554 S.E.2d 781 | Ga. Ct. App. | 2001
A jury found Bromekis Hudson guilty of child molestation. On appeal, Hudson claims the trial court erred in denying his several motions for a mistrial because the State improperly placed his character into issue. He also claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.*
The mother asked L. L. why she was in the men’s bathroom, and L. L. replied that she was changing toilet tissue. L. L.’s mother was suspicious that something inappropriate had taken place between L. L. and Hudson, but L. L. repeated her explanation until her mother spanked her and informed her that she was going to take L. L. to the emergency room to see if Hudson had touched her. L. L. then told her mother that Hudson had taken her pants down. The mother took L. L. to the hospital where a medical exam indicated that L. L. had suffered no physical trauma and there was no indication of rape.
L. L. testified at trial that, in a stall in the men’s bathroom, Hudson had pulled her pants down and told her to turn around and bend down, and that he touched her vagina with his penis. McCord then came in the bathroom to warn Hudson that L. L.’s mother was in the restaurant. Before Hudson left, he told L. L. to stand on top of the toilet, although L. L. did not do so because she knew her mother would find her anyway.
1. Hudson claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for child molestation. He points to the evidence showing that (1) L. L. experienced no physical trauma; (2) L. L. only told her mother that Hudson had touched her vagina after her mother spanked her; and (3) L. L. told a restaurant employee that nothing had happened between her and Hudson. We note that although L. L. admitted that she spoke to the employee, she testified that she never recanted her claim that Hudson had touched her.
Georgia law does not require that L. L.’s testimony be corroborated.
2. Hudson claims the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial because his character was improperly placed in evidence. When the prosecutor asked L. L.’s mother about what had happened in the restaurant bathroom, her reply included the following unre
Defense counsel also made a motion for mistrial after the prosecutor asked the victim a series of questions with regard to previous kissing between L. L. and Hudson. Hudson claims this is similar-transaction evidence and that the trial court failed to hold the hearing required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3. However, evidence of prior kissing between L. L. and Hudson is not similar transaction evidence subject to the requirements of Rule 31.3, but is simply evidence of a relationship between L. L. and Hudson that is admissible to show Hudson’s motive, intent, and bent of mind in committing the charged act against L. L.
Judgment affirmed.
Grant v. State, 195 Ga. App. 463, 464 (1) (393 SE2d 737) (1990).
Id.
Atkins v. State, 243 Ga. App. 489, 490 (1) (c) (533 SE2d 152) (2000).
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
(Citation omitted.) White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 32 (4) (486 SE2d 338) (1997).
Id.
(Footnote omitted.) Sims v. State, 268 Ga. 381, 382 (2) (489 SE2d 809) (1997).
See Griffin v. State, 240 Ga. App. 494, 496 (2) (523 SE2d 910) (1999).
See Myrick v. State, 242 Ga. App. 892, 893 (1) (531 SE2d 766) (2000).