68 Ala. 280 | Ala. | 1880
That exemplary damages, or smart money, can be recovered in such an action as this, is settled in this State.—S. & N. Railroad v. McLendon, 63 Ala. 266; Phil., Wil. & Balto. R. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 202.
The limitation of actions of this kind is one year, and there can be no recovery for injury sustained after the commencement of the suit.—Roundtree v. Brantley, 414 Ala. 544; Polly v. McCall, 37 Ala. 20.
The bill of exceptions states that it contains all the evidence, and nothing is said in it of any permanent or lasting injury to the freehold. No proof that the injury complained of caused any deposit on plaintiffs’ land, or that the increased flow of the water caused any of the soil of the lands to be washed away. Hence, we are not able to perceive on what ground any question could have arisen on the subject of permanent injury. From dll that appears before'us, if the ditches on defendant’s lands were filled up, and the earth Restored to the condition it was in before the excavation, the injury the plaintiffs complain of would cease. Our rulings hereafter announced will rest on the absence of proof of permanent injury.
As we understand the facts of this ease, the plaintiffs and the defendant were coterminous landholders, each engaged in agriculture; the former owning the inferior, and the latter the superior heritage. Through the lands of the plaintiffs, and near the dividing line, flowed a natural stream or branch, whieh was the natural outlet for a part, at least, of the water which fell on defendant’s land. The water flowed naturally from the defendant’s land upon the lands of plaintiffs, and across a portion of it into the running stream. It flowed slowly, not in a collected body, but scattered over the surface. In its natural state, part of this water was absorbed, and part evaporated before it reached the lands of plaintiffs. By means of ditches, defendant collected all this surface water into one channel, thereby draining his own lands, and causing the water to flow much more rapidly, and in one body, into the branch on plaintiff’s land. This emptied the water off defendant’s land much sooner, and, as a consequence, precipitated it much more rapidly, and in increased volume, on the lands of plaintiffs, thereby flooding a portion
Under these rules, defendant had no right, by ditches or otherwise, to'cause water to flow on the lauds of plaintiffs, which, in the absence of such ditches, would have flowed in a different direction. As to the water theretofore accustomed to flow on the lands of the plaintiffs, defendant was not bound to remain inactive. He was permitted to so ditch his own lands as to drain them, provided he did so with a prudent regard to the welfare of his neighbor, and provided he did no more than concentrate the water, and cause it to flow more rapidly, and in greater volume on the inferior heritage. This, however, must be weighed and decided with a proper refer-ence to the value and necessity of the improvement to the superior heritage, contrasted with the injury to the inferior; and even this license must be conceded with great caution and prudence. It is a question for the jury to determine, on the facts of each particular case, under proper instructions from the court.
Applying these principles to the charges asked by defendant and refused, the first charge was calculated to mislead, because its tendency was and is to deny to plaintiffs the right to recover exemplary damages. If malice, vexation, or wantonness on the part of defendant was shown, the jury would be authorized to go beyond the actual injury to the land. The second charge should have been given. The third charge was rightfuly refused, for two reasons. Its tendency was to require a too strict and severe rule for the separation of the damages accruing within the twelve months, from those suffered before that timé. Much latitude and discretion are allowed to juries in such inquiries. And, in any event, on the hypothesis of this charge, the jury would be authorized to award nominal damages.—Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130. The fourth and fifth charges assert the same legal proposition as the third, and were rightly refused. The sixth charge is an argument, and not in proper form for instructions to a jury. Charges to juries should be made up of clear and distinct legal principles, without involvement, and free from redundant verbiage, or other confusing elements.
Reversed and remanded.