Hughes v. Commissioner of Correction

Sep 1, 2026

AC47977

Syllabus

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm and criminal possession of a firearm, appealed following the granting of his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court‘s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his criminal trial counsel, H, rendered ineffective assistanсe by failing, inter alia, to request that the jury be instructed on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm. Held:

The habeas court properly concluded that H did not render ineffective assistance in deciding not to request a jury instruction on manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm, as the petitioner‘s actions in shooting the victim multiple times after the situation between them had deescalated and then fleeing without attempting to render aid were ill-suited to a claim that the petitioner had acted with recklessness, as required under second degree manslaughter, and, as a jury instruction on that offense would have undermined the petitioner‘s credibility and his claim of self-defense, H‘s decision reflected objectively reasonable trial strategy.

The habeas court properly concluded that H‘s decision not to object to the state‘s evidence of the victim‘s peaceful character did not demonstrate deficient performance, as H‘s strategic decision to counter the evidence of the victim‘s peaceful character with evidencе that supported the defense theory that the victim had been aggressive toward the petitioner and was a potential threat to him was not an unreasonable one.

Opinion

ELGO, J. The petitioner, Dante Hughes, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claims that the court improperly rejected his claim that his criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.¹ We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

This case involves a homicide in Groton. As our Supreme Court recounted in the petitioner‘s direct appеal, “[i]n the early morning hours of December 11, 2016, the [petitioner] and his girlfriend, Latoya Knight, stopped for a drink at Ryan‘s Pub, a neighborhood bar in Groton, after Knight picked the [petitioner] up from work in the couple‘s Nissan Armada. Knight was already intoxicated when the couple arrived at the pub. While the [petitioner] and Knight were inside the pub, the [petitioner] engaged in a friendly conversation with two other patrons, John Hoyt and then the victim, Joseph Gingerella.

“At some point, the [petitioner] and Knight started arguing. Knight slapped a beer bottle out of the [petitioner‘s] hand, picked it up, and hit him in the face with it. She then demanded the keys to the Armada and stormed outside through the pub‘s side door with the keys in hand. When the [petitioner] went to follow her, the pub‘s bartender, Rachel Smith, tried to stop him because she could see that he was angry and told him not to hurt Knight. The [petitioner] pushed Smith away and continued to follow Knight. Smith then asked Andrew Flynn, another patron, Hoyt, and the victim to check on Knight. When the [petitioner] reached the Armada, Knight was sitting in the driver‘s seat. The [petitioner] opened the door and punched Knight multiple times in the face, cаusing her nose to bleed. Hoyt and the victim then approached the Armada, positioned themselves on either side of the [petitioner], and attempted to stop the assault. Hoyt put his hands underneath the [petitioner‘s] arms and tried to pull him away. The victim also tried to pull the [petitioner] away from Knight and yelled, ‘[y]ou‘re not gonna hit her like that! . . . [Y]ou‘re not gonna put your hand[s] on her!’ The [petitioner] and the victim continued arguing, and Flynn intervened by extending his arms between the two of them and telling them to ‘chill.’

“Another pub patron observing the incident, Elvira Gonzalez, saw both Flynn and the victim gesture with their hands for the [petitioner] to calm down. Smith, who had gone outside to tell everyone to calm down, saw Flynn gesture to her that everything was okay. Seconds later, several witnesses present at the scene heard multiple gunshots fired, but no one saw the [petitioner] pull the trigger or observed the victim immediately before he was fatally shot. . . . After Hoyt heard the shots, he turned around to see what had happened and saw the [petitioner] holding a gun and the victim lying on the ground, shielding himself with his hand up. The [petitioner] then fled the scene.²

“The [petitioner] wеnt to his home, changed his clothes, and made phone calls to his two brothers, his sister, and his mother. Thereafter, one of the [petitioner‘s] brothers picked him up and drove him to the Norwich home of their uncle, Shelton Rawls. The [petitioner] told Rawls that he had shot someone after telling that person to mind his own business and to leave him and Knight alone, and that he thought he had killed this person. He asked Rawls to cut his hair, and Rawls then cut off the [petitioner‘s] green dreadlocks. The [petitioner‘s] other brother met the [petitioner] at Rawls’ house later that morning to give thе [petitioner] a new prepaid cell phone. Before turning off the subscriber phone that he had been using, the [petitioner] sent a text message to his work supervisor that stated, ‘[n]ot coming in for a long time . . . .’

