153 P. 61 | Or. | 1915
delivered the opinion of the court.
“The court or judge thereof may, upon notice to the respondent, and such terms as may be just, by order enlarge the time”: Deady & Lane, Code, p. 220, § 531, subd. 3; 1 Hill’s Code (1887), § 541, subd. 3; 1 Hill’s Code (1892), § 541, subd. 3.
In 1899 the statute was amended by omitting the words “upon notice to the respondent”: Laws 1899, p. 229. Section 554, subdivision 2, L. O. L., now reads:
“If the transcript or abstract is not filed with the clerk of the appellate court within the time provided, the appeal shall be deemed abandoned, and the effect thereof terminated, but the trial court or the judge thereof, or the Supreme Court or a justice thereof, may, upon such terms as may be just, by order enlarge the time for filing the same; but such order shall be made within the time allowed to file the transcript, and shall not extend it beyond the term of the appellate court next following the appeal.”
It is contended that the authority to extend the time “upon such terms as may be just” is limited to those cases where notice is first given to the adverse party, for the reason that the justice of any terms could not be ascertained without a hearing, and an opportunity for a hearing is not afforded unless notice is first given. Until the amendment of 1899, notice was essential to the validity of an order extending time for filing a tran
“An application to this court or a justice thereof for an order enlarging the time in which to file a transcript shall be accompanied by a stipulation of the respondent consenting thereto or by proof of notice to respondent of such application at least five days before the same is made: Provided, however, that when the time in which to file the transcript will expire by limitation before such notice can be given, the court or a justice thereof may enlarge the same sufficiently to enable the required notice to be given. ’ ’
The respondent argues that rule 24 must apply to the Circuit Court, claiming in his brief that:
“In the case of Johnson v. Iankovetz, 57 Or. 24 (102 Pac. 799, 110 Pac. 398, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 709), this court declared the rule of law to be that the practice and procedure announced in the rule of the Supreme Court would govern the practice throughout the state, in order that uniformity in the practice might be preserved.”
The answer to the argument made in the brief is that the opinion in Johnson v. Iankovetz did not go as
1 ‘ Orders enlarging the time within which to file transcripts are made by justices of this court without notice to adverse parties.”
And it is also true that rule 24 is now in force. It will be noticed, however, that rule 24 does not pretend to regulate or govern applications when made in the Circuit Court. The case of Johnson v. Iankovetz, 57 Or. 24 (102 Pac. 799, 110 Pac. 398, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 709), does not decide that the Circuit Court must observe a rule which in express terms names this court and makes no mention of the Circuit Court. Eule 24 is made applicable to the Supreme Court, and does not ex proprio vigore regulate requests for extensions of time in the Circuit Court. It is not necessary to decide whether this court has the power to prescribe rules for the Circuit Court, because it is sufficient to say that no attempt has been made to require the giving of notice, where the application for time is made in the trial court.
Certified copies of the notice of appeal, the undertaking, and final adjudication made by the trial court, are filed here. This court has jurisdiction of the cause, although it may appear on the final hearing that the transcript is not accompanied by sufficient evidence to warrant a review of the proceedings appealed from: Clough v. Dawson, 69 Or. 52 (133 Pac. 345, 138 Pac.
The motions to dismiss are denied.
Motions Denied.