter— contempora- transcript compared to —as Humphries’ neous misdeeds in life. J.A. pages three and a half devoted to the of Dickie life. Compare narrative Smith’s J.A. 92-104 with J.A. 105-08. The domi- only The dissent that the possi- contends argument nant theme of the was solicitor’s purpose juxtaposi- ble and effect of such a that, despite hardships he faced in his convey tion was conclusion that youth, Humphries childhood and bore still Humphries’ than life was worth less Dickie responsibility moral The for his choices. (“The post life. See at 237-38 Smith’s following excerpt summarizes his twelve- solicitor’s no simply leave page Humphries’ personal discussion inadvertence, explanations room or for culpability: of an unintentional verbalization an er- Rather, thought.... rant train of A lot of people come from broken prosecution side-by- A come sought point-by-point, people homes. lot from sin- side, year-by-year parent Dickie came gle demonstrate homes. Smith very parent Ashley that at a single instant one life home. use, put being single parent was to worthwhile the other from a home. Smith now not.”). single was But everybody of course does not If who came from a that, follow a parent family because the references home or blended violence, every breaking person home if went into houses judgment with is a murdered, freighted comparative out and couldn’t fill this we with moral im- port.”). people. Humphries box Because with could have choices, made better including choice question [Humphries’] daddy There’s no Smith, not to kill Dickie he should be held question was no vio- violent. There’s actions, morally despite accountable lence is a learned behavior.... attempt argue the defense’s problem And that’s America. Humphries’ exculpated difficulties of life it, question vio- There’s no about but murder Dickie lence as a learned behavior does not Smith. Such tenor of solici- to explaining happened come close what argument, tor’s import clearest it. just here. It doesn’t do the contrasting references to events in ... Violence as a behavior learned does Humphries’ Dickie Smith’s lives. To explain larceny. not Violence say that Dickie Smith are explain learned evil behavior does morally both responsible for their choices killing. Simply malice do it. doesn’t say is not life “worth Smith’s ... the mitigation they’re That’s than Humphries more” or that Smith was you. throwing at That’s crux of person” Humphries. “more valuable than defense. Clearly, the solicitor’s about Why is it the crux of the defense? Be- Humphries’ moral accountability, and his you’ve got aggravated, cause sense- victim-impact use of highlight evidence to less No killing. question about it. And it, unobjectionable Payne. were under you’ve got kid who’s been trouble Court openly countenanced the since he was horrible record. juxtaposition of victim-impact evidence only thing try So the left is to mitigation with the defense’s evidence use, marijuana take this alcohol use and purpose deflating exculpato- for the and poverty background and sort of *26 ry story at presented sentencing by life bootstrap yourself into of up some sort many capital defendants: I mitigation. mental would And submit legitimate state has a interest [T]he horribly. you to that it fails counteracting mitigating 100-01, 103. to J.A. Like the reference in, to put which the defendant is entitled passage, Dickie Smith above by reminding just the sentencer that challenged Humphries to in the references the murderer be an should considered as solicitor’s brief narrative of Dickie Smith’s individual, so the victim too is an individ- life the main underlined theme the solic- represents unique ual whose death loss argument, namely itor’s whole that Hum- society particular family. to and in to his bear moral phries responsibility should references, by Payne, the choices he made. Both U.S. S.Ct. 2597 (alteration men, contrasting suggest original) (quotation the two marks omitted). Here, could have made other choices and citation the solicitor Smith, victim-impact that he did not make. Like Dickie used evidence to “counteract by mitigating presented could have chosen to build the evidence” faced; adversity by spite suggesting houses he defendant that the unfortu- instead, of Humphries’ he chose to break into houses. nate circumstances back- (“That Compare post ground Dickie Smith did not him of moral re- absolve Thus, happened be building sponsibility houses while for his crimes. Humphries happened reading Paul be natural ar- Shawn most solicitor’s (“Defense unreasonable) coun- portion objectively did not challenged gument, comparison preserve a tactical a human-worth sel made decision constitute selected.”); Rather, contrast already it was statement that had been all. accountability Inst., moral Roxbury defendant’s 194 F.3d Spicer v. Corr. Therefore, it un- (4th Cir.1999) was not an joined his actions. (opinion Payne application C.J.) (counsel’s for South reasonable Wilkinson, object failure to that, Payne even if Carolina to determine testimony eyewitness at trial of an compari- value did bar victim-to-defendant objectively not unreasonable because sons, no value occurred in such may preferred counsel have cross-exami- this case. witness); to exclusion of the Arnold nation (fail- (4th Cir.1997) Evatt, v. 113 F.3d 1352

