Case Information
*1 Before B AUER H AMILTON S T . E VE Circuit Judges . H AMILTON Circuit Judge
. This appeal about business names when an employee’s error naming fatal employment discrimination claim. Plain ti ff Humberto worked manager Ashley Fur niture HomeStore near Chicago. He red then Equal Employment Opportunity Commis sion alleging age discrimination retaliation. he listed name of Illinois store he worked— Ashley Furniture HomeStore—as well as address and tel ephone number store. correct legal name of jillo’s employer, however, Rockledge Furniture LLC, business operates several Ashley Furniture HomeStores and registered do business Illinois under name “Ashley Furniture HomeStore – Rockledge.” dis trict dismissed Trujillo’s ad ministrative remedies because he name his employer su ffi ciently because never managed notify correct employer
We reverse based two premises. First, Trujillo his su ffi ciently his original when lawyer later sent his pay stub Rockledge’s address, he removed any doubt about ployer’s identity. Second, EEOC’s error processing does bar Trujillo suing employer. I. Factual Procedural Background
We review de novo without deference court, grant motion dismiss Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Huri O ce Chief Judge 2015). accept all well pleaded facts true draw all reasonable inferences plainti ’s favor. Flannery Recording Indus. Ass ʹ n America
From June through March worked store manager several Ashley Furniture HomeStores Chicago area. These stores were owned operated Furniture LLC. Rockledge Wisconsin limited liability company associated Ashley Industries, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation. According to Rock ‐ ledge’s registration Illinois Secretary State, op ‐ erates Illinois assumed names “Ashley Furni ture HomeStore – Rockledge,” “Ashley Furniture Outlet,” “Ashley Sleep.” Each store Trujillo worked held itself out public as an “Ashley Furniture HomeStore.” can summarize brie fl y substance case, but without vouching for allegations. In late ac cording Trujillo, Rockledge launched an initiative focused hiring promoting younger employees. Rockledge as signed younger sales manager report Trujillo. Trujillo alleged young manager failed perform her basic duties repeatedly missed work without excuse. He complained human resources. Instead disciplining young manager, however, Rockledge promoted her. Rock ledge then conducted unscheduled “store audit,” which Trujillo alleges was used pretext justify his fi ring. jillo alleges he was actually fi red because age (he about years old when he red) retaliation complaints about young sales manager.
On May discrimination Illinois Human Rights Commission. identi ed “Ashley Furniture HomeStore.” He list “Rockledge Furniture LLC,” he provided Illinois address telephone number operated store he been managing. never contacted anyone address phone number. stead, used new, automated system warded Texas business Hill Country Holdings, LLC, operated Ashley stores ‐ ‐ Texas. Hill Country replied to EEOC that Trujillo was its employee.
In April EEOC told Trujillo’s then lawyer that “Ashley Furniture” (meaning Hill Country) had responded that had stores only in Texas had never employed ‐ jillo. In response, Trujillo’s lawyer explained that his ‐ ployer Rockledge, an “Ashley Franchise,” Trujillo’s EEOC listed location he had worked. The lawyer sent EEOC one paystubs, listed Rockledge’s full name corporate address. One mystery this case still failed to serve Rockledge. closed fi le April issued Trujillo right to sue le tt er. July Trujillo led complaint district
court asserting Age Discrimination Em ployment Act, U.S.C. § et seq., Illinois Human Rights Act, ILCS 5/1 et seq. Rockledge moved to dis miss. Instead opposing motion dismiss, Trujillo amended complaint adding plainti s three other older Rockledge managers. Rockledge moved dismiss again, ar guing Trujillo had failed exhaust administrative remedies. court granted motion dismiss without prejudice, nding Trujillo failed because he Rockledge party gave opportunity replead allege facts su cient show knew should known thereby satisfying “ Eg gleston exception” exhaustion require ment. See Eggleston Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Un ion No. (allowing dis crimination suit against who all 18 3349 19 1651 5 charge, who received actual notice given opportunity participate conciliation). second amended complaint, Rock ledge again moved dismiss based on same exhaustion argument. court dismissed claim for administrative remedies because did not list “Rockledge LLC” because complaint plausibly allege notice explained:
an individual who brings an ADEA claim must rst le with EEOC. U.S.C. § 626(d)(1); Husch v. Szabo Food Service Co. , F.2d 999, (7th Cir. 1988); Flannery v. Record ing Ind. Ass’n America , F.3d 632, (7th Cir. 2004). Further, party charging document review normally subject subsequent lawsuit. Alam v. Miller Brewing Co. F.3d 662, (7th Cir. 2013); Small Chao This so provide ployer adequate notice opportunity reconciliation without need resorting courts. Ezell Po tt er (emphasis added). rare ex ception this construct where party can prove “an unnamed party has been pro vided adequate circumstances been given opportunity participate conciliation proceedings aimed voluntary compliance.” Schnellbaecher Baskin Clother Co. *6 6 18 ‐ 3349 19 ‐ 1651 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Eggleston Chicago
Journeyman Plumbers’ Local Union No. (7th Cir. 1981)). dismissing claims, district court held that “Tru jillo fails allege any new facts singularly or collectively show how Rockledge was either appropriately or how they had of Trujillo fi led permi tt ing application of exception.” The district court relinquished supplemental jurisdiction Trujillo’s state ‐ law claim dismissed it with out prejudice. Trujillo moved entry separate fi nal judgment under Rule 54(b). The district court granted mo tion Trujillo this appeal. Although dismissal was nominally without prejudice, was by then too late jillo le new remedies. That means judgment was e ectively prejudice appealable separate nal judgment on Trujillo’s Rule 54(b). See, e.g., Hernandez Dart 2016); Schering Plough Healthcare Products, Inc. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. 2009). 18 3349 & 19 1651 7
II. Analysis
The purpose of Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), like Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, reduce discrimination workplace. Husch v. Szabo Food Service Co. , 851 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. Supreme Court explained: ADEA, like Title VII, sets up “remedial
scheme laypersons, rather than law yers, are expected initiate process.” v. Commercial O ffi ce Products Co ., 486 U.S. 107, 124 (1988); see also Oscar Mayer Co. v. Evans , U.S. 750, (1979) (noting “common purpose” Title VII ADEA). sys tem must be accessible individuals who have no detailed knowledge relevant statutory mechanisms agency processes.
Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki , U.S. 389, (2008); accord, e.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg College U.S. 106, (2002); Love Pullman Co ., U.S. (1972).
Along these lines, often explained “it par ticularly inappropriate undermine e ectiveness these statutes dismissing merely because victim alleged discrimination failed comply intri cate technicalities statute.” Husch 1002; see Huri O ce Chief Judge 2015) (“Courts review scope liber ally.”); Stearns Consolidated Management, Inc. (“The ADEA humanitarian legislation should be construed hypertechnical manner.”). When argues suit should dismissed *8 8 18 3349 19 ‐ 1651 remedies properly, must keep these general principles mind. [2]
There are, however, speci fi c requirements. An ADEA claimant must fi rst fi le a charge discrimination with EEOC then wait sixty days before bringing action federal court. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1); Husch , 851 F.2d at 1002. charge must be fi led within 180 300 days alleged discrimination, depending relevant state law, may require ling a with state agency well EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1); Flannery Recording Indus. Ass ʹ n America 2004); Husch , at 1002. regulations de ne ADEA “charge” mean a “statement with Commission” alleging “the prospective defendant” has violated ADEA. C.F.R. § 1626.3. A must writing, “name pro spective respondent,” generally allege discriminatory & acts. C.F.R. § 1626.6. A “should”—but is re quired to—contain “full name address of person against whom is made.” C.F.R. § 1626.8(a)(2) (b). Upon receiving supposed to serve “persons in such prospective de fendants” “seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice informal methods of conciliation, conference, persuasion.” U.S.C. § 626(d)(2). rst question here whether error in naming
jillo’s employer in original requires dismis sal case failure remedies. There no doubt plainti ff provided correct address telephone number place employment, he gave name was missing one word from business name had Illinois government order able do business legally in Illinois: “Ashley HomeStore” versus “Ashley Furniture HomeStore – Rockledge.” See ILCS 180/45 5(a)(1). This case therefore presents name all, Eggleston minor error stating name employer.
This minor naming error does defeat ability pursue claim. Take extreme case: suppose ployee misspells employer’s way leaves lit tle room misunderstanding: “MacDonald’s” instead “McDonald’s,” “Lockhead Marten” instead “Lockheed Martin.” found no cases courts have even decide whether such minor naming errors entitled dismissal.
Here mistake one word missing employer’s assumed business name. (Rockledge cannot com plain about anyone’s use assumed business name.) & Several cases show how courts overlook similar less trivial errors naming employers charges. For example, Virgo v. Riviera Beach Associates, Ltd ., 1350, Cir. 1994), plainti ’s EEOC named her employer the name of hotel where she worked. Eleventh Circuit re versed dismissal of suit against limited partnership owned hotel of name and against general partners of limited partnership. Shehadeh v. Chesapeake Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland 711, 727–29 (D.C. 1978), former employee’s used sev eral informal variants employer’s proper name. District of Columbia Circuit reversed dismissal, explaining informal references employer gave ample information identify and give of same can be said here, provid
ing nearly correct trade correct address telephone number of store he managed. Accord, Romero v. Union Paci c Railroad 1303, 1311–12 1980) (reversing dismissal noting “informally” naming ployer can su ffi cient); Kopec City Elmhurst F. Supp. 646–48 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (denying dismissal where police o ffi cer applicant’s “city” instead its board police re commissioners provided su ffi‐ cient identi cation employer); Aguirre McCaw RCC Com munications, Inc ., F. Supp. 1433–34 (D. Kan. 1996) (denying dismissal plainti ff meant include defend ant CSI naming “Cellular One” agents her Cellular One complicated association most lay persons would di culty ascertaining exact role CSI); Johnson County Cook F. Supp. (N.D. Ill. (denying dismissal suit against county and sheri ff EEOC charge named county depart ‐ ment corrections as employer). These cases illustrate both human tendency use informal names use in com mon parlance (some may remember “Ma Bell” and “Big Blue” American Telephone and Telegraph Co. and Interna tional Business Machines Corp.) and legal challenges can arise identifying legally correct employer in com plex business arrangements, such those involving fran chises, joint ventures, prime subcontractors, outsourcing human resources payroll functions, temporary ployment services, like. slight di ff erence between Rockledge’s business name name used EEOC should not prevented EEOC from reaching proper pursuing possible conciliation. EEOC is, after all,
supposed investigate charges. It has lot do, however, some mistakes are inevitable. brief amicus curiae this appeal, asserts correctly determining whether claimant satis ed ling require ments, focus should on information claimant provided EEOC, on what actually did information. See, e.g., Ste en Meridian Life Ins. Co. 1988) (“The EEOC’s act … does bar person maintaining ADEA action.”).
