15 S.C. 82 | S.C. | 1881
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages from the defendant for enticing one Jordan Butler, who had been employed by the plaintiff as a farm laborer, to leave the employment of the plaintiff. The contract under which the said Butler, with the other farm laborers, had been employed, was not in writing, but is stated in the “case” as follows : “ About the first of January, 1879, the plaintiff contracted with Jordan Butler and other persons to work his land during
The Circuit judge charged the jury that under the terms of said contract the relation of master and servant did not exist between the plaintiff and Butler, and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover; to which charge exception was duly taken. . The plaintiff requested the judge to charge the jury that the rule of law giving a remedy for employing the servant of another after notice, is not confined to menial servants, “but extends to all cases where the person is employed to give his exclusive personal service for a given time under the direction of an employer, who is injured by the wrongful act.” This the judge refused to do, except with the qualification that it only extends to persons so employed for hire or wages of a definite sum. To this also exception was duly taken.
Most of the points presented in the argument here, have, in ourjudgment, been definitely settled by the decision of this court in the case of Daniel v. Swearengen, 6 S. C. 297, and we deem it unnecessary to add anything to what is there said as to these points. In that case it was held: First. That the relation of master and servant exists in this state as at common law. Second. That to constitute such relation it is not necessary that, there should be a contract in writing. Third. That one who contracts as a farm laborer may come within the class of servants, menial service not being essential to place one in that class. Fourth. That the statutes of this state do not prescribe the only mode of redress where one entices or persuades a servant to leave the employment of his master, but that in such cases, as at common law, the master is entitled to his action for damages. It did not
The case of Burgess v. Carpenter, 2 S. C. 7, is not in conflict with these views, because, although the Circuit judge, in that case, did rest his decision upon the ground that a contract to pay a laborer for his services by giving him a share of the crop, constitutes the laborer a partner and not a servant, the Supreme Court did not place its decision upon any such ground, but upon the ground that the common law gave no right of action to the master for any injury done to the servant, except where the servant was a menial one, and as the employee, whose status was there in question, was an agricultural laborer and not a menial servant, the action could not be maintained by the employer. This view, as we have seen, has been repudiated in the subsequent case of Daniel v. Swearengen, supra. It is true that
The judgment of the Circuit Court is set aside, and a new trial is ordered.
In the second edition of Spears, the title of this case is City Council of Charleston v. Kleinback.