C. object at trial to evidence discredit- ure Third, if even South Carolina had erred ing testimony reasonably a witness’ could Payne, or application in its treatment part strategy). have been trial unrea- could not hold that would be we case, clearly even if estab- sonable for South Carolina to determine against rule lished a victim-to-defendant object failure to never- that trial counsel’s if human-worth and even constitutionally accept- theless constituted clearly compari- had made such a solicitor under Strickland. performance able As son, it not unreason- would constitute an above, compounded here owe noted we for South application able Strickland to trial counsel’s decision: we deference that Humphries’ Carolina to conclude highly defer the South Carolina court’s constitutionally counsel ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‍ineffec- were per- trial deferential review of counsel’s all, failing object. tive for After And deference that trial formance. objectionable allegedly portion of the solic- under counsel must be afforded Strickland objec- An quite itor’s brief. extensive, appel- appropriately because might tively adequate attorney defense poorly late courts are suited to second- easily judged have that he would lose face strategy on-the-fly trial deci- guess jury by objection an posing with the sions trial counsel. See Strickland emotionally point charged caviled at 668, 689, Washington, 466 U.S. argument, might and that this harm (1984) (“[A] 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d court outweigh any benefit to his client from indulge strong presumption must having a few sentences stricken counsel’s conduct falls within the wide *27 Indeed, given that record. there no range professional assis- reasonable clеarly rely, law on which to established tance; is, the over- that defendant must may reasonably trial counsel have feared that, cir- presumption come the under the the jury very probably that would view his cumstances, challenged might action unjustified objection strategy.”). considered sound trial In- be unsuccessful point pettifogging that as mere dis- deed, it failure is well established that —and Also, credibility accordingly. counted his objectionable ma- object to inadmissible or brief, given the indirect nature of the al- tactical can terial for reasons constitute reason- leged comparison, objectively an objectively strategy trial under reasonable See, attorney might that Nuth, able even have feared Booth-El v. e.g., Strickland. (4th Cir.2002) (Wilkin- objection actually ju- his draw the would 288 F.3d (counsel’s son, C.J.) compari- into a human-worth object rors’ minds failure to son, fleeting than ref- objectionable panel may have rather the solicitor’s all, Humphries. After absent favorable other reasons was not erences to been might argument. well objection, have missed itor’s See ante at 220-22. challenge bases alleged significance primarily these references twenty-eight as on three sentences in a supposed comparison, page as a human-worth argument. court ma- All three referred did the South Carolina and the circuit, fleetingly to that he all whom had dis- jority judges this extensively only cussed a few that an hu- minutes be- unwilling explicit are to hold concludes, As the majority fore. there man-worth occurred in this was no reasonable Likewise, probability that the attorney so- a reasonable case. licitor’s use of those few sentences at that judged objection have that an might changed point the outcome of the proceed- point might highlighted solic- have (“[W]e ings. ante See at 222 no harbor debunking exculpato- effective itor’s that, notwithstanding doubt the solicitor’s pre- life ry Humphries’ history version comparison that Humphries objec- finds so by sented the defense. tionable, a sentence of death would have sum, given the deference owed to resulted.”). Far less did it constitute an real-time, significant tactically decisions application of unreasonable Strickland for counsel, objections about made trial South thus to Carolina conclude. unlikely could trial is that we hold that The denial of Humphries’ Strickland object objectively counsel’s failure to claim, thus, independently supported by unreasonable under Strickland —even if distinct, individually four compelling, were claim considering we Strickland grounds sufficient for affirmance. It is for even Payne the first instance and had if that I judgment reason concur clearly rule against established a human- opinion of the court. comparisons. fact Considering WILKINSON, Judge, dissеnting: Circuit explicit counsel grounds had no objection Payne under because person No should be executed Amer- comparisons, does address such theory ica on the life that his is of less the fact that the deference we trial owe worth than that of else. This someone compounded counsel is the deference only clearly is not principle established in judgment owe we South Carolina’s under law; anciently it is so. federal Neither AEDPA, Humphries’ pe- it is evident attorney, defense nor court judge, a state tition must be denied on the first prong federal counterpart nor his should need Strickland. any prompting object to a death sen- premised principle

tence that on a D. human comparative worth. Because the majority’s opinion respect fails to the ban Fourth, ap- it was not unreasonable comparisons, process such plication of Strickland for South Carolina them, strays perilously endorsing close to that Humphries prej- to hold did not suffer I respectfully dissent. challenged portion udice *28 II, argument. solicitor’s See should There be no doubt that this case (“In opinion, 570 S.E.2d at 168 our the a presents pros- violation of this sort. The argument solicitor’s ... made no did ecutor bones about what he did. Petitioner.”). prejudice challenged baldly compared general The He the worth of references were brief referred to evi- the victim’s existence that of the with de- a urged jury impose dence had been admitted into the fendant and the record, the jury, penalty submitted to and exten- death on that This sort of basis. sively solic- upon argument prelude commented earlier the should not serve as a Humphries’ sentencing, a at of much the time less punishment, sort of I af clearly would therefore forbidden. capital sentence. ' conviction, -but I would Humphries’ firm Tennessee, U.S. purposes the for resentenc- issue writ (1991), the 115 L.Ed.2d I ing. regret exception I take such many good the Supremé made clear my colleagues distinguished the views impact victim evi- uses of legitimate issue, concurring on this and able brother doubt, impact a victim dence. Without Ibut do.* in our important an role

evidence serves It a mul- justice system. affords criminal the impressing for on

titude of avenues I. jury anguish of the loss peculiar the majority’s The defense of the state solic- Indeed, evi- impact victim violent crime. begins the closing argument itor’s with the important more may dence become transgression that claim that it contains no It is severity of offense increases. My our censure. col- would warrant capital sentencing in a certainly warranted leagues argument “simply claim that this family proceeding, where the loss did not invite the to return sentence profound friends most and where is on the relative worth of the lives based prosecution of murder has robbed the Op. Humphries.” Maj. Dickie Smith and critical witness. proposition, support To this perver- But here happened what majority attempts submerge prose- Payne. proper sion of all that is under improper weighing cutor’s of human worth those system in our reflects Punishment argument at the end of his the sea is things for which an individual defendant already legitimate evidence before responsible, not of the relative val- notions jury. But close examination the solici- prose- ue of human lives. The respective betrays final to the presentation tor’s principle cutor took leave of the bedrock futility apology. punishment on circum- rests began closing argu- his solicitor crime, consequences stances of sentencing phase by ments at the sketch- victims, criminal its and the defendant’s would ing contours the evidence he history. sen- capital Rather than seek He discuss. announced: wholly de- tence these traditional and bases, into strayed the prosecutor fensible things deciding You at four look should territory whose forbidden nature punishment. issue of You look at have been self-evident. aggravated Is it mur- aggravation. der? look at the You character