agree. Keeping mind the EEOC’s role investiga ‐ tor, we have explained:
Even explicit an ‐ ployee’s complaint will be deemed exhausted if “the current claim reasonably could devel ‐ oped the EEOC’s investigation the charges before it,” meaning “the EEOC complaint must describe same conduct implicate same individu als.” Ezell Po tt er F.3d (7th Cir. 2005).
Delgado Merit Systems Protection Bd. same logic applies to imperfect naming employer. After all, purpose requirement to le “to provide with su ffi cient information to notify it been charged with discrimina tion provide with opportunity to inves tigate … [and] eliminate any unlawful practice through formal conciliation.” Downes Volkswagen America, Inc. 1994), quoting Ste en 542. EEOC’s amicus brief explains gave su ffi cient information process properly give appropriate Rockledge. Again, agree. Penalizing charging EEOC’s mistake pro cessing su cient information would frustrate pur pose ADEA design allowing non lawyers pur sue before EEOC. That’s why documents “should construed, extent consistent permissible rules interpretation, protect employee’s ‐ ‐ 13 rights statutory remedies.” Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki U.S. (2008).
Even if Trujillo’s original charge were deemed have named employer with su cient accuracy, additional information that lawyer provided should re ‐ move any lingering doubts. Recall that when heard back no doubt mysti fi ed company Texas, it con tacted lawyer, who responded with paystub named LLC headquarters address telephone number. This infor mation should be considered deciding whether jillo adequately exhausted remedies before EEOC. See Edelman Lynchburg College U.S. (2002) (to avoid forfeiting rights inadvertently, statute required veri fi ed, regulation properly allowed who timely but unveri fi ed pro vide veri cation after time limit ling passed).
Finally, acknowledge Rockledge’s point EEOC’s failure give it proper notice complaint denied it opportunity pursue informal resolution dispute through conciliation. Supreme Court faced same problem Federal Express Holowecki rejected argument proper remedy lost opportunity to dismiss case entirely. Court explained “would illogical impractical make de nition dependent upon condition subsequent over parties no control”—i.e., EEOC’s mishandling plainti ’s U.S. at 404. imperfect but best available remedy, Court said, simply allow par ties reasonable opportunity pursue conciliation if there fact genuine interest doing so. Id. 407; see Mach Mining, LLC S. Ct. (2015) (if fails tt empt conciliation required statute, remedy dismiss case order tt empt conciliation). No. REVERSE court’s judgment dismissing admin istrative remedies REMAND further proceedings con sistent this opinion. DISMISS AS MOOT No. 1651.
[1] Trujillo’s main appeal (No. been consolidated separate appeal denial later Rule 60(b) motion (No. Rule 60(b) motion was based on evidence Trujillo’s original law yer had sent email Rockledge human resources official two weeks before Trujillo’s original email notified Rockledge Trujillo’s potential age discrimination claim. denied Rule 60(b) motion ground email own lawyer could “newly discovered evidence” email con cealed since aware access it. need reach merits second appeal.
[2] parties cited cases dealing with ADEA Title VII interchangeably. Supreme Court cautioned all pay attention differences between statutes’ enforcement mech anisms deadlines. See, e.g., Federal Express U.S. at 393. For exam ple, unlike Title VII, ADEA does require plaintiff obtain a right sue letter pursue court. Compare U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (ADEA) (allowing suit days after is filed regardless whether takes action) U.S.C. § 2000e 5(f)(1) (Title VII); see Hodge New York College Podiatric Medicine (2d 1998); cf. Fort Bend County Davis S. Ct. —, WL *5–6 (2019) (holding Title VII’s filing requirement “not jurisdictional prescription delineating adjudica tory authority courts” rather mandatory “processing rule” forfeited if timely asserted). That being said, general points about applying laws so complaining should need lawyer construing documents liberally apply both statutes.
[3] Cf. Simbaki, Ltd ., (Title VII claimants franchisor fran chisee, claimants could try show identity interests actual franchisor).
[4] court’s analysis seems gone off track focusing Eggleston line cases, apply multi factor test when de fendant lawsuit all still received actual See Eggleston Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union No. dis trict therefore consider more directly applicable line cases cited above dealing charging party’s ployer perfectly.