194 Iowa 726 | Iowa | 1922
The lease was entered into on September 1, 1920, by the plaintiff’s intestate, John Hughes, as lessor, and by the defendant as lessee. It covered a farm of 345 acres, and was for a term of three years, beginning March 1, 1921, at an annual rental of $3,440, of which the sum of $500' was paid in advance. Prior to the lease, the parties were strangers to each other. The defendant had seen Hughes’s advertisement of the farm for rent in a Davenport paper, and responded thereto. The fraudulent representations charged were, in substance, that the farm was a good farm, and was not subject to overflow. The making of the representations'is denied by plaintiff. That the representations, if made, would have been false, is conceded. That is to say, it is conceded that the farm was subject to overflow. The farm lies upon the Iowa River bottoms, near the river, and is partly in Tama and partly in Benton County. It is traversed by Salt Creek, which bisects it diagonally, northwest to southeast. This creek has its 'source 25 or 30 miles farther north, and has a watershed of very hilly land. This results in-sudden, frequent, and extensive overflow. In times shortly previous to the date of the lease, the farm had been completely submerged under a depth of several feet of water. Before entering into the lease, the tlefendant, Greider, went with Hughes upon the farm, and saw it." He had no previous acquaintance with it. He was permitted to make "all the examination thereof that he wished. One of the points made against him now by the appellant is that he had his opportunity to see and judge the farm, and that he is precluded thereby from claiming that he was misled. There was no flood upon the farm, nor sign of one, when he visited it. At that time, Salt Creek looked as diminutive as the Tiber in the drouth of summer, and as harmless as a sleeping serpent in wintertime. That it was not always thus is undisputed in the record. Later, the defendant
I. The plaintiff moved for a directed verdict, predicating his motion, in part, upon certain testimony given by -the defendant himself. The testimony so relied - on was given in response to two or three successive questions, of which the following are sufficient examples:
‘1Q. Now, at the time that you were down around the barn and other buildings on this place, as you have testified, and at the time mentioned in your testimony, was anything said to you by any person in regard to this farm being subject to overflow? A. Not that I know. Q. Now, at the time, Mr. G-reider, that you were in these buildings, — these barns and other outbuildings, as you have testified, — and after you had come back from the trip out on the farm, was anything said to you by anybody in regard to this farm, as to whether or not this was an overflow farm? A. Not that I know of.”
The defendant relied upon the testimony of one Beem, to show the making of false representations by Hughes to the defendant, in the presence of this witness. The testimony of the defendant above quoted was, on its face, contradictory to the
II. It was further urged, as a ground of motion for directed verdict, and is now urged here, that the defendant was precluded from relying upon the alleged false representations complained of, because he had inspected the farm, and acted upon his own judgment. Sufficient to say, as to this point, that, from the record, it was permissible for the jury to find that the opportunity furnished to him by his visit upon the farm to discover the overflow character of Salt Creek was wholly inadequate to that end. This being so, he had a right to rely upon representations, if any were made.
III. The plaintiff offered to prove certain statements made by the decedent and certain actions done by him, looking to a demand for damages from the defendant, such statements and actions being made and done on February 13 and February 14, 1921. This offer of evidence was rejected by the trial court, and complaint is now made thereon. This evidence purported to set forth certain instructions given by Hughes
IV. Particular complaint is urged against the instructions of the corrrt, in that they failed to state the issues concisely, and in that the statement of issues by the court amounted to setting forth copies of the pleadings, or portions thereof. That the statement of issues by the court is prolix may be conceded. As compared with the pleadings themselves, it appears to be reasonably concise. When attorneys persist in prolixity of pleading, they must be prepared to endure some degree of prolixity in the statement of issues by the court. The trial judge is between two fires. On the one hand, he must be concise; on the other, he must omit nothing. The pleadings have been abstracted in appellant’s abstract, and we- may assume that they have been there presented in as concise form as they will bear, for appellate consideration. The petition and amendment and reply, as abstracted, cover 18 printed pages. The answer and its amendments cover approximately the same area. We may assume that the original pleadings have been much condensed by the process of abstracting for the printed page. The statement of issues, as made in the instructions, comprises 10 printed pages. Prolix as this may appear, it does represent a substantial condensation, as compared with the condensation thereof accomplished by the abstract. ' We see no fair ground of complaint by the appellant at this point.
The foregoing presents the principal points that are argued by the appellant. Eighty-nine errors are assigned as grounds for reversal. Manifestly, we cannot discuss them all in detail. The weight of appellant’s argument goes to the sufficiency of evidence in support of the two defenses pleaded by the defendant. We are clear that the evidence in support of each was sufficient to go to the jury. We discover no grounds of reversal among the errors assigned therefor. The judgment below must, accordingly, be affirmed.—Affirmed.