82 Iowa 686 | Iowa | 1890
Lead Opinion
I. The plaintiff’s right of recovery is dependent upon two ultimate facts: First, that she
It will be observed that the action of the board on September 24 was a refusal to approve the contract signed by the president and the plaintiff. The discharge was on the thirteenth of September, and at that time there had never been any action of the board with reference to the employment. The plaintiff entered upon the discharge of her duties on the twenty-ninth of August, with the knowledge of all' the members of the
Appellant questions the validity of the action of the president of the board' on several grounds. Reference is made to Athearn v. Ind. Dist., 33 Iowa, 105, and Gambrell v. District Twp., 54 Iowa, 417, intimating that the two are in conflict, and that the rule of the latter is that the board has no power to execute contracts for employing teachers. That case has reference to the boards of district townships, and adheres to the statutory requirement that a contract must be made by a subdirector, and approved by the president, etc. The case treats of the methods of executing a written contract, and holds that it must be by those whom the law directs, and not by .others. It does not bear upon the question before us as to the right of the board to authorize its president to make contracts subject to approval; nor is it at all in conflict with the rule given in Athearn v. Ind. Dist., supra.
The appellant earnestly contends that, if the board had the power to make the contract, it could not delegate its authority to its president or any member. We need not determine that question, as no such effort was
II. The defendant board had by resolution provided that only teachers with first-grade certificates
' The defendant sought to show by evidence the conduct of the plaintiff in attempting, after commencing her school, to obtain a first-grade certificate, which the court refused, and complaint is made of' the ruling. This point is controlled by the same considerations'. The testimony could avail nothing. It could not show that there was no contract, which is the only practical question in the case. The plaintiff,’s cause of action depends, as we have said, upon two facts, — a contract . and a wrongful discharge. The question of whether or not there were grounds for a discharge is not in the case, and it is a misapprehension of this point that has led to much of the discussion. ,
The judgment below is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
( dissenting). — The president of defendant was authorized by its board of directors to employ a teacher having a first-grade certificate. The plaintiff did not hold such a certificate when she was employed by the president, or afterwards. He, therefore, had no authority to employ her, and the contract he entered into with her was, therefore, void. The plaintiff and the president of the school district cannot, by bold disregard of the will of the district, as expressed by the board of directors, defeat the just and lawful requirement of the board' that the teacher for the district shall hold a first-class certificate. On these grounds I dissent to the foregoing opinion.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION.
Monday, February 9, 1891.
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In a petition for rehearing, complaint is made that this court, in its original consideration of the case, assumed certain facts not authorized by the record, and we briefly notice some of the points made.
The opinion states that each member of the school board knew when the school commenced, and that the plaintiff was there as a teacher under a contract made with the ’ president. And, further, that “ plaintiff entered upon the discharge of her duties on the twenty-ninth of August with the knowledge of all the members of the board.” It is said the court has assumed these facts without proofs, and the petition asks the court “ where it gets its authority for the statement.” The authority is derived from certain undisputed facts in the case: First. That the president of the board was authorized to employ teachers with the consent of the board. Second. That in pursuance of such authority the president did make the written contract with the plaintiff. Third. That by virtue of such contract the plaintiff entered the school on the
The appellant complains that the court “ignored” the question of excessive damages, and says “it was ■assigned as error;” but does not say that the assignment was argued, nor was it. And under repeated decisions-it was waived, and could not be considered.' See Patterson v. Seaton, 70 Iowa, 689; Clark v. Town of Epworth, 61 Iowa, 750; Beeson v. Railroad, 62 Iowa, 173; Wood v. Whitton, 66 Iowa, 295; Wood & Co. v. Hallowell, 68 Iowa, 377.
Other complaints in the. petition are equally without merit, and the petition for a rehearing is overruled.