delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе order appointing the receiver was passed on the 2d of March, 1886, from which no appeal was tаken ; hut after filing their answer, the defendants moved to rescind the order of appointment, and on the 10th of April, 1886, thе Court passed an order refusing to rescind its previous order, whereby the receiver was appointed ; аnd it is from that order of the 10th of April, 1886, that the present appeal has been taken.
The appellee has moved to dismiss the appeal, and it is clear thе motion must prevail. The order from which the appеal is taken is in no sense an order in the nature of a finаl decree ; and while an appeal is given from an order appointing a receiver, no apрeal is given from an order refusing to rescind the appointment; or to discharge the receiver. Code, Art. 5, secs. 20, 21. There have occurred cases where аppeals have been taken, and maintained in this Court, from orders appointing receivers, orders granting injunсtions and appointing receivers, and orders refusing tо dissolve injunctions and discharge receivers (in all of which cases appeals are authorized by the stаtute): and under which appeals the question of the propriety of continuing the receiver, (because necessarily involved,) has been considered; as in thе cases of Speights vs. Peters, 9 Gill, 472, and Voshell & Heaton vs. Hynson, 26 Md., 83. In such cases there was a proрer subject-matter of appeal, in the order appointing the receiver, or granting, or refusing to dissolve, the injunction, and it was only in connection therewith, and as being necessarily involved therein, that the question, as tо the propriety of retaining or discharging the recеiver, was presented, or could be considered by this Cоurt. But we are not aware of any case where it hаs been held by this Court, that an appeal would lie from аn order simply refusing to rescind the appointment of, or to discharge, a receiver.
It is contended that thе order appealed from is embraced within the mеaning of that clause of sec. 21 of Art. 5 of the Code, whiсh declares that an appeal shall lie “from an order determining a question of right between the partiеs, and directing an account to be stated on the рrinciple of such determination.” But it is an established principle that neither the appointment of a receiver, nor the refusal to discharge him, before final dеcree, involves the determination of any right between the parties. As said by this Court, in Ellicott vs. U. S. Ins. Co., 7 Gill, 307, 320, repeating the language оf Chancellor Bland, “ a receiver is an officer оf the Court. He is truly and properly the hand of the Court; but his aрpointment determines no right, nor does it affect the title of the property in any way. The holding of the receiver, is the holding of the Court for him from whom the possession was taken.”
The appeal must therefore be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.