167 P.2d 600 | Kan. | 1946
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action in forcible detainer brought in the county court of Greenwood county and which reached the district court by appeal, where, after a hearing, the court rendered judgment for defendants. Plaintiff has appealed.
Defendants filed answers in which they denied plaintiff’s right to possession of the property and alleged that on July 9,1940, plaintiff and her husband, P. L. Hull, executed a written lease for the farm, a copy of which was attached, to W. G. Prather for one year ending March 1, 1942, with an option to extend the same from year to year for five years from that date; that W. G. Prather went into possession of the property and each year exercised his option to extend the lease; that W. G. Prather died intestate March 22, 1943; that in a proceeding brought in the probate court therefor the court assigned all the real and personal property of W. G. Prather to his heirs, and that on May 4,1944, the children of W. G. Prather assigned all of the personal property to his widow, Mrs. W. G. Prather, who became the sole owner of the leasehold estate; that the defendant Donald Prather, a son, was farming the place for his mother, Mrs. W. G. Prather, and that defendants had informed plaintiff they would continue the lease contract until the expiration of its term; and further alleged that plaintiff had at all times recognized the contract and accepted benefits therefrom and was therefore estopped from denying the contract or claiming immediate possession of the property.
To these answers plaintiff filed a reply which consisted of a general denial.
The pertinent findings of the trial court may be summarized as follows: P. E. Hull died May 10, 1912, leaving a will, which was duly probated, in which he devised an undivided one-half interest in the real property in controversy (and other land) to his son, P. L. Hull, for life, and if he died leaving a widow and children the widow should have a life estate in one-half of the real estate devised to P. L. Hull and the remaining one-half to go to the children of P. L. Hull; that P. L. Hull died May 31, 1944, and
In its conclusions of law the court held that the plaintiff, Ida May Hull, is the owner of a life estate in an undivided one-fourth interest in the real estate involved; that all rights, liabilities and privileges under the lease executed by P. L. Hull and Ida May Hull to W. G. Prather are binding and in full force and effect upon Ida May Hull and the heirs at law of W. G. Prather; that the notices served by plaintiff to defendants were not served in accordance with law and were of no effect; that the defendants are occupying the real estate by exercising their option under the lease and are not tenants at sufferance or at will, insofar as concerns the plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was duly considered and overruled, and she has appealed.
In this court counsel for appellant present the question for our consideration as follows:
‘‘Plaintiff claims that lease ceased on the death of Pete [P. L.] Hull, the life tenant, on May 31, 1944.”
Plaintiff argues that Ida May Hull did not take her life estate by inheritance, or in any other manner through her husband, P. L. Hull; neither did she acquire any title by virtue of his right of possession; that his estate was abruptly cut off at his death; that plaintiff acquired her life estate through the will of her husband’s father, P. E. Hull, which expressly defined the estate which should come into existence on the death of his son, P. L. Hull.
In support of this argument counsel cite and rely heavily upon the case of Menard v. Campbell, 180 Mich. 583, 147 N. W. 556, Ann. Cas. 1916A 802. Inq that case the testator had devised a life estate to his son in certain real property and provided that at the death of the son the property should go to the son’s heirs at law. The son and his wife executed a general warranty deed to the property. After the son’s death, leaving surviving him a widow and one child, the widow and child claimed to own the property. After examining the common law and several statutes of that state the court sustained that view and held:
“Since a married woman is not held liable on her covenants in a deed executed by herself and husband, in the absence of statutory provisions creating such liability, the wife was not estopped by a joint deed of conveyance with full warranties executed by herself and husband, so as to cut off the estate thereafter vesting in her under the will of the testatrix, and without testimony tending to disclose her purpose in joining in the conveyance, or that the consideration was paid to her, the signature of the wife was a nullity.” (Syl. f 5.)
We have no reason to question the soundness of that decision under the rules of law and statutes relied upon by the court. We think it sufficient to say that under our statutes and decisions the same result could not be reached. (See G. S. 1935, 67-207 and cases there annotated.) It was argued on appellant’s behalf that she had no
We find no error in the record. The judgment of the court below is affirmed.