Indeed, majority point is able to any mitigation, You Defendant. look approaches no that even other statutory mitigation mitigation or other prosecutor’s com egregiousness of this they’ve you. last presented to And the ments no case which a court other victim, thing look you is has tolerated such misconduct. There uniqueness. harm to commu- majori What reason lacuna in the telling nity family and to and to victim ty opinion wrongfulness putting —the cause? are compara did this Defendant Those people to death on the basis of now, things you at. arguments tive human worth the four look * (4th Cir.2004). My changed any respect upon that This dissent relies views have not *29 opinion supplemented by points expressed panel the debated from those I in vacated as Ozmint, during rehearing. opinion, Humphries process F.3d the en banc Pat, entirely [I]n the evidence was met [Dickie Smith] This outline of and love, Indeed, they got they the fell in married. unremarkable. year propri the That’s the same Paul Hum- generally has endorsed Shawn See, phries committed two ety e.g., of each of its elements. house break-ins at Carolina, age pretty 13. 1986 Dickie makes a v. Smith 512 U.S. Simmons (1994) 2187, 129 drastic He going move. decides he’s L.Ed.2d 133 quit and go full-time, Kemet build homes the (aggravating including factors defen out, goes and he building he starts “prior history”); Lockett v. dant’s criminal Ohio, homes in the he 586, 604, community grown had 438 U.S. up in. the evidence). year That’s same Shawn Paul (mitigating L.Ed.2d 973 up proba- for his second prosecutor The was therefore well with- tion violation and sent down Colum- exegesis in constitutional bounds in his bia. first the three sections. The trial evidence 4th, July they Then in the have a received, testimony the at sentenc- witness girl little baby Ashley. named You ing, closing prosecution’s argu- and the know, Defense in a 12 brought year the aggravating ment discussed turn the said, old stepdaughter stepsister, — crime, Humphries’ the circumstances of put “Please don’t Shawn Paul Hum- history, mitigating criminal and the evi- phries in electric I’m sorry chair.” I The dence offered defendant. testi- appropriate did not feel was to bring mony prosecutor elicited for the final Ashley in a year girl parade six old concerning presentation, element his you. her front similarly uniqueness, was sound. victim’s Ashley In 1988 is born. That’s the same Dickie appeared Smith’s relatives before year Paul Humphries jail Shawn went to objection without and recounted years. spring two And their recollections of the victim and what 1992, believe, opens I Dickie Smith Indeed, had he meant to each of them. MaxSaver, doors building to the a busi- juncture, stopped had the solicitor at this community. ness in that down beyond his actions would have been scruti- majority claims that the solicitor ny. only foreground meant “Dickie Smith’s The problem was that the solicitor did uniqueness part an as individual” stop. commentary his on the victim his contends impact evidence, prosecutor took leave vignettes nothing from victim’s life did of his announced intention to discuss “the Maj. more than further this purpose. Op. victim, uniqueness” and the “harm to 212-13, majority 220. The keeps re- community to the victim and to peating prosecutor’s comments family” that crime defendant’s had comparison. did not involve human worth Instead, gen- he into a caused. launched begins why But it not. explain never human Indeed, eral could majority why tells us never not have been more from his Humphries’ removed Paul full name needed Shawn purpose Dickie showing stated Smith as to occur at all—let alone three times—in unique being. part closing argument and individual human that was expressly previewed This stark detour should have been obvi- to the en- tirely Dickie legitimate ous the solicitor’s first mention of the discussion of Smith being. as an human defendant narrative of the victim’s individual Because prosecutor using life: avoided words such own *30 238 “worth,” general my purpose comparing the worth “compare” or “value” or

as portion assert that this the colleagues also the victim’s and defendant’s existence. credibly Haselden, argument regarded Indeed, cannot be his the the case on which human Id. comparative one of worth. n.7, relies, 224 majority chiefly Maj. Op. at char- 220-21, accept 222. I cannot up single the most it can muster Indeed, argument if this acterization. begin approach did not to sentence which hu- comparative deemed to be one exploration of prosecutor’s the extensive worth, I of an then conceive man cannot Humphries’ in the case. relative worth designa- that would merit that cen- have not hesitated to Other courts tion. than violations of less horrific sort sure simply leave comparisons The solicitor’s v. happened that which here. In State inadvertence, explanations of no room for Koskovich, 448, 776 A.2d 144 168 N.J. an of an unintentional verbalization of or (2001), to court that a the held “directive Indeed, such thought. errant train jurors they balance the victim’s back- may be glancing implicit comparisons or that of defendant was akin ground against sentencing pro- all unavoidable in but asking jury compare the the worth vic- ceeding persons focused the person,” “inherently prejudi- which is each perpetrator. prose- and Yet the tim jurors impose “might prompt cial” and identically-phrased cution here uttered arbitrarily.” at 182. penalty the death Id. comparisons separate occa- three Muhammad, v. that took on the air of Likewise the court in State comparisons sions— 23, (1996), All of men- empha- a refrain. these N.J. 678 164 A.2d “[vjictim tioned defendant full name may impact testimony sized his. dramatic construc- employed all same weighing ... as not be used a means of tion, Paul year same Shawn “[t]hat’s against the worth of defendant ” pres- The record thus Humphries.... v. of the victim.” State Id. no general, oblique, ents inadvertent (en (Mo.1995) Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886 comparisons of victim defendant. meanwhile, banc), found ineffective assis- Rather, sought prosecution point-by- object tance of failure to counsel side-by-side, year-by-year point, “[wjhose argument, life is prosecutor’s very demonstrate to that at the has important you? more life Whose being put life to worth- instant one more value? Defendant or vic- [the use, the other was not. while at 902. And the tim’s]?” Id. South Car- Thus, showing far from victim as only recently olina over- individual, prosecution presented two capital turned a sentence which had been in tandem. In this largely separate lives prosecutor returned after a asked the beyond regard, went far “the lives” whether victims were only two cases raised the State Catoe, “worth” that of “killer.” Hall v. purport compara to reconcile with (2004). 360 S.C. S.E.2d Haselden, arguments, tive worth State prosecutor may used the While the have (2003), 357 N.C. 577 S.E.2d argument, his com- word “worth” (Tex. State, Jackson v. S.W.3d ments did not rise to the level of a studied Neither of those cases Crim.App.2000). chronology peo- of two comparative time sought to advance the sort human lives, ples’ as we have before us here. Nei prosecution chart the ventured here. I precedents, face of am deliberately sought past these ther take clings to defense surprised majority in two unrelated lives for the sole its events *31 peroration readily of in trial. the trial were prosecutor’s apparent [that] this to jury.” Maj. Op. majority For the leaves the liter- at 221. case law ally willingness in alone its to sanction I suggest do not this evidence was inad- weigh- of executions on the basis extended To contrary, missible. the victim im- ings worth. of relative human pact properly evidence was submitted. testimony brother, of Dickie Smith’s

