164 N.W. 131 | N.D. | 1917
Lead Opinion
The action is one for malicious prosecution. The complaint alleges that on the 17th day of July, 1915, the defendant maliciously and without probable cause falsely charged the plaintiff herein with the crime of adultery, before a justice of the peace within and for the county of Mercer, and. also swore to a criminal complaint before such justice, charging the same crime. Such complaint further shows that such charge was false, and that the defendant knew it was false at the time he made the complaint. The plaintiff further shows his arrest by reason of the making of such complaint and the issuance of such warrant. That, when the preliminary hearing was had, the plaintiff was bound over to the district court, and was tried by a jury, by whom he was acquitted. Plaintiff alleges damages by reason of money expended in employing counsel to defend him in said action, and the payment of witness fees, and alleges general damages in the sum of $7,500, and makes demand for judgment in the sum of $8,350.
The answer admits the arrest of the plaintiff by’reason of the warrant, and states further by way of defense the binding over of the plaintiff upon the preliminary hearing. Defendant alleges further
Trial was had in the district court of Mercer county of all the issues in the case, and the jury .returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $1,850, and the costs and disbursements of the action taxed at $170.90, in all $2,020.90. Motion for a new trial was made, which was based upon the alleged passion and prejudice of the jury .and the excessiveness of the verdict, and upon other grounds. An •order was made denying the motion for a new trial, and judgment was ■entered. From the order denying a new trial and from the judgment the defendant appeals and assigns four specifications of error. First, that the court erred in denying the motion of the defendant for a new trial of the action, and in refusing to order a new trial of the action. The granting or refusing to grant a new trial rests largely in the ■discretion of the trial court, and unless there is plain abuse of such ■discretion, its order in such matter will not be disturbed. There .appears to be no abuse of such discretion in this case. As to the second assignment of error, which is that the damages awarded by the jury .are so excessive as to appear to have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice, we conclude there is no merit in such assignment of error. There is nothing in the record to indicate any passion or prejudice on the part of the jury, and the verdict is not •excessive under all the circumstances of the case. As to the third assignment of error, which claims that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, we are of the opinion that the verdict is amply sustained by the evidence in the case. There was sufficient evidence in the case to support the allegations of the complaint, and there was ■conflicting evidence as to certain material matters connected with the case; and it was the province of the jury to pass upon all disputed questions of fact presented to them, which they did, and returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, which is amply supported by the
The judgment is affirmed, witb costs.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). This is an appeal from an order and judgment denying a new trial in favor of tbe plaintiff in a suit for malicious prosecution. Tbe complaint charges that in 1915, without probable cause, tbe defendant falsely and maliciously charged tbe plaintiff witb tbe crime of adultery, caused bis arrest, procured false-evidence against him, so that be was bound over and put on trial in tbe district court, and that on tbe trial tbe plaintiff was acquitted and discharged. Special damages were alleged and proved to tbe amount of $850, and tbe jury found a verdict in favor of tbe plaintiff for $1,850. Tbe strong presumption is that tbe evidence was sufficient to sustain tbe verdict, and that presumption is well fortified by reading tbe evidence.
Defendant charged that on December 3, 1914, tbe plaintiff committed adultery, and be circulated a report to that effect. Tbe plaintiff commenced an action against him for slander. Then on July 17, 1915, tbe defendant made complaint and caused tbe arrest.
Defendant’s wife was a sickly woman, who bad been for years subject to epileptic fits. Apparently defendant wanted a new wife, and forced her to say that tbe plaintiff bad been witb her, which was not true. Subsequently, in presence of tbe defendant and of numerous other parties, she stated positively that she was forced to say what she said; that defendant stood before her witb a butcher-knife and forced her to say it; and she made tbe declaration in presence-of the defendant and of nearly a dozen other parties, and said it in a loud voice, and was crying when she said it. She wept for tbe disgrace and shame which tbe defendant bad brought upon her, and which probably shortened her life. It is true she was called as a witness for her husband, and directly contradicted tbe testimony of all tbe numerous witnesses as to what she bad said in tbeir presence. Then she was taken witb one of her fits and bad to leave tbe witness stand. Her statements are so well disproved that her denial simply shows tbe fear she bad of her husband.
Tbe jury saw tbe poor, sickly woman, and beard her testimony and
Judgment affirmed.
On power of appellate court to grant new trial for excessive damages, see note in 26 L.K.A. 391.