Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.

HUGHES, Appellant, Thomas

MASSEY-FERGUSON, INC., Appellee.

No. 93-548. Iowa. Supreme Court of Sept. Fuerste, Carew,

William C. Fuerste Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque, Coyle, Juergens & Trannel, Hughes Hughes and Alfred E. & P.C., Dubuque, appellant. for

Frederick G. White Frederick G. White Office, Waterloo, Pawlak, and Ronald Law MI, Troy, appellee. HARRIS, P.J.,

Considered LAVORATO, NEUMAN, ANDREASEN, TERNUS, JJ. NEUMAN, Justice.

Appellant Thomas seeks a third injuries sus- trial in this suit for severe operating a combine manufac- tained while Massey-Ferguson. tured defendant whether, question contends, erroneously the district on a state of the art de- structed Because we believe the issue was fense. submitted, properly we affirm. morning of October On Massey- harvesting Hughes was corn with 295 (MF760) Ferguson pur- model 760 combine such concept devices that the of state began apply. chased his father 1973. Trouble of the art does not when the six-row cornhead mounted Sufficiency I. clogged. front of combine became the evidence. was well aware manufacturer expert Thomas contends that the evidence

warnings engine that the should be shut off Massey-Ferguson put forth at best raised an knew, unclogging before the head. He how- regarding issue whether the combine and ever, stop that he could the machine’s for- cornhead conformed to custom in the indus- and, ward engine movement run- try, not state of the art. Because the two ning, raise the cornhead to allow the mecha- concepts synonymous, are not Hughes claims nism to run and clear itself. erroneously the court instructed on an issue having evidentiary support. clogged, Hughes As the cornhead became thought coming noticed what he was smoke Our review is for the correction of through engine compartment. Fearing errors at law. Sandhorst v. Mauk’s Trans fire, engine quickly he felt he had to act Inc., (Iowa fer, 1977). 252 N.W.2d origin determine the of the smoke. Instead considering When evidentiary whether sup descending steps walking the cab and port exists, for an instruction we engine compart- behind the combine to the evidence the most favorable construction it ment, he crossed the front of the machine will bear. Id. If the record contains evi stepping guardrail surrounding over a support party’s defense, dence theory platform. stair engine running With the at the court’s decision to so jury instruct speed full and the cornhead in the raised should not appeal. be disturbed on Id. position, placed his foot on the narrow (1991) Iowa governs Code section 668.12 rim three-inch of the cornhead’s the state of the provides art defense. It that trough. step As he took another he lost his any brought against action a manufacturer balance auger. and fell into the He was damages arising alleged defects machine, pulled into the peril- “throat” of the product, percentage of a “a beaters, ously ultimately close to the and lost assigned fault shall not persons to such if leg. his left they plead and con- Massey-Ferguson sued on theo formed to the state of existence at negligence liability. ries of and strict A first the time the was ... manufac- tured_” trial, resulting Hughes, verdict for § Iowa Code 668.12.

was reversed and a new trial ordered based us, Pertinent the case before appeals’ finding on the court of Corporation, Chown v. USM 297 N.W.2d 218 question engendered, had not been (Iowa 1980), we drew a distinction between submitted, should not have been on the issue industry” what is considered “custom in the liability. Hughes Massey- strict See and what is “state of the art.” We said that Inc., Ferguson, 490 N.W.2d “[ejustom being refers what was done in App.1992). Following negli retrial on the industry; state of the art refers to what gence only, claim found that feasibly could have been done.” Id. at 221 combine and cornhead conformed to the state added). (emphasis recognized Our decision specifications of the art for all may lag that technologi custom well behind except adequacy warning. It found that 222; developments. cal Id. accord warn, however, from failure to fault 169, 182, O’Brien v. 94 N.J. Muskin Hughes’ injuries. not a cause of (N.J.1983). question, 463 A.2d n appeal following concluded, anyone On this denial of “is whether else trial, more, motion for doing although may new he claims the court was be con sidered, submitting erred in the state of the art in- but whether the evidence disclosed (1) anything struction reasonably because the evidence was insuf- more could economically ficient to such a his be done.” 297 N.W.2d Paccar, Inc., specific allegations (quoting involved at 221 Hancock v. (1979)). combines manufac- models of John Deere Neb. guards. contained such tured before 1960 industry custom as jury may consider Thus a art, evi but such of state evidence all but two Morton countered conclusively the not establish dence does pro- major manufacturers 222; also Id. at see the art defense. state of years just a few open augers; within duced 94, 98 Corp., 514 N.W.2d v. Avco Hillrichs auger open augers. A shielded went with all 1994) industry cus (compliance with he technologically practical was not defense). complete a tom not testing experience suggested, because solid or that a cover—whether revealed context, is used As the term crop flow into interfere with mesh —would product design that “feasibility” connotes critical auger operator’s and obstruct technologically, sound. practically, as well Fur- and its contents. view of the eornhead 222. courts Other thermore, auger he stated See, similarly. e.g., applied the doctrine have location,” by concept approved “guarded by a Corp., 58 Wash. v. Fibreboard Crittenden Engi- Society Agricultural American of (1990); n. 2 794 P.2d App. (ASAE) and federal OSHA standards. neers 183-84, O’Brien, 463 A.2d at 305. 94 N.J. at auger concept, open Under this regula government suggest that Still others tentionally area difficult to ac- located an by may proper a standard furnish tions cess, expo- thereby minimizing the risk of See, feasibility. e.g., Fra measure which to location, tes- This inaccessible Morton sure. Colo.App. Kysor Corp., 43 Indus. zier tified, safety equivalent using a was the (1979), 1296, 1301 rev’d on 607 P.2d safety Expanding on this auger metal cover. (Colo.1982). P.2d 908 We grounds, 642 other consideration, that a cov- Slavens testified all these one or believe evidence auger, by increasing the likelihood of ered and material on the factors would be relevant per- chance of clogging, would enhance the a state of the art defense question of whether injury by inviting operator into the sonal sufficiently to warrant has established disputed area of the obstruction. He also jury. to the submission feasibility'of placing auger a covered on a weight, eornhead to increase multirow due us, we Turning to the record before drives, power and cost. tendered satisfied that the defendant are state of the art —not compliance with Guardrailing. opined that a 2. Sevart specifi just industry each of the custom —on guardrail the area of access to the between design alleged negligent cations unguarded engine compartment and the primarily of Hughes. The evidence consisted auger provide need- cross and beaters would testimony plaintiffs expert, John Se- safety operators checking engine mal- ed vart, admittedly engineer with a mechanical acknowledged that no other functions. He manu experience or no or little railings. manufacturer utilized such opinions equipment. farm facture of Sevart’s however, stated, guardrail simple He experts Earle were countered defendant’s ordinary tubing, such as the made of metal Morton, safety engineer at Mas after the acci- one father installed MF760, sey-Ferguson who worked dent, technology with avail- was consistent Slavens, Deere Wayne a retired John able in 1973. engineer and corn- who combines manufacturer Morton testified that follows heads for that manufacturer. What railings not to install on the back of elected testimony summary competing is a operator the eornhead because the did Hughes’ allegations offered on each in that area when the machine need negligent design. Existing railings running. next away operator auger. opined that cab were meant to direct over Sevart Cover machinery. exiting when over the would from the head mesh cover railing testified that the prevented operator like Both he and Slavens have counterpro- machinery suggested by would be becoming entangled in the Sevart from safety, inviting operator’s ductive to the of a fall. He testified that certain the event danger. Additionally, trip stop the device and the machine unnec- operator into zone railing Second, essarily. exposure testified that a this location Slavens the device to operator’s from the likely obstruct the view elements would make it unreliable. unnecessarily complicate Slavens, the use of Along expressed cab and who concern machinery attachments. that such a out cable would be of reach of caught auger, one in the such a feared engine compartment. route to 3. Access operator device would a false sense requiring that cited ASAE standards Sevart security, contrary safety. provided steps and handholds be to facilitate entry operating from and servic- to and exit Warnings.1 Although Hughes con- that, ing positions. Hughes complained un- many ceded that the combine carried warn- operator less the chose climb down instructing operator stop decals machinery behind the the cab and cross servicing the or unclogging machine before it operator engine, the was forced service header, Sevart told the that in to cross front of the cab—which slants warnings inadequate. were He believed that are no forward —where there handholds. danger signals should have been affixed in major Noting that other manufacturers potential areas access to the throat. He safety limited the access routes on the ma- also believed use of the word “caution” was chinery Massey- Morton stated that convey machinery’s too to danger. weak Ferguson only put handholds where it want- Hughes Massey-Ferguson also claimed the operator to be. that ed the Slavens testified warnings were not state of the art because he knew of no combine manufacturer that they proper procedure faded to advise the cheeking servicing engine condoned or engine warnings case of an Nor fire. did the up. with the cornhead He believed that a (1) ledge caution that the three-inch behind company provided which a means of servic- (2) step, designate the header was not a engine up with the head and step desired route from the first to the turning would have been in violation of throat, or advise whether the head should ASAE standards. up during servicing. or down 4. device. that Sevart claimed Shutoff warnings Morton countered that the and equipped the combine should have been industry instructions conformed to custom emergency opera- an shutoff device to aid an acknowledged and ASAE standards. He experiencing tor difficulties while outside the operating operator manual did warn the suggested easy cab. He it would have been throat; to lower the cornhead to access the along to install a cable the back of the corn- unnecessary it he believed to state “the obvi- operator pull head which could to disen- ous.” He that the manual instructed advised gage power. He admitted that had he operator keep extinguisher a fire feasibility never tested the of such a device engine the cab in the event of fire. Slavens combine, on a nor was he aware of other many offered his too “no step” view using cornhead manufacturers such a fea- signs might disre- result their ultimate ture. He noted the use of such devices thereby actually gard, endangering oper- 1973, however, machinery on other was ator. suggested also not unusual. He alterna- safety tive features would have included Finally, alleged 6. Handholds. Sevart seat switch or clutch. adequate in the lack of handholds on disengaged forward-tilting area crossed Morton testified that 1973 a windshield by Hughes engine compart- clutch suitable for a machine the size of the to access Morton, yet developed. responding as he had to the MF760 had not As for ment. routes, cable, safety rejected charge access reiterat- the idea of a he its of insufficient First, safety providing grounds. pro- on two ed that dictated handholds only supposed to harvesting operator cornstalks tend to where the be. cess of application negligent Although appellant based on failure here makes no such conten- claims Prosoco, tion, opinion today another filed holds that the to warn. See Olson v. (Iowa 1994). § defense under has no 668.12 conclusion, proper- we believe the provide acces- The combine only art to the ly when the comhead issue submitted state sible handholds Finding down. for its careful consideration. error, upon judgment affirm the entered believe this evidence is together, we Taken jury’s verdict. support the court’s sub- ample to than the art defense instruc- mission state AFFIRMED. industry in 1973 custom tions. Evidence by testimony con- clearly supplemented TERNUS, justices except All concur technology, safety, prac- cerning issues LAVORATO, JJ., who concur HARRIS driving manufac- ticality, and economics specially. was also ten- turing Evidence decisions. TERNUS, (concurring specially). Justice govern- engineering pertinent dered majority agree opinion I concur in the guiding those choices. As ment standards judgment Massey-Fergu- favor of Chown, every safe- “[n]ot noted in this court affirmed. son should be technology exists is nec- ty device for which complains that the record did not essarily feasible.” contention, the of a state-of-the-art Contrary submission of the art apply object proposed state-of-the- was not asked did not containing believe, than instruction, no more law to a record art instruction. That industry evidence. The as- custom in the unnecessarily separately broad. I write signment is without merit. of error convey my should take this belief we opportunity define “state of “Simplistic claims” and state the

