Hughes v. NoyesHughes v. Noyes
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A proceeding in equity, in the nature of a creditor’s bill, was begun in Clark county, by appellant, to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance of real estate, being the separate property of Reuhamia Noyes, made by her and Gilman Noyes, her husband, to their son, Frank G. Noyes, all of whom were made defendants to the bill, and to subject said property to the payment of a certain judgment obtained by appellant against Gilman and Reuhamia Noyes. The evidence was taken before the master, who reported it to the court, with his findings, in favor of complainant, but the chancellor set aside the findings and entered a decree in favor of the defendants. The Appellate Court having affirmed that decree, this appeal is prosecuted.
The appellant’s judgment against Gilman and Reuhamia Noyes was entered on November 21,1893, in vacation, by virtue of a power of attorney to confess judgment, contained in certain promissory notes executed by Reuhamia and Gilman Noyes. It was urged by the defendants in their answer and on the hearing, and it is insisted here, that the judgment was irregularly obtained, and therefore void, and that the notes upon which it was entered were obtained by duress and fraud as to Reuhamia Noyes. Neither of these contentions is sustained by the evidence, in our opinion, nor is it sufficient to justify us in opening up the judgment in order that the question of fraud and duress may be submitted to a jury.
We have often held that where a party seeks to remove a fraudulent conveyance or encumbrance out of the way of his execution, he may file his bill for that purpose as soon as he has obtained his judgment and before he has made any effort to satisfy it out of other property of the creditor. (Weightman v. Hatch, 17 Ill. 281,—citing Miller v. Davidson, 3 Gilm 518. See, also, Newman v. Willetts, 52 Ill. 98, Bennett v. Stout, 98 id. 47, and many later cases.) Under these decisions it was unnecessary for appellant
Briefly, the theory of appellant is, that he, as a mere friend of the Noyes family, went security for them to start a grocery store, having confidence in them and believing they had ample property to protect him against loss; that as a result, in less than a year he had become liable for them to the extent of about § 1200, for which amount he insisted upon, and did receive, their notes; that this was in January, 1893; that on November 21, following, Gilman Noyes, finding himself about to fail in business, gave his wife his promissory note for § 1200, upon which she immediately took judgment and had execution issued and levied on the stock of groceries then on hand; that on the same day appellant took judgment on his notes; that two days thereafter Frank G. Noyes filed a deed to the property in dispute from Reuhamia Noyes to himself, which was dated October 18,1893; that some time before the failure, on November 21, 1893, Gil-man Noyes, finding- that failure was inevitable, fraudulently procured all the merchandise he could get on his credit, without expecting to pay for it; that the note given to his wife was without consideration, fraudulent, and void as to creditors; that Frank G. Noyes took said deed in contemplation of such insolvency, without consideration, and for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding the creditors of Reuhamia Noyes.
Appellees’ contention is, that at the solicitation of the appellant, Gilman Noyes, with appellant as a silent partner and furnishing the credit, went into the grocery business; that in January, 1893, they dissolved partnership, appellant retiring from the business, and in settlement with him the notes upon which he took judgment were given; that between January, 1893, and November 21, 1893, Reuhamia Noyes loaned her husband, at various times, certain sums of money, amounting in all to § 800; that Gilman Noyes had also owed his wife § 400 for several years previous
The principles of equity which enter into this case are defined and regulated by chapter 59 of the Revised Statutes, as follows:
“Sec. 4. Every gift, grant, conveyance, assignment or transfer of or charge upon any estate, real or personal, or right or thing in action, or any rent or profit thereof, made with intent to disturb, delay, hinder or defraud creditors or other persons, and every bond or other evidence of debt given, suit commenced, decree or judgment suffered, with like intent, shall be void as against such creditors, purchasers and other persons.
“Sec. 5. The foregoing section shall not affect the title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless it appear that he had notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor.”
