Hughes v. Tupelo Oil Co., Inc.Hughes v. Tupelo Oil Co., Inc.
Ronald Wayne Haven, second child of Frances Haven, was born on December 10, 1963. Before Ronald reached his second birthday, his father died. Ten (10) years later, Ronald‘s mother remarried.
Ronald dropped out of school during the eleventh grade. He went to work for Gem, Incorporated, and left the home of his mother and stepfather to live with his older sister Mary and her husband. Becausе Ronald worked the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift, he seldom saw Mary, who worked days. He did, however, help care for Mary‘s six-year-old son, and he became close friends with Mary‘s husband, Butch.
On the evеning of February 11, 1983, Ronald was working at Gem, Incorporated. He spent his 7:00 p.m. supper break at the Wagon Wheel Restaurant, as was his custom. Later that evening, between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., Ronald returned to the Wagon Wheel. Gloria Turner, whose family owned the restaurant, saw Ronald and believed he had been drinking.
As Ronald left the Wagon Wheel he happened uрon his younger brother Allen, who was about to ride to Memphis with a friend. Ronald went along for the ride and drank from a bottle of gin during the trip. After returning from Memphis, Ronald and Allen went to the Hughes hоme, where Allen lived with the boys’ mother and stepfather. Allen went to bed, and Ronald went into the bedroom of his younger sister Ann. He awakened her, and the two discussed an upcoming cоncert in Memphis. Then Allen asked Ann to go with him the following day to purchase a Valentine‘s Day present for their mother. When Ann expressed concern about not having enough monеy, Ronald assured her he would pay for the gift. Ronald then kissed his sister, said he would see her the next day, and left.
Shortly before 2:00 a.m. on that same night, Eddy Brown, an employee of Tupelo Oil Company, was driving from Tupelo, Mississippi, to West Memphis, Arkansas, in an eighteen-wheel truck. The weather was clear as Brown trаvelled west on Highway 78. Monitoring the citizens’ band radio, Brown heard a report that there was “someone in the road” ahead. Brown reduced his speed until he passed the area where the pedestrian had been sighted. He then began to regain speed, and he dimmed his lights for oncoming eastbound traffic, continuing to look for the pedestrian.
Then Eddy Brown saw Ronald Wayne Haven running straight toward him down the center line of the highway. Brown, the only witness to what occurred next, testified as follows. Because there was a steep slopе on the right shoulder, Brown swerved to the left to avoid Ronald. When Brown swerved, however, Ronald changed his path and again ran directly toward the oncoming truck. Brown then cut sharply tо the right in a final attempt to avoid the boy. The effort was in vain. The tractor-trailer struck the boy and then jack-knifed. Ronald Wayne Haven was found dead on the steep slopе to the right of the highway. He was nineteen (19).
Frances Haven Hughes filed a wrongful death action alleging negligence. Named as defendants were Brown and Tupelo Oil Company. At trial, Hughes called Brown as an adverse witness and elicited the following: 1) that Brown, who was driving with his lights on dim at the time of the accident, was travelling at such a speed that he could not stop within the range of his headlights, and 2) that Brown did not brake when he first saw Ronald. By way of defense, Brown and Tupelo Oil Company attempted to prove that Ronald committed suicide by deliberаtely running into the path of the oncoming truck. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
Hughes appeals, assigning as error the admission, over objection, of the investigating officer‘s testimony that no traffic citation was issued to Brown as a result of the incident. The admission of this testimony was reversible error. It allowed defense counsel to put on circumstantial evidence of the officer‘s opinion as to the ultimate issue — liability. No doubt, defense counsel was attempting to persuade the jury to reason as follows: since the оfficer did not cite Brown, he must not have been at fault; since he was not at fault, he cannot be held liable. Such testimony is inadmissible. South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Parker, 491 So. 2d 212, 214 (Miss. 1986); West Cash and Carry Bldg. Materials v. Palumbo, 371 So. 2d 873, 877-78 (Miss. 1979);
On cross-appeal, Brown and Tupelo Oil Company raise two (2) evidentiary questions. Because the Mississippi Rules of Evidence will be applicable on remand, we base our analysis on those rules.
Brown and Tupelo Oil argue that the trial court erred in refusing tо admit evidence that Ronald, two (2) or three (3) months before his death, had attempted suicide by lying down in the highway in the path of a truck. The trial judge excluded the evidence as being too remote. Miss.R. Evid. 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
Finally, Brown and Tupelo Oil Company argue that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence that Ronald‘s blood alcohol content, tested at the request of the investigаting officer, was .15%. The trial court excluded the evidence, ruling that the highway patrol officer had no authority to request the blood alcohol test. On appeal Hughes argues that the trial court properly excluded the evidence, based on
In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976), the United States Supreme Court considered the admissibility, in a federal civil tax case, of wagering records unlawfully seized by a state law enforcement offiсer. The Court noted that “[i]n the complex and turbulent history of the [exclusionary] rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceedings, fedеral or state.” Janis, 428 U.S. at 447, 96 S. Ct. at 3029, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1057. Balancing the deterrent effect of the rule against the societal costs of excluding relevant and reliable evidence, the Court held exclusion of suсh evidence in federal civil proceedings was unwarranted.
In the case at bar, exclusion of this relevant evidence would have no deterrent effect, since the parties penalized would be Brown and Tupelo Oil, rather than the officer who ordered the unauthorized test. We make no determination of the admissibility of evidence obtainеd through the wrongful acts of the party seeking its admission, nor do we retreat from our holding that evidence seized by the State in violation of the state and federal constitutions is inadmissiblе in quasi-criminal proceedings. See, e.g., State for Use of Kemper County v. Brown, 219 Miss. 383, 68 So. 2d 419 (1953). On remand, the results of the blood alcohol test should be admitted into evidence.
Because the trial court erred in admitting the officer‘s testimony that no traffic citation was issued, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED ON BOTH DIRECT APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL.
ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
DAN M. LEE, J., concurs in result only.