183 Ga. 391 | Ga. | 1936
This case was transmitted to the Court of Appeals, and by that court transferred to us, for the reason that the Supreme Court alone has jurisdiction of writs of error in habeas corpus cases. The petitioner is not deprived of his liberty by virtue of any sentence of a court of this State, but was rearrested by the chief of police of Thomaston for a violation of a municipal ordinance of that city. In the sworn answer of the respondent it is alleged: “On or about the 23rd day of June, 1935, plaintiff was guilty of disorderly conduct in the City of Thomaston and was drunk, and was arrested by R. L. Knox, one of the policemen of said city, and turned over to defendant to be held to answer the charge against him. That when defendant attempted to take said Huffman to the city jail, said Huffman hit defendant in the eye with his fist while defendant was wearing his glasses, and defendant was forced to use force in order to place said Huffman in the city jail. That thereafter, on the 24th day of July, 1935, said Huffman was tried on said charges in the mayor’s court of the City of Thomaston, and was found guilty and was sentenced to work 90 days on the public streets.” There is a slight variance in the wording used by the petitioner on the one hand, and the respondent on the other, between paragraph 3 of the petition and paragraph 3 of the answer, the petition alleging that the remainder of the sentence was imposed on the condition that petitioner would leave the City of Thomaston; in the answer it is alleged that after Huffman had served thirty days he and his mother requested Hon. Hugh Thurston, mayor of said city, to postpone the service of the remainder of said sentence, etc. However, to the allegation in paragraph 4 of the petition, in which it is alleged that “on March 30, 1936, due to dire distress of his wife and children who reside outside of the city limits of Thomaston, all being without food and clothing and greatly in need of your petitioner’s support, your petitioner thereby returned to them on said date,” it is answered in paragraph 4 of the answer that defendant can neither admit nor deny the allegations in paragraph 4 of plaintiff’s petition, for want of sufficient information. Thus
If the mayor of Thomaston, whose order was obeyed by the police department, had not discharged Huffman from the chain-gang, even attempting to enforce a sentence of banishment, he would no doubt have remained in the custody of the officer until the expiration of the ninety days to which he was sentenced. It matters not what the motive underneath his discharge. It may be that at the time the appeal was made to the mayor there was no pressing need for such work upon the streets for mere day-laborers like Huffman to perform. It may be that the number of such convictions were so small that they were not adequate to require the services and consequent expense of a warden’s salary. It may be that Huffman’s clothes were ragged, and it would become necessary for the city to buy him a new suit of clothes and a new pair of shoes before the expiration of the sixty days that he had not served. It matters not what was the motive. The outstanding fact remains that Huffman’s failure to work out his sentence according to its terms was due alone to the act of the n^or of Thomaston. It is wholly immaterial that the city mingled the blessings of a release with the thorn of banishment from his home. The sentence of the recorder had only one meaningninety days consecutive work upon the streets of Thomaston — not work to be taken in broken doses. Yarious decisions of this court on ordinary cases of habeas corpus are not unfamiliar, and the cases are very few where the rulings upon this subject are relaxed; but the general rule that criminal proceedings are to be most liberally construed in favor of the accused has not been always overlooked. - It was recognized in Gordon v. Johnson, 126 Ga. 584 (55 S. E. 489), by Mr. Justice Lumpkin, with the entire court concurring. The only difference between the Gordon case and the case at bar
In the case at bar the effect of the sentence, if taken as a whole, was that the accused should be released from imprisonment upon working upon the streets for ninety particular days, from the 24th of July, 1935, until the 24th of October, 1935, and on the latter date the service of his sentence would have been completely ful
Judgment reversed.