22 N.W.2d 3 | Minn. | 1946
Respondent, on or about April 21, 1943, under a written contract, became an employe of relators in Alaska, where the latter were engaged in construction work for the War Department of the United States. The contract granted respondent free transportation to Alaska and, in the event that he stayed nine months or more on the job, free return transportation, subject, however, to the express provision that respondent "will pay his return transportation costs and expenses if he voluntarily leaves prior to nine (9) months from the date of this contract." The contract also provided that "Workmen's *281
Compensation Insurance, under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act as Amended by Public Law 208, will be carried by the Employer," the relators herein. About August 27, 1943, respondent, according to his complaint, "suffered and sustainedinjuries arising out of and in the course of his employment for defendants which disabled him from performing further services to defendants under said contract, and plaintiff was requiredto return to St. Paul, Minnesota, for medical treatment forsaid injuries." Upon his return, respondent commenced proceedings against relators herein before the United States Employees' Compensation Commission under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, hereinafter called the Longshoremen's Act (
Although respondent returned from Alaska before the nine-month period had expired, on July 20, 1945, he sued relators on the contract in the municipal court of St. Paul to recover $138.06 as the cost of his return trip, on the theory that his return was not voluntary but necessary to obtain medical treatment for his injuries. About July 27, 1945, relators interposed their verified answer and counterclaim and made a motion to have the United States of America joined as a party defendant. The motion was denied. Respondent then served an unverified reply. By motion dated September 18, 1945, relators moved the court for an order dismissing respondent's action on the ground that his complaint failed to state a cause of action, and on the further ground that the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter. This latter motion was also denied. Subsequently thereto, relators instituted this proceeding. *282
Relators contend that, insofar as the travel expense for the return trip to St. Paul was incidental to and necessary for obtaining medical treatment, respondent can recover therefor only as a part of the amount awarded, or to be awarded, by the United States Employees' Compensation Commission and that said commission has such exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter as to bar an action therefor in a state court.
1. We cannot now be concerned with respondent's failure to verify his reply as required by Minn. St. 1941, §
2. Contrary to the representation made by relators in their brief,
"§ 907. Medical services and supplies
"(a) The employer shall furnish such medical, surgical, andother attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine, crutches, and apparatus for such period as the natureof the injury or the process of recovery may require. If theemployer fails to provide the same, after request by theinjured employee, such injured employee may do go at theexpense of the employer. * * * The deputy commissioner may, * ** make an award for the reasonable value of such medical orsurgical treatment so obtained by the employee." (Italics supplied.)
3. Does the statutory requirement to furnish medical, surgical, and hospital service include the cost of travel incident to, and reasonably necessary for, obtaining such service? It is the general rule that compensation laws are remedial in character, seeking to accomplish a humane purpose, and their terms should be liberally construed. Allen-Garcia Co. v. Industrial Comm.
The federal courts follow the general rule in giving a liberal construction to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.3
"The trend is in the direction of increasing the medical liability. Where the legislature has not fettered the courts, the judges have been liberal in construing medical provisions." Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation, p. 297. *284
Respondent alleges that his return trip to St. Paul was necessary in order to obtain the medical treatment which relators had failed to provide. It has been held that in making an award for the expense of medical treatment to which an injured employe is entitled, which he must go a distance from the place of injury to obtain, an actual outlay for railroad fare may properly be included. Scruggs Bros. Bill Garage v. State Industrial Comm.
The purpose of the statute would be defeated if the respondent were to be denied reimbursement for expenses incurred in travel reasonably necessary to make medical service available. There is little doubt that the United States Employees' Compensation Commission may allow the costs of such travel if the employe can establish that the return trip was reasonable from a medical standpoint. Whether the trip was reasonably necessary or whether suitable treatment could have been obtained at a point nearer the place of injury involves a question of fact for determination by the commission. We cannot, and need not, determine here whether the item of travel expense was considered by the commission when it made its award to respondent. We conclude, however, that respondent was subject to the compensation act and had, or has, a complete remedy thereunder for any and all medical expenses necessarily and reasonably incurred, inclusive of the cost of essential travel.
4. The remedy afforded employes entitled to benefits of the Longshoremen's Act is exclusive. South Chicago Coal Dock Co. v. Bassett,
"* * * All compensation statutes create rights as well as benefits that were unknown to the common law. They also deprive injured employees of rights, such as the right to sue the employer at common law. Employers are likewise deprived of the right to make certain common-law defenses to claims for compensation. The chief benefit to employers is that they are immune from suits at common law." Adams v. Hercules Powder Co.
5. Relators expressly agreed to carry workmen's compensation insurance pursuant to the Longshoremen's and Defense Bases Acts, and thereby these statutes were read into and became a part of the contract. State Industrial Comm. v. Nordenholt Corp.
6. Clearly, the municipal court of the city of St. Paul has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Relators' liability to furnish medical service for the treatment of respondent's injury arose only under the Longshoremen's Act and can be enforced only in the manner therein prescribed. See, Burns v. Millers Mut. Cas. Co.
7. Prohibition is not a writ of right, but, in the absence of another legal remedy which is reasonably efficient and adequate, issues in the discretion of the court to prevent an inferior tribunal from proceeding in a matter over which it is wholly without jurisdiction or in which it is exceeding its legitimate power and authority. It is a writ of prevention and not of correction. State ex rel. Laurisch v. Johnson,
It follows that the writ of prohibition heretofore issued should be made absolute. Pursuant to Minn. St. 1941, §