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Huff v. Commonwealth
763 S.W.2d 106
Ky.
1988
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*1 HUFF, Terry Appellant, Lee

v.

COMMONWEALTH

Kentucky, Appellee. Posnansky, Asst. Public Advo- Mark A. No. 87-SC-664-MR. cate, Frankfort, appellant. Kentucky. Supreme Court of Frankfort, Cowan, Gen., Atty. Frederic J. Gen., Garrison, 17, Atty. Denise A. Asst. Nov. 1988. appellee. 9, Rehearing Denied Feb. 1989. OF THE COURT

OPINION Appellant September indicted was charge pre-trial murder. At a on a hearing, appellant attacked the constitu- 439.- tionality 532.055 and KRS of KRS these proper filed motion to have Af- statutes declared unconstitutional. two denied, where- hearing, the motion was ter plea guilty upon appellant entered a charge. the court that said He advised pursu- plea, entered plea was a conditional 8.09, which reads: ant RCr the con- approval of the court and With Commonwealth, a defendant sent of the guilty, plea of may enter a conditional appeal writing right, on reserving review the ad- judgment, from the trial any specified determination of verse pre- pre-trial If the defendant motion. appeal, shall be allowed he vails plea. withdraw KRS 532.055 great part of his expends a appellant is- statute on the argument argu- powers. separation sue to the ones herein are identical ments made court in Commonwealth by this considered (1987), in Reneer, Ky., 734 S.W.2d the statute to hold we declined which case it vio- grounds that on the unconstitutional and “ac- powers, separation of lated the being time for the cept[ed] provisions its comity.” P. principle under the ap- argument advanced new 532.055(2)(a). This pellant concerns sentencing phase of applies to section procedure provided trial the bifurcated that, once a specifies this statute guilty to be defendant has determined *2 107 propensi- together the character and phase in the initial with of a crime its verdict cases.) (Citing ties of the offender. (after guilt trial or innocence of the determined), may mat- introduce certain KRS 439.3401 ters, including reads as follows: This statute

(a) may be offered evidence sentencing, violent offend- 439.3401. Parole for Commonwealth relevant section, ers.—(1) “violent As used this including: any person has offender” means who prior parole eligibility, 1. Minimum pled guilty to the convicted of or been defendant, felony of the both convictions offense, A capital Class commission of misdemeanor; felony involving B felony, or Class portion The statute herein attacked is a victim, rape in the first death of the “Truth-in-Sentencing” package sodomy degree degree or the first adopted Assem- General victim, physical injury to a or serious 1986, bly purpose the avowed of which victim. uncertainty to remove the veil of was (2) A offender has violent who been jury provide speculation from the and to (and capital of a offense has convicted jury each with more accurate information (25) twenty-five not been sentenced to concerning the defendant on trial. As we years parole), A felo- or a Class noted, this is made have evidence known sentence, ny or to and receives a life guilt. predetermination after a his sentence is commuted to a death and life sentence not be released on shall of the Court United parole until he has served at least twelve States examined several cases the (12) years penitentiary. in the the case of Cali questions In before us. (3) A offender violent who has Ramos, 992, v. 463 103 U.S. S.Ct. fornia felony of a Class A with convicted 3446, (1983). 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 Justice years B sentence of a term of or Class O’Connor, majority opinion, in her cites felony is a violent offender shall not who (Prop. ALI Model Penal Code 210.6 Off. § parole be released on until he has served 1962), Draft in which it is stated: (50%) percent fifty at least of the sen- sentencing ... the court at state imposed. tence shall inform the of the nature of the (4) apply only shall This section imprisonment sentence of that persons those who commit offenses after imposed, including implication its July respect possible upon parole, release Appellant challenges constitutionality against sentence is sentence First, grounds. on three he statute ours). (Emphasis of death. contends that it violates the due Gregg Georgia, 428 U.S. 96 of the Fourteenth Amendment of clause (1976), 49 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 859 the court and Section the U.S. Constitution stated: Second, argues Kentucky Constitution. he We think it advisable for the equal protection guaranteed that it denies have as much information before it as constitutions; and, third, argues he both possible when it makes the unconstitutionally vague that it is its decision. application. Gregg further held: arguments predicated All three are certainly proposition upon possibility