II. way distinguishes art” in a the art. affirmative defense from the elements of the Hughes’ argument on second plaintiffs ease. He claims that all of the is less conventional. confusing concept of the art is a as State shields, handles, described devices above— aptly pointed one commentator has out: danger signals so guardrails, —are art”? And what about “state of the “State straightforward that some date back to term, of the art” is a chameleon-like refer- so, being he asserts That the “cavemen.” ring everything ordinary customs regarded they possibly be “state of cannot objective of the trade to the existence thus claims error the court’s the art.” He technological information to fea- economic jury. the issue from the refusal to withdraw sibility. meanings Its are so diverse and appealing, Hughes’ Although superficially easily so confused that the wise course of unpersuasive. Devising a argument is sim- action, think, I is to eschew its use com- example, might ple railing, not have been pletely. breakthrough in technological but Wade, in Product John W. On Effect safely large powerful attaching it to a Liability Knowledge Prior to Unavailable clearly engineering exper- calls for Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 750-51 According Massey-Ferguson’s ex- tise. (1983). suggestion to abandon state of by perts, railing installed the homemade concept tempting. a distinct is neither safe nor reliable father was However, that alternative is available to inability by industry because of its standards design legisla- us defect cases because during vibrations to withstand the machine’s ture has codified state of the art as an affir- operation. considerations would The same mative defense Iowa. See Iowa Code by apply proposed of the devices to all (1993).1 § 668.12 rejected by Massey-Ferguson, Hughes and problematic Section 668.12 is for two rea- adequacy warning signals. including the First, Co., it does not contain a definition sons. Equip. Farm See Fell v. Kewanee (Iowa 1990) Second, (applying of the term “state of the art.” N.W.2d warn). an affirmative to claim of failure to statute makes state of the art the art defense negligent design challenge applicability of section 668.12 to cases. did not availability plead must of “a safer alternative de- that the defendant defense Thus, sign.” it is left to the court to define Chown USM prove. 1980); Miller, as to the defendant Keith De-

“state of the art” so by sign Litigation Myths as envisioned in Iowa: The the benefit of this defense Defect — However, Liability, time legislature. at the same Strict Drake L.Rev. (1991) (“One must be careful that we do define of the more critical factors broadly design risk-utility that the affirmative defense courts consider in their term so case, thereby plaintiffs analysis proof shift- product subsumes an alternative de- available.”). Fell, the burden of to the defendant. sign is See 457 N.W.2d at (fact question unreasonably dangerous just majority has done that. I believe the plaintiffs generated part element of case By injecting safety, eco- considerations by evidence that a safer existed at the art, practicality into state of the nomics and manufactured). time the nearly indistinguish- this defense has become concept or in the able from The Chown court’s definition of the unrea- liability, concept of unrea- case of strict sonably dangerous enlightening: element is sonably dangerous, elements we have tradi- case, risk-utility analysis In a tionally required plaintiff, not the defen- balancing gravity involves the “the dant, prove. danger posed challenged design, understanding problem An of this is most danger likelihood such would oc- easily examining gained first what cur, the mechanical of a safer products liability plaintiff must design, alternative cost of an financial alleging design tibis- case defect.2 improved design, and the adverse conse- case, negli- is a consider both quences to the and to the consum- liability gence and strict theories since er that would result from an alternative definition of state of the art we use here design.” liability presumably apply in a strict would case as well. (quoting 297 at 220-21 Bark N.W.2d Co., 413, Eng’g er v. Lull 20 Cal.3d 143 liability negligence a proving In under the- Cal.Rptr. 573 P.2d ory, prove plaintiff a must that the defendant added)). Thus, safety, (emphasis economics design product failed to “to be reason- practicality are factors to be considered reasonably ably used a foresee- when safe plaintiff determining whether the has met able manner.” Hillrichs v. Avco plaintiffs proof. burden of (Iowa 1994) added). (emphasis Safety any reflecting other factor on the Here, majority incorporated has these reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct defense. The factors into the state-of-the-art components plaintiffs of the case under a are suggest- majority relies evidence theory. design ed alternative was not as safe as the design proving liability liability design, that the alternate

In under a strict defendant’s impractical product less theory, plaintiff prove design must was and made the design product unreasonably functional and that the alternate defect made the dan Farm, costly. gerous. Equipment These considerations should Fell v. Kewanee (Iowa 1990). case, Co., plaintiffs properly Proof be factors 457 N.W.2d requires affirmative defense. The re- of unreasonableness to bal the defendant’s majority’s analysis utility product against sult of the is that ance the of a the risk effectively shifted deciding proof the risks has been of its use. Id. whether burden outweigh utility, jury may consider to the defendant.3 longer specifications of the art is no a defense in one of the warn, in this case was based on a failure to negligent failure to warn case. design my focus of discussion is on the defect allegations. ignore specifi- I the failure-to-wam persuasion, not the I refer burden holding cation because under our in Olson v. producing evidence. burden of Prosoco, Inc., (Iowa 1994), If the defendant failed scope the manufactured.4 that we limit the suggest consider then the this defense to minimize ov- proved that plaintiff had plaintiff’s case. whether of the

erlap with the elements already design, advantages of the alternate overlap is way prevent most effective The technologically possible, to be determined to mean state of define disadvantages alter- outweighed the knowledge and technical the level of scientific preferred design and should have been nate existing time the at the design This Robb, used the defendant. Gary A Prac- over C. and manufactured. analysis using the latter would be made the Art Approach to the Use State tical Cases, unreasonably dangerous factors for Liability Chown Products Evidence in Strict (1982). as modified above. The defense 77 N.W.U.L.Rev. solely technological possi-

would focus impact of this Now we must determine design. bility of an alternate suggested analytical framework on this case. technologically design Hughes argues in substance that the evi- If an alternate is it makes sense that the defendant was insufficient to a state-of- possible, dence failing of- be liable for to use the-art defense because the defendant would not designs invented or could not have the alternate that had not been fered hand, by Hughes’ expert if an alter- tech- suggested made. On the other were not Thus, possible argu- under the then ex- is nologically nate feasible. knowledge, technical of state of the art. isting scientific and for narrow definition plaintiff shift to the burden should case, problem has how- the al- the defendant should have used ever, argument is that he did not make this design actually design instead of the ternate Consequent- when the was instructed. analysis, weighing the merits of used. This ly, jury was instructed that state of the design against merits of the product’s art meant accomplished design, is under the alternate technologically practically could what analysis used to determine risk-benefit done at the time of manufac- have been unreasonably danger- whether the ture, based on the latest scientific knowl- unreasonably current test for dan- ous. Our field, design, edge and discoveries in the only slightly to gerous would be modified manufacture, in a and market the combine factor “the mechanical remove as a prevented manner that would have the in- design.” of an alternative safer The exis- juries meeting the needs. while consumer’s already tence of an alternate would added.) (Emphasis This broad definition jury’s have determined in the consider- beyond goes the consideration of mere scien- ation of the defendant’s affirmative defense knowledge. Hughes did tific and technical art. the alternate of state of the Whether object Consequently, to this instruction. part design is a safer would be argue he cannot that the evidence jury’s analysis when it considers risk-benefit was insufficient to submission of the consequences “the adverse defense as he now that would result from an and the consumer reason, I defines it. For this concur design.” alternative majority’s jury’s decision affirm the ver- summary, approach sug- under the dict. gest, first instruct the would LAVORATO, JJ., join HARRIS de- consider the defendant’s state-of-the-art special concurrence. successful, the defendant would fense. To be design sug- have to that the alternate

gested by plaintiff possible under knowledge exist- scientific and technical designed and at the time the slightly have to be modified. In the unusual case where no alternative de- sign suggested by plaintiff, this definition

Case Details

Case Name: Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.

Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa

Date Published: Sep 21, 1994

Citation: 522 N.W.2d 294

Docket Number: 93-548

Court Abbreviation: Iowa