■ Aрpellant Hudson Buick, Pontiac, GMC Truck Company, which is now known as Lively Buick, Pontiac, GMC Truck Company (“Hudson”) appeals from a multimillion dollar personal injury judgment awarded to Appellees 1 as a result of injuries they sustained in a three-car automobile accident on May 30, 1994. Hudson was made a party to the suit because the 1981 Cadillac in which the Gooches were riding at the time of the acсident had been obtained from Hudson earlier that day. When a vehicle struck the Cadillac from behind, it was propelled into the Irwins’ lane causing them to collide head on with the Cadillac. Mary Jeanette Cooper Irwin was killed as a result of the collision. In eleven issues, Hudson asserts the trial court erred in its submission of certain jury questions and instructions, and that there was no or insufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination of its liability and the amount of damages. We will reverse and render.
I. Factual BACKGROUND
A few months prior to the accident at issue, Newton Hudson (“Newton”), President of Hudson Buick, became acquainted with Don Shirley through an Al-Anon and Acoholics Anonymous family support group they attended in Longview, Texas. Through their conversations, Shirley learned that Newton was in the car business, and he, in turn, informed Newtоn that he was an automobile wholesaler. Shirley then asked Newton whether he could purchase some vehicles through Hudson, and Newton said that he could do so. At trial, Newton explained that it was not unusual for Hudson to sell some of its *194 less desirable used vehicles to other wholesalers or at car auctions.
Sometime after their conversation at AA, Shirley went to Hudson on two occаsions prior to May 30, 1994, and purchased automobiles wholesale. On May 30, 1994, which was Memorial Day, Newton stated that he was the only person showing cars at Hudson. Sometime that day while Newton was occupied with other matters, Shirley arrived at Hudson and looked over a number of its used vehicles. Shirley thereafter informed Newton that he had found four vehicles he would like to purchase, and he would like a “package price” on the four. Newton gave Shirley a lump sum price on the four, Shirley made a counteroffer, and after some negotiations, the two ultimately settled upon a package price for the four vehicles. 2 Shirley then told Newton what portion of the total purchase price he wanted attributed to each of the four vehicles, and Newton рlaced those respective amounts on the sales contracts for each vehicle. Shirley represented to Newton that he was wholesaling these cars on behalf of Cars of Texas, a used car dealership in Longview. Shirley, however, told Newton that he had not planned to purchase four cars, and thus, only had several hundred dollars in cash with him at that time. Newton stated that because the banks were closed, he knew Shirley and his family and knew that they lived in town, he was not concerned about getting his money the next day. Thus, he agreed to give Shirley possession of the vehicles on Memorial Day and to allow him to pay for the vehicles the next day. Newton stated that the certificates of title would be turned over to Shirley after Hudson received payment for the vеhicles. Before Shirley took possession of the vehicles, he and Newton signed a contract of sale reflecting the purchase price on each of the vehicles. Hudson then gave Shirley the keys to each of the four vehicles.
Shirley, assisted by his son and two other drivers, Dean and Jamie Gooch, drove the cars from Hudson Buick in Henderson to the Cars of Texas lot in Longview. With the exception of the Cadillac, all of the cars Shirley had obtained from Hudson were left on the lot at Cars of Texas. Shirley, however, used the Cadillac to transport himself and his three drivers back to Henderson. After returning to Henderson, as Shirley was stopped and preparing to make a left-hand turn off of the highway, a car driven by Doris Watkins struck the Cadillac from the rear knocking it into the path оf a vehicle driven by Edelle Newton Irwin. The Gooches, Irwin, and his wife’s estate thereafter sued Hudson and others for damages resulting from their injuries sustained in the accident. The jury found Hudson fifty-five percent negligent, Shirley thirty-seven percent negligent, and Watkins eight percent negligent, and it awarded Appellees damages of approximately $3,700,000.
II. Hudson’s First and Second Issues on Appeal: The Ownership Issues
In its first issue, Hudson contends that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury an ownership question regarding the 1981 Cadillac, because the automobile’s ownership was a question of law for the court to determine. 3 Hudson contends that as a result, the jury’s answer to the question regarding ownership should be disregarded as immaterial. In its second issue, Hudson further contends that as a matter of law, it did not own the 1981 Cadillac at the time оf the accident.