Any doubts one lingering might have wife, Pat, Randy, and his was all legiti- purpose about the thor- State’s should be mately designed to underscore the impor- oughly by dispelled considering how tance of family the victim’s life to his mem- solicitor drew his comments to close. He bers, friends, to his the community and to to that returned the notion “Dickie Smith he served. Comment this upon evidence much Paul is as about this case as Shawn clearly would conform to the strictures of Humphries” by rhetorically asking “[w]ho Payne and the rhetorical embellishment of here, is the victim Shawn Paul the evidence would within be well the lati- legitimately or is it He Dickie Smith?” closing tude afforded arguments. implored jury capital return a sen- tence “if with asking not in a case But that is not what occurred in this this, if character like not a case when prose- case. That the facts from which the taken, somebody like Dickie Smith is then comparison already cutor drew his were you going when are to do it?” It was the record does not the prejudice cure exhortation, however, another ending that resulting the format in which the “[Wjhen you left the in no doubt: look prosecutor chose to present significant Defendant, at the character this and portion comparison close. The be- you Smith, when pro- look at Dickie how tween the victim and perpetrator that you fane when look at all the circum- formed the focus of this stances of this crime and of Defen- point reached the at which differences in dant, give profane gift how this man a of degree ripen into differences kind. The life under these circumstances.” This con- simply State did not seek to comment on cluding only flourish served one purpose: the evidence. The State did seek sim- point already hammer home the that ply explore consequences the terrible specific infused multiple comparisons family this crime the victim’s and com- of episodes from those two that the lives munity lay unique- out the victim’s just solicitor had set forth: Hum- Shawn sought ness as an individual. The State life, phries had Dickie led a worthless present peoples’ two lives in a crafted invi- one, worthy had led a death Smith and a compare tation to the their relative sentence was warranted on this basis. side-by-side comparison This worth. the relative value of two lives was calculat- The majority finally contends edly incendiary and the sentenc- rendered in- prоsecution’s argument entirety its ing fundamentally infirm. permissible volved no more than comments My on colleagues emphasize against backdrop the evidence. Viewed that all of the past message, majority’s suggestion discussion lives prosecutor obeyed prohibition the victim and defendant had al- ready judgments comparative been into at the human worth submitted sentencing hearing. The majority avoiding “compare” *32 plainly disagree Payne on what better not more have made “could Payne unequivocally endorsed Op. Cone. holds. is untenable.

choices” capital in impact of victim evidence argued use prosecutor could have The close choices, it never came proceedings, un- but Humphries’ nature tragic of of any imprimatur on the sort clos- placing those responsibility derscored prosecutor offered here. choices, Humphries’ mitigat- ing argument and attacked fact, plain Court issued indulging Supreme In day long all without ing evidence clear human worth warnings to steer of relative human worth. an of regret warnings which I compari- comparisons, explanation no Left with not here, say majority has heeded. plausi- let alone a that occurred son one, ap- only I what again can state ble A. so obvious from record:

pears intrinsic jury that the prosecutor told Payne example of provides good itself than one time less of life over value impact victim evidence the uses which another, and that a sentence that of put. case the mur- may be The involved was warranted on that death basis. twenty-eight-year-old of a mother and der two-year-old daughter the de- her whom II. with a viciously stabbed to death fendant Payne approved The us re knife. Court This case comes to on collateral butcher impact of victim evidence judgment the introduction reviewing state court view. attack, concerning physical psychological our of def obligations collateral three-year- quite are harm inflicted on the victim’s proceedings to state court erence repeatedly, also Congress that a feder old son who was stabbed has declared plain. survived, witnessed the may yet of habeas and who thus grant al court writ Testimo- holding murder his mother sister. corpus unless the state court’s to, the victim contrary ny surviving unreason relatives of or involved an “was of, the use of provides paradigm case for application clearly established able evidence, law, impact regardless by the Su victim Federal as determined States,” actually wit- the United whether those survivors preme Court of 2254(d)(1) nessed, (2000), boy Payne, young § in as the did in or “resulted U.S.C. unreason commission of the crime. decision that based on an light able determination faсts impact Payne made clear that victim presented court the evidence State evidence, per- to the relating or “evidence 2254(d)(2). § The 28 U.S.C. proceeding.” of the victim and the sonal characteristics question simply before us is whether of the crimes on the vic- impact emotional violated court’s decision this case state legiti- family,” important tim’s has clearly applying federal law established sentencing. 501 place capital mate U.S. law governing rule that “a contradicts 817, permit- are 2597. States S.Ct. cases.” [the Court’s] set forth offer to introduce such evidence to ted Taylor, 529 U.S. Williams quick “a life which a glimpse (2000). 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d extinguish, dem- [to chose to defendant family to the agree pivot- onstrate] I the loss victim’s majority society has from the analysis in this v. Tennes- which resulted Payne al case prejudicial defendant’s homicide.” Id. at 111 no more than the many tactical (quoting Maryland, S.Ct. 2597 Mills v. 486 decisions that must be made in the course 367, 397, U.S. 108 S.Ct. 100 L.Ed.2d capital litigation. Id. at C.J., (Rehnquist, dissenting))(in- 2597. While Booth and Gathers believed omitted). quotations ternal Grounding a the individualized consideration of a capital sentence in considerations of this required defendant in a capital pro- case sort does not violate the traditional pre- evidence, hibited victim impact cepts sentencing. contrary, On the vic- protested the victim should impact tim informs the likewise be accorded respect. individual *33 “specific harm by caused the crime in 822, 825, Id. at 111 Finally, S.Ct. 2597. 825, question,” 2597, id. at 111 S.Ct. Payne Court determined that ap- consequences of a criminal act have proach sentencing underlying Booth and long been factor on which punishment narrow, Gathers had been too criticizing may 819-20, 825, properly rest. Id. at 111 premise of those cases that victim im- reason, S.Ct. 2597. For this forbidding pact evidence general not in “do[es] reflect allowing states from impact victim evi- on the ‘blameworthiness,’ defendant’s sentencing dence in proceedings would re- only relating evidence to ‘blamewor- duce the deceased to a “faceless stranger thiness’ is relevant to the capital sentenc- penalty phase capital of a trial [and] ing 819, decision.” Id. at 109 S.Ct. 2207. may prevent from having before it endorses, Payne explicitly thus and un- all the information necessary to determine equivocally, the use of victim impact evi- the proper punishment for a first-degree dence at the punishment phase 825, capital of a murder.” Id. at 111 (quot- S.Ct. 2597 Yet, trial. Gathers, while the ing plainly South states “remain Carolina v. 490 U.S. free, 805, 821, cases, 2207, capital others, 109 S.Ct. as well as L.Ed.2d 876 (O’Connor, J., (internal dissenting)) procedures devise new quota- and new remedies omitted). needs,” tions 824-25, to meet felt id. at 111 S.Ct. 2597, Payne neither any nor other Su- Payne also rebutted in turn argu- each preme suggеsted Court case has that vic- against ment victim impact evidence that tim impact may evidence be used without had informed the earlier decisions of Booth limit, constraint, or without reference to Maryland, 496, v. 2529, 482 U.S. 107 S.Ct. the harm by caused the crime to those (1987), 96 L.Ed.2d 440 and South Carolina aggrieved. This fundamental idea of harm Gathers, 805, 2207, 490 U.S. caused the victim family by and his (1989). 104 L.Ed.2d 876 While Booth and crime of the defendant pervades Gathers asserted that such evidence led to Indeed, Payne opinion. by it is mentioned arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, the Court as the rationale for victim im- the Payne any Court found that effect on pact evidence no fewer than ten times. capital incidence of sentences was con- (victim See id. at sonant S.Ct. 2597 im- principle with the that punishment may pact be calibrated evidence is relevant to fit the harm a for the “harm crime by had caused Payne, caused. See the defendant 501 U.S. at result of the crime”); (sen- 111 S.Ct. 2597. While id. at Booth and Gathers were concerned that victim tences are impact commonly evi- calibrated to the (sen- criminal”); dence would “harm by by frustrate the defendant done id. forcing a diversion of tencing judge’s attention from his properly guid- discretion is in mitigation character, case by to the victim’s ed consideration of the “harm caused Payne crime”); Court concluded that by this was id. at 111 S.Ct. 2597 sentencing consequences afield state far

