Oрinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS.
Judge:
John D. Huddy petitions for review of a Federal Communications Commission decision denying his request for a hearing on his challenges to the assignment of a television broadcast license. We dismiss for lack of stаnding.
Huddy is the sole shareholder of Riklis Broadcasting Corporation, the former owner and licensee of TV station KADY. In July 1996 Riklis entered involuntary bankruptcy and a trustee was appointed to manage the corporation’s estate. The FCC consented to an involuntary transfer of the KADY license to the trustee, who *722 proceeded to auction off the station. John Cobb emerged as the highest bidder. On the trustee’s endorsement of his creditworthiness, the bankruptcy cоurt approved the sale. Cobb assigned his purchase rights to Biltmore Broadcasting, of which he is the controlling principal.
In November 1997 Biltmore applied for FCC approval of assignment of the license. Huddy filed a petition asking for a hearing, claiming that Cobb had falsely certified his financial qualifications to the FCC. In support, he asserted that in a phone conversation Cobb had said that he hadn’t yet secured funding for the purchase. Cobb responded thаt Huddy misunderstood his remarks and that he told Huddy only that he had not chosen which of various means of financing he would use. Cobb also struck back, alleging that during the same call Huddy threatened to oppose Cobb’s license application unless the latter assisted Huddy in his claims against the Riklis bankruptcy estate. Huddy later added a charge that Cobb had assumed control of KADY before FCC approval of the transfer, in violation of Commission rules. The trustee answered with an affidavit saying that in the relevant period he (the trustee) had controlled all business decisions at KADY.
The FCC ultimately approved the assignment, and on July 1,1998 the purchase of the television station was consummated. After twice petitioning thе FCC to rethink its decision and each time being rebuffed, Huddy sought review here.
To be heard on the merits Huddy must first satisfy the three elements of constitutional standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. See
Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,
As a resident of the service area and a viewer of the station, Huddy can assert a possible injury to a legally protected interest. Under our рrecedents listeners or viewers may serve as “spokesmen” for a station’s entire audience. See
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
But Huddy’s theory breaks down on causation. At best he raises concerns about Cоbb’s integrity with respect to the Commission’s rules regarding future licensees’ behavior in financial matters and to pre-acquisition station control. But he makes no effort to link these business behavior issues with plausible predictions about Cobb’s likely programming decisions. To be sure, in the interests of “preserv[ing] the integrity” of its operations,
FCC v. WOKO, Inc.,
Indeed, we’ve already held that the Commission’s failure to inflict pecuniary penalties on а licensee for an isolated breach of the Commission’s
program-related
requirements does not increase the probability of future violations enough to afford a listener standing to insist that it pursue those penalties.
Branton v. FCC,
Huddy’s theory here is quite a stretch from prior cases allowing listener standing. In
United Church of Christ,
for instance, listeners sought denial of license renewal on the ground that a TV licensee had failed to “give a fair and balanced presentation of controversial issues, especially those concerning Negroes,” and thus violated the Fairness Doctrine,
To bolster his claim Huddy argues that Cobb breached a promise to add a news program to the KADY schedule. To Hud-dy this is evidence that Cobb will not serve the public interest. Had Cobb made such a promise in an effort to induce favorable action by the Commission, we might agree. But in fact Cobb made no such promise. He simply responded to Huddy’s allegation thаt he had exercised premature control, explaining that in his contacts with the KADY staff he had sought to explore the possibility of launching a newscast after the FCC approved his application. Cobb made no commitment to the FCC or to KADY viewers. •
Huddy points out that Cobb had KADY’s rating market changed from Santa Barbara to Los Angeles in January 2000, evidently to enable it to force cable companies in Los Angeles to carry its signal. This change was possiblе only with the approval of the Commission after it considered the effect on local programming. See In re Comcast Cablevision of Santa Maria, Inc., 13 FCC Red. 24,192 at ¶ ¶ 3, 14-17 (1998) (applying standards specified in 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(1)(C)). Huddy alleges no illegality in that process. In any event, the fact that the change originated with action by Cobb does nothing to overcome Huddy’s failure to offer evidence, or even a theory, as to how an alleged lack of candor on financial matters might increase the likelihood of markеt switches that injure listeners.
Huddy’s second theory of standing begins with the observation that KADY is more valuable today than when Biltmore purchased it. Here Huddy turns, surprisingly, to the very fact previously invoked to show Cobb’s programming treachery, namely his securing Commission approval to shift KADY’s market to Los Angeles, with prospects of more lucrative cable carriage. He also says that when the FCC *724 changed its “television duopoly rules” in August 1999 to allow common ownership of more than one local commercial television station in the same market, the value of stations in all big markets jumped. In the Matter of Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 14 FCC Red. 12,903 (1999). Hud-dy argues that if this court were to remand to the FCC for a hearing on Cobb’s integrity, and if the FCC were to revoke Biltmore’s license, and if the trustee were to re-auction KADY, Huddy would profit as a residual claimant of the Riklis bankruptcy estate. Although Huddy’s counsel seemed to аbandon this second theory of standing at oral argument, we include a brief treatment to dispel any belief that it might hold water.
First, the injury to Huddy is (at most) the result of Cobb’s alleged lack of candor only in a narrow “but for” sense.
1
Yes, had Cobb not acquired the station, he would not have been able to switch KADY’s market. And yes, had the FCC not changed its rules since the bankruptcy sale, the station’s market value would not have benefited from the rule change. But there is nothing inherent in the FCC’s slack policing of its rules on candor about financial resources or on when a buyer may first exercise control, that tends to bring about the kinds of increases in station value that Huddy asserts. See
Movitz v. First National Bank of Chicago,
We question whether “but for” causation of this sort could ever be sufficient to confer constitutional standing. Certainly Huddy does not point to any standing decision that finds a causal relation based on merely the рassage of time and an accompanying change of market conditions. And acceptance of such “but for” causation would effectively enable parties to secure constitutional standing purely at their оwn volition. Suppose that two persons, without interests at stake in an agency process, had bet a sum of money on its outcome. If “but for” causation of the kind involved here were enough, the party picking the losing side would satisfy the causation prong, and, unless the wager were illegal, standing would ensue. It seems improbable that the Court intends all its learning on constitutional standing to be so readily evaded.
We need not finally decide whether such “but for” causatiоn can ever be enough, as Huddy has not shown that the supposed injury could be redressed. As his counsel conceded at oral argument, the record says nothing on the consequences of an FCC veto of the transfer to Cobb. For all we know, the trustee in bankruptcy would then be required simply to award KADY to the next highest bidder in the original auction. As we have no reason to believe that Huddy would even reap his desired windfall, he flunks the redressability criterion.
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,
As Huddy lacks standing, his petition for review is
Dismissed.
Notes
. We say “at most” bеcause even "but for” ■ causation is questionable (apart from the issue discussed in the text below — whether Commission rejection of Biltmore's application would have led to a new auction). The FCC did not change its duopoly rulеs for another 16 months after its approval of the transfer. Had its decision been the other way, a new auction might well have been completed before the rule change was made or the prospect of its adoption apparent, and Huddy would not have garnered his windfall.