*1 appeal corrected the will be during dismissed February- said period. set with aside leave judgment to have —Submission entered.
All Justices concur. C. W. Hubbard, appellant, v. J. doing B. Marsh, business as Veneer Lumber Company, appellee.
Marsh &
No. 47491. (Reported 488) in 40 N.W. 2d
January 10, 1950. *2 appellant. Dubuque, for O’Connor, O’Connor, & Thomas Dubuque, for Kenline, Reynolds, Hoffmann & Roedell, appellee. correctness appeal is the issue on this J.—The
Mulroney, consisting of the of the contract of the trial court’s construction March dated plaintiff, to following from letter numbers): supplied (for have convenience we our conversation Agreeable with 1. Mr. Hubbard: “Dear following you the give propose I to Indianapolis Dubuque, in and accept- your duplicate and in is written Opportunity. This letter agreement. ance will constitute an log charge its take Dubuque and will to 2. “You come de- in that for all activities responsible be department. You will to- responsible You equipment. partment, personnel and hand hand and two will work undersigned, and we no one but the policy changes in etc. logging program, to formulate this time need at greatest our fully that understood 3. “It is de- logging management and efficient prompt, proper, is then department, in that you good make partment, but after departments, of other study problems you propose that all de- any and management eventually qualify for efficient carry on necessary, you could it become should partments, that successfully. use'of personal for account drawing a have “You shall
4. In addition allowance. traveling expense week, plus per option, my on participate, you will compensation, weekly this Company, Lumber Yeneer Marsh profits of the net participa- This Indianapolis operations. Dubuque and both from extend and shall realize profits we vary with the tion will 10% 33%. busi- into this come you to propose to summarize, I 5. “To satisfactory very well-established, earning ness, which knowing period, postwar your Chances and take return, busi- enlarge build, maintain you help if well, full ratio direct will be in personal income your ness, that company’s earnings, and also in the event the sledding gets tough, yon are willing to make necessary personal adjustments downward to meet the prevailing condition. Then, event, I would like you sign on the dotted line, and return my copy an early at date.
6. you “Assuring that I we can together feel work in per- fect agreement, and our prospects to very make good money for several years, is most excellent, and personal with the best regard, I remain
Yours sincerely, J. B. Marsh.” Endorsed on the letter is acceptance May dated By appropriate pleadings before trial parties submitted *3 question of the construction of the contract to the court and the court ruled the contract was “full and complete in itself and unambiguous”; that the weekly compensation was clearly stated; any participation by plaintiff in profits was at defendant’s and that permit oral evidence “would be to add to and option; specifically change the terms of the written agreement.” It is now admitted this ruling disposed of ease, plaintiff now appeals from the judgment dismissing petition. his For an earlier appeal, held to be interlocutory, see Marsh, Hubbard v. 239 Iowa 472, N.W. 2d plaintiff’s
The appeal asserts the trial court erred (1) in not construing the as entitling plaintiff to at least ten per cent of and (2) in construing the contract as unam- biguous. I. question of whether a written contract is
ambiguous or not is one construction and interpretation. Am biguity may be said appear when after the application of pertinent rules of interpretation to the face of the instrument a genuine uncertainty results as to which one two or more mean ings is the proper one. Eestatement of Law, Contracts, sections 17 C. S., Contracts, J. section 294. Defendant’s argument in support of the trial court’s ruling is based entirely on portion of the second sentence in fourth paragraph: “you will participate, my on option, in given their profits.”
net in a contract are to be Of course words appears. contrary ordinary meaning unless a intent and natural 2d 50, 25 N.W. Co., 238 Iowa Pipe Line Carson v. Great Lakes phrase, standing alone, perhaps 855. The above if compel would phrase the construction the trial made—but does not court paragraph stand It is tied into other sentences the same alone. light it must be considered of what the contract states in the fifth and paragraphs. sixth
We said in United States F. & G. Co. v. Iowa Co., 174 Tel. 476, 485, 729: “It is a well-settled rule of ** * legal construction that the force and effect of a contract are by taking to be ascertained .into consideration entire instru- parts.” ment in all its paragraph
The fifth where the defendant seeks “to sum- agreement marize” the entire square will not with an interpreta- tion' of the language of the fourth paragraph, participation option. was to at defendant’s In para- be. the fifth graph definitely proposition plaintiff states his plaintiff into” to be that “come the business and is enlarge helps “build, maintain and “full well” that if he know “personal income will be in direct business” ratio to the company’s earnings.” certainly He would not know full well that participate company’s earnings he would ever under the All he interpretation four. that would defendant’s a week draw- he would receive full well would be that know sledding if told that “the ing Here too account. personal adjust- gets tough” “willing necessary he to be to make *4 weekly plaintiff But if was assured of his ments downward.” necessity nothing no more there would be drawing account and “adjustment.” willing make a downward for him to be to thought participation profits of some in The carried same paragraph expresses the and last where the defendant into sixth together” and their they “pros- “can work feeling that excel- money years, is most very good for several make pects to “most, prospects excellent” plaintiff have could lent.” How contract was right the only under money if his making very good drawing ? account the stated receive fourth phrase quoted the with The sentence must be read as a whole and must read be with the sentence goes before the sentence that it. The follows sentence starts the with words: “In weekly addition compensa to this plainly indicating the something is to receive tion” — drawing provided for more than the a week account $100 entirely with the use of preceding sentence. This consistent drawing A ac personal use.” phrase “drawing account salary. The term quite as the same to be count be said cannot determine used to method is other that some rather denotes allowed drawing is to be an advance compensation, full sales commission field of In the compensation. against said as aof an advance mean probably would drawing account men the commis anticipated against monthly, weekly or sum, constant So. 489, 103 212 Ala. Tally, Co. v. Motors In Packard sions. well-recognized ais drawing account “A 457, it is said: means with employee furnishing the method business modern wages or which from service engaged while of maintenance are to accrue.” commissions drawing and the a salesman as employment was Here, the nest for the sentence advance, an to be be said cannot account drawing ac- to the “in addition” is to be says participation “drawing term used fact defendant count. But the something more that will meaning of which carries the account” said fact that compensation; full determine the mean might well which “personal use” was for account drawing could be deter- anticipated compensation until other maintenance says he will he next sentence mined; and fact that .the account, all drawing “in participation addition” receive something than offering defendant was more indicate would compensation. True, the defendant states a week my participate option,” will “on but in the last sentence optional participation purpose for the defines the paragraph he vary stating: participation will with of this contract “this profits we realize and extend from shall This 10% 33%.” “you fourth paragraph say, could be construed to well have $100 a drawing optional week account in addition participa- profits. tion in optional participation means that participation my will at option extend from 10% 33% *5 a construction Such realize.” upon profits we
depending fifth sum- language in the only with the would be consistent “drawing phrase paragraph, also with the use of marizing but language of the fourth personal account and the other use” participation where “in addition” was to be with a drawing “participation” and the term was defined account range. clearly minimum neces- and maximum There would be no sity defining optional participation saying of “shall any participation if was to be at the extend from to 33%” 10% whim mere of the defendant. interpretation gives effect at all trial no court’s participation paragraph: the fourth “This
last sentence of vary profits from with the we realize shall extend 10% (Italics supplied.) Nylander Nylander, We said in 33%.” all fundamental 1360, 7, 8: “It is 268 N.W. effect, given if reason- words used in written instruments must * ably possible that this of trial court’s construction is The force entirely superfluous. Why would defendant take sentence was percentage figures if range participation in pains to of state right participation? was to receive no Portions Contracts, section S., in 17 rules set forth C. J. construction “* ** no words were used page 1228, presumed it is state: plainly aimlessly provision superfluous and that no unless * * in a con that a sentence not be assumed *. will repetitious have a no when it can reasonable intend was to have effect tract ment.” speaks only promise a do not think this contract
We many are too pay plaintiff drawing account. There a week employee some- expressions in it which indicate the is to receive ambiguity been has the test thing of which means more—all properly contract should plaintiff’s argument that the met. The per entitling him to at least ten cent be construed as he contends— at this quite persuasive of the but we to so rule hesitate —is petition especially because stage proceedings, employment. portion his contract asserts that there is an oral *6 It is our holding that is ambiguous contract and the ruling of the trial court and the judgment based thereon are reversed.—Reversed.
Bliss, C. J., and Oliver, Garfield and Hays, JJ., concur. Maotz, Hale and WenNerstrum, JJ., dissent.
SMITH,J., part. takes no J. MaNtz, (dissenting) respectfully dissent from —I majority opinion. The opinion, in my judgment, misconstrues the contract sued upon, enlarges its terms, deals with matters not involved appealed from, and avoids others in which, my opinion, are decisive in the case and which would support the ruling of the trial court. The majority opinion seems to discuss but one issue and that is the basis for the holding so-called —the ambiguity of the contract letter as set forth therein. The majority opinion purports to set forth grounds two urged by plaintiff in his appeal. grounds set forth (1) are the court in erred not construing the contract as entitling plaintiff to at least ten per cent of the profits and (2) in construing the contract as unambiguous. The majority opinion seems based upon ground (2) as set forth above and in so doing seems to assume that the compensation as there stated was in not fact the true compensation.
We call attention to the fact that plaintiff in his brief and argument set forth argued other two errors: (3) “The court erred in holding that the contract of employment consists only of portion written thereof” and (4) “the court erred in holding parol evidence would not be admitted to part show of the contract resting in parol or to explain ambiguity.” The majority opinion ignores these two claimed errors. Let us examine pleadings. Paragraphs 3 and 5 plain- petition
tiff’s are as follows: 3.
Paragraph “That on or about the 24th day of May, 1944, plaintiff entered into an agreement, partly in writing and partly oral, whereby plaintiff was employed by defendant in the carry- business; ing on of his that the written portion of agreement said is contained in a letter of defendant to plaintiff dated March ‘Exhibit hereto, marked being attached 1944, copy letter of said portion of The oral petition. part hereby A’, and made petition.” of this agreement is ont Par. said set un- agreed and orally mutually “That it was Paragraph participate plaintiff would parties that between derstood least of at extent company of defendant profits of the par- amount 33%, the exceed profits, but of such 10% excess profits of the business by plaintiff in the ticipation option of defendant.” being at the and not exceed 33% 10% writing and partly claims Thus he *7 into. contemporaneously entered oral, and partly para- two these reveal that examination A casual mere the Yet other. to each repugnant in conflict are graphs part thereof upon the oral passing opinion majority avoids argument plaintiff’s asserting “The that it merely refers he contends— as construed properly should that the per- quite profits cent per ten of entitling to at least him —is proceedings, stage this rule at of hesitate to so we but suasive oral is an there that petition asserts plaintiff’s because especially find we employment.” Yet of his contract portion to raised issues argument to part of his devoting considerable evi- oral ruled specifically The court pleadings. by these correctness pass upon fail to admissible. To dence was not grounds up simply set my opinion, to is, in matter one. being the second present appeal, the another $100 opinion as majority the discussion toAs language account, a sense drawing being a simply per week is per week $100 implication that this or impression carries go necessary to to me money. It seems simply expense by the term meant was what show letter beyond the written as sum speaks of this sentence very next The “drawing account.” has per week $100 item The compensation.” “weekly plain- find I do not expense.” traveling sentence, “plus same per week $100 any claim argument brief tiff’s any such make does not He compensation. than anything other upon it? pass why argue so it, does not he pleading, claim nothing. simply adds unnecessary a discussion Such has 103 So. Ala. Tally, Motors citation, Packard working on commission employee There the application. no given and was a certain drawing account. The real issue there was whether such could be by garnishment. reached That court’s definition of what was a drawing applied account as real dictum, issues involved was pure
