DR. MAX HUGHES, Appellant, v. CARL R. HASTINGS, Appellee
Supreme Court of Tennessee
June 7, 1971
469 S.W.2d 378
Jackson, April Term, 1971.
HEARN W. TIDWELL, LESTER F. LIT, Memphis, for appellee.
This cause is before this Court on petition for certiorari heretofore granted.
In the course of this opinion, the parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial court; that is, Carl R. Hastings as plaintiff, and Dr. Max Hughes as defendant.
This is the second time this case has come before this Court. The first was in November, 1968, on petition for certiorari to review judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court reversed judgment of the Circuit Court of Shelby County in favor of defendant, by direction of the court, and remanded the case for new trial. This Court denied certiorari.
This case originated in October, 1966, upon a declaration filed by plaintiff, Carl Hastings, alleging three acts of negligence in one count and res ipsa loquitur in a sec-
The testimony becomes a vital factor as to the applicability or non-applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Therefore, considerable attention will be given it in this opinion.
Plaintiff‘s proof in chief revealed the following facts:
In the afternoon of October 25, 1965, about 2:30 P.M., plaintiff was admitted to St. Joseph Hospital for an exploratory lumbar laminectomy recommended by his personal physician, Dr. Peter B. Wallace. On the following morning, October 26, 1965, plaintiff was given a preoperative injection by a nurse to make him “woozy” or “drunk“, and instructed to inform the doctors in the operating room that he, plaintiff, had three capped teeth. Upon being wheeled into the operative suite, plaintiff was met by Dr. Wallace and introduced for the first time to defendant, Dr. Max Hughes. Plaintiff was told that Dr. Hughes was an anesthesiologist, and would administer the anesthesia. Plaintiff was then told by Dr. Wallace that he was to receive local anesthesia, called a “spinal“. Plaintiff refused to be given a “spinal“, and demanded to be put to sleep. After futile efforts to convince plaintiff of the advantages of local anesthesia, Dr. Hughes agreed to give plaintiff a “general“; that is, put him to sleep.
Other proof by plaintiff was the testimony of Mrs. Mary Williams, the medical records librarian at St. Joseph Hospital, and testimony of plaintiff‘s wife. Mrs. Williams verified plaintiff‘s entry into the hospital and subsequent admission to surgery, as aforementioned, and further testified to the contents of two progress reports signed by Dr. Hughes stating the cause of the accident resulting in damage to plaintiff‘s teeth. Plaintiff did not introduce expert testimony on his behalf, nor did he introduce any evidence to support the first count of his declaration, based upon specific allegations of negligence.
Cross-examination revealed that plaintiff had three capped teeth. The two that were damaged were the upper left and upper right front incisors. The left incisor had been devitalized; that is, a hole had been drilled up inside the back of his tooth, and nerves and blood vessels re-
Testimony of Mrs. Carl Hastings on cross-examination was that before plaintiff‘s operation his teeth looked normal; that they looked like regular teeth.
At the end of plaintiff‘s proof, defendant moved for a directed verdict. The motion was denied.
Defendant‘s proof consisted of the testimony of defendant and his expert witness, Dr. William C. North. The testimony of Dr. Hughes was a detailed outline of the standard of care of a practicing anesthesiologist in Memphis, Tennessee; of the procedures used by him in administering general anesthesia to plaintiff; and an explanation of the cause of the accident resulting in damage to plaintiff‘s teeth.
Dr. Hughes testified that it is his habit after surgery every day, between 4:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M., to check the surgeon‘s schedule for the names of patients to be admitted to surgery on the next day; that he then goes to the room of each patient, studies his chart for everything pertaining to lab work and/or medication, reads
Defendant testified that when plaintiff arrived in surgery he was woozy from a light pre-operative injection of atropine and demerol; that plaintiff demanded general anesthesia instead of a “spinal“, and he, defendant, and Dr. Wallace, consented; that he read plaintiff‘s chart to which was attached a surgical check list prepared by the nurse in plaintiff‘s room, and which listed all medication given to plaintiff and other information concerning false teeth, glasses, artificial limbs, etc.; that plaintiff‘s chart showed none of these; and that he, defendant, proceeded to put plaintiff to sleep.
Dr. Hughes stated that he lifted plaintiff‘s lips and “casually and routinely” looked at the front upper and lower teeth; that he saw nothing to cause him concern or to warrant a more detailed examination of plaintiff‘s mouth and teeth; and that he then proceeded to administer anesthesia. First, a shot of sodium pentothal rendered
Dr. Hughes explained that for the type of back surgery that plaintiff had, it was necessary that Mr. Hastings be nearly 100 per cent relaxed; that the anectine and fluorthane drugs were continuously administered in order to maintain that condition; that while in that condition plaintiff‘s respiratory system was completely arrested and the only thing functioning was his heart; and that since plaintiff was face down on the operating table, the plastic airway was necessary to (1) prevent the tongue from obstructing the air passage, and (2) to prevent
Dr. Hughes testified that the surgery went fine, and that about 10 to 15 minutes before Dr. Wallace finished suturing the skin and applying a dressing, he, defendant, cut off the flow of anectine for the purpose of getting Mr. Hastings to begin breathing on his own. When Dr. Wallace finished and left the operating room, plaintiff was put into the care of defendant. Dr. Hughes testified that plaintiff was still face down, so he and a group of nurses and orderlies turned plaintiff over and laid him on a recovery room stretcher; that he then removed the tape binding the plastic airway and endotracheal tube together, and disconnected the gas machine, because plaintiff was breathing well; and that he aspirated plaintiff‘s mouth and throat and removed the endotracheal tube. Defendant testified further that he then listened closely to plaintiff‘s breathing for 30 to 60 seconds for the purpose of making sure that there was no obstruction in his air passage, and that it was clear; that while he was listening and before plaintiff was removed to the recovery room, Mr. Hastings suddenly bit down hard on the plastic airway still in his mouth and throat, breaking into pieces one tooth and cracking another; and that it happened so quickly that he could do nothing to stop it.