It is not a of the results emanat novel in the from difference between one who discretion area of imprisonment sentenced to life be exercised an informed manner. We has been has a minimum eligibility long recognized deter- who [f]or sentences, justice generally years, mination of of 12 and one who has been years has a requires there taken into sentenced to a term of and who ... offense, least account the of at circumstances of means, imposed. ruling of the sentence This of the lower court on the 50% constitutionality course, that one KRS 532.055 who receives a sentence 439.3401 affirmed. years or more of 25 has a minimum eligibility in excess of one who receives STEPHENS, C.J., GANT, layman life sentence—a sentence which the STEPHENSON, VANCE and longer considers a sentence. We do not *3 JJ., WINTERSHEIMER, concur. find this a matter of violation constitutional LEIBSON, JJ., by juries but a matter to be in LAMBERT considered dissent. affixing sentences. J., GANT, separate files a

Appellant argue does not that the classi concurring opinion in which length crimes and in stay fication of of the STEPHENSON, J., joins. penitentiary is of prerogative other than a legislature, and the indeed could not. See LEIBSON, J., dissenting opinion files a Estelle, 263, 100S.Ct. J., Rummell v. 445 U.S. LAMBERT, except in joins, which (1980); Rudolph 63 L.Ed.2d 382 v. portion judicial which discusses whether Ky., jury sentencing is Kentucky, preferable. Corrections Cabinet of (1986). 236 The entire 710 S.W.2d GANT, Justice, concurring. predicated on KRS 439.3401 is attack disparity possible the in which opinion herein, the majority I concur with eligi may exist in the minimum for upon my in based concurrence Common- bility. Reneer, Ky., wealth v. 734 S.W.2d 794 However, (1987). my opinion that it is parola- in Kentucky A life sentence put comity. has come to an end to As time ble Life abol- offense. was Reneer, in supra: stated we possible many years sentence ished as Supreme this Court of Common- history of ago. authority prescribe has the wealth varying life sentences is a one. It has practice procedure of rules minimum, six-year ranged from a then Kentucky courts of this Commonwealth. seven, eight, present then to its now Constitution, Because Section 116. eligibility for of minimum violent offenders legislative attempt is 532.055 a invade argument years. 12 be made could rule-making prerogative of Su- period years any minimum of affixed by legislatively prescribing preme Court legislature arbitrary, is we do but practice procedure, of vio- agree. not separation powers doctrine lates imposed do not find We enunciated 28 of the Section capricious legislature arbitrary to be Constitution. uncertainty of life any way. It also Ex Auditor Public See Parte eligi- itself, declaration a minimum not a Accounts, (1980), Ky., 682 609 S.W.2d at disparity. possible creates bility, which page 688. imposed on a example, a sentence For life Commonwealth, authority to In this des- same as a defendant is not the 60-year-old ignate sentencing authority lies with imposed 20-year-old upon a life sentence As Supreme Kentucky. Court of defendant. Reneer, 28 of the Consti- stated Section again call would to the attention We powers separation provides tution fact a mini- appellant that this is government. among the three branches parole eligibility is thus period of mum power provides judicial 109 Section considered only one of the factors to be Court, vest in the and Sec- shall parole. granting empowers Supreme Court to tion 116 procedure. rules of practice make all circumstances, we do

Under all operated history, Kentucky in its unconstitutional In its has find this statute constitutions, separate none of four of violent offenders. under treatment

109 involving except pun- cases any makes reference sentenc- offenses which ishable death. ing. right Each of the four retains the by jury.” of trial This “the ancient mode (2), above, Paragraph calls to mind an adopted in our phrase was Section 7 of interesting anomaly. Kentucky already Constitution, present as “The an- follows: judicial has under section in by jury mode of shall held cient trial judi- all of the cases our but about 10% and the thereof remains invio- impression sacred my system. cial It that at late, subject to such modifications as count cases in last 9.85% justice system actually authorized this Constitution.” criminal were tried by jury. explained early This was as Wilson justice The trend modem criminal 341, 348, Commonwealth, Ky. 132 sentencing. been toward At (1910), in which the court S.W. stated: viz., Arkansas, present, six states — guaranteed What is here *4 Oklahoma, Missouri, Kentucky, Texas and by according trial jury to the ancient Virginia jury sentencing, with Mis- —have mode; by the that is as was of trial souri, allowing Oklahoma and Texas the jury at the At commonlaw. the common jury judi- defendant choose between and special law the returned ver- either sentencing. cial dicts, setting the supporting forth facts sentencing by Judicial has been endorsed prosecution prayed the judgment and the Association, the American Bar the Presi- thereon, general of the court or a verdict Commission, dent’s the National Crime guilty. Thereupon of punishment the Commission Law Observance and En- by by was fixed the court and enforced forcement, Sentencing the Model Act charged by ministerial officers law the (§ 12), the Model Penal Code. The Citing with duty. 4th Blackstone Judges Kentucky of Circuit Association has Commentaries, page 361. ardently judicial sentencing. endorsed question comity This of has indeed not, per se, These endorsements do furnish recognized by Assembly the General of rule, grounds change for a of the but are Kentucky itself. When the Rules of Crimi- thinking of indicative of best minds adopted nal Procedure were the which have studied the situation. legislature recognized that previous herein, already ju- As indicated statutory governed rules general had “... majority dicial in the vast of criminal proceedings only as a of matter 532.050, really cases. which Under comity on part of the courts It ...” Procedure, adopted should be as a Rule policy leg- further declared that of the may imposed by judge no sentence be prescription islature was “... considering report a written fol- governing procedure details of left will be lowing pre-sentence investigation, which discretion of Department the Judicial report by is made Officer and Probation after the effective date of this Act ...” analysis includes “an defendant’s Acts, 61(2). 1962 C. Preamble and § criminality, history delinquency physi- previous authority rule condition, family cal and mental situation re-enacted, to sentence was not but became status, background, economic edu- Rule i.e., of the Rule Court— cation, occupation, personal any habits and 9.84: other matters court directs to be includ- Penalty. (1) Rule 9.84. When ed.” The defendant is ádvised of the con- — jury returns guilty a verdict of it shall investigation report tents this degree

fix the given opportunity offense and reasonable time and penalty, except penalty any where the controvert facts and conclusions. by law, fixed in which case it shall be present time, At the sentenc- fixed the court. procedure ing, tool for this use (2) plea When the defendant probation discharge. enters a Under conditional guilty, laws, fix penalty, present provide court which for a clum- trial, instance prob- met the time-consuming each we have sy and bifurcated muffed it. smattering lem and we have jury is furnished with information; but, main, in the conducting sentencing phase of the I. MINIMUM PAROLE ELIGIBILITY dimly in a lit room. trial function but an Parole is prospectively immediately I would It is executive function. administered provide that, change when a RCr 9.84 to Board, body ap- an autonomous the Parole guilty which fixes a verdict of jury returns in KRS 439.320. Parole pointed as directed offense, penalty shall degree of the nothing post-conviction than clem- more pre-sentence fixed the court after ency, grace. The Parole Board a matter investigation report, which also should promulgated administrative various provided the Rules of this court. regulations establishing rules and a sched- eligibility, the Parole

ule for but these rules and Board is free to revise STEPHENSON, J., joins in this and, time, further, any to “re- schedule at concurring opinion. any case of inmate for view the LEIBSON, Justice, dissenting. prior to his date consideration do so.” appears advisable to I Respectfully, dissent. DC-RG6(8). Reg. As stated Parole Board continuing saga Chapter II in the This is 532.060, Commentary Sen- in the to KRS problems generated by the *5 felony, “The Imprisonment for tence of Statute,” “Truth-In-Sentencing so-called length imprisonment to be actual in KRS and 439.3401. codified 532.055 parole by determined the board.” Beneer, I, v. Commonwealth Chapter pa- Indeed, “determining rules for new (1987), only the issue Ky., S.W.2d 794 734 by “emergen- eligibility” role were enacted or not KRS 532.- considered was “whether September regulation” effective cy Statute) (The Sentencing vio- 055 Truth (501 1:030E), public subject KAR to 1988 Constitu- lates Section 21, 1988, hearing scheduled for October powers separation of relating to the tion parole eligibil- the rules and thus separate departments of state among the already appellant may ity applicable to this Id., held government.” at 795. We changed. be powers separation of doc- “it violates the information is the kind uncertain This Id., Nevertheless, we re- at 796. trine.” stamps ap- with Majority that our statute, stating “nullify” the fuse to proval as admissible evidence. recognize being for the time we would “comity,” subject to further the basis of Dissenting Opinion my As stated parts of problems individual review of with Reneer, supra at Commonwealth general procedural structure. the statute’s anticipating problem: any consider to “We reserve the tell the will Commonwealth “What accept its and we injustices or ... abuses eligibility? parole jury about being time under provisions for the period to determine the power ... [T]he Id., comity.” at 798. principle of completely to the passes of incarceration Board_ in Ken- Parole ‘[W]e [have] very has come to confront some The time awith tucky indeterminate sentence an applying problems emerging from cer- bad fixed term that maximum [is] (1) Act, specifically: sections tain Commentary no minimum term.’ Commonwealth proviso permitting the 532.060. eligibili- parole of “minimum offer evidence comprehensibly con- way no (2) There is (KRS 532.055(2)(a)(l),” a multi- ty conflicting of the vey to the all the sen- problems at tude of constitutional parole eligibili- statutory possibilities that surround generated tencing phase prospect of confusion parole ty.... dealing with language in the section 439.3401). is inevitable.” (KRS ‘half-truths’ offenders for violent