It will be seen that paragraph 4 of said letter and paragraph petition, in part, refer to the same matter, wit, the percentage profits arising from the business. The letter designates the drawing account of plaintiff as per week; also traveling expenses. Immediately there follows: “In addi- tion to this weekly compensation, you will participate, on my option, in the profits net of the Marsh Yeneer and Lumber Com- pany, in both the Dubuque and Indianapolis operations.” (Ital- ics supplied.) When we compare the above (as statement to the option) with part of the claimed part oral of the contract, it can
readily be seen that the latter conflicts with the former. Plain- tiff argues that the written part of the agreement definitely ob- ligated defendant to pay the designated wage, expense money, and in addition per ten cent of of the business; and that no option was needed or required as to per cent, but only place the option could be exercised by appellee was between per said ten cent thirty-three per cent of profits. The trial court in ruling its held that the part oral pleaded *8 was inconsistent with the written agreement pleaded and that permit “to oral evidence of alleged the oral contract would be to add to and specifically change the terms of the written agree- ment.” Likewise, the court also found that there was am- no biguity in the written contract. I am opinion of the that the court right was in its ruling.
Plaintiff plead does not argue or that in the contract of em- between him ployment and defendant there any was fraud or simply mistake. He claims that he entered into said employment by virtue of a contract —a part in writing part and a oral— contemporaneous with said writing. His claim simply relates to a share profits of the which pleads he argues and promised under the contract as a whole.
Plaintiff in petition his states: “That pursuant to said agree- ment of parties, plaintiff the devoted his full time and attention
172 up year and the 1944 through all of business defendant’s 1, 1946.” December
about contract right compensation out arises Plaintiff’s only The found him defendant. trial court and between compensation was claim could whieh under May 24, him on 1944, accepted writing 17, March writing that of defendant such the claim The court sustained - parties. I think only contract between with- writing is finding. The clear pleaded such facts sustain of the the nature prior negotiations, ambiguity. out It refers to carry on, the was to needs of part plaintiff employment, co-operation attained, the be- objects sought to business, defi- separate which a follows parties, then tween plaintiff was entitled compensation to which forth the nitely sets my op- “you participate, on follows, immediately and then or am- nothing is uncertain There etc. tion, profits,” in the net weekly compensation It fixes paragraph. in such biguous any participation specifically states then expenses defendant. option of at will be presume or infer of words to idle waste an seems It un- be so capabilities would or any business sense any man understand did not he or claim assert as to sophisticated up to add simply does “option” meant. the word what absurd. It amounted upon the and borders sense make common pros- squinting at the word eyes to that closing his majority opinion tois effect profits. pect of future so. to do permit him right election to exercise privilege a means option An 352, 62, 2d Mo. S.W. Tabor, 341 v. Lively privilege.
a Works, 89 214 P. 171, Okla. Brass v. Vinita Hyatt 976; R. A. L. alternative; v. 91 Fla. Meres, Malone election; 706.; right 1057; 402, 39 N. Supp. Misc. Y. Rothe, 17 Levy v. 677; 109 So. 2d Norwood v. 120 S.W. Mo. Busch, 343 Suhre Myers v. In the case of 2d 625. App., 51 S.W. Civ. Adams, Tex. Rep. 180, 507, 111 Am. St. 10, 102 Son, & Stone privilege personal option an Ann held that 912, —(cid:127) Cas. *9 power of choos “option” is the word to-choose, etc. right 204 Bergwell, v. Oleson alternative. choice, an right ing, 3 choice—election. means Option 770. N.W. 450, 283 Minn. 173 Bouvier’s Law Diet., Rawle’s 3d Rev. 2421. Many other decisions approving the might above rule be cited. In the instant ease “on my option” simply meant the right, choice or privilege of de- fendant give a share in the of the business. Defendant an had right absolute grant or refuse and it can hardly said that his refusal legally questioned. can be
Plaintiff
sign
did not
the written offer for over two months
after it was sent Mm.
ample
He had
time
examine
study
it
hardly
and can
claim that he was misled or overreached. He
did
plead
ambiguity; he
by
raised
argument.