(describing federal and sentencing au- criminal act. “the reform that enables information about the thority to consider Indeed, Payne opinion one searches by committed harm caused the crime in vain for indication the Court (victim defendant”); evi- impact id. judg- comparative meant condone such “designed portray the sen- dence is part opinion ments. In the one authority caused the actual harm tencing comparative ap- considers where crime”); id. by a particular sort, only to con- peals does so (factors relating ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‍to generally S.Ct. 2597 ques- them. considers the demn long “specific harm” caused crime have tion, Booth, raised in of whether victim authori- by sentencing been “considered might “a impact permit (evidence ties”); “illus- id. submitted was victims were find defendants whose Payne’s caused by trative of the harm community are more de- assets their (states double-murder”); may properly id. serving of than those whose punishment harm “specific authorize consideration perceived worthy.” to be less victims are *34 assessing pun- caused the defendant” Booth, 823, (citing Id. at 111 2597 482 S.Ct. (evi- ishment); 826, at 111 S.Ct. 2597 id. 2529). 8, at In 506 n. 107 S.Ct. U.S. poi- quite dence submitted “illustrated possibility, pro- response to this Payne’s harm gnantly some of the that incredulity, noting fesses that (sentencer caused”); may killing had id. a general impact ... victim [a]s matter in mind” “harm” also “bear such while encourage evidence is offered considering evi- mitigating defendant’s comparative judgments of this kind—for dence). instance, that killer of hardwork- ing, parent devoted deserves the death Notably absent from the Court’s discus- penalty, rep- but that murderer of a hint human imprimatur sion is designed robate not. It is to show does comparisons, worth let of the naked alone ‘uniqueness instead victim’s as an each variety that occurred here. For human being,’ individual human whatever comparisons worth are so far removed might think the loss to commu- harm the Court’s central concern of nity resulting from death might be. that it that the Court inconceivable 823, Id. at 111 S.Ct. 2597. The Court meant allow Indeed somehow them. ... majority noted that cases “[i]n comparison the human worth offered entirely le- impact victim evidence serves very presents this case antithesis 825, gitimate 111 purposes.” Id. S.Ct. Payne’s victim evi- impact rationale for 2597. But it chose to conclude discus- its Evidence introduced inform the dence. precise “if sion terms. It stated that sentencing authority “specific of the harm” to permit the State chooses the admission 825, question, the crime in id. at caused n — previously impact of victim evidence” 2597, very opposite 111 S.Ct. “personal defined as the characteristics of general value of the weighing comment impact” of the the victim and emotional victim’s and defendant’s entire lives. Tes- crime, 817, see id. at 111 S.Ct. 2597—“and timony focusing consequences argument subject, on that prosecutorial question crime ensures that victim Eighth per erects no se Amendment re- impact promotes rather than 827, Id. 111 bar.” S.Ct. sen- purposes tards the fundamental drawing impact The of victim tencing Argument function. Court’s discussion roams comparative judgment Payne signals of human life evidence in therefore a clear disapproval interpersonal for the kind of and Gathers to holdings their “that evi- comparison that occurred here. dence and relating to the victim (and South Carolina Court held impact of the victim’s death on the majority appears agree) family victim’s Payne are capital inadmissible at a only prohibited comparisons sentencing hearing,” 2, between the id. at 830 n. victims, why relative worth of S.Ct. rather than com would take pains to emphasize parisons between perpetrators. impact victims and some victim evi- dence, State, See otherwise proper, might be prej- S.C. so (2002). 160, 167-68 udicial that “it renders the S.E.2d It trial fundamen- is true that a unfair,” tally id. comparison of one may victim another why it would see fit emphasize differ from a of a victim to a proper victim impact evidence shows “each permits defendant. The former the intro victim’s ‘uniqueness as an individual duction of collateral hu- evidence—the worthi ” man being.’ Id. at ness of other society members of —while (emphasis added in рart). the latter invites commentary on evidence already Nonetheless, before jury. dis point, To this I have confined myself to tinguishing types these two of human a textual analysis of the Payne opinion. worth splits awfully thin But an overview of leads to the hair. very same conclusion aas textual dissec- tion, namely that a victim’s status as “an fact, contrary to majority’s claim id., individual being,” human does not al- comparative judgments are “in- low human worth comparisons, let alone n.6, after Payne, Maj. Op. evitable” at 222 *35 approve them. An Payne overview of n.9, 225 a fair examination of the case sentencing its philosophy necessary be- that reveals the Court did even believe cause it likewise forfends the majority’s that arguments of this sort would be conclusion. in capital raised proceedings, much less

