126 Ga. 639 | Ga. | 1906
(After stating the foregoing facts.) During the existence of slavery it was neither necessary nor important that the negro should be instructed as to the binding obligation of a contract. When he emerged from this condition, and immediately, without any instruction on the subject, became clothed until full contractual powers, it is not surprising that he could be induced by unscrupulous white men to flagrantly violate the obligations of contracts into which he had entered. It may "be that while the constitution of 1865 was in force, and prior to the adoption of the fourteenth" amendment to the constitution of the United States, the General Assembly had power to declare that the violation of a contract by a negro should be a crime, without making such an act by a white man penal. The General Assembly however, seemed to have had no desire to make such a discrimination, nor was it deemed in furtherance of a wise public policy that every breach of a contract should be declared a crime. To prevent as far as possible the disastrous effects resulting from servants being enticed to violate their contracts of employment, in 1866 a statute was enacted which declared it a crime for a person to employ the servant of another during the term for which he was employed, knowing that the servant was so employed and that his term of service had not expired, and also making it a crime for any person to entice,
The ingredients of the offense defined in this section are: a contract by which one person is bound to render service to another as a servant, cropper, or farm laborer, which contract may be either in parol or in writing; the enticing away of a .servant so bound, by offering higher wages or in any other way; knowledge on the part of the person who entices that the servant is so employed; and the
2, 3. The general grounds of the motion for a new trial remain to be disposed of. There was evidence from which the jury could find that a contract of service had been entered into between Baker and Mathews, who was a minor, such contract having been made both with the minor and his mother, who, so far as the record discloses, was entitled to his custody and authorized to make contracts for service to be performed by him. The evidence on some of the points in the ease is circumstantial in its nature. The circumstances are such as to authorize a finding that the accused knew that Mathews was in the employ of Baker, that he offered him higher wages than he was receiving, and that, as a result of this
It is contended, though, that the contract of service appearing in the evidence was not to be performed within a year from the time it was made, and that neither Mathews nor his mother was bound thereby, by reason of the fact that it was within the operation of the statute of frauds; and that for this reason no crime was committed by the accused in enticing Mathews to leave the service of his employer, the effect of Mathews’ conduct being simply to take advantage of a defense which he or his mother might have made at any time that the employer sought to enforce the contract against him or his mother. We will not undertake to determine in the present case whether the statute of frauds would be applicable as a defense to one charged with a violation of the statute under consideration. Under the view that we take of the case, the contract was not within the operation of the statute. The evidence of Baker on this subject is set forth in the statement of facts. A reasonable construction of this evidence is that the term of service was to begin at once and continue for one year, or longer if the servant so desired. There was a binding contract for one year’s service, to begin at once. Whether this should continue any longer after the -expiration of the twelve months was a matter to be determined by the -employee or his mother. There was no effort to make a binding contract for longer than twelve months. Is such a contract within the operation of that provision of the code which enumerates among those promises which are required to be in writing, “any agreement (except contracts with overseers) that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof” ? Civil Code, §2693(5). A contract of hire for a year, to begin in presentí, is not within the operation of the statute of frauds. 1 Smith’s Leading Cases (9th ed.) 600, and cases cited; Pollock on Contracts (Text Book Series), top p. 224; Broom’s Common Law (9th ed.) 391. If the contract had contemplated a year’s service to begin at a future date, it would have been otherwise. We see no reason for reversing the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.