(cid:127)
aWhere
complete
contract is
and its terms
ambig
are neither
nor
uous
parol
Uncertain
explain
evidence to
it is inadmissible.
Rath v. Schoon, 192 Iowa
182
180,
180;
N.W.
Seibel v. Com
monwealth Life
Co.,
Ins.
written contract must be construed together, and force and effeet
given to each, where
practicable.
that is
The intent
parties
to a contract is ordinarily
deteirmined
the language they use,
and, if that is definite, certain, and complete, it must control.”
Citing Emerick v. Clemens,
In the absence of mistake or fraud a written contract merges
prior
all
and contemporaneous negotiations in reference to the
subject
same
engagement
the-whole
parties
and the
extent and manner of their undertaking are embraced in the
writing. All
agreements
verbal
made at or before the time of the
execution of a contract are to be considered merged
as
written instrument. 12
Jur.,
Am.
Contracts,
section
page
756; Farrell v. Wallace,
Ambiguity is doubtfulness —doubleness in meaning. Chap-
174 E. 801. 250, 173 S. Co., 172 S. C. Life Ins. Metropolitan v.man written terms of a meaning in the uncertainty of Ambiguity is an Co., 142 Warehouse Bk. v. Hancock National First instrument. Read, Assn. v. Assurance Men’s Business 481; 82 99, S.E. Ga. State, 115 Ohio St. 678; Caldwell v. 2d 48 S.W. App., Civ. Tex. 208 Wis. Assn., v. Pure Milk Wheelwright 792; 154 N.E. 458, 8 Kempner, Corp. v. Amusement 769; Arkansas 240 40, N.W. Ambiguity Ambiguity, 1034. S., 466; 3 C. J. 2d Ark., F. 57 Cir., in written meaning uncertainty of or indistinctness duplicity, is A con Diet., Rawle’s Rev. 3d Law 1 Bouvier’s instrument. meaning with cannot be ascertained when ambiguous is tract 197, 38 Ariz. Francis, v.Co. Miller Cattle corners. four in the uncertain or nothing doubtful see can 631. We P. 298 to it some add part pleaded would oral contract. written terms. contrary to its thing- partly was plea the contract under argues that Plaintiff be admissible evidence would written, and partly oral neces- evidence oral argues that He part. oral such to show estab- part; also to written language explain sary to part. oral lish many times. before an issue such had has court This where- this court holdings of additional to some call attention con- contracts such claimed validity of as to issue between and conflicts contradictions were there where sidered con- were the same where parts, oral claimed written executed. temporaneously admissible is not parol-evidence rule a well-settled & Chicago, M. Kelly v. contract. written aof terms vary the City v. Sioux 957; Lerch 436, 61 N.W. 93 Iowa Co., Ry. P. St. Morine, 167 611; Miller 750, N.W. 60 Iowa Co., Times Retread Proof v. Puncture Blackledge 287, Iowa the last-cited 663. In 662, 181 N.W. Co., at claimed petitioner contract written awas there case agreement. Evi contemporaneous awas there time same inadmissible. held oral support offered dence said: Evans, it was Justice by Chief opinion, In the an law, proposition abstract an true, as it is “While between into may be entered oral contract independent therewith, contemporaneously contract, written a parties it is also true that such oral contract independent must be in fact, and must not be a contradiction, modification, qualification or the written contract, either as to its enforcement, its considera- tion, executory its obligation. We very deem it clear, ease us, before that the oral contract relied on plaintiff did *11 affect the consideration for the in an overwhelming sense. was, It in respects, material contradictory thereto. It is argued by plaintiff that the exclusion agreements of these oper- ates as a fraud upon plaintiff. But the priv- had its ilege plead to the fraud. If the agreements oral representa- pleaded tions by plaintiff were made fraudulently, there was no impediment in any rule of evidence to proof of the same, upon appropriate allegations. We think the ruling of trial in regard court was clearly correct.” In In re Estate Simplot, 215 Iowa 581, 246 397, this court considered the matter of the admission of evidence support to agreement an oral which was claimed to have been contemporaneous with a written agreement. Therein Justice Evans discussed such matter and set out what were termed the “exceptions” to the rule excluding by evidence which it was sought to show said contemporaneous agreement. oral Briefly, there was a will contest. finally was settled the defendant paying a certain sum, and in a written stipulation it was agreed that the matter, involved fully settled. Later, suit was brought against the estate of the defendant in stipulation claiming that at the time stipulation such was entered into there was an oral agreement that such stipulating defendant would execute a will making the other stipulating party a beneficiary Objections thereunder. were made the evidence offered to sus- tain such claimed agreement. oral Such objections sus- were tained and on appeal the plaintiff-appellant argument said, “ ‘The only question before this court for review is whether or not the offered [parol] evidence vary tends to or contradict the terms of the written instrument, which is claimed to be a full ” complete contract-.’ opinion exhaustive exceptions to said oral evi- dence were set forth in detail. exceptions Said were seven in number and each separately discussed and authorities re- ferred to. opinion Said cites its support, Miller v. Morine,
176 207, 127 N.W. Iowa Co., Lbr. Kint v. Lbr. Co. supra; Canfield Wag 17; Edwards Greene) Iowa (G. Galland, 3 70; Taylor v. v. P. M. & Chicago, St. Kelly 822, 183 N.W. ner, v. 189, 68 Co., 99 Iowa Chicago &N.W. Jessup v. Ry. Co., supra; R. cited reasoning record and N.W. 673. think that case. instant application has direct ease court said supra, the Morine, Miller case cited In the N.W.: 230 of Iowa, page page 289 of at competent Was it however, is, case, question one “The promise agreement alleged oral prove for the lease?” upon written ingraft thus plaintiff, “Parol evidence held: court following this the Immediately Thus instrument. a written terms vary the admissible recited ambiguity and from was free lease a written where perform towas the lessor paid to be rental consideration the lessor agreement parol of a covenants, evidence certain covenant different perform towas consideration same *12 of (Page 287 admissible.” not writing was the expressed Iowa.) 167 shows which agreement a written have case, we instant In the be- and discussion conference of result was the face that it on its con- such held that court trial Marsh. Hubbard
tween ambigu- free from face upon its complete full and tract right. court was trial ity. believe the per compensation, the argue that to seems Plaintiff regard I do not so being nominal. field of on year, borders consid- taking into take, and to elected something he It it. acceptance, he offer and elapsing'between time eration to relating paragraph In the it to think over. ample had time additional might receive that he forth was set compensation participate in defendant —he option of at the compensation reveals reading of the letter A careful the concern. profits-of depending option, exercise or would defendant could pleadings plaintiff. The by the duties performance upon the that he is averred good made deny defendant —it plain- what clearly states The letter business. losses caused per- option his exercised in case receive tiff was to said that the hardly profits. can him share mit
177 in the written compensation as set forth matter of agree- contemporaneous oral contract and that as claimed not in ment are harmonious and conflict. in In was the of conversations
The written contract
result
dianapolis
Dubuque.
The first
of the contract so
Possibly
states.
there
later
record is
were
conferences—the
point.
presumes
parties
on
silent
The law
reduced
Contracts',
writing.