“The [petitioner] made arrangements to be driven to Boston, Massachusetts, by one of his brother‘s friends and decided to make his way across the Canadian border from there. While heading to Canada, the [petitioner] called several family members using the prepaid phone but used a function on the phone that prevents the person recеiving the call from seeing the phone number of the person who is calling. The [petitioner] made a stop at Niagara Falls, New York, and threw the gun that he had used to shoot the victim into the Niagara River. Afterward, he walked across a bridge into Canada, where he was detained by Canadian border agents.

“Nine days after the shooting, Groton police detectives drove to Canada, took custody of the [petitioner], and brought him back to Connecticut, where he was placed under arrest. Groton detectives subsequently interrogated the [petitioner]. For most of the approximately two hour interrogation, the [petitioner] denied any involvement in the shooting. He falsely claimed that he had left the area before the shooting occurred and had no idea how it happened. He also falsely claimed that he did not own a gun, had fought with Knight outside the pub but no one intervened, had left the pub after calling a cab to take him to the bus station, had cut his hair in Buffalo, New York, because he had an upcoming job interview, and had traveled to Canada for enjoyment. At one point, when the interrogating officers urged the [petitioner] to tell them the real story because ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍they already knew that he had shot the victim, he responded, ‘[y]ou got no cameras.’

“Approximately one hour and forty minutes into the interrogation, the [petitioner] admitted that he had shot the victim but claimed to have done so in self-defense. He claimed that the victim had started to pull up his shirt, and the [petitioner] ‘thought [that the victim] was reaching for something . . . that he was going for a gun.’ He stated that he was trying to protect himself and was ‘not trying to kill [the victim].’ He also indicated that he ‘didn‘t know [that the victim] didn‘t have nothin‘.’

“In two substitute informations, the [petitioner] was charged with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and criminal possession of a firearm [in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-217, as amended by Public Acts 2016, No. 16-34, § 15]. At trial, the [petitioner] asserted a defense of self-defense. The state disputed that the [petitioner] had acted in self-defense but also argued that he was not entitled to the defense because he had a duty to retreat. . . . At the close of evidence, pursuant to the state‘s request, the trial court instructed the jury on both murder and the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm [pursuant to General Statutes §§ 53a-55 and 53-55a]. The court also instructed the jury on its obligatiоn to consider whether the [petitioner] acted in self-defense, if it found the [petitioner] guilty of either crime.

“The jury found the [petitioner] guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, and the court thereafter found the [petitioner] guilty of criminal possession of a firearm. The court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict and its finding, and imposed a total effective sentence of fifty years of imprisonment, execution suspended after forty-five years, followed by five years of probation.” (Footnote added; footnotes omitted.) State v. Hughes, 341 Conn. 387, 390–94, 267 A.3d 81 (2021). The petitioner directly appealed from that judgment of conviction, which our Supreme Court affirmed. See id., 429.

The petitiоner commenced this habeas action in 2020. In his operative petition, his November 17, 2023 amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleged that his criminal trial counsel, Attorney Walter Hussey, rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing “to seek a lesser included charge of manslaughter in the second degree [with a firearm pursuant to General Statutes §§ 53a-56 and 53-56a] after the [prosecutor] sought jury instructions for manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm,” (2) opening “the door to evidence of the victim‘s peaceful character,” and (3) failing “to object to evidence regarding the victim‘s peaceful character and/or preserve the issue for appeal . . . .”³ In addition, the petitioner alleged that his criminal appellate counsel, Attorney Vishal K. Garg, rendered ineffective assistance by failing “to directly challenge the trial court‘s line of inquiry into jury misconduct when it questioned [a] juror . . . on his use of the dictionary definition of manslaughter.”

A trial was held on February 8, 2024, at which the petitioner offered the testimony of Hussey and Garg, as well as documentary evidence that included transcripts from his criminal trial.⁴ In its subsequent mеmorandum of decision, the habeas court concluded that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that Hussey or Garg rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court subsequently granted certification to appeal from that judgment, and this appeal followed.

“A criminal defendant‘s right to the effective assistance of counsel extends through the first appeal of right and is guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and by article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution.” Small v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 707, 712, 946 A.2d 1203, cert. denied sub nom. Small v. Lantz, 555 U.S. 975, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2008). “In Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], the United States Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel‘s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction . . . . That requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel‘s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍defense [by establishing a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel‘s mistakes, the result of the proceeding wоuld have been different]. . . . Furthermore, [i]n a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner‘s burden . . . is not met by speculation . . . but by demonstrable realities.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Farnum v. Commissioner of Correction, 118 Conn. App. 670, 675, 984 A.2d 1126 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 905, 989 A.2d 119 (2010). “Although a petitioner can succeed only if he satisfies both prongs, a reviewing court can find against the petitioner on either ground.” Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 325 Conn. 640, 669, 159 A.3d 1112 (2017).