*195 A. Standard of Review for Charge Error
An appellate court reviews allegations of error in the jury charge under an abuse of discretion standard. Tex.R.Civ. P. 277;
Howell Crude Oil Co. v. Donna Refinery,
B. Was Ownership of the Cadillac a Question of Law?
In its charge to the jury, the trial court submitted the following ownership issue as Question Number 3: “At the time of the incident in question, did HUDSON BUICK PONTIAC GMC own the. 1981 Cadillac automobile driven by DONALD SHIRLEY?” The jury’s answer to that question was “yes.” Hudson contends that this is a question of law, and it should nоt have been submitted to the jury. For the following reasons, we agree. First, it has been held that determination of the ownership of a vehicle is a conclusion of law based upon established facts.
Foust v. Old American County Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
Appellees contend that there is a factual dispute regarding ownership of the 1981 Cadillac DeVille which should be resolved by the jury rather than the court as a matter of law. They cite
Dean v. Lowery,
For the reasons set forth below, however, we conclude that Lowery is not controlling here. First, the cases are readily distinguishable on their facts. Lowery dealt with a father’s attempt to transfer to his son ownеrship of a pickup truck that the father had purchased for his son’s use two years earlier. Although the father executed a bill of sale to his son, financing for the pickup truck still remained in the father’s name, and there was no evidence that the son had given consideration for the vehicle. In contrast, here, the undisputed facts surrounding the transaction show that Shirley and Newton, acting on behаlf of Hudson, negotiated a sale price for four vehicles including the 1981 Cadillac, signed a contract of sale for each' vehicle which reflected its purchase price, and Shirley then took possession of the vehicles and removed them from Hudson’s lot with the understanding that their titles would be delivered to him the next day upon payment. 4 Further, in Lowery, the father executed a bill of sale; whereаs, in this case, the sale of the vehicles was evidenced by one of four contracts of sale specifying the purchase price for each. Unlike a bill of sale which is unilateral in nature, each of these contracts bore signatures for both Hudson and Shirley. Finally, unlike Lowery where at the time of the accident more than two months had passed without transfer of the certificate of title and without evidence that the father had intended to do so, here, the parties had agreed to transfer title upon payment the next day. The accident, however, occurred only a few hours after the contracts were executed and before the established time for transfer of the certificates of title. For these reasons, we do not find Lowery persuasive. There having been no facts in dispute regarding the transaction at issue, the ownership issue was a question of law, and the trial court erred in submitting it to the jury.
C. Was Submission of the Ownership Issue to the Jury Harmful Error?
Having determined that the trial court erred in submitting the ownership issue to the jury, we must next determine whether such error was harmful, ie., viewed in the light of all of the circumstances, did the error amount to such a denial of the rights of Hudson as was probаbly calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a)(1). As noted above, the jury found that Hudson owned the 1981 Cadillac at the time of the accident. Thus, if that answer is legally incorrect, then the trial court was required to set aside the jury’s answer to the question, and its failure to have done so will constitute reversible error since Hudson’s liability turns upon thе answer to that question.
Hudson contends that the Certificate of Title Act (“Act”) does not apply to the ownership of the four automobiles and more specifically, to the 1981 Cadillac. It contends that ownership is controlled by Chapter 2 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code (“Code”). Appellees, on the other hand, assert that the Act must be considered in analyzing the facts of this *197 case. We will thus examine both the Code and the Act.
Section 2.102 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code applies to transactions in goods. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 2.102 (Vernon 1994). “Goods” are further defined in the Code as all things including “specially manufactured “goods” which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale ...” Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 2.105(a) (Vernon 1994). The broad definition of “goods” as defined in the Code includes motor vehicles.
