Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian CenterHubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Graves, Grall, Ashrafi
GRALL, J.A.D.
Plaintiffs Gloria and Michael Hubner appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Spring Valley Equestrian Center. The trial court concluded that recovery for Gloria‘s personal injuries and Michael‘s consequential loss was barred by statutes allocating the risks and costs of equine animal activities,
The facts, stated in light of the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to plaintiffs, are as follows. Gloria, Michael and four others in their party went to Spring Valley Equestrian Center to ride Spring Valley‘s horses on trails with the guidance of a Spring Valley employee. Upon arrival, Gloria signed a rental agreement and a release discharging Spring Valley of its liability for any injury she might sustain due to the ordinary negligence of Spring Valley or its agents in relation to its “premises and operations.”
After signing the agreement and release, the members of the Hubner party were taken to a barn in which Spring Valley‘s horses were stabled. The barn has an open area in which the Hubner party stood before mounting. About fifteen feet from that area, there were between six and eight poles lying on the barn‘s floor. The poles were made of pine and about six inches in diameter. They were approximately fourteen to sixteen feet long and were positioned parallel to and several feet from one another. The purpose of the poles was to simulate a horse stepping over obstacles along the trail so as to acquaint the horse and rider with such conditions before encountering them on the trails. The barn was also equipped with a set of movable stairs for the use of riders unable to mount a horse from ground level.
Kate Martin, a trainer and trail guide employed by Spring Valley, led a horse known as “Lady” to Gloria. Lady was already bridled and saddled. Gloria mounted from the ground while Martin stood by. At that point, Lady was facing the poles arranged on the ground, but after Gloria was on the horse Martin led Lady away from the mounting area. Whether Martin turned Lady or Lady turned on her own, Lady and Gloria ended up facing in the opposite direction and away from the poles behind them.
Martin left Gloria and Lady and went to get a horse for another member of the Hubner party. Lady whinnied, moved her head up and down and then moved backward. Martin, who had returned, told Gloria to release the reins, which Gloria did immediately. Nonetheless, Lady continued to back up, tripped on the poles and
Plaintiffs’ expert, Andrew J. Elder, attributed the accident to Spring Valley‘s negligence in equipping and using its barn. Elder explained:
The defendant‘s use of unsecured jumping poles on the ground of the arena, in close proximity to the mounting of the horses, was negligent, and improper. As succinctly stated by author Donna Snyder-Smith in “The All-Around Horse” ... the poles, called “cavaletti,” should be set up correctly:
1. Don‘t scare your horse by riding him into a long line of poles the very first time you work him over cavaletti.
2. If you use the poles on the ground, be sure they are secured so they will not roll over if your horse steps on them.
This is precisely what the [d]efendant did wrong. These poles were not secured in any way in the traditional “x” base or other manner of securing them from rolling. In addition, they were set up in close proximity to the mounting area, and behind the horses. Horses cannot see behind them and the stepping on the unsecured pole would cause the horse to be further frightened and could cause it to fall as it did in this instance.
The Legislature has determined that “the allocation of the risks and costs of equine animal activities is an important matter of public policy and it is appropriate to state in law those risks that the participant voluntarily assumes for which there can be no recovery.”
Consistent with those findings and declarations, the Legislature has limited the liability of those who operate such activities by identifying the “inherent risks” that participants assume and by barring suit and providing a complete defense for injuries resulting from the assumed risks.
Notwithstanding any provisions of [
N.J.S.A. 5:15-3 ] to the contrary, the following actions or lack thereof on the part of operators shall be exceptions to the limitation on liability for operators:a. Knowingly providing equipment or tack that is faulty to the extent that it causes or contributes to injury.
. . . .
c. A case in which the participant is injured or killed by a known dangerous latent condition on property owned or controlled by the ... operator and for which warning signs have not been posted.
d. An act or omission ... that constitutes negligent disregard for the participant‘s safety, which act or omission causes the injury, and
e. Intentional injuries to the participant caused by the operator.
[
N.J.S.A. 5:15-9 .]
In this case, the trial court concluded that plaintiffs’ suit was barred because Gloria‘s injuries resulted from an assumed inherent risk and not from faulty equipment. Summary judgment was granted on the ground that there was no dispute of material fact and Spring Valley was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the act.
Applying the same standard to assess the propriety of that grant of summary judgment, we conclude the evidence was adequate to present a jury question as to the existence of circumstances described in subsection a or d of
The “inherent risks” assumed by a participant are those “created by the equine animals, weather conditions, conditions of trails, riding rings, training tracks, equestrians, and all other inherent conditions.”
The definition of inherent risks provides no indication that the Legislature intended to include dangerous conduct and instrumentalities within the operator‘s capacity to control. In defining the “inherent risks,” the Legislature provided additional guidance by way of a non-exhaustive list of illustrations.
Moreover, despite the participant‘s assumption of inherent risks,
We reject Spring Valley‘s claim that the complete bar against suit for assumed risks and the irrelevance of comparative negligence when
In this case the evidence relevant to the placement and use of the training poles and movable steps is not sufficiently one-sided to permit a grant of summary judgment in favor of Spring Valley. See Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540, 666 A.2d 146. Elder‘s expert opinion on the additional dangers posed by Spring Valley‘s use and positioning of that equipment would permit a jury to find that Gloria‘s injuries were caused by conduct within the scope of subsection a or d of
The question remaining is whether Spring Valley is entitled to summary judgment based on Gloria‘s agreement to release Spring Valley from liability based on its ordinary negligence. The release in this case was sufficiently broad to encompass any claim based on Spring Valley‘s ordinary negligence relating to its premises and operations. The release agreement provided:
In consideration of THIS STABLE allowing my participation in this activity,... I, the rider ... do agree to hold harmless, release, and discharge THIS STABLE, its owners, agents, employees... and others acting on its behalf ... of and from all claims, demands, causes of action and legal liability ... due to THIS STABLE‘S ... ordinary negligence; and I do further agree that except
in the event of THIS STABLE‘S gross negligence and willful and wanton misconduct, I shall not bring any claims, demands, legal actions and causes of action, against THIS STABLE ... for any economic and non-economic losses due to bodily injury, death, property damage, sustained by me ... in relation to the premises and operations of THIS STABLE....
The issue here is whether this exculpatory provision is enforceable against a claim that Gloria‘s physical injuries were caused by Spring Valley‘s use of faulty equipment or its acts or omissions “constitut[ing] negligent disregard for [Gloria‘s] safety.”
The governing principles are clear. “Exculpatory agreements have long been disfavored in the law because they encourage a lack of care. For that reason, courts closely scrutinize liability releases and invalidate them if they violate public policy” or are unconscionable. Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 333, 901 A.2d 381 (2006) (citations omitted); Lucier v. Williams, 366 N.J.Super. 485, 491, 841 A.2d 907 (App.Div.2004). Thus, waivers of the right to recover damages for negligence included in contracts of adhesion have been deemed unenforceable, Brough v. Hidden Valley, Inc., 312 N.J.Super. 139, 154, 711 A.2d 382 (App.Div.1998), but enforcement against a party who has “executed the agreement in order to engage in a recreational activity” is generally not denied on that ground, Marcinczyk v. State Police Training Comm‘n, 406 N.J.Super. 608, 617, 968 A.2d 1205 (App. Div.2009); see, e.g., Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., L.L.C., 408 N.J.Super. 435, 449-51, 975 A.2d 494, 2009 WL 2243696 at *7-*8 (App.Div.2009); McBride v. Minstar, Inc., 283 N.J.Super. 471, 490, 662 A.2d 592 (Law Div.1994), aff‘d sub nom., McBride v. Raichle Molitor, USA, 283 N.J.Super. 422, 662 A.2d 567 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 319, 670 A.2d 1061 (1995); see also Hojnowski, supra, 187 N.J. at 338, 347-48, 901 A.2d 381 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting).
The sources of public policy against which our courts have measured exculpatory clauses are varied. See Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J.Super. 575, 585, 111 A.2d 425 (App.Div.1955). Enforcement is denied when a contract “releases liability from a statutorily-imposed duty.” Hojnowski, supra, 187 N.J. at 333, 901 A.2d 381; see, e.g., McCarthy v. NASCAR, Inc., 48 N.J. 539, 542, 226 A.2d 713 (1967) (duties imposed by law and regulations governing race tracks); Brough, supra, 312 N.J.Super. at 147, 711 A.2d 382 (statutory duties of ski area operators). But our courts have also refused to enforce exculpatory agreements when inconsistent with public policy inferable from statutory or established decisional law. See Hojnowski, supra, 187 N.J. at 334-37, 901 A.2d 381 (relying on the combination of public policies reflected in the parens patria doctrine and the common law duties of landowners to preclude enforcement of a parent‘s agreement to waive a child‘s right to damages for personal injuries arising from negligence related to premises); Gershon v. Regency Diving Ctr., Inc., 368 N.J.Super. 237, 248-51, 845 A.2d 720 (App. Div.2004) (barring enforcement of exculpatory release where it would undermine the beneficial purpose of the wrongful death act).
The Legislature‘s expression of policy inconsistent with enforcement of exculpatory agreements so as to defeat a claim of liability pursuant to