Ill guided prongs only There are two to the attack on te do. It is be prosecution guilt permitting pertaining to the or innocence to introduce evi- facts accused, applicable eligibility,” dence about “minimum of the and the law judicial valid. One both is that it is bad thereto.”

policy making and second that it is of the Before enactment Truth-In-Sen- unconstitutional. tencing statute, crime character sentencing procedure, for including the was the consideration permit fixing decision whether to evidence the sentence for the offense.1 After parole eligibility,” Truth-In-Sentencing “minimum is a matter of stat- enactment procedure judicial policy ute, has has because the character the criminal been constitutionally allocated to the to the character of the offense as a added government. In Reneer we setting branch consideration in the sentence for adopt procedures proof made a decision to certain offense. It allows his charac- general concept specifics as a because the General ter in those itemized the stat- them, Assembly subject recommended profound ute. Even if we assume that this occur, subsequent change review of individual should character of injustices.” well “abuses Now we have been criminal as as the character of the injustice, sentencing, confronted clear abuse offense should considered in still and nevertheless future does not fit embrace General As- sembly’s pattern. into the permit recommendation to evi- parole. dence about We have done so in govern- Constitutional limitations on the longstanding, conflict with well reasoned arbitrary power ment’s exercise judicial precedent mandating contrary re- guarantee of constitutional due instance, Broyles For v. Common- sult. prohibit using should evidence in sentenc- wealth, (1954), Ky., 267 S.W.2d misleading, confusing inherently that is explained why eligibility should not Const., incomplete. Ky. Sec. 2. It is sentencing thusly: considered thing Truth-In-Sentencing one for the stat- judiciary attempts to antic- “[W]hen permit, ute us to condone *6 ipate legislative the rules of the and ex- comity, jury past of criminal consideration departments ecutive relating pa- to the setting history in the sentence for the of- effect, prisoners, role of attempts, and However, being quite fense tried. it is a to infringes circumvent those rules it speculation to different matter factor on upon prerogatives depart- of parole other eligibility, a matter which is future government.” ments of unknowable, inherently vague and sub- change. ject subsequent to or Statutes long The condemning line of cases dis- permitting criminal such evidence parole eligibility cussion of includes Farm- transgress necessarily constitutional limita- Commonwealth, Ky., er v. 450 S.W.2d 494 on tions arbitrariness. Commonwealth, (1970); Abernathy v. Ky., (1969); Brown 439 S.W.2d 949 v. Common- against majority position case The is wealth, (1969), Ky., Supreme 445 845 fully by S.W.2d made Tennessee Commonwealth, Ringo v. Ky., long ago 346 S.W.2d Court. Not too it struck down a Commonwealth, v. (1961). 21 Postell requiring judges similar law trial court Ky. 272, 39, (1917), 174 192 44 S.W. criminal cases to inform the State, 608, Farris v. principle parole stated the fundamental as fol- 535 S.W.2d (Tenn.1976), lows: 614 in these words: jury’s sentencing] permitted spec- not to verdict “Jurors should be “[T]he [on sentences, length should not influenced be what another ulate on the of discre- department government tionary parole, good of the state of accumulation might might do, conglomera- authority or had and honor time and a whole course, was, te. subject subsequent 1. It of to en- upon proof persistent felony hancement sta-

