Appellant William B. Hudgins brought suit against appellees CPC Parkwood Hospital, Dr. Gary G. Bawtinhimer, Dr. David C. Cook and Dr. William I. Wieland, alleging false imprisonment, inten
1. Because Hudgins has the right to directly appeal the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Bawtinhimer, OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), he also has the right to have this court review rulings of the trial court otherwise not directly appealable.
Southeast Ceramics v. Klem,
2. The trial court granted summary judgment to Dr. Bawtinhimer, onе of the psychiatrists who evaluated Hudgins and recommended that his involuntary commitment be continued, on the basis that Hudgins had presented no evidence that the procedure followed was defective and that the trial court found the process followed by Dr. Bawtinhimer was valid. In
Williams v. Smith,
By his affidavit based on his personal knowledge, Dr. Bawtinhimer showed that he complied with the provisions of the law in his examination and evaluation of Hudgins and that he acted in good faith. In opposition, Hudgins relies on the cеrtified copy of the order of the probate court dismissing the petition for involuntary commitment. The order reads in its entirety: “This matter came on for hear
Hudgins argues the trial court improperly considered medical records that were privileged, confidential, included hearsay and were nоt certified in connection with Dr. Bawtinhimer’s motion for summary judgment and therefore it was error to grant the motion. However, this issue is completely pretermitted because exclusive of the medical records is Dr. Bawtinhimer’s personal recollection as given in his affidavit. As shown above, this evidence is sufficient to show compliance with the involuntary commitment process. At issue in this case is not the correctness of the medical diagnosis made by the doctors involved, but rather whether the procedure used was valid. Although Hudgins argues many points regarding what he perceives to be the bad motives of the doctors and hospital (primarily that the commitment was done to gain revenue from Hudgins’ insurance company), none of this is relevant to the issue of false imprisonment. As more fully discussed in Williams, suрra, such conduct might support an action for malicious use of process, id. at 714, but is completely irrelevant to the issue of false imprisonment. The grant of summary judgment to Dr. Bawtinhimer was proper.
3. Hudgins argues the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint against Dr. Cook for insufficient process. The record shows the complaint was filed on October 13, 1988. Service was not attempted
We affirm. Hudgins argues that service on the office manager should be good sеrvice on Dr. Cook because Dr. Cook was on the premises at the time. We disagree. In a similar case, the Supreme Court held that leaving a summons and complaint with an employee who wаs not an agent for service of the person intended to be served did not meet the clear requirements of OCGA § 9-11-4 (d) (7) and that the statute means exactly what it says.
Bible v. Bible,
4. Hudgins аrgues the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint against Dr. Wieland for insufficiency of service. Hudgins first attempted service on Dr. Wieland at the hospital on October 17, 1988, but service was returned “non-est.” Sometimе later, Hudgins’ counsel called Dr. Wieland’s home number and spoke to a woman there who gave him an address. Believing the address to be in Fulton County, counsel had service attempted by second original, but, it too was returned “non-est.” Twenty-eight days passed before counsel made an agreement with counsel for the hospital, who thought he might also represent Dr. Wieland, to see if he could аrrange for acknowledgment of service. This was accomplished on January 3, 1989, with the filing of his answer. The trial court, after hearing argument and considering the evidence, found Hudgins had not exercised due diligence.
“As we held in
Childs v. Catlin,
“Here the trial judge heard argument and considered the affidavits filed. Based thereon he fоund, in his discretion, that defendant’s motion should be granted. Although excuses were offered, we can not hold that the plaintiff was diligent, as a matter of law.”
Webb v. Murphy,
5. Hudgins argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel discovery against CPC Parkwood and in granting a protective order to non-party Charter Peachford Hospital. Hudgins has not identifiеd the specific discovery requests at issue, but instead refers only to the trial court’s order denying the discovery. It appears the requests seek information relating to CPC Parkwood’s decision to сonfer staff privileges on Dr. Cook and Dr. Bawtinhimer. The requests of non-party Charter Peachford Hospital apparently seek information on its billing practices and insurance reimbursement. Hudgins’ theory of recovery in his RICO claim is that CPC Parkwood engaged in the practice of admitting patients just to get insurance money. However, the only basis for this pointed out in the record is a newspapеr article discussing insurance abuse in the psychiatric care field. The trial court’s order denied the requests on the basis that the material sought is privileged and confidential. Having examined the record before us, we question, in addition, the relevance of the material sought. “ ‘In such interlocutory rulings of the trial court as the sustaining or overruling of objections to interrogatories and decisions as to whether answers are or are not sufficient, this court will reverse only upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.’ [Cits.]”
Smith v. Bass,
Judgment affirmed.