I

The petitioner claims that the court improperly concluded that he had not established ineffective assistance on the part of Hussey for failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser included offensе of manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm. In response, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, maintains that Hussey made a reasonable strategic decision not to request such an instruction. We agree with the respondent.

At the petitioner‘s criminal trial, the state presented ample evidence that (1) the petitioner punched Knight in the face multiple times outside Ryan‘s Pub on December 11, 2016, (2) the victim was shot after attempting to intervene on Knight‘s behalf, (3) a witness saw the petitioner holding a gun after the victim was shot, (4) the petitioner fled thе scene, (5) the petitioner told his uncle that he had shot someone, (6) the petitioner fled the state and attempted to flee the country, and (7) the petitioner subsequently admitted to shooting the victim in an interview with detectives from the Town of Groton Police Department. See State v. Hughes, supra, 341 Conn. 391–93. In light of that uncontroverted evidence, Hussey testified at the habeas trial that self-defense was the petitioner‘s only viable theory of defense. As he stated: “[The petitioner] was identified. It‘s not like . . . he wasn‘t the perpetrator. So . . . we needed an explanation as to why it happened.” Hussey also noted that the state was required to disprove that the petitioner had acted in self-defense, which “makes it that much harder for the state.” See State v. Matheney, 354 Conn. 212, 217–18, 350 A.3d 516 (2026) (“[i]n Connecticut, once a criminal defendant raises the justification defense of self-defense, the state must disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt in order to secure a conviction“).

As Hussey explained, the petitioner‘s theory of defense was that he reasonably feared for his life during the altercation outside Ryan‘s Pub because the victim acted aggressively with him, made a racially inflammatory statement to him, and then made “a movement toward his waistband, which, to [the petitioner] . . . indicated [that the victim] was reaching for a weapon, and [the petitioner] reacted accordingly.” Hussey testified that, in his view, the petitioner‘s self-defense claim “had some pretty good merit to it” and that he personally believed the petitioner‘s account of what transpired.

Following the close of evidence at the petitioner‘s criminal trial, the court instructed the jury on both murder and the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree at the request of the state. The court also provided the jury with detailed instructions on self-defense and the state‘s corresponding burden. The record indicates that Hussey did not request an instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.

On direct examination at the habeas trial, Hussey was asked if his strategy changed after the court provided the instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. Hussey answered in relevant part: “No, because the way I look at it in a situation like this, if the jury bеlieves [the petitioner] and it‘s self-defense, it is not disproved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . he would be convicted of carrying the firearm, but that was a manageable situation given that factual scenario. . . . I think if you ask for something lesser than that, you‘re just drawing attention to a weakness to your defense that you‘re trying to establish. I mean, that‘s just a strategy. . . . So, if the state‘s going to say, well, look, this really isn‘t a murder, it‘s . . . a manslaughter case with a firearm. And then you say, well, wait a second . . . I wanted something lesser than that because [the petitioner] didn‘t have the requisite intent that thеy claim. Now, you‘re really kind of diluting [the petitioner‘s self-defense claim that he] wouldn‘t have done this but for the fact that [he] feared for [his] life.”

On cross-examination, Hussey further explained the strategy behind not pursuing an instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree. He stated in relevant part: “[H]ere‘s how I view things, and I could be wrong, but when you have a situation like [the petitioner‘s case] . . . the first thing is, why else would he shoot [the victim] unless he thought that he had a weapon. That was my thought process. And I told him, as I tell everybody, that has to take the [witness] stаnd in this situation, that‘s the only way you‘re going to [prevail] . . . you‘re going to have to be a good witness and . . . the jury is going to have to believe you. . . . So, I thought that everything basically rode on what [the petitioner] had to tell the jury. In my mind, if I was in the jury, I would have acquitted him. Unfortunately, I wasn‘t. So, that‘s where I kind of left it. I didn‘t want to take away from that because that‘s really the focal point.” Hussey also testified that, in his view, advancing an alternate theory under the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree would both weaken the petitioner‘s claim of self-defense and undеrmine his “credibility to some degree” with the jury.⁵ Hussey thus made a strategic decision to focus on the petitioner‘s self-defense claim at the petitioner‘s criminal trial.

