Hudson Keyse, L.L.C. v. Carson, 07ap-936 (5-29-2008)Hudson Keyse, L.L.C. v. Carson, 07ap-936 (5-29-2008)
{¶ 2} On May 8, 2006, appellee filed a complaint in the Franklin County Municipal Court naming appellant as the defendant. The complaint set forth four causes of action: (1) failure to pay money owed on an account, (2) quantum meruit based on the failure to pay for the agreed upon financial services, (3) unjust enrichment, and (4) breach of contract. The claim for money owed on an account was based on the assertion that appellee is Chase Bank's assignee by virtue of its purchase of certain credit card accounts with outstanding balances due and owing. The complaint also alleged that appellant and appellee entered into an oral financial services agreement regarding payment on the account, and that appellant failed to pay the outstanding balance as provided by the financial services agreement. The claims for quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract appear to have been based on the alleged financial services agreement.
{¶ 3} The complaint further stated that appellee did not have a copy of the financial services agreement or a copy of the assigned account. Appellee attached to the complaint an affidavit executed by Nancy Quere, appellee's Legal Account Manager. The affidavit stated:
*31. That I, Nancy Quere, am the Legal Account Manager of the Plaintiff herein and am competent to testify to the matters stated herein, which are made on my personal knowledge and are true and correct.
2. That there is justly an amount due and owing Hudson Keyse, L.L.C., Assignee of Chase Bank Usa [sic], N.a. [sic] by the Defendant to the Plaintiff the sum of money amounting to $7,833.38, plus interest totalling [sic] $3,512.78, beginning from MAY 18 2004 through MAR 31 2006; and that such balance will continue to earn interest at a rate of 24.00 from MAR 31 2006, as an annual percentage rate calculated as required by the Federal Truth In Lending Act.
3. That the said indebtedness represents the amount due and originating on a credit card, which Hudson Keyse, L.L.C. is the Assignee of Chase Bank Usa [sic], N.a. [sic] and that Hudson Keyse, L.L.C, Assignee of Chase Bank Usa [sic], N.a. [sic], the within named Plaintiff, having purchased said debt from said assignor, is the owner of said debt and is the proper party to bring this action.
4. That Plaintiff has not directly or indirectly received any part of the money or goods herein as due, or received an [sic] security or satisfaction for which credit has not already been given.
5. That the Plaintiff keeps regular books of account and that the keeping of said books of account is in the charge of or under supervision of the undersigned affiant. The entries in said books of account are made in the ordinary course of business. Said entries show the Defendant is indebted to the Plaintiff in the manner and amount set forth herein.
6. That I have made diligent inquiry to determine if the defendant is in the military service of the United States of America, and have determined that defendant is not in such military service and is therefore not entitled to the rights and privileges provided under the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended.
{¶ 4} On July 7, 2006, appellant filed a motion seeking a definite statement pursuant to
{¶ 5} On August 17, 2006, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or, alternatively, for a definite statement. This motion reiterated the arguments previously set forth. On September 8, 2006, appellant filed a motion seeking dismissal based on lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, again reiterating the arguments previously set forth. The trial court overruled both motions by entry dated October 5, 2006.
{¶ 6} On October 16, 2006, appellant filed an answer to the complaint, which included a counterclaim claiming violation of a variety of federal laws, including the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Credit Billing Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Appellant claimed damages in an amount exceeding $20,000.
{¶ 7} On November 29, 2006, with leave from the trial court, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellee argued that summary judgment was appropriate based on requests for admissions deemed admitted by appellant's failure to respond to them. Appellee subsequently filed a motion seeking dismissal of the counterclaim because the damages sought exceeded the municipal court's monetary jurisdiction. On November 2, 2007, by separate entries, the trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss appellant's counterclaim.
{¶ 8} Appellant filed this appeal, alleging three assignments of error: *5
I. PLAINTIFFS APPELLEES [sic] APPEAR[S] TO HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY BASIS FOR THE RELIEF REQUESTED WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE STATE OF OHIO PURSUANT TO WHICH THEIR ACTION IS BROUGHT.
II. THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN ALLOWING THIS CASE TO PROCEED AGAINST MR. CARSON APPEARS TO VIOLATE THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF OHIO AND THE RULE OF LAW, THEREFORE PLAINTIFFS [sic] SHOULD BE [OVERRULED] AND THE RESULTING JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT APPEARS TO HAVE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE COUNTERCLAIM OF MR. CARSON WITH PREJUDICE, WITHOUT THE SPECIFIED SEVEN DAY NOTICE, SEEMINGLY ADVERSE TO HIS PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE RESPECTIVE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTIIUTIONS [sic].
{¶ 9} For ease of discussion, we will address the assignments of error out of order. In his second assignment of error, appellant essentially assigns as error the trial court's decision to allow the action to proceed by denying his motion for definite statement. Appellant argued in the motion for definite statement that appellee failed to attach certain documents to the complaint, thereby failing to comply with
{¶ 10}
Appellant argued in his motion that appellee failed to attach a copy of the account, a copy of the financial services agreement alleged in the complaint to exist between appellant and appellee, and a copy of the agreement by which Chase Bank assigned the credit card account to appellee.
{¶ 11} Initially, we note that the assignment agreement between Chase Bank and appellee was not the foundation for the claims against appellant, but was instead the foundation for appellee being the real party in interest for purposes of bringing the action. Appellee could not prevail on the claims assigned by the bank without proving the existence of a valid assignment agreement. Natl. Check Bur., Inc. v.Cody, Cuyahoga App. No. 84208,
{¶ 12} Likewise, failure to attach the alleged financial services agreement between appellant and appellee did not implicate
{¶ 13} The issue then is whether appellee complied with the
[A]n account must show the name of the party charged. It begins with a balance, preferably at zero, or with a sum recited that can qualify as an account stated, but at least the balance should be a provable sum. Following the balance, the item or items, dated and identifiable by number or otherwise, representing charges, or debits, and credits, should appear. Summarization is necessary showing a running or developing balance or an arrangement which permits the calculation of the balance claimed to be due.
Asset Acceptance Corp. v. Proctor,
{¶ 14} Ohio courts have recognized that the
{¶ 15} We agree with those courts that have held that compliance with
{¶ 16} Appellee points out that in its complaint it asserted claims other than the claim for an account that would not have required compliance with
{¶ 17} For the above stated reasons, appellant's second assignment of error is sustained, and this case is remanded with an instruction for the trial court to order appellee to file an amended complaint that complies with
{¶ 18} Consequently, we sustain appellant's second assignment of error, overrule the remaining assignments of error as moot, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.
PETREE and T. BRYANT, JJ., concur.
T. BRYANT, J., retired of the Third Appellate District, assigned to active duty under authority of Section