111 Ga. App. 389 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1965
Lead Opinion
The defendant Pan American World Airways demurred on the ground that the petition failed to set out a cause of action against it either individually or jointly with any other defendant. The allegations directed particularly against it are to the effect that Del Rocco, who wrote the letter, furnished it to the other defendants within the scope of his employment, it being a part of his duties to furnish in proper case and under proper circumstances such letters on employees and former employees; that the letter was untrue and false because plaintiff was in fact employed by this defendant as Supervisor of Buildings and Facilities as he stated in his announcement; that the personnel files of Pan-American show the letter was false and that this defendant on at least one other occasion furnished plaintiff’s subsequent employer with the correct information on October 1, 1955. Plaintiff then alleges that Del Rocco, “furnished said letter to the other defendants herein with the full knowledge of the falsity of the same, and with full knowledge that the same was and would be injurious to the plaintiff and said activity of the said Del Rocco, as agent aforesaid, became a part of the said conspiracy of said defendants in publishing said false malicious and libelous letter causing said harm and hurt to your plaintiff.”
Merely to state that a former employee was a diesel generator operator is not actionable per se, as there is nothing about this occupation which is criminal, debasing, or having a tendency to hold one up to public hatred, ridicule and contempt. Since no special damages.are sought, and since the information conveyed by World Airways to Schnall in answer to Schnall’s inquiry was not actionable in and of itself in the absence of special damage it is not the original publication of the material by this letter to Schnall of which the plaintiff complains, but the republication of the letter by Schnall in the special circumstances set out in the petition. To hold the employer liable for this republication, it
It was not error to sustain the general demurrer of Pan-American World Airways, Inc.
“When in an action for libel the words declared on are harmless in themselves, and the petition alleges no extrinsic facts which would show that the words might be taken in other than their ordinary sense, a cause of action for a libel is not sufficiently set forth. . . If in the light of extrinsic facts words apparently harmless are such as to convey to the mind of the reader who is acquainted with the extrinsic facts a meaning which will be calculated to expose the person about whom the words are used to contempt or ridicule, then such harmless words become libelous, and an action is well brought although no .special damages may be alleged.” Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 221 (50 SE 68, 6 9LRA 101, 106 ASR 104, 2 AC 561), and see Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Stanley, 56 Ga. App. 85 (4) (192 SE 300). “To write and publish of another that he is a liar is libelous.” Colvard v. Black, 110 Ga. 642 (1) (36 SE 80); Huey v. Sechler, 107 Ga. App. 467, 469 (130 SE2d 754). In Colvard the plaintiff was called a liar in print; as previously stated, the words used in the letter printed as a part of Mr. Rhodes’ advertisement do not, on their face, convey any suggestion that the plaintiff in any way falsified his qualifications or that he was engaged in any prior course of conduct which was illegitimate, reprehensible, or which would subject him to ridicule. The letter, even though inaccurate, was in no way libelous. See in this connection Anderson v. Kennedy, 47 Ga. App. 380 (170 SE 555). “It may be stated as a general proposition that the question whether language used in impugning a claim or the good faith of the claimant will support an action of libel or slander depends on whether that language imputes crime, fraud, or other reprehensible conduct; to be actionable, the language must be more than hypothetical and must exclude the possibility that the claimant acted in good faith.” 33 Am. Jur. 70, Libel and Slander, § 49. Construing the petition against the pleader, as we must, it then remains to be determined whether the extrinsic facts alleged support the conclusion that
Since the conclusion of the plaintiff, that the language used had the effect of calling him a liar because it was contradictory to previous language used by the plaintiff, is not sustained by the facts alleged, it must be disregarded.
The trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers of the defendants and dismissing the petition.
Judgment affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially. I concur in the judgment for a reason different from those of the majority. It is affirmatively alleged twice that the advertisement was published in the newspaper by all three of the defendants and there are no allegations which are inconsistent with those allegations. The defect in the petition, as I see it, is that it is not alleged when the plaintiff moved to Marietta. In the absence of such an allegation there is no basis for the allegation that the publication was understood by those who read it to charge the plaintiff with telling a falsehood.