131 Minn. 461 | Minn. | 1915
The action is upon an accident insurance policy, renewable from time to time upon payment of a stipulated quarterly premium. The defense was that, for nonpayment of the premium, the policy was not in force when the insured was killed, and that the insured did not die an accidental death, but committed suicide, which is not covered by the policy. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appeals from the order denying its alternative motion for judgment or a new trial.
Hilton & Thompson were defendant’s agents at Fergus Falls. Quarterly, and a week or ten days before the date on which any accident policy would expire unless a renewal premium was paid, defendant would forward to Hilton & Thompson a receipt for such premium, signed by its president, to be countersigned by the agents and delivered to the policyholder when paid. Hilton & Thompson would at once countersign and mail the receipts, before the premium came due, to those policyholders whom they trusted. Afterwards they would collect. The agents accounted to defendant every month by forwarding the cash for the amount represented by the receipts sent them by the company and which they had countersigned and delivered to the policyholders. Those not countersigned and delivered — that is not collected — were returned. In this particular instance Hilton & Thompson had remitted for all the premiums due upon the policy so that it was in force, and had delivered to the insured the receipts, properly countersigned by them. However, the insured had not paid Hilton & Thompson for the last four quarterly premiums remitted to defendant. In other words, the agents had advanced and paid to defendant, out of their own funds, the renewal premiums on this policy and had charged the amounts thereof on their books to the insured. The defendant had received and accepted the stipulated premiums. Where the money came from is no concern of defendant. No question of waiver by agent is involved. The defendant received the premium in proper time. We think a bare statement of
The insured, Mr. Huestis, was killed by the discharge of a shotgun. The court instructed, in conformity to the terms of the policy, that the bmden was upon plaintiff to prove that death was accidental, and also that it was not incumbent on defendant to establish that Huestis committed suicide. The charge was acceptable to both parties and was in line with these cases cited by defendant: Whitlatch v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 149 N. Y. 45, 43 N. E. 405; Laessig v. Travelers’ Protective Assn. 169 Mo. 272, 69 S. W. 469; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Weise, 182 Ill. 496, 55 N. E. 540. The policy insured Huestis “against liability or death resulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, suicide (sane or insane) not included.” The charge being correct, we can only inquire whether the proof fairly supports the verdict to the effect that the death of the insured was accidental. The defendant contends that not only has plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proof, but that the insured appears conclusively a suicide. In this we think the record does not sustain defendant. The substantially undisputed facts are these: Mr. Huestis was a barber, 50 years of age, living with his wife and two grown daughters, the one daughter having been married a few months before the accident and, with her husband, temporarily residing at the home of her parents. He was devoted to his wife and children, generally spending his time with the family when not at work. His habits were, excellent; his health good; his disposition genial, and he enjoyed the favor and esteem of his fellows. He had always made a good living, and for some time before his death was in partnership with another person, conducting a barber shop with apparently satisfactory results. He had not accumulated any property outside of household goods and his share of the
Error is assigned upon the reception of testimony showing that deceased had a revolver in his bed room. It was rightly admitted as bearing upon suicidal intent. It is a plausible inference that if deceased intended to take his life he would employ the instrumentality most readily adapted to accomplish his purpose. To support the 11-pound double-barreled shotgun so as to cause such a wound, at the place where it did hit, would be exceedingly awkward and not likely to be attempted when he possessed such a convenient weapon to use as the revolver, if he desired to take his life.
The gun went off when close to the place of the wound, for the hair was singed around the edges. How close might have some bearing on the probability of its being fired intentionally. The court permitted the result of experiments with the same gun loaded with similar shells fired into sheets of cotton wadding to be testified to. Such matters are largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge. The evidence was of very little value to either side and no prejudice could have resulted from its reception.
Order affirmed.