52 S.E.2d 585 | Ga. | 1949
1. Persons who have actual knowledge of the existence and contents of a restraining order, even though they are not parties to the proceeding for injunction upon which the restraining order was issued, are subject to attachment for contempt for a violation of its terms.
2. Whether a contempt of court has been committed in violation of a restraining order is a question for the discretion and judgment of the court that issued the order, and its discretion will not be controlled by this court unless there has been an abuse of that discretion.
1. The plaintiffs in error were not named as parties defendant in the original injunction proceeding. Nevertheless, it is well settled that they were subject to attachment for contempt for a violation of the terms of the restraining order, provided it was shown by the evidence that they acted after having actual knowledge of the court's order. Carson v. Ennis,
2. Having held that the evidence authorized the finding that the plaintiffs in error had actual knowledge of the restraining order, we now turn to a consideration of the question whether the evidence authorized the judge to find that they had violated its terms. It is conceded that Huckaby and Akin are guilty, if at all, of violating only the following provision of the restraining order: "from using any threats to or towards any employee to refrain from working at said mills." The evidence, as gathered from the affidavits offered by the petitioner, shows: That on the evening of November 15, 1948, just after dark, Huckaby and Akin were standing in Deedy Woodruff's front yard trying to persuade him to cease his work at the mill; that as Hulon Davis passed in his car he was asked to stop by Akin (Akin and Huckaby), and he did stop and drive his car into Woodruff's yard; that Huckaby and Akin then continued in their efforts to persuade Woodruff and Davis to stop working at the mill; that when Davis turned to leave, Huckaby said to him, "Will you come on out of the mill with us?" Davis replied that he would not. That Huckaby then struck Davis in the face, and they fought until separated by Akin and another person, that Woodruff then ordered Huckaby and Akin to leave his property, but they refused to leave until a State patrolman drove up, whereupon they both left in Akin's car, but were halted by the patrolman. There was evidence that both Huckaby and Akin were under the influence of intoxicants. Huckaby and Akin stated in their affidavits that it was their information and belief that the incident was instigated and provoked at the instance of the vice-president of the mills so that a rule for contempt for violating the restraining order could be brought against them; and that the fight was provoked by Davis by the use of vile and abusive language toward Huckaby.
"Whether a contempt of court has been committed in the violation of an injunctive order, and how it shall be treated are *91
questions for the discretion and judgment of the court that issued the order, and its discretion will not be interfered with by this court unless there is an abuse of discretion. If there be any evidence from which the judge could have concluded that the order had been violated, this court, under the above rule, has no power to disturb his judgment." Patten v. Miller,
Under this view of the case, the evidence authorized the judge to conclude that his order had been violated by both Huckaby and Akin, and we therefore have no power to disturb his judgment.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.