112 which, original.] contingent they phasis Disparate is

tion of events all, pass pass appellant’s objections to least come to at will come stated Very heavily involved is the probably significant the future. least right a constitutional defendant a constitutional considerations involved. fair trial. imper- potential constitutionally The ‘by guess by golly’, This is trial a life sen- disparity occurs because missible by uphold- we will not countenance may, depending future un- tence every sense ing a statute which offends considerations, result a shorter knowable every precept pro- of due of fairness and term of incarceration than a sentence a cess. years. primary and insur- term of But the problem constitutional occurs mountable disposition of the future The matter when this section of the Truth-In-Sentenc- wholly is ut- defendant convicted juxtaposed Act is with the section we guilt terly foreign to his and is not a discussed, 532.055(2)(a)(l), just jury in deter- proper consideration permitting Commonwealth to introduce mining length his sentence.” parole eligi- evidence Against array own bility. powerful why this precedents and reasons provisions together, these two Taken permit mini- Court should not evidence of present an insolvable dilemma defense Opin- parole eligibility, Majority mum amply in a case illustrated counsel criminal nothing language more than ion offers present appellant’s The circumstances. case, from States Court a United argue sentencing in the best counsel cannot entirely dif- badly misapplied, because an presents client. This a con- interest Majority ferent issue was involved. stitutionally impermissible encroachment Ramos, 463 cites California be heard “right to ... on the accused’s 77 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. counsel,” guaranteed [emphasis added] (1983). in- v. Ramos involved California Kentucky Section Constitution capital in a case where structions right Amendment as- and the Sixth possible life with- one of the sentences was United States of counsel sistance Obviously, parole. possibility out constitutional Constitution. pen- required to the death choose between this is not protection stronger is because alty possibili- life and sentence to right represented, but just a to be ty a sentence where “heard.” possible, necessarily told be heard necessarily carries inapposite to our prospect. This so will able allowing premise that counsel present Opinion with it the Common- *7 logical vague, judgment a produce to uncertain and to make reasonable wealth in best existing argument mini- is his client’s incomplete as to what evidence 439.3401, as- parole guidelines further com- The terms of KRS mum that interest. understood, space. meaning can suming of their be ment waste apparently require that a violent offender 439.3401, PAROLE FOR II. KRS including 439.3401(1), as defined in KRS OFFENDERS VIOLENT murderer, pa- for not be considered shall twelve has served at least Opinion is of mark role until he Majority wide the The to life penitentiary the sentenced years in it the “entire attack on KRS when states be considered possible imprisonment, dis- and shall not is on predicated 439.3401 the fifty at he has served least (between parole term for until sentence and a parity life imposed if he has percent of the sentence may in years) sentencing which exist of years.2 to a term of been sentenced parole eligibility.” the for minimum [Em- capital as statutory language KRS 507.020 "a elsewhere defined in any 2. make To sense 439.3401(3) necessary felony. to construe A is not a Class KRS it offense" and offense, although it is murder as a Class A H3 to prospect parole, the of the out life sentence the end cannot be Excluding the disregarded. sentencing set statutory structure which is Chapter styled out KRS Classifica- hand, if he On other assumes the the Designation tion and Offenses-Autho- paroled point at the of his defendant will be Disposition, rized contemplates life mean eligibility, this would minimum