“The first thing you do when you go to sleep is relax, and the first thing you do when you wake up is clamp down on the muscles of the body.
Mr. Hastings just that quick (snapping fingers) just bit down on this airway, and before I could do anything, the tooth just disintegrated and went into pieces. I took the pieces of tooth out.”
Defendant further testified that all the instruments he used in administering general anesthesia to plaintiff were customarily used in Memphis; that the use of anectine is a matter of choice, but is used by four out of five anesthesiologists; that the fluorthane gas machine is widely used in Memphis, and the most proper machine available; that he looked at plaintiff‘s teeth before starting the anesthesia, but saw nothing to cause him concern; that he had no knowledge of a devitalized tooth; that there is no way a physician can anticipate when a patient will react and bite down on the airway; and that such a reaction of the masseter muscles can occur regardless of the care, skill and caution of an anesthesiologist.
Dr. William C. North, who at time of trial was chairman of the department of anesthesiology at the University of Tennessee, and a practicing anesthesiologist, testified on direct examination to the standard of care
On cross-examination of Dr. Hughes, and his expert witness, Dr. William C. North, plaintiff‘s counsel attempted to show the court and jury three specific acts or theories of negligence. First, that defendant failed to make inquiry or examine plaintiff‘s teeth both before administering anesthesia and afterwards; secondly, that defendant failed to use certain precautions to avoid breaking plaintiff‘s teeth; and thirdly, that defendant failed to exercise due care as required of a physician administering general anesthesia in Memphis, Tennes-
At the conclusion of all the evidence, and before the court‘s charge to the jury, there was considerable argument, absent the jury, about the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. The trial court concluded that although plaintiff had alleged res ipsa loquitur and had relied upon the doctrine in his proof in chief, defendant‘s explanation of the accident, coupled with plaintiff‘s attempt to show acts of negligence, destroyed the applicability of res ipsa loquitur, relying upon Ross v. Griggs (1955), 41 Tenn. App. 491, 296 S.W.2d 641, and Wooten v. Curry (1962), 50 Tenn.App. 549, 362 S.W.2d 820.
The court, therefore, did not charge res ipsa loquitur, but submitted to the jury plaintiff‘s three theories of negligence, as aforementioned.
The jury returned a verdict for defendant, Dr. Max Hughes. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a third trial. That Court was of opinion that the trial court should have charged res ipsa loquitur for the reasons that at the close of all the evidence the proximate cause of plaintiff‘s injury did not clearly appear; that there was basis for difference among reasonable
Defendant‘s assignments of error in this Court present, primarily, one question; that is, whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to the case at bar?
The law of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been often stated in the reported decisions of Tennessee appellate courts and this Court. Also, its proper application in medical malpractice cases has been carefully enunciated. It would be no more than mere supererogation to again belabor the rationale of these various decisions. The function of the doctrine, its limitations and its consequences in cases of the nature of the case at bar are adequately stated in Poor Sisters of St. Francis v. Long (1950), 190 Tenn. 434, 230 S.W.2d 659, and Wooten v. Curry (1962), 50 Tenn.App. 549, 362 S.W.2d 820, and the authorities cited therein. Suffice it to say we have again thoroughly reviewed medical malpractice decisions in this state; and are convinced that res ipsa loquitur cannot be given application in this case. The reasons are twofold----(1) that evidence was offered at the trial of a specific act or acts of negligence; and (2) this record is abundantly clear that what occurred in the instant case could not be prevented by any technique known to and recognized by the medical profession. Compare Quinley v. Cocke (1946), 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S.W.2d 992. It is equally apparent that all plaintiff‘s theories of negligence were submitted to the jury by the
The result is that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed; and that of the trial court affirmed. The costs are assessed against Carl R. Hastings.
DYER, CHIEF JUSTICE, and CHATTIN, HUMPHREYS and MCCANLESS, JUSTICES, concur.
OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
MR. JUSTICE CRESON.
In this case we have been presented a petition to rehear filed on behalf of Carl R. Hastings. Upon consideration we find that this petition constitutes no more than a reargument of those things considered and determined in the original opinion.
Clearly, the above does not conform to the objective purposes of petitions to rehear as enunciated in Rule 32 of the rules of this Court. After consideration, we are of opinion that the petition should be, and the same is denied.
DYER, CHIEF JUSTICE, and CHATTIN, HUMPHREYS and MCCANLESS, JUSTICES, concur.