In its memorandum of decision, the court expressly credited Hussey‘s testimony, as was its sole prerogative. It is well established that the habeas court, “as ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sanchez v. Commissioner of Correction, 314 Conn. 585, 604, 103 A.3d 954 (2014). On appeal, this court must defer to the habeas court‘s credibility determination. Id.

The court further found that Hussey‘s testimony reflеcted “a sound and objectively reasonable trial strategy.” We concur with that assessment. We also note that the facts of this case are ill-suited to a claim that the petitioner acted with mere recklessness, rather than extreme indifference to human life, which is the distinction between manslaughter in the first and second degrees. See State v. Sotomayor, 61 Conn. App. 364, 380, 765 A.2d 1 (2001), appeal dismissed, 260 Conn. 179, 794 A.2d 996 (certification improvidently granted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 922, 123 S. Ct. 313, 154 L. Ed. 2d 212 (2002). The evidence in this case indicates that the confrontation between the petitioner, Knight, Flynn, Hoyt, and the victim “had deescalated and . . . appeared to have been resolved just before the shooting.” State v. Hughes, supra, 341 Conn. 402. Thе evidence also indicates that, as the situation deescalated, the petitioner retrieved a nine millimeter pistol from his vehicle that was “already loaded and cocked“; id., 396; that the petitioner then shot the victim three times; id., 391 n.3; and that an autopsy confirmed that two of the victim‘s wounds entered his body “from the back.” Id. In addition, the evidence demonstrates that, after shooting the victim multiple times, the petitioner did not attempt to render aid to him but, rather, “fled the scene” and later fled the state. Id., 392; see also State v. McCoy, 91 Conn. App. 1, 8–9, 879 A.2d 534 (evidence that defendant “[a]lmost immediately after the shooting . . . engaged in a pattern of conduct reflecting not a desire to save the victim‘s life, but a desire to evade police apprehension” supported finding that defendant “was not merely reckless or careless in creating a risk of death but acted with an extreme indifference to human life“), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 904, 884 A.2d 1026 (2005). In light of the evidence adduced at the petitioner‘s criminal trial, Hussey reasonably could have determined that an instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree was unsupported by the facts of this case and would undermine the petitioner‘s claim of self-defense. For those reasons, the court properly concluded that Hussey did not render ineffective assistance by failing to request that instruction.

II

The petitioner also claims that the court improperly concluded that he had not established ineffective assistance on the part of Hussey for failing to object to evidence of the victim‘s peaceful character. We do not agree.

The following additional facts are relevant to that claim. On the first day of the petitioner‘s criminal trial, the prosecutor called Brandon Slocum, a longtime acquaintance of the victim, to testify. The prosecutor asked Slocum if he had ever known the victim to “start a fight,” to “carry a weapon,” or to “be violent,” to which Slocum replied in the negative. The prosecutor then called Smith, who was working at Ryan‘s Pub at the time of the incident. The prosecutor asked her if she had ever known the victim “to be violent” or “to carry a weapon“; she answered in the negative. The prosecutor then asked Smith to describe the victim‘s “demeanor and his disposition,” to which Smith responded that he “was very friendly.” The prosecutor also asked Smith if she ever had problems with the victim “fighting at the bar,” and she answered: “No.”

On the second day of the petitioner‘s criminal trial, the prosecutor asked Hoyt if he knew the victim to “be violent,” to “get involved in any fights,” or to “carry any weapons“; Hoyt answered in the negative. The prosecutor also called Flynn, who was a close friend of the victim. The prosecutor asked Flynn if he had ever seen the victim “carry a weapon or initiate a fight,” to which Flynn answered in the negative. On cross-examination, Hussey asked Flynn if he reсalled telling a responding police officer that the victim had “a lot of self-confidence and he can . . . pretty much, like, talk shit to anybody,” and that the victim had “a tendency to maybe talk a little reckless to the wrong people sometimes.” Flynn answered those questions affirmatively. Hussey also asked Flynn if he told the police that the victim was “always getting himself into some sort of shit” and had “always been that way“; Flynn did not deny making those statements.

