37 F. 307 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | 1889
This cause has been heard by the court upon written-waiver of a trial by jury. The plaintiffs are trustees of an association-called by the name of the “Yew York & Pacific Car Trust Association,” for the purpose of buying, soiling, and leasing railroad equipment and rolling stock, to be sold or leased to companies owning or operating railroads. The articles of association provide'that the capital stock should' be issued in series of certificates representing the property, from time to time, to be classified by letters, and based upon successive contracts for equipment and rolling stock and leases thereof, and for authority in the trustees to contract with the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company, for the lease to the said company, and their successors, from time to time, of equipment and rolling stock, a separate lease to he made of each series of equipment and rolling stock which might be delivered to-the trustees under the articles of association, upon specified terms and conditions. Pursuant to this authority, the trustees entered into an agreement with the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company, a corporation of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, which recited this authority, and witnessed that the trustees, as well in consideration of the sum of one dollar to them paid by the said Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific-Railway Company, parties of the second part, at and before the sealing and delivery thereof, the receipt of which was ihereby acknowledged, as-
The equipment provided for in this agreement, designated “Series A,” was delivered to and taken possession of by the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company under the terms of the agreement. Like agreements were made for three other series in succession, designated respectively “B,” “C,” and “D,” and the equipment provided for therein was in like manner delivered and taken possession of. The agreement in respect to Series J) was modified as to the rate of interest and times of payment. Default was made in respect to payments provided for in each of the agreements. Afterwards an agreement for a lease of the roads and equipment of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company, including all this equipment and rolling stock, to the defendant, a corporation of Missouri and Arkansas, was made between these two companies. The stock of the defendant consisted of 220,700 shares, of which 219,459
“The undersigned, president and secretary of the Wabash, Saint Louis & Pacific Railway Company, certify that the annexed instrument, bearing date April 10, 1883, is a certain original indenture of lease by and between the Wabash, Saint Louis & Pacific Railway Company and the Saint Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, and that the holders of a majority of the stock of the Wabash, Saint Louis & Pacific Railway Company have assented thereto in writing.
[Seal] “Jay Gould, ^President,
“Wabash, Saint Louis & Pacific Railway Company, “O. D. Ashley, 2d Secretary, “Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company.”
“The undersigned, president and secretary of the Saint Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, certify that the annexed instrument, bearing date April 10, 1883, is a certain original indenture of lease by and between the Wabash, Saint Louis & Pacific Railway Company, and that the holders of a majority of the stock of the Saint Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company have assented thereto in writing.
[Seal] “Jay Gould, President, “Saint Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company.
“A. H. Calef, Secretary, “Saint Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company.”
Whether the defendant took possession of the roads, equipment, and rolling stock of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company under this lease is a disputed question of fact upon the evidence. The respective offices of each company were filled mostly by the same persons j and many of the executive agents of each were respectively the same. Mr. Amos EL Calef, who was secretary and treasurer of the defendant company from 1881, and became such of the other in May, 1883, was called as a witness by defendant, and gave evidence tending to show that such possession was not taken. The plaintiffs offered in evidence a letter signed by him as such officer, and directed to the president and directors of the other company, dated May 10, 1884, which stated among other things, that “under the indenture of lease between the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific R’y Co. and this company, dated April 10,1883, the lines of the lessor company have been operated for a period of about thirteen months. ” It was received, subject to objection. Without considering this letter as evidence of the fact stated in it, or otherwise than as affecting the testimony of that witness, upon all the other evidence and circumstances it is found that these roads and the equipment and rolling stock wrere brought, by force of the lease, which was at that time recognized as valid by all, within the bontrol and management of the defendant company. In view of the-situation, and to induce the trustees to let the equipment and rolling stock’remain in use upon the roads, the defendant entered into an
“ Whereas, the said railway company is not in default as to each of said agreements by reason of tiie non-payment of certain of the sums mentioned therein; and whereas, the second party hereto has leased the railroads and equipments of said Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company, and is desirous of preserving intact the said equipment for use in the operation of said railroads: 'Now, therefore, it is agreed by and between the parties as follows: First. The second party hereby assumes and agrees to pay to the first party the several sums remaining unpaid by the said Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company at the times and in the manners following, provided tiie same are not sooner paid by the said railway company, that is to say: Tiie principal of each of said installments of rent at the expiration of three years from the date when the same would otherwise respectively fall due, and during the three years and thereafter tiie interest on each and all of said installments quarterly, as required by the terms thereof, until the principal debt is paid. The second party further agrees with the first party that it will promptly and fully make good any default of the said railway company hereafter to keep and perforin any and all of the remaining stipulations and covenants which the said railway company has in and by tiie said agreements, or any of them, agreed to keep and perform. Second. The first parties further agree that when and as the extended payments shall mature and become due, if tiie same or any of them are not paid by said railway company, then, upon receiving the money therefor from tiie second party, the first parties will use the funds in the purchase of, and hand over and deliver to tiie second party, certificates issued under the various car trusts above mentioned, corresponding at par to the amount paid by the second paity under the guaranty hereinbefore stated; the second party holding the said certificates, with all interest accruing and thereafter to accrue upon, in the samo manner, and with the same rights, and with tiie same security, as appertained thereto in the hands of the holders whose certificates they purchase; and tiie first parties shall give to the second parties, for any payment the second party may make on account of either principal or interest-, receipts which will show that the second party have bought the rights of the holders of the certificates under the car trust to tiie extent; of such payment, with the same rights, power, and authority as were possessed' by the holders of tiie certificates on account of which principal or interest shall have thus been paid by the second party, and binding the first parties to hand the certificates over to the second party so soon as the first parties shall have received the same. And tiie first parties further agree that whenever the second party shall have paid to them any sums now or hereafter due upon any of said agreements, and not paid by said railway company, and the first parties shall also have received the entire sum which by the terms of such agreement the first parlies are entitled to receive, then the said first parties will assign and transfer to the second party the said agreement and all the right, title, and interest of the second party thereon.”
Thereupon the equipment and rolling stock were left to remain within the control of the defendant, in use upon the roads covered by the lease.
On May 19,1884, the defendant company informed the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company that the net earnings of the roads had been insufficient to pay the interest, rentals, and other fixed charges;
The defenses set up and urged are that the lease is ultra vires and void, and that the contract depends upon that, and falls with it; that the contract is itself ultra vires and void; that it is within the statute of frauds; that it is a mere guaranty of the contract of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company, without consideration; that, as such guaranty, no cause of action would accrue upon it until all other remedies should be exhausted. That one railway company cannot lease its road and franchises to another, or acquire those of another by lease, without statutory authority from the jurisdiction in which they are situated, is not disputed in this case, and seems to be well settled. Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71; Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 118 U. S. 290, 630, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094, and 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24. That these things may be done with such authority follows, and also is not questioned. The Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1879 provide by section 790 that—
“Any railroad company organized in pursuance of the laws of this or any other state * * * may lease or purchase all or any part, of a railroad, with all its privileges, rights, franchises, real estate, and other property, the whole or a part of which is in this state, and constructed, owned, or leased by any other company, if the lines of a road or roads of said companies are continuous at a point either within or without this state, * * * provided that no * * * such lease * * * shall be perfected until a meeting of the stockholders of said company or companies of this state * * * Shall have been called by the directors thereof, at such lime and place, and in such manner, as they shall designate, sixty days’ public notice thereof having*313 been previously given, and the holders of a majority of the stock of such company, in person or by proxy, shall have assented thereto, or until the holders of a majority of the stock of such company shall have assented thereto in writing, aud a certificate thereof, signed by the president and secretary of said company or companies shall have been filed in the office of the secretary of state. ”
The laws of Illinois of February 12, 1855, (Priv. Laws, 304,) that—
“All railroad companies incorporated * * * under the laws of this state shall have power to make such contracts and arrangements with each other, and with railroad corporations of oilier states, for leasing or running their roads, * * * as shall be necessary and convenient for carrying into effect the object of this act.”
The Revised Statutes of Ohio, by section 8300, that—
“Any company may lease or purchase any part or all of a railroad constructed by another company, if the lines of road of such companies are continuous or connected, and not competing, upon such terms and conditions as may bo agreed upon between the companies.”
Therefore, under some circumstances which, might exist, the defendant could lawfully acquire the roads of the St. Louis, Wabash & Pacific Railway Company, and all of them, by lease, except that part in Indiana. Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 118 U. S. 290, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094. The only condition required as to Missouri and Ohio is that the roads should be continuous or connected; and none appears to be required as to Illinois. At the time of the lease trains of all the roads ran to and from a union depot in St. Louis. To do this, trains of the defendant crossed a track of the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, running in the same direction, by being switched onto it from one side and passing along on it 134 feet, and then being switched off on the other side; and trains of that part of the roads of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Comjmiy oast of the Mississippi river passed over the track of a bridge and tunnel company across the Mississippi river to the depot, by right acquired by lease. They connected otherwise by their own tracks. These breaks, such as (boy were, separated parts of their own roads, and not the roads of these parties, from one another. These methods of crossing the track of another road and the river do not appear to break the connection between the two roads, within tho meaning of these statutes: and these lines are found upon the evidence of this situation and these circumstances, as a matter of fact, to have been connected and continuous. The holders of a large majority of the stock of each company appear to have assented to the least; at "meetings when that subject was considered, but not at any meeting called and held for that purpose. No vote at any meeting was required by the laws of Missouri, if the holders of a majority of tho stock assented to the lease in writing, and the proper certificates were filed in the office of the secretary of state. The propositions voted upon were in writing, and the voting was by written ballots. This is argued to have been an assent in writing to the lease; but the ballots were not signatures, and were cast to accomplish corporate, and not individual, action. This does not seem to amount to the assent in
“A corporation, quite as much as an individual, is held to a careful adherence to truth in their dealings with mankind, and cannot, by their representations or silence, involve others in onerous engagements, and then defeat the calculations and claims their own conduct had superinduced.”