proffered as the basis for the death sen- Payne The proceed Court had to at a tence. The pairing of people, two one high level of generality because the deci- actual and one supposed, contemplated by it sions overruled had already ascended to condemns, the example Payne which see Booth, register. instance, for held 823, 501 at U.S. 111 S.Ct. does not sentencing that only evidence must relate suddenly acceptable become when the to the defendant’s blameworthiness. See hypothetical dyad element of the is re- 818-19, Booth, at id. 111 (citing S.Ct. 2597 placed by prosecutor with the person 2529). 504, 505, 482 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. But of the defendant. Payne conception criticizes the of punish- ment set forth Booth and Gathers as too Quite opposite, it is the relative na- Instead, cramped. prop- sentencer can ture of judgments these sorts of pro- that erly consider the “harm caused voked the disapproval, Court’s not the ima- defendant as result of the crime ginative leap conjectural that resort to a charged.” at Id. S.Ct. The comparator requires. Life in our society explicitly Court thus preoccu- extends the is not the relative matter that prosecu- pation subjective in Booth with guilt “the tor tried to make it. Each life stands of the defendant” to encompass also “the footing instead on a of its own. This is the harm caused his acts.” Id. at 820. point essential expresses. the Court Oth- impossible erwise it is imagine why significance Payne is that it add- Court would tether overruling its of Booth ed harm to Booth’s discredited insistence n.9, shortcomings,” Maj. Op. few at 225 solely relate sentencing

that evidence must and that it has made human worth com- blameworthiness. See to the defendant’s Id., 222 n. 6. For Booth, parisons “inevitable.” its 818-19, (citing id. at finds fault 2529). part, the concurrence likewise 482 U.S. at inconven- Payne, with because dismisses harm Payne envisions blame and as “dicta,” opinion ient statements in categories sentencing ev- organizing two 229, 230, ignoring thus Op. Cone. Indeed, Payne stands for the idence. explanation of the basis Court’s argu- proposition that relevance Payne for its own decision. I do not think sentencing be capital ments should any “shortcomings.” has Far from mak- in at least one of these two grounded “inevitable,” ing human worth doubt, possible, it is no principles. And by stressing condemns them reasoning the chain reconstruct an quality of victim as individual human every such a cat- supports relationship Payne, See being. U.S. egory evidence state federal nothing S.Ct. 2597. there was all Thus sentencing permits. history, law Criminal prosecutor’s about this “inevitable” deci- instance, See, e.g., relates blame. sion to take leave of the focus on Dickie intro, (“A k,Ch. comment defen- U.S.S.G. Smith and Shawn Paul as indi- prior criminal dant with record behav- into viduals and launch culpable is more than a first offender ior which, by side-by- two laying their lives deserving punish- of greater and thus side, individuality. If undermined ment.”) impact Victim “inevitable,” this were all so wonders one Payne contemplated, meanwhile, re- sort why only argument country it is the in this in like manner to harm. lates indulge explicit such an extended and judgments, Comparative human worth weighing of the relative worth of human contrast, defy in stark classification under life. general this rubric. For their resort to transgression The extent the State’s lives, human respective worthiness of is, beyond sadly, salvaging through the they slightest do not on the bear *36 aforementioned standard review. For culpability defendant’s or deleterious process due its core contains a commit- Indeed, consequences his criminal act. litigants ment to treat all as individuals of majority argument offers not one Castillo, equal v. dignity. Lyng 477 See comparisons relates human either worth 635, 2, 2727, 636 U.S. n. 106 S.Ct. 91 Instead, concepts. of these seminal (1986). individuality L.Ed.2d This majority pro- retreats behind nebulous however, compromised, prosecutors when nouncements about “the boundaries of implore juries to hand down sentences on question required was to consid- of comparative theories human worth. 223, er,” Maj. Op. at observations The past lives this was exhorted to argument bulk “[t]he solicitor’s relation, balance no connection bore or that Humphries should die because his tragic brought for the events save which life was worth less than Dickie Smith’s.” the into Yet parties court. the State en- at 220. as Propositions Id. such these gaged comparisons in of the sweeping life ignore prosecutor simply both what defendant, histories victim and what he did in breaching said in process, far re- coapting, events Payne all principles about. place in time moved and relevance majority proper inquiry The concludes its own review of from the at hand. The very Payne saying opinion concept has “a of a sentence should have operated preclude this vating mitigating circumstances, misadventure. or the does not receive a sentence for See, One lead- sheer heinousness of the e.g., offense. ing 16-3-20(C). a less valuable life than someone else. § South Carolina Code All of system One receives sentence under our these factors are focused on individuals having committed a Violating crime. qua comparative individuals are not principle, prosecutor’s human nature. But thing one the centerpiece of worth comparison my colleagues’ defies closing argument cannot invite is a sen- justification just did the deci- tence on the basis that person one is of sion. more intrinsic value than someone else. A may

defendant not be simply condemned B. deemed, for being long trajectory over the life, a less estimable human being than steps surveys When one back and Amer- his victim. ican sentencing practice, the fact that the majority faces so hard a task in accommo- Payne, the wake of gov- the federal dating Payne of human ernment, military, thirty-three surprising. worth is not thirty-eight states pen- with the death comparative

The worth alty relied have authorized the use of im- victim category on here fell within the pact of factors in capital sentencing. John Blume, that the prohibited Court has as H. Ten Years Payne: Victim unduly prejudicial penalty Cases, the death Impact Evidence in Capital 88 Cor- sentencing (2003). context. See Johnson v. Mis- nell L.Rev. Unsurprising- sissippi 584-85, ly, U.S. jurisdictions while these allow a broad 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d (quoting range evidence, Zant of victim impact none Stephens, 462 U.S. sanctions the comparative sort of (1983)) 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (prohibiting arguments advanced in proceeding. penalty death “predicated decisions place on To the matter in perspective, ‘caprice’ mere or on ‘factors that are con- Guidelines, United States Sentencing made stitutionally impermissible Booker, or totally advisory irrele- after contemplate a mul- ”). vant to the sentencing process’ titude of departures enhancements and comparison of what Humphries and variety Smith a relating factors to the crime. happened to doing be 1984 or 1986 or These include knowing selection of 1988 or at some fortuitous past point victim, 3A1.1, § vulnerable U.S.S.G. their separate lives is the perpetrator’s essence of an aggravating role the of- arbitrary fense, and capricious 3B1.1, § circumstance. U.S.S.G. of a abuse *37 That happened Dickie building position Smith to be of trust or of special use a skill in houses while Shawn Paul Humphries hap- offense, 3B1.3, committing § the U.S.S.G. pened breaking to be into houses is a the significant physical infliction of or ex- judgment freighted with comparative mor- psychological injury victim, treme on the not, import. however, al It 5K.2, 5K2.3, was permis- § a U.S.S.G. the use of a weap- sible basis under the Due dangerous Process Clause on or instrumentality in the on which crime, to condemn 5K2.6, the defendant to § commission of the U.S.S.G. death. Juries are free to capital mete out purpose the crime’s of facilitating verdicts based on the concealing offense, evidence before another U.S.S.G. them, consequences the § of the crime for 5K2.9. One can look in vain among these ones, the family victim’s and loved departures enhancements and for fac- presence variety or absence of a aggra- remotely of tor resembling the worth relative