Associates Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc.,
Conversely, section 501.071(a) of the Act provides that “a motor vehicle may not be the subject of a subsequent sale unless the owner designated in the certificate of title transfers thе certificate of title at the time of the sale.” Tex. Teansp. Code Ann. § 501.071(a) (Vernon 1999). The Act further provides that “a sale made in violation of this chapter is void and title may not pass until the requirements of this chapter are satisfied.” Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 501.073 (Vernon 1999).
Hudson contends that sections 501.071(a) and 501.073 of the Act stand in direct conflict with section 2.401(b) of the Code which allows for transfer of title to gоods to the purchaser at the time and place that the seller physically delivers the goods, even when the document of title is to be delivered at a different time and place. Appellees counter this contention on the basis that Texas courts have reconciled the apparent conflict in language between the statutory schemes of the Code and the Act. Appellees cite four cases in support of their contention:
Gallas v. Car Biz, Inc.,
Having found no merit in Appellees’ suggested common law resolution of the conflict between the Code and Act present here, we next examine the purpose of the Act. The legislative intent behind enactment of the Certificate of Title Act was to “lessen and prevent thеft of motor vehicles, traffic in stolen vehicles, and sale of encumbered vehicles without disclosure of existing hens.”
Najarían v. David Taylor Cadillac,
In recognition of the potential for this type of conflict, the Texas legislature has decided which statutory scheme applies in the event there is a conflict between the Code and the Act. Section 501.005 of the Act states: “Chapters 1-9, Business and Commerce Code, control over a conflicting provision of this chapter.” Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 501.005 (Vernon 1999). The legislative history behind thе passage of this provision of the Act is instructive. In April of 1971, the supreme court issued the opinion of
Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
Appellees next claim that the contract of sale was not dispositive that a sale of the four vehicles took place between Hudson and Shirley. In support of their position, they cite to the testimony of Gene Ballard, the owner of Cars of Texas, where he testified that Shirley told him he had four cars on consignment. Ballard, however, did not seem to know what four cars it was that Shirley said he had on consignment and from what dealership he had obtаined them. Moreover, under the parol evidence rule, this testimony is not probative.
Jackson v. Hernandez,
Based upon the record before us and our determination that the Code and not the Act governs interpretation of the transaction between Hudson and Shirley, we hold that Hudson transferred ownership of the 1981 Cadillac and three other vehicles to Shirley on May 30,1994. Thus, Hudson was not the ownеr of the 1981 Cadillac at the time the accident in question occurred. Having so concluded, we hold that the jury’s answer to Question Number 3 was incorrect. Moreover, because the trial court did not disregard the jury’s answer to that question, harm to Hudson resulted since it caused rendition *199 of an improper judgment, issues one and two are sustained. Accordingly,
III. Conclusion
Because determination of ownership of the 1981 Cadillac is dispositive of this case, we need not address Hudson’s remaining nine issues. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court below, and render judgment that Appellees, Dean Gooch and Kathy Gooch, Individually, Dean Gooch and Elaine Masterson, as next friends for Jamie Gooch, and Edelle Newton Irwin, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Mary Jeannette Cooper Irwin, take nothing against Appellant Hudson Buick, Pontiac, GMC Truck Company, which is now known as Lively Buick, Pontiac, GMC Truck Company.
Notes
. Damages were awarded to Dean Gooch, Kathy Gooch, Jamie Gooch, Edelle Newton Irwin, and the Estate of Mary Jeanette Cooper Irwin, collectively referred to herein as "Ap-pellees.”
. Shirley agreed to purchase the four vehicles for $3,750, and their purchase prices were set as follows: (1) a 1982 Oldsmobile Firenza for $800; (2) a 1985 Dodge Van for $1000; (3) a 1988 Dodge Shadow for $1,000; and (4) a 1981 Cadillac DeVille for $950.
. Hudson timely objected to the submission of Question Number 3 at trial.
. While not decisive of the ownership issue, the undisputed evidence also reflects that both Newton and Shirley intended and believed that their actions constituted a sale of the four vehicles and not any other type of transaction, e.g., consignment.
. Act of May 10, 1971, 62nd Leg., R.S., ch.123, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 895, 896 recodified as Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 501.005 (Vernon 1999) by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch 165, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.