“The decision of this court in the recent case of Langley v. Railroad Co., 10 Gray, 103, rests upon grounds wholly distinct from those upon which this action is based. The court there decided that the Boston & Maine Railroad, being the owners of the Methuen Branch Railroad, and authorized to run cars over it as common carriers of passengers and freight, could not, without the authority of the legislature, lease that road to a corporation created by another state, and transfer their powers and duties to such corporation, so as to discharge themselves from liability for injuries to persons or property which might arise in tho use of the road. But if the plaintiff in the present action might have had a remedy, at liis election, against the Boston & Maine Railroad, he is not therefore precluded from seeking it against the party with whom he directly contracted. The defendants, so far as any evidence showed, were competent to hire and use tho Methuen Branch Railroad, if they could find any party that would permit them to uso it, and put them in possession. They were in the actual possession and use of it, without obstruction from the Boston & Maine Railroad of the commonwealth; and they received the plaintiffs’ property through their agents, and agreed that it should be safely kept, and transported to its destination. It is no answer to a breach of that agreement, to deny the validity of their own contract for the use of the road. ”
This contract does not appear to be void from any want of corporate authority to make it. The questions made in respect to the consideration, construction, and effect of the contract are to be determined in view of the situation out of which it grew, and to which it is to be applied. The contracts between the plaintiffs and the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company, in respect to this equipment and rolling stock, are in the instruments called “leases,” and they are sometimes said to be “contracts for conditional sales,” and at other times, “mortgages.” bTeither of these names would seem to be apt to describe thorn fully, and perhaps they partake somewhat of the nature of such instruments as each of these terms is usually applied to. The title to the property was not to pass until payment, and in that respect they resembled conditional sales. The use of the property by the conditional purchase was provided for on compensation, and in that respect they would have the qualities of a lease, so far as that name is applicable to agreements for the use of personal property. And they provided for security on the property in tho hands of the so-called “lessee,” and in that respect were like mortgages. In all aspects they fixed the right of tho plaintiff to retake the property on default. A default had been made, and the property was subject to the right of tho plaintiff's to remove it at once; and the lease passed tho right to redeem to the defendant, subject to the rights of tho plaintiffs. If the lessor redeemed, tho defendant would have tho property of the lessor under the lease. If the defendant fulfilled the contract, it would have the property as purchaser. The undertaking of the defendant to pay what should remain unpaid at the prescribed times was an agreement to pay the price of tho use and ownership of the property which it would have of the plaintiffs. What the lessor should pay, it would pay for itself. The reference to what should
The evidence tending to show that the lease was not executed according to the laws of the several states in which the road was situated, as well as evidence showing that the stock of the defendant corporation held by Jay Gould, trustee, was in fact held for the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, was received súbject to objection, without passing definitely upon its materiality, to make the case complete. The Missouri Pacific Railway Company is a corporation of Missouri, and as such appears to have had authority to hold the stock, and to assent to the lease, either by itself or through a trustee. The presumption is that the act of the trustee was authorized or approved by that company, if anything in that behalf was necessary; and this presumption is not rebutted.
The.argument made in behalf of the defendant, that want of power to take a lease of the roads would involve wrant of power to operate them, or to provide means for operating them, although sound in law, does not appear to be well founded in the actual situation. The defendant was not without power by the laws of its situs to take title by lease or otherwise of all of those roads. The laws of Missouri already recited appear to have conferred ample authority to acquire title to them in any manner in which it could be obtained; and title could be obtained to all of them, in some form, and by lease to all except that part in Indiana, by procuring the execution of conveyances with the required formalities. The 'defendant accepted such an instrument in that behalf as was made, and that-operated to give the defendant the roads. Whether this operation Was due to the concession of the lessor, or to the force of the instrument, the defendant acquired the roads with authority to operate them, and to provide for their operation. In this view, the defendant became bound by its contract with the plaintiffs to provide rolling stock and equipment, without reference to the actual validity of the lease as against the lessor. The defendant, as lessee, could not dispute, the lessor’s title as against the lessor; and still less could it dispute that title as against third parties and strangers to the lease, who had dealt with the defendant on its own representation of the lease. This evidence, therefore, now appears to be immaterial, but the facts shown by it are in the case, to have such weight as may be found to belong to them, if any, in the further progress of the cause. Upon the whole case, as now considered, the plaintiffs ar.e entitled to recover of the defendant the installments for which the actions consolidated into this one were brought. There must therefore be judgment for the plaintiffs.