246 manageable domain of lives. itself to the more and defendant’s Such

of the victim’s consequences. of a and their hardly form the basis crimes a factor would increase, the imposi- much less two-level III. a of death.

tion of sentence habeas ignore Payne’s application condemnation of The of the federal If we requires inquire to whether argu- statute here us comparative use of human ments, governing legal applied the state court we invite future abuses. As exclaimed, partic- a “unreasonably “one rule to the facts of judge trial this was of Taylor, my prisoner’s I have heard in ular case.” Williams v. arguments ever best 1495, 362, 407-08, 146 ... 120 given argument in a U.S. S.Ct. life (2000). delivery, The law that technique, of ... effec- L.Ed.2d 389 federal terms effective, governs Humphries’ so claim of ineffective The tiveness.” v. however, it was im- is precisely because so assistance counsel Strickland 2052, 668, prejudicial Humphries, ig- Washington, U.S. S.Ct. properly (1984). “punish- majority that The de- premise L.Ed.2d nored bedrock related, the lion’s share of its attention directly ment should be votes prosecutor’s comments re- the criminal defen- whether personal culpability Brown, 538, dant,” spected central Payne. Payne 479 U.S. course California it a rule of provides 93 L.Ed.2d 934 this case. But (O’Connor, J., here as this record concurring). only decision insofar dictates, presents a glaring violation its repeatedly My concurring brother seeks which the defense should have noticed to condemn the dissent’s discussion sen- The to do complained forthwith. failure tencing trying without ever principles wrong so was a under here constitutional Indeed, it. the concurrence fails to rebut Amendment. Sixth grips with the fact what come profound area set- transpired in this case was The standards in this are well Strickland, American tled. defendant departure from traditional sen- Under before, tencing practice perform- existed both must first “show that counsel’s during, By decision. ance deficient.” Id. at 104 S.Ct. and after breaking sentencing regimes deficiency, which 2052. To establish this the de- produce ac- punishment relate the defendant’s fendant must tions, representation also fell an ob- majority departs from the “counsel’s below understanding jective Id. at punishment historic standard of reasonableness.” status, Second, rather a func- defen- not matter of but 104 S.Ct. 2052. wrong perform- citizen has com- dant show that the legal tion must deficient responsibility prejudice mitted therefor. ance in actual to his resulted majority showing prejudice requires allows defendant to be case. A executed, doing, being prove defendant to errors but “counsel’s deprive defen- worthy person less than someone else. were so serious as to strays far from dant a fair Id. at sentence so trial.” Such *38 capital a court law as to 2052. In the of a sentenc- normal ambit of strain context Measuring ing proceeding, question human faculties. the relative is whether that, beings but probability value of human on whatever ineffa- “there is reasonable errors, the unprofessional not be a more counsel’s applies ble scale that could Thankfully, dangerous proceeding American result of the would have been exercise. 694, sentencing has now Id. practice until limited different.” at capital still, a' distract Prejudice jury. case the court and Worse is established considering aggra- hindsight might discourage is both such where the tactical silent, mitigating during sen- choices to remain vating prompting evidence law yers off-putting interjections if is a tencing probabili- “there reasonable that would - ty juror needlessly least one would imperil their client’s defense. have balance,” possibilities these, but for Mindful struck a different of ill such as Smith, always error. v. circuit Wiggins indulged constitutional has a “strong 510, 537, presumption 539 U.S. that counsel’s falls .conduct (2003). Strickland, range L.Ed.2d 471 Under pro wide of reasonable within Humphries’ cry Moore, the failure of counsel to fessional assistance.” Truesdale (4th. Cir.1998). prosecutor compared foul when the 142 F.3d 753-54 general victim’s value to that of the defen- said, That been having there are some supports dant clearly Sixth Amendment object occasions counsel must when lose violation. all claim to his defined Sixth Amendment already degree I role representative have described as accused. I emphasize which worth com prosecutor’s yet unprecedent- human once more the parisons existing ed prosecution’s flew face of federal character sentencing practice. argument law and established I the extent departure of its do recognize sentencing state law settled principles most Ameri- permissive. is State v. Gut can For a sentencing. lawyer See allow his ledge, 326 594 client to be put S.C. S.E.2d death on the basis of (1997). argument But there are to be such an deprive boundaries the defen- respected, prosecutorial and the comments dant of semblance of effective assis- beyond Coming, precise here traveled well them. tance at moment when he did, at they proceedings, the close of needed that assistance most. among explicit and nestled several re Humphries’ Neither of two counsel ob- death, quests put his client to the com jected to the State’s comparative worth parative worth these com exhortations arguments lodge They gen- trial. did have ments should struck defense counsel eral challenge admissibility to the of victim instanter. notice, impact evidence without prior I they they realize that counsel’s should which But appeal. decisions reserved apart hindsight. remarkably picked not be Caution were silent during compar- particularly pro- ative arguments, needed collateral after admitted ceedings, appear plain object when issues that to trial that their failure to constituted only have so habeas court become after ineffective assistance of counsel. Their post-trial several review. be rounds anterior Advo- admission here must taken as cates must often make instantaneous deci- more than a mere tactic. the con- While imperfect with sions information with- currence contends that the failure of an objection judgment. “objectively out the benefit of considered trial reasonable And, every strategy,” Op. at is a although correcting error of Cone. crea- benefit, yield might thought counsel some tive reconstruction of would counsels’ processes majority, go- also create far more substantial costs that neither the nor Court, ing particular, second-guess- forward. the South nor Carolina State, ing object decision counsel’s not to clos- nor counsel itself has ever ing encourage object sought would slew of to advance. The failure was, words, challenges needlessly vexatious that would counsel’s “not a matter of *39 tactics,” 219, majority’s of the com- approach but of the kind strategy trial J.A. at Indeed, represents. product ar- the putation The State’s simply dropping the ball. ar- inquiries be to prece- once of those would reduced which was at without gument, judicial we to dilute the precepts at traditional bitrariness were dent and odds with in a manner. process, Humphries’ enterprise called for such of due had those skills which counsel exercise Second, position fails to my colleagues’ to their appointment. led the qualities of appreciate the effective com- oratory record which the human worth There is no doubt that this also claim Contrary that at occurred. to the probability parison presents “reasonable comparison of the lives juror have a differ- thаt the “solicitor’s least one would struck balance,” was er- of both and Dickie Smith” but for the constitutional ent 537, argu- centerpiece at “the of the solicitor’s Wiggins, 539 U.S. 123 S.Ct. not ror. ment,” Maj. comparison judge recognized Op. The as much this trial pros- piece-de-resistance in fact of the profusely complimented he the when object jury. prosecutor’s presentation to the close. Counsel’s failure ecutor’s simply argument review prosecutor’s therefore One cannot to the comments to- inexorably that it builds seeing the second without prejudiced Humphries under prosecu- this this The apex. wards devices prong Strickland. Comments ju- making compari- represent types appeal employs tor while sort words potential prejudice repetition the Su- son—dramatic of the rors whose year,” punctuation of a long same preme “[t]hat’s Court has condemned jury v. “how Eddings plea phrase to the with penalty death context. Sec Oklahoma, “if profane,” plaintive repetition S.Ct. 455 U.S. (1982) (O’Connor, J., exhortation, in his and the not” ultimate L.Ed.2d Florida, questions stand concurring); 430 U.S. series rhetorical Gardner —all 349, 358, prosaic to the remainder of 51 L.Ed.2d stark contrast argu- it (plurality opinion). Coming, Appreciation the record. of an did, dynamic compels just began its delibera- ment’s the conclusion before tions, emotionally compari- human human charged solicitor’s worth be, was, a climac- comparison prosecutor made son was intended worth only improp- designed tical flourish could have caused move a sentence of prejudice. er death. attempts deny respect fully I of law- majority prerogative by maintaining yers that these com- to make an emotional close. The

