485 U.S. 913 | SCOTUS | 1988
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in this case that the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce
The court recognized that its view of the pre-emptive scope of the Carmack Amendment was shared by three other Circuits. See 829 F. 2d, at 1414 (citing Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Illinois Central Gulf R. Co., 721 F. 2d 483, 484-485 (CA5 1983), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 832 (1984); Fulton v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 481 F. 2d 326, 331-332 (CA8), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1040 (1973); W. D. Lawson & Co. v. Penn Central Co., 456 F. 2d 419, 421 (CA6 1972)). The court noted that a divergent position had been taken by the Tenth Circuit, however, in Reed v. AAACON Auto Transport, Inc., 637 F. 2d 1302, 1304-1305 (1981); Litvak Meat Co. v. Baker, 446 F. 2d 329 (1971); and L. E. Whitlock Truck Service, Inc. v. Regal Drilling Co., 333 F. 2d 488 (1964). For example, the Litvak court held that the Carmack Amendment “did not oust all other remedial rights of shippers” against interstate carriers. 446 F. 2d, at 337.
Accordingly, because a conflict exists among the Circuits concerning the pre-emptive scope of the Carmack Amendment, I would grant certiorari.
Lead Opinion
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.