delivered the opinion of the court:
Appellee, plaintiff below, brought suit against appellant, as defendant, to quiet title to a quarter section of land located in Kit Carson county. The defendant answered, setting up several defenses. To this answer the plaintiff filed a reply, putting in issue its affirmative averments. The case was tried to the court, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendant has appealed.
Plaintiff, in order to establish his title, introduced in evidence the judgment roll of the district court of the city and county of Denver, including- the judgment rendered in an action in which the appellee was plaintiff, and The Reliance Trust Company defendant. .The action was to recover on a money demand. An attachment was issued and service had upon the defendant by publication. Un
It is contended the judgment roll shows that certain steps taken were not sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction. We think they were.
It is also contended the roll fails to exhibit that, certain other steps were taken. The mere absence from the judgment roll of proofs which ought to have been included does not establish affirmatively in a collateral attack, that a court of record was without jurisdiction. to .enter the judgment it did—Farmers’ Union Ditch Co. v. Rio Grande Canal Co., 37 Colo. 512. This rule applies in attachment cases.—Burris v. Craig, 34 Colo. 383; Van Wagenen v. Carpenter, 27 Colo. 444.
Defendant, in order to establish title, offered in evidence a tax deed to the premises in controversy, which, on objection of the plaintiff, was refused. It appeared upon the face of the deed that several non-contiguous tracts of land were offered and sold en masse for a gross sum. Such a sale is void, and a tax deed which shows this fact is also void.—Page v. Gillette, 47 Colo. 289; Clark v. Huff, 49 Colo. 197.
The tax deed was dated October 22, 1898, and was recorded November 27, 1901. Plaintiff’s case was insti
The defendant also pleaded that for a period of seven successive years prior to the commencement of the action he and his prior grantors had been, and .still were, in possession of the premises in controversy, in good faith, under color and claim of title. By virtue of this plea it is contended by counsel for defendant that the tax deed exhibited color of title and should have been received in evidence by virtue of the provisions of section 2923-e, 3 Mills’ Stats. A tax deed does not constitute color of title so as to set in motion this statute of limitations until filed for record.—Sayre v. Sage, supra.
Patent from the government for the land involved was issued to one Harold A. Carpenter in 1891. In February, 1902, Carpenter and his wife executed a quit-claim deed to one Edward J. Batie, a remote grantor of the defendant. These conveyances were offered by the defendant, and received in evidence, as, also, mesne conveyances, from which it appeared that whatever title Batie obtained from the Carpenters was vested in the defendant. Counsel contends that this chain of title, in connection with the testimony regarding possession and payment of taxes, established a title superior to that of plaintiff. Prior to
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed.