754 So. 2d 636 | Ala. Civ. App. | 1999
Lead Opinion
Charles M. Hughes, the father, appeals from a judgment in favor of Mary L. Hughes, the mother. The issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to modify, retroactively, the father’s child-support obligation.
The parties married in 1971. Two children were born of the marriage: B.M.H. on August 16, 1974, and M.L.H. on January 5, 1981. In January 1991, the mother petitioned for a divorce. The trial court, in April 1991, entered a divorce judgment, incorporating an agreement of the parties. The father was to pay $492.94 per month ■in child support.
On May 19, 1998, the State filed a contempt petition on behalf of the mother, alleging that the father had failed to pay child support. A hearing was held on the petition. On June 19, 1998, the court found that the father owed $30,446.08 in child support, plus interest in the amount of $12,737. The court ordered him to pay $2,000 within 30 days of the order, so as to purge himself of contempt; to pay $57.06 per month on the arrearage; and again ordered him to pay $492.94 -per1 month in child support. An income-withholding order was sent to the father’s employer, instructing the employer to withhold $550 per month for child support and for the arrearage. The father did not appeal from that judgment.
On February 19, 1999, the father filed a motion to modify, requesting the court to recalculate his child-support obligation, because B.M.H. had reached 19 years of age on August 16, 1993, and to recalculate the arrearage based on the new child-support amount. A hearing was set for March 23, 1999.
The father’s brief fails to substantially comply with Rule 28, Ala. R.App. P. It is not the function of this court to search a record on appeal to find evidence to support a party’s argument. Rule 28(a)(4); Brown v. Brown, 719 So.2d 228 (Ala.Civ.App.1998). Additionally, it is not the function of the appellate court “to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument.” Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248, 251 (Ala.1994). The father does cite one case, Stinson v. Stinson, 729 So.2d 864, 867 (Ala.Civ.App.1998), dealing with the specific issue of calculating arrearages. However, that case does not support his argument that the arrearage should have been retroactive to August 16, 1993, the date the older child reached majority. In Stinson, this court made clear that under Rule 32(A)(3)(a), “the provisions of any judgment respecting child support shall be modified only as to installments accruing after the filing of the petition for modification.” (Emphasis added.) In the present case, the petition to modify was filed on February 19, 1999.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Daniel v. Wilson, 626 So.2d 1277 (Ala.1993); Lockett v. A.L. Sandlin Lumber Co., 588 So.2d 889 (Ala.Civ.App.1991).
AFFIRMED.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially.
Included in the trial court’s calculation of the child-support arrearage is an amount representing child support for a period after the older child reached the age of majority. The law is settled that a parent owes no child support once the child reaches the age of 19, the age of majority, unless the child is entitled to post-minority support pursuant to Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So.2d 986 (Ala.1989), or Ex parte Brewington, 445 So.2d 294 (Ala.1983). Whitten v. Whitten, 592 So.2d 183 (Ala.1991). I advocate that Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., be amended so that it is self-executing in a situation like this one. Once a child reaches 19, the child-support obligation should be automatically recalculated in accordance with the child-support guidelines without the noncustodial parent’s being required to file a petition to modify based upon the fact that the child has reached 19 years of age. See State ex rel. Howard v. Howard, 671 So.2d 83 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) (Crawley, J., dissenting).
