Carl F. Hughes, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Martin J. Hughes, III, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19AP-865 (C.P.C. No. 19CV-7615)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
October 22, 2020
[Cite as Hughes v. Hughes, 2020-Ohio-5026.]
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on October 22, 2020
On brief: Zeiger, Tigges & Little LLP, Marion H. Little, Jr., and Christopher J. Hogan, for appellee. Argued: Christopher J. Hogan.
On brief: Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Julia B. Meister, Russell S. Sayre, and Aaron M. Herzig, for appellant. Argued: Russell S. Sayre.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Martin J. Hughes, III, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the application to confirm arbitration award filed by plaintiff-appellee, Carl F. Hughes. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} This case arises from the arbitration award in Martin J. Hughes, III v. Carl F. Hughes, JAMS Ref. No. 1345000131.1 At 11:03 a.m., on September 20, 2019, appellant filed
{¶ 3} In October 2019, appellant moved to dismiss appellee‘s application to confirm the arbitration award in the Franklin County trial court based on the jurisdictional priority rule. Appellant argued that because he invoked the jurisdiction of the Marion County trial court before appellee invoked the jurisdiction of the Franklin County trial court, the Franklin County trial court lacked jurisdiction over appellee‘s application. On December 9, 2019, and before the Franklin County trial court ruled on appellant‘s motion to dismiss, the Marion County trial court held a hearing on appellant‘s motion to vacate the arbitration award. At the hearing, the Marion County trial court rejected appellant‘s assertion that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority and consequently orally denied his motion to vacate the arbitration award. It filed a judgment entry the next day dismissing the matter with prejudice for the reasons stated at the hearing. On December 18, 2019, appellant appealed from this judgment to the Third District Court of Appeals.
{¶ 4} On December 17, 2019, the day before appellant appealed from the Marion County trial court judgment to the Third District, the Franklin County trial court granted appellee‘s application to confirm the arbitration award. In granting the application, the Franklin County trial court took notice of the Marion County trial court‘s final judgment dismissing with prejudice appellant‘s request to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 6} Appellant assigns the following errors for our review:
- The trial court erred in ruling on Carl‘s application to confirm the JAMS Award when it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to do so.
- The trial court erred in ruling on Carl‘s application to confirm the JAMS Award before Martin exhausted his appeals regarding his corresponding application to vacate.
- The trial court below erred in adopting the Marion County court‘s decision denying Martin‘s application to vacate the JAMS Award.
III. Discussion
{¶ 7} Because they involve interrelated issues, we address together appellant‘s first, second, and third assignments of error. In his first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in ruling on appellee‘s application to confirm the arbitration award because it lacked jurisdiction. Appellant‘s second assignment of error alleges the trial court erred in ruling on the application to confirm because he had not exhausted the appeals process in the case involving his request to vacate filed in Marion County. And appellant‘s third assignment of error asserts the trial court erred in adopting the Marion County trial court‘s decision denying appellant‘s application to vacate. These assignments of error lack merit.
A. Judicial Review of Arbitration Award
{¶ 8} All three assignments of error generally raise the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting appellee‘s application to confirm the arbitration award. “Arbitration occurs when disputing parties contractually agree to resolve their conflict by submitting it to a neutral third party for resolution. It provides the parties with a relatively speedy and inexpensive method of conflict resolution and has the additional advantage of unburdening
{¶ 9} To encourage the resolution of disputes in arbitration, judicial review of arbitration awards is limited. Franklin Cty. Sheriff v. Teamsters Local No. 413, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-717, 2018-Ohio-3684, ¶ 17. ”
{¶ 10} Alternatively, a party may seek judicial confirmation of an arbitration award. Within “one year after an award in an arbitration proceeding is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to the court of common pleas for an order confirming the award. Thereupon the court shall grant such an order and enter judgment thereon, unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections
{¶ 11} An appellate court‘s role when reviewing a trial court‘s determination regarding arbitration is even more limited. “An appeal may be taken from an order confirming, modifying, correcting, or vacating an award made in an arbitration proceeding or from judgment entered upon an award.”
B. Jurisdictional Priority Rule
{¶ 12} Our determination of whether the trial court erred in confirming the arbitration award in this case centers on the applicability of the jurisdictional priority rule. “The jurisdictional priority rule prevents the prosecution of two actions involving the same controversy in two courts of concurrent jurisdiction at the same time.” Davis v. Cowan Sys., 8th Dist. No. 83155, 2004-Ohio-515, ¶ 11. Under the jurisdictional priority rule, “[a]s between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first invoked by the institution of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of the parties.” State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar, 50 Ohio St.2d 279 (1977), syllabus. See John Weenink & Sons Co. v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga Cty., 150 Ohio St. 349 (1948), paragraph three of the syllabus (“When a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action, its authority continues until the matter is completely and finally disposed of, and no court of co-ordinate jurisdiction is at liberty to interfere with its proceedings.“).