imprisonment punishment is the maximum sentence, years any life twelve for a sentencing authority can order years greater than to a term of sentence any penalty is not case where death years more than a twenty-four severe Indeed, imposed. statutory language life sentence because KRS 439.3401 fixes specifically statutory involved the authorized states minimum for a (20) twenty years fifty percent. years sentence “is less than term of at imprisonment,” nor more life KRS than case, appellant present faced 532.060(2)(a), and the is so instructed. prospect of trial and for conviction except Majority Opinion suggests, As the shotgun killing, meaning- a violent had no confusing in- for the evidence that will be argument ful for minimum sentence of parole eligibility, troduced years twenty in the event of conviction “layman long- considers life [‘a sentence’] though, arguably, even there Indeed, except er un- sentence.” mitigating relat- some circumstances certain and unknowable answers to capacity. to the defendant’s diminished questions, “will the attempting argue Parole Board release Logic foreclosed to prisoner hearing; on the first how the minimum sentence for a sentence twenty twenty-four many deferred; years. will from Faced times he be will prospect deprived by with this the stat- require Parole Board him to serve out any argue meaningful opportunity ute of time?” a sentence life will be fact as well sentencing, opted negotiated plea, he for a theory longer as in sentence. reserving challenge appeal Appendix Attached an as to this sentencing constitutionality styled are Parole Board statistics “Results him scheme which denied ar- Hearings Only,” First-time 1983-87. gument. paroled hearing first number at 439.3401, structured, providing as dropped by over The number commit- 25%. parole eligibility years twelve ted to out” “serve has more than doubled. fifty percent for life sentence for a but bring? Who what knows future will years, arbitrary term due denies point impossi- all this is it guaranteed by as ble for defense counsel to make a rational Constitution, Section This much should argument to the authority, jury elementary jus- to an obvious sense or judge, interest, in his client’s best be- However, were I under- tice. even able to cause he cannot divine future actions why my colleagues accept stand how can Parole Board his client’s case. The reasonable, surely sur- statute attorney sorely tempted defense will passes understanding to disclaim ac- ask for he presumably a life sentence since guarantees, federal cused’s constitutional then possibility has a in twelve state, to the assistance of counsel and years, he must but also consider that There be heard counsel. *8 may Parole well to his Board refuse way figure is that can how no counsel out (the hearing client at the first time last in argue to his client’s best interest for a rejection available statistics rate jury show the will be reasonable sentence to that 70%), hearing at first time almost and burdened with a of half-truths bundle possibility parole eligibility. his minimum He is that client have to serve Next, necessary By regulations it is to make substantial the Parole Board has rewritten 439.3401(2) changes punctuation changes. to can in the in statute effect these I having Majority approves every "capital speculate

to avoid conviction that the offense,” sentence, regardless subject to the Parole Board’s version of the statute sub parole eligibility years. twelve silentio.

forced, defendant, give up authority prescribe as to practice was this to “rules of right guilt procedure justice.” exchange his for for the court of to contest promise of minimum sentence. jury I familiar am not with how well sentencing sister works our states. But inspired by part No doubt at least in state, quite confidently, I prepared am to outrageous upon thrust sen- confusion sentencing problems that in Federal courts tencing procedure by the Truth-In-Sen- using judge sentencing procedures instead statute, tencing Gant has filed Justice jury sentencing great, greater, are as Concurring Opinion proposing change to sentencing problems than with in Ken- judge sentencing from our time honored A tucky. distinguished Judge, Federal system sentencing. problems Frankel, Honorable Marvin E. in his book Reneer are of our own by making created Order,” Sentences, “Criminal Law Without not and should be used a vehicle to expounded prob- in detail on the serious people’s right abandon the to decide judge sentencing lems Federal courts. appropriate verdict what is an sentence. A Judge judge Frankel’s conclusion about proper question sentence is a of fact and sentencing is as follows: just procedure. not a matter of made, point in all stark its “[T]he It is out of character with the delibera- horror, evidence, compelling that power tive for our Court to assume widely unequal imposed sentences are sentencing judge sen- trade every day great numbers crimes tencing prop- until been first issue has distinguish- essentially and criminals not erly presented carefully considered. [Frankel, p. each other.” able from 8.] preliminary This should include research Judge Frankel documents treatise legal op- and an review issues example. example after He con- portunity public afforded to the and to the cludes: participate pro- bar association to

cess. judges “The evidences conclusive widely varying attitutes sentenc- thoroughly Until this matter has been ing, administering that confer statutes considered, preci- researched and is both discretion, huge mete out measures pitous presumptuous suggest divergent widely sentences where guarantee not Constitution does divergences explainable only by are ap- jury’s to a verdict an among judges, variations ma- propriate sentence in those cases where in the defendants or terial differences pleads not guilty, defendant decide p. [Frankel, crimes.” their 21.] that the new Judicial Article meant to dis- anything peo- proof of the failure in the turb so fundamental as the What more sentencing system than ple’s jury sentencing simply be- Federal is needed specifies changes recently now enacted cause Article 116 drastic “[t]he Comprehensive power Congress in the Crime Con- Court shall have the system new prescribe practice proce- trol Act of An elaborate ... sentencing guidelines supervisory dure for the of Justice.” I would of Court seriously people procedures has enacted to control the question that the of Ken- Assembly, judges, of trial much tucky, or the General would discretion being challenged in Feder- presume it as for us to of which now view reasonable power jury sentencing from al courts as unconstitutional.3 to abolish limited, up Sentencing thus be set 3. From Vol. No. Criminal Justice News- cretion now, letter, "Up guidelines. They the Consti- October 1988: went Commission to draft the widely differing tutional issue has led to results involving last November 1.” A case into effect judges in federal courts. Of 560 federal district sitting, constitutionality sen- of the new criminal have the 1984 ruled that tencing special guidelines Commis- and of unconstitutional, reform while 108 law was argu- wrote them heard on oral sion that was law, reflecting Congress’ upheld it. *9 Supreme Court ment before the United States sentences be made desire that federal criminal on October judges’ and that dis- more certain and definite

H5 argument judges pre- wrong that are ment impression better leaves a because pared juries proper than to decide on a jury defendant waives the to a undocumented, sentence is probably sentencing only verdict on pleads when he question untrue. The appro- of what is an guilty. exception Almost without these priate fact, question sentence is a plea guilty cases where a is entered are deciding the time honored method for facts plea bargained. This means there is an in a jury powerful court law agreed sentence beforehand recommended protection liberty. of our plea Commonwealth at the time the Any fair,

is entered. judge who he matter found My on this views decides he plea will abide bar- in the Bar Association an article Louisville gain, permit will the defendant to withdraw Lawyer, Winter publication, Louisville plea guilty and retain the portion of that article: quote 1982. I guilt contest his jury sentencing. and to citizens, forced to submit “Disinterested against proposi- arguments for or

their inquiring scrutiny of their to the tion change judge for Ken- ‘get it jurors, likely more fellow are tucky no will be small matter. On the fact, including right’ any question contrary, it away people will take from the crime, punishment that fits the than power to make a fundamental and im- judge.” portant decision, power and transfer that governmental officials, into the hands of jury process selection insures that judiciary. my judgment, elected In jurors have no stake in the outcome of change such casually should not be un- requires they the case. The law must Indeed, dertaken. it should not be under- impartial, long those of us with taken at all until first it has been estab- experience judicial almost lished credible evidence that it is a exception develop great respect for change for the better and then it has been jury impartiality. people established that change. want this Judges on the other hand have a stake in system. profession It is their and their They livelihood. must run for reelection. political view current wisdom about present sentenc- There is much about our importance to the being candidate of structure, mandated as viewed as a “law and candidate, order” statutes, to restore that needs reform defendant would every right to fear sentencing process. We credibility to the the worst prospect at the facing judge feasibility system of a study the need to sentencing in an year. election long As setting sentencing, fair and determinate judges we elect in Kentucky, I oppose will place in the first reasonable sentences substituting judge sentencing sen- system often abandoning which tencing. Can honestly expect of a prison of the only to control the size serves

judge that he will be able to view the no reason to be- population. But there is prospect of sentencing with the same objec- abolishing as to verdict lieve that tivity detachment, impar- fairness and improve the sentence will appropriate tiality, that expect we can of a every reason to fear that system, and whom the outcome of per- the case has no may make our situation worse. consequences? sonal LAMBERT,J., Concurring Dissenting concurs in

Justice Gant’s makes judi- point “Kentucky already Opinion,except portion which discuss- jury sentencing cial in all es whether but 10% judicial system.” preferable. cases in our This state-

APPENDIX A AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL FARM STATE COMPANY, INSURANCE Appellee,

Appellant/Cross REEDER, Wayne

Delbert

Appellee/Cross

Appellant. 88-SC-146-DG, 88-SC-313-DG.

Nos. Kentucky.

Supreme Court of

Nov. 1988.

Rehearing Denied Feb.

Case Details

Case Name: Huff v. Commonwealth
Court Name: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date Published: Nov 17, 1988
Citation: 763 S.W.2d 106
Docket Number: 87-SC-664-MR
Court Abbreviation: Ky.
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