118 Wash. 262 | Wash. | 1922
Lead Opinion
— This is a bitterly contested divorce suit in which the court made findings and conclusions in favor of the wife, and a decree accordingly. On October 8, 1920, respondent filed her complaint, alleging two causes for divorce — nonsupport and cruelty. The complaint alleges that there are three children, of the ages of eight years, five years, and seven months; and that there is community property of the value of
Appellant assigns as errors the making of ten of the eighteen findings of fact; the making of the conclusions of law; the refusal to dismiss the action; the granting of a decree against appellant; the awarding
Eespondent also cross-appealed on the eighteenth finding of fact made by the court, that the net value of the interest of the parties in the property was $26,000, and the decreeing to respondent only the sum of $8,000, instead of $13,000, together with the other sums to be paid as alimony, suit money, money for the support of the children and attorney’s fees.
We have diligently examined the entire record. It would serve no good purpose to relate the evidence introduced or offered at the trial. Discussion in detail would be utterly profitless. The trial court saw the witnesses and their demeanor and found in favor of respondent. There was sharp conflict in the evidence. It is true there were more witnesses who testified in behalf of appellant than in behalf of respondent; but we have frequently announced that, though in a divorce suit the trial here is one de novo, the findings of the trial court upon conflicting evidence are entitled to great weight. We are in no position to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. Rogers v. Rogers, 81 Wash. 502, 142 Pac. 1150; Glenn v. Glenn, 84 Wash. 215, 146 Pac. 619. These cases cited many of our previous decisions to the above effect.
We said in Dyer v. Dyer, 65 Wash. 535, 118 Pac. 634, that:
“In cases of this kind there is often an atmosphere apparent at the trial, sometimes elusive, but none the*265 less palpable to tbe trial court, which is seldom fully manifested in the written record.”
The trial court could have found either way; and, having carefully scrutinized the findings of fact and examined the evidence shown in the record, we are unable to say that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings in any respect. Suffice it to say that, by way of recrimination, the endeavor of appellant tended very largely to cast infamy upon respondent and two of the children by accusations of infidelity upon the part of respondent, which the trial court found were not sustained.
As to the disposition of the property, we consider the award made to respondent very lenient to appellant, in view of the trial court’s findings. Nor are we disposed, upon the entire record, to disturb the allowances made for alimony, support of the children, suit money, attorney’s fees, and for alimony and attorney’s fees pending appeal, upon the appeal of either appellant or respondent.
The decree is in all respects affirmed.
Fullerton, Main, and Hovey, JJ., concur.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) — The testimony does not lead me to believe that the respondent was entitled to a divorce. Until this opinion was written, it was not the law that a wife could, by brazen immorality, give, not her husband, but herself, good ground for divorce. The rewards ought to be to the virtuous.
