(after stating the facts). The decision of the chancellor was correct. The city purchased th<j property for use as a dumping ground for its refuse. This-was a public purpose. Section 16, art. 5, of the Constitution exempts from taxation public property used exclusively for public purposes. Section 9858 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest exempts from taxation the following:
“All market-houses, public squares, other public grounds, town and city houses or halls, owned and used exclusively for public purposes, and all works, machinery and fixtures belonging to any town and used exclusively for conveying water to said town.”
We do not think the ease of Pulaski County v. First Baptist Church,
In State v. Gaffney, 34 N. J. 131, the court held: “Lands and real estate acquired and held by the 'corporation of Jersey City, under the act to authorize the construction of works for supplying Jersey City and places adjacent with pure and wholesome water, and its supplements, although not in actual use, are exempt from taxation, if not held for speculation or to meet -a remote, contingent expectation of necessary use, or mere incidental convenience, but are held in good faith, and are reasonably necessary to meet the increased and growing demand for water.”
We think that principle of law controls here. Having held that the property belonged to the city and was used by it for a public purpose, Hudgins acquired no title at the tax sale* and the city was entitled to maintain this action. Winn v. Little Rock,
It follows that the decree will be affirmed.