On the third day of trial, the prosecutor called Gonzalez, who was in the parking lot of Ryan‘s Pub when the shooting occurred. Thе prosecutor asked Gonzalez if she ever knew the victim to “start a fight or be violent,” to which Gonzalez responded in the negative. It is undisputed that Hussey did not object to the foregoing testimony from Slocum, Smith, Hoyt, Flynn, and Gonzalez regarding the victim‘s character.⁶

At the petitioner‘s habeas trial, Hussey testified that, strategically, his “focal point” was on what transpired between the petitioner and the victim outside Ryan‘s Pub. Hussey confirmed that his “primary philosophy” was to establish that the victim had been aggressive and had used “fighting words” ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍with the petitioner. Hussey thus sought to establish, through the testimоny of Flynn, that the victim “did have a reputation” for “running his mouth.” As Hussey explained, there was evidence that the victim acted aggressively and made a racially inflammatory statement to the petitioner,⁷ which Hussey attempted to tie to Flynn‘s testimony that the victim would “talk shit to anybody” and had “a tendency to maybe talk a little reckless to the wrong people sometimes.”⁸ Hussey further testified that his aim was to “get across to the jury that [the victim] was a potential threat to [the petitioner].”

“As this court repeatedly has noted, [t]he decision of a trial lawyer not to make an objection is a matter of trial tactics, not evidence of incompetency . . . . [T]here is a strong presumption that the trial strategy employed by a criminal defendant‘s counsel is reasonable and is a result of the exercise of professional judgment. . . . It is well established that [a] reviewing court must view counsel‘s conduct with a strong presumption that it falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that a tactic that appears ineffective in hindsight may have been sound trial strategy at the time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raynor v. Commissioner of Correction, 222 Conn. App. 584, 611–12, 306 A.3d 25 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 944, 307 A.3d 910 (2024). For that reason, “judicial scrutiny of counsel‘s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel‘s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel‘s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‘s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel‘s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that [the] conduct [of trial counsel] falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grover v. Commissioner of Correction, 183 Conn. App. 804, 819–20, 194 A.3d 316, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 933, 194 A.3d 1196 (2018).

Applying this standard to the petitioner‘s claim, we cannot say that Hussey‘s strategic decision to counter the evidence of the victim‘s peaceful character, rather than object to that evidence, was an unreasonable one, particularly in light of the testimony he elicited from Flynn on cross-examination. The habeas court, therefore, properly concluded that the petitioner did not demonstrate deficient performance on the part of Hussey for failing to object to evidence of the victim‘s peaceful character.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Notes

In his appellate brief, the petitioner also challenged the habeas court‘s conclusion that he had not established ineffective assistance on the part of his criminal appellate counsel. The petitioner withdrew that claim at oral argument before this court.

At his criminal trial, the petitioner testified that, prior to the shooting, he had retrieved а nine millimeter pistol from his vehicle that was “loaded and cocked . . . .” . He further testified that, when he saw the victim reach into his waistband moments later, the petitioner “thought that the victim was going to shoot him,” so the petitioner ” ‘came up and just shot’ ” the victim.

In his amended petition, the petitioner also claimed that Hussey rendered ineffective assistance by failing “to move for a mistrial based on a due process violation for paneling a juror with a diminished capacity.” The petitioner abandoned that claim in his posttrial brief to the habeas court.

The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, did not present any evidence.

As our Supreme Court observed in , cert. denied, , “[t]rial counsel . . . could reasonably have decided, given the state‘s evidence . . . that any chance of an acquittal . . . based on juror sympathy had to be premised on maintaining credibility with the jury. Trial counsel‘s belief that the weakness of the evidence supporting the lesser included offense would have risked that credibility falls within the range of trial strategy that courts may not second-guess upon collateral attack.” See also (“[i]t may be sound trial strategy not to request a lеsser included offense instruction, hoping ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍that the jury will simply return a not guilty verdict” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In his appellate brief, the petitioner also contends that Hussey failed to object to testimony from Jacqueline Caron that, in her experience, the petitioner had “a short fuse.” That claim is not properly before this court, as it was neither raised in the operative petition nor addressed by the habeas court in its memorandum of decision. We therefore decline to review that claim. See, e.g., .

At his criminal trial, the petitioner testified that, during the altercation outside Ryan‘s Pub, the victim threatened him, repeatedly stating, “I‘ll [fuck] you up.” The petitioner also testified that the victim called him a “[b]itch ass nigger.”

We reject the petitioner‘s bald contention that Hussey had improperly “opened the door to the admission of evidence of the [victim‘s] character” by eliciting testimony from Flynn regarding the victim‘s argumentative tendencies. The record belies that claim, as the prosecutor presented testimony from Slocum, Smith, and Hoyt regarding the victim‘s peaceful character prior to Flynn‘s testimony at the petitioner‘s criminal trial. Hussey‘s subsequent cross-examination of Flynn, therefore, did not initiate discussion of that issue. Cf. (party that initiates discussion opens door to rebuttal).