121 So. 130 | Miss. | 1929
Lead Opinion
It being known in advance that by operation of the statute aforesaid it would not be possible to have before *360 him all the facts, it was the responsible duty of the chancellor to make an especial effort to diligently attend each witness that could be and was presented, to closely watch every maneuver, and to take the greatest caution that nothing of value for the purposes of a correct decision should escape him. His advantages in these respects were and are superior to ours, since we have before us only the written record. We have no doubt that the capable and conscientious chancellor who heard this case faithfully discharged every one of his afore mentioned duties. His findings of fact are supported by sufficient evidence, and, the whole situation presents a case, and peculiarly so, in which the chancellor's decision should stand as correct.
Affirmed.
Addendum
It is true, as contended by appellant, that there was no substantial conflict in the evidence as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the transfer of the bank deposit. The question before the chancellor was what those surrounding facts and circumstances meant. The ultimate *361 fact to be proven was Mrs. Whitehead's state of mind or intent; that was sought to be shown by witnesses who testified to what Mrs. Whitehead said and did at the time of the transfer, in connection with the other surrounding facts and circumstances. In order to find the ultimate fact — her state of mind — the chancellor was required to draw deductions from the evidence. The evidence, although in the main undisputed, reasonably justified either of two inferences — that the transfer of the bank deposit was intended as a gift absolute, or was a transfer in trust. The trior of an issue of fact, whether judge or jury, where the ultimate fact to be proven depends on the surrounding facts and circumstances of the transaction out of which the ultimate fact grew, must by process of reasoning and deduction find the ultimate fact. If, from the undisputed facts and circumstances, two reasonable inferences of fact may be drawn, which inferences are conflicting, and the trior of the issue of fact has found in favor of one as the more reasonable, such finding will not be set aside on appeal, unless against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
The chancellor in this case heard and saw the witnesses testify, and observed their demeanor on the witness stand. It could have been reasonably inferred from the undisputed evidence that the transfer of the bank deposit was intended as a gift absolute, and, on the other hand, it could have been reasonably inferred that it was a transfer in trust. The chancellor found that the latter was the more reasonable inference. The two inferences, of course, were conflicting. The chancellor settled the conflict. This court cannot substitute its judgment for his.
Suggestion of error overruled. *362