Jur.,
their contract into
12 Am.
section
page
“All
or
232,
756, states:
verbal
made at
before
agreements
of a contract are to be considered as
the time
the execution
S.,
17 C.
Con
merged in
instrument.” See also
J.
the written
162;
751;
1342,
tracts, 750,
Moss,
Iowa
Jacobsen v.
In
Jacobsen
239,
If the contention of the
in the instant case he
put
upon
parity
a
tained
would
oral evidence
then such
rule
im-
would be
contract,
with the written
and no written contract
also Parks & Co. v.
against
mune
oral contradiction. See
said
Realty
Plaintiff states prof- per cent of the him ten standing by to at least itself entitles inconsistency. why Then ? Note his period of time its. For what *13 significant that on ? is rather It pleadings of the oral contract the plaintiff ruling of which made the July 28,1947, Judge Chalmers reply to defend- However, filing a plaintiff find complains. we indicate, would All February 17, 1949. ant’s answer on proper posi- to his uncertain as plaintiff was confused in matter. tion in laid down principles general quarrel with the
I no have ap- deny their opinion. majority in cited cases most plication pleaded facts in this case. The letter written 17, 1944, March followed conversations and in conferences both Indianapolis and Dubuque, at both places of which defendant presumed conducted his business. must be that at such times pertaining dealing the various matters to and with the contem- plated employment thoroughly gone were into and discussed. However, binding agreement the letter shows that there was no at, arrived for in the first of the letter we find the saying: “I propose give you op- to following portunity.” The letter was written from one businessman to an- plaintiff other and it is reasonable to assume that was no novice in business affairs. Here anwas offer made and over two months accepted. plaintiff later it was Under it worked two and one- being half years, paid doubtless regularly, and it was not until ' employment any after he left that claim was made for a share profits. in Apparently dates meant little to in plaintiff, view pleading of his that he worked all of when as a matter of fact he employed could have been so for at least five months of period. standing In offer, out crystal-clear, was paid as to what statement be and at the same time clearly unequivocally it was any stated that further com- pensation my option.” required will be “on Plaintiff was not accept negotiating had the alternatives of further or of re- —he fusing sign. He could have asked for a clarification order point majority opinion be made fixed or certain. The parts my other In seeks to tie into statement letter. merely judgment, things those included the letter advised might by way compen- do of additional what defendant sation case defendant felt he was entitled to Boiled more. employee by down, pros- it would be akin to an offer to an telling expected, pective employer, what after former pay you per day and if I am saying, then “I’ll satisfied with you you I’ll your pay are entitled to more work convinced day.” goes employer what like per It all back to felt $7.50 arrangement had been tried out. Defendant’s doing after the not satisfied with work answer was that defendant was shortages management log 120,000 of about and that under his (cid:127) inspector inspect logs sent to up and an had feet showed neglect also, plaintiff’s absences plaintiff; place *14 17,1944, and study par- of March Upon a the letter his duties. specific duty it will be noted that the agraph thereof log department.” While the exercise charge “take its was to defendant, yet you here have option privilege a of the of the plain- ground why, how and where the pleading specific job. A and sensible view of falling on the sane tiff down option could exercise the that defendant would be whole situation on his that he carried Plaintiff claimed saw fit. privilege as he years no- but close to two and one-half for work for defendant any profits until he of the laid claim to that he ever where asserts majority I As view the effeet employment. left way for to avail himself of simply opens the opinion it expectation with litigate forth opportunity go an nothing. I, one, unwilling afford something for am getting facts and pleaded I assert opportunity. him that affirm. against him. would law are JJ., join
Hale this dissent. WenneRSteum, Freight Application National Lines, In re Inc. Cyril H. H J. Haas and Wissel, doing
U. business as W & Express objectors-appellants, Company, Motor Commission, appellee, and Na State Commerce Freight Inc., Lines, tional intervenor-
appellee.
No. 47577.
(Reported 612) 2d in 40 N.W.