{¶ 13} “Generally, it is a condition of the operation of the state jurisdictional priority rule that the claims or causes of action be the same in both cases, and if the second case is not for the same cause of action, nor between the same parties, the former suit will not prevent the latter.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 393 (1997). The jurisdictional priority rule also applies “when the causes of action, relief requested, and the parties are not exactly the same so long as the actions are part of the same ‘whole issue.’ ” Triton Servs., Inc. v. Reed, 12th Dist. No. CA2016-04-028, 2016-Ohio-7838, ¶ 8. “Actions comprise part of the ‘whole issue’ when: (1) there are cases pending in two different courts of concurrent jurisdiction involving
C. Analysis
{¶ 14} Appellant argues the jurisdictional priority rule required the Franklin County trial court to dismiss and thereby effectively deny appellee‘s application to confirm the arbitration award. We disagree. Under the circumstances of this case, the jurisdictional priority rule did not preclude the trial court from granting appellee‘s request to confirm the arbitration award.
{¶ 15} In resolving the ultimate issue before us, we first address the threshold issue of whether the jurisdictional priority rule can apply to concurrent judicial review of an arbitration award. Citing Licking Hts. Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Reynoldsburg City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-579, 2013-Ohio-3211, appellee argues the jurisdictional priority rule cannot apply to statutory arbitration proceedings initiated pursuant to
{¶ 16} Pursuant to Licking Heights, the denial of a motion to vacate an arbitration award in one proceeding does not preclude, based on compulsory counterclaim procedural rule requirements, the subsequent filing of an application to confirm the same arbitration
{¶ 17} Even though the jurisdictional priority rule can apply in the arbitration proceedings context, in this case, the rule did not preclude the trial court‘s confirmation of the arbitration award. Analytically, a request to vacate an arbitration award and a request to confirm that award are opposite sides of the same coin. Both requests emanate from the same award but seek opposite relief in relation to that award. Appellee‘s application to confirm the arbitration award was filed in Franklin County and served on appellant‘s counsel after appellant‘s application to vacate was filed in Marion County and served on appellee‘s counsel. Thus, the Marion County trial court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the “whole issue,” which did not cease until that court entered final judgment. See John Weenink & Sons Co.; Primesolutions Securities, Inc., supra.
{¶ 19} According to appellant, even though the Marion County trial court‘s jurisdiction over the case had ended, the Franklin County trial court still could not rule on the application to confirm because he had not exhausted his appeals as to the disposition of the motion to vacate. This argument is unpersuasive. When the Franklin County trial court entered judgment confirming the arbitration award, no case relating to the arbitration award was pending in Marion County or the Third District Court of Appeals. Appellant filed his notice of appeal in Marion County the day after the Franklin County trial court entered judgment. And, even if appellant had appealed from the Marion County trial court judgment before the Franklin County trial court had entered judgment, the Franklin County trial court and the Third District Court of Appeals are not courts of concurrent jurisdiction. See Wellman v. Salt Creek Valley Bank, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-177, 2006-Ohio-4718, ¶ 9 (“Franklin County Common Pleas Court and the Fourth District Court of Appeals are not courts of concurrent jurisdiction.“).
{¶ 20} Further, our review of whether the Franklin County trial court erred in confirming the arbitration award is confined to the record at the time it rendered judgment. See Leiby v. Univ. of Akron, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1281, 2006-Ohio-2831, ¶ 7 (“appellate review is limited to the record as it existed at the time the trial court rendered judgment“); State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 405 (1978), quoting Bennett v. Dayton Mem. Park & Cemetery Assn., 88 Ohio App. 98 (2d Dist.1950), paragraph one of the syllabus (” ‘in an appeal on questions of law the reviewing court may consider only that which was considered by the trial court and nothing more’ “). Thus, subsequent proceedings do not affect our review in this appeal of whether the Franklin County trial court erred based on the record before it.3
{¶ 21} Lastly, appellant contends the Franklin County trial court erroneously adopted the Marion County trial court‘s decision denying his application to vacate the arbitration award based on its statement that it “reache[d] the same conclusion as the Marion County Court and incorporates Judge Finnegan‘s opinion as if rewritten herein (See Exhibits A and B).” (Dec. 17, 2019 Order at 2.) This statement indicated the Franklin County trial court‘s agreement with the Marion County trial court‘s conclusion that appellant failed to demonstrate the arbitration award must be vacated for a reason set forth in
{¶ 22} In the final analysis, once there were no longer two actions on the same whole issue pending in courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the Franklin County trial court could exercise its jurisdiction over appellee‘s application to confirm. At that time, it was required to grant the application to confirm because the arbitration award had not been vacated, modified, or corrected, and no challenge to the arbitration award was pending in any court of common pleas. See
{¶ 23} For these reasons, we overrule appellant‘s first, second, and third assignments of error.
IV. Disposition
{¶ 24} Having overruled all three of appellant‘s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
KLATT and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur.