Christopher Hughes, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Respondent
No. 433 C.D. 2017
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Submitted: October 6, 2017; FILED: February 14, 2018
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge; HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge; HONORABLE J. WESLEY OLER, Jr., Senior Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE J. WESLEY OLER, Jr., Senior Judge
OPINION BY JUDGE WOJCIK
Christopher Hughes petitions for review of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole‘s (Board) Mаrch 6, 2017 decision denying his request for administrative relief and affirming the Board‘s March 8, 2016 order recommitting Hughes as a convicted parole violator (CPV) and recalculating his parole violation maximum date. Appоinted counsel, David Crowley, Esq. (Counsel) has filed an application to withdraw as counsel, asserting that Hughes’ petition for review is meritless. We grant Counsel‘s application and affirm the Board‘s decision.
On February 1, 2012, Hughes wаs sentenced to a 2- to 5-year term with a minimum expiration date of December 27, 2013, and a maximum expiration date of December 27, 2016. Certified Record (C.R.) at 12-13. On December 29, 2013, Hughes was released on parole. Id. Upon his release, Hughes signed the following acknowledgement:
If you are convicted of a crime committed while on parole/reparole, the Board has the authority, after an appropriatе hearing, to recommit you to serve the balance of the sentence or sentences which you were serving when paroled or reparoled, with no credit for time at liberty on parole.
On August 18, 2014, Hughes was arrested in Lackawanna County on drug-related charges and held in lieu of $50,000 bail, which was never posted. C.R. at 17-20, 31. The Board issued a detainer warrant that same dаte. C.R. at 21. After Hughes entered a guilty plea, he waived his right to a revocation hearing and was recommitted as a CPV to serve 18 months backtime when available. C.R. at 24-25, 52-61. He filed a pro se administrative appeal from that dеcision on April 24, 2015. C.R. at 64-66. The Board affirmed its decision on June 29, 2015, and Hughes did not appeal. C.R. at 70-71.
On September 10, 2015, following the withdrawal and re-entry of his guilty plea, Hughes was sentenced to a term of 18 to 36 months, followed by 3 years оf special probation. C.R. at 79. He again waived his right to a revocation hearing. C.R. at 85-86. The Board rescinded its prior action and recommitted Hughes as a CPV to serve 18 months backtime, establishing a new maximum parоle date of November 1, 2018. C.R. at 87-99.
Hughes filed an administrative appeal, asserting, among other things, that the Board impermissibly exceeded the judicially-imposed maximum sentence date when it recalculated his maximum date for release on parole. C.R. at 101-105. In its March 6, 2017 determination, the Board denied Hughes’ appeal, C.R. at 110,
When a court-appointed counsel concludes that a petitioner‘s appeal is meritless, counsel may be permitted to withdraw if counsel: (1) notifies the petitioner of the request to withdraw; (2) furnishes the petitioner with a cоpy of an Anders brief or a no-merit letter satisfying the requirements of Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);3 and (3) advises the petitioner of his right to retain new counsel or submit a brief on his own behalf. Miskovitch v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 77 A.3d 66, 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Once appointed counsel has fully complied with the technical requirements for withdrawal, the Court will independently review the merits of the petitioner‘s claims. Id. at 70.
In this appeal, Hughes had a statutory right to counsel, and Counsel was only
The record reflects that Counsel informed Hughes of Counsel‘s request to withdraw; provided Hughes with a copy of the Anders brief that details Counsel‘s review of the issues and the reasons why Counsel concluded those issues are meritless; and advised Hughes of his right to retain new counsel or raise any new points he might deem worthy of consideration. Because Counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements for withdrawal, the Court will independently review the merits of Hughes’ appeal.
Hughes first argues that the Board acted contrary to law by imposing a sanction that exceeds the remaining balance of his judiсially-imposed maximum sentence when it recomputed his maximum parole date to November 1, 2018. Although phrased in various ways, it is clear that this argument rests entirely on Hughes’ mistaken belief that the maximum date of his sentence, rather than the maximum length of his sentence, is cоntrolling for purposes of recalculating his parole violation maximum date.
When Hughes was paroled on December 29, 2013, 1,094 days remained on his original sentence. C.R. at 98-99, 54, 57. He was recommitted as a CPV and returned to the Board‘s custody on November 3, 2015. The Board‘s recommitment order properly added the remainder of his original sentence, 1,094 days, to the date of his return to the Board‘s custody. Thus, when the Board imposed backtime, the Board did not impose an additional sentence on Hughes but, rather, directed Hughes to complete the original judicially-mandated sentence. Epps v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 565 A.2d 214, 217 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). See also Gundy v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 478 A.2d 139, 141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) (noting that the Board‘s action in recommitting a parolee “had no effect” upon the parolee‘s judicially-imposed sentence). Accordingly, Hughes’ argument that the Board erred in extending his new maximum parole date beyond the maximum date of his original sentencе is meritless.
Hughes also argues that the Board erred in denying him credit for time he spent at liberty on parole. Hughes asserts that Section 6138 of the Code requires the Board to credit a parolee with street time priоr to an arrest on new charges where
If the parolee‘s recommitment [as a CPV] is sо ordered, the parolee shall be reentered to serve the remainder of the term which the parolee would have been compelled to serve had the parole not been granted and, except as provided under paragraph (2.1), shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on parole.
Finally, Hughes contends that the Board‘s failure to credit him for time served pursuant to the Board‘s detainer is cоntrary to law, particularly where the Board‘s detainer has “stripped” his right to be released on bail. Petition for Review ¶3(b). As to this issue, the law is settled:
[I]f a defendant is being held in custody solely because of a detainer lodged by the Board and has otherwise met the requirements for bail on the new criminal charges, the time which he spent in custody shall be credited against his new sentence. If a defendant, however, remains incarcerated prior to trial because hе has failed to satisfy bail requirements on the new criminal charges, then the time spent in custody shall be credited to his new sentence.
Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 412 A.2d 568, 571 (Pa. 1980) (emphasis in original); Hammonds v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 143 A.3d 994, 997 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Here, Hughes did not post bail on the new criminal charges, and the Board‘s detainer did nоt affect his ability to do so. Accordingly, this argument also is meritless.
Accordingly, we grant Counsel‘s application to withdraw and affirm the Board‘s decision.
MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of February, 2018, the Application to Withdraw as Counsel filed by David Crowley, Esq., is GRANTED, and the decision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, dated March 6, 2017, is AFFRIMED.
MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
Notes
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set[s] forth counsel‘s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) states counsel‘s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