conclusion also qualitative- prosecutor’s position were as advocate must quantitatively ments him latitude of But the ly unimportant totality pros- in the of the afford wide tactic. objective beyond But at times se- closing. must extend ecutor’s First, grounds. curing it the State’s wishes at cost. To flawed on least two law, juror simplistic. portions ways unschooled The offensive may human prosecutor’s presentation final the solicitor’s pages may legitimate legal ap- than have up appeared well take “less four departure it not the from historic sen- approximately twenty-eight” peal, [the] Maj. Op. tencing procedure 221. But Thus as- occupies full. was. automata, if we invidious invitation judges, we would be sured the State’s juror may mandated at least one well permitted, undertook sort inquiries consciously engaged have what would oth- prong the second of Strickland with *40 only faintly challenges implicit preceded adjudica- have remained an erwise I guilt. tion of am Wiggins, pos- And well aware that a in the evidence. Under this variety in sibility safeguards prejudice prong satisfies the state federal law protect legitimacy work to supports resentencing. of such Strickland

convictions. IV. say But to properly system our Capital procedure in must guilty thing found he say is one largely province the states. remain another, properly can quite be executed is many good victim impact And has when his sentence is based on the kind uses, awakening them legitimate among extraordinary arguments that the prosecu- to the of serious juries tragic toll crime. presentation represents. accept tor’s To was an But here abuse of this set sentence is to foot on a road tool, powerful an prosecutorial abuse recognize Americans will not and our Con- n attorney ‍‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‍that no reasonable would sit and stitution will not tolerate. re- great With argue with that a greet silence. To defen- spect my I majority, friends should be death dant sent to because his single would not step along take a was of life less intrinsic value than his path. decide, is to ask a not victim on the MICHAEL, GREGORY, Judge Judge crime, not on character the conse- Judge join DUNCAN me this dis- crime, quences the criminal sent. crime, of the of the perpetrator record but on some unfettered evaluation of human prejudice. works improper impact may play an es-

Victim important

pecially part capital proceed-

ings where the crime has caused almost pain.

unfathomable But no state sentenc- practice nor

ing precept federal law capital be permit should read to sentence BARRIE, David behalf of On themselves comparison-of to be based on a the relative similarly situated; and all others Jill value human life or worth of human Richling, C. behalf On of themselves beings. comparisons Human worth are similarly Cary situated; and all others governments. hallmarks of totalitarian Luskin, Alan behalf of themselves On country. do not They belong our Soci- similarly situated; and all others Deb gotten have deepest eties into the sort of Luskin, bie behalf of themselves On making these trouble similarly situated, and all others imposition basis explicit for the of death. Plaintiffs-Appellants, most terrifying regimes Twenti- v. Century govern- eth were which those weighted the value of the lives of ments INTERVOICE-BRITE, INC., D. Daniel executing citizens as a prelude their Roy Graham; Hammond; Rob J. them. Brandenburg; H. David W. Gordon Polcyn; Givens; A. transgression I realize that Michael J. David before Berger; Hammond; today approach H. Harold us does not the most Dwain even Brown; Gregory Smith, D. examples expendability. of human M. Defen terrible dants-Appellees. appreciate I that the sentence notes the words and “value” history “the solicitor’s life or “worth” is a invitation to simple subter- year-by-year chronology fuge, condoning contained in human egregious during was based upon long facts established substance so as cer- see, Likewise, U.S. are avoided. phrases tain (1991). agree But we prosecu- L.Ed.2d 720 while suggestion that concurrence’s case, we could saying applicable than doing no more here tion was

Case Details

Case Name: Humphries v. Ozmint
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Feb 4, 2005
Citation: 397 F.3d 206
Docket Number: 03-14
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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