There are three modes of ascertaining the fraudulent intent quoted in the statute above: (1) It may be inferred from the circumstances, as a conclusive presumption of law; (2) as a prima facie or rebuttable presumption of law; (3) as an argumentative conclusion of fact. It is said in Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (vol. 2, par. 971): “In the first place, where a conveyance is made upon a valuable consideration, and is alleged to be fraudulent against the grantor’s creditors, an actual and express intent to hinder, delay or defraud is necessary to be proved. *
The first question which naturally presents itself in this case, under these rules, is, was the deed from Reuhamia Noyes to Frank G. Noyes made upon a valuable consideration. This subject was gone into at great length on the trial. It was shown by appellees that the consideration paid consisted of $250 cash, $170 assumed on a mortgage which Reuhamia Noyes was bound to pay and which was released to her as a part of the consideration for this property, $53 for work previously done, and $30 for a barn built by Frank G. for Reuhamia at her request; also, the note of Frank G. to her for $-100 at the date of the deed, making in all $1203. It was shown that Frank G. Noyes, at some time after the conveyance was made, paid $100 and interest on the assumed mortgage, and one Routines, whose evidence appears by the record to be disinterested and reliable, testified that he purchased the $100 note above mentioned from Reuhamia Noyes for $375. There is no, direct evidence in the record to impeach the foregoing facts as to the consideration I)aid for the land by Frank G. Noyes to his mother. The assessment of the county assessor, showing that Frank G. Noyes listed his personal property for that year, and for several years previous, at but a little over $100, in no proper sense tends to disprove
Prom what has been said, it follows that appellant could only maintain his bill by proving that Reuhamia Noyes made the conveyance with actual intent to defraud her creditors, and that the transaction on the part of Prank G. Noyes was made with notice of such intent. Much of the evidence goes to show the fraudulent character of the judgment obtained by Reuhamia Noyes against Gilman Noyes, the object, no doubt, being to show a conspiracy between Reuhamia, Gilman and Prank G. Noyes to defraud the creditors of the former two. Reuhamia Noyes testified that she had loaned Gilman Noyes § 400 long prior to starting the grocery store; that after the settlement with the appellant, on January 24, 1893, and before November 16, 1893, she loaned him § 800; that she did not know the dates when these various sums were given to him, — only kept a “kind of a memorandum;” that the money she loaned him she had derived from the sale of property, etc., before and after she had moved to town; that she got § 500 or § 600 after she came to town; that she got § 250 from Prank G. Noyes the day she delivered him the deed, October 21,1893; that she also sold the note Prank G. Noyes gave her, after October 21, 1893, to Roy Romines for § 375. The trouble with this transaction is the uncertainty that pervades the matter. She only kept a “kind of a memorandum” of the amounts advanced, and neither Gilman Noyes nor Reuhamia Noyes can tell anything about the time or the amounts paid on this loan to Gilman Noyes, except Gilman says he remembers of § 60 in April and § 55 in the summer, while Reuhamia Noyes testified that she did not think she gave him any of it in the spring. We think it may safely be assumed that this, evidence fails to show an indebtedness against Gilman Noyes and in
The law is well settled that a wife may loan her separate property to her husband, and he can give her security, which will be binding against both prior and subsequent creditors; but the law is equally well established that the mere fact of the wife letting the husband have her money to use is not sufficient as against other creditors. The actual contractual relations must appear by satisfactory evidence. (Iseninger v. Criswell, 67 N. W. Rep. 290; Ronans v. Maddow, 77 Iowa, 206.) When the rights of creditors are involved, the law will not, from mere delivery by her of money to him, imply a promise to repay her, but will require more,—either an express promise, or circumstances to prove that in such matter the husband and wife dealt with each other as debtor and creditor. (Steadman v. Wilbur, 7 R. I. 481.) “A claim by a wife against a husband, first put in writing when his liabilities begin to jeopardize his future, should always be regarded with watchful suspicion, and when attempted to be asserted against creditors upon the evidence of the parties alone, uncorroborated by other proof, should be rejected at once, unless their statements are so full and convincing as to make the fairness and justness of the claim manifest.” Clark v. Rosenbraus, 31 N. J. Eq. 667.
But, notwithstanding the notes given November 16, 1893, by Gilman Noyes to his wife, and the‘judgment obtained on them, were void as to creditors of Gilman, the evidence fails to show an actual intent at that time in Reuhamia Noyes to defraud such creditors. The question here is, whether there was such actual intent on her part existing on October 18, 1893,—the date of the deed, —to hinder, delay or defraud her creditors. The evidence showed that the only debts she owed, except those due her son, Frank G., were the notes to appellant, neither of which was then due, and upon which she was merely surety for
As we have said, the evidence fails to show knowledge by Frank G. Noyes of the condition of affairs in the grocery business at the date and delivery of his deed, which
We have given the evidence in this case the fullest care and consideration, and while we are not prepared to say the cause is free from doubt, in view of the family relations existing between the parties, yet we are unable to say, under the rules of law applicable, that the decree of the circuit court was not authorized. The judgment of the Appellate Court will accordingly be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Boggs took no part in this decision.