226 F. 135 | S.D.N.Y. | 1915
(after stating1 the facts as above). That an unconstitutional statute is not a law at all is a proposition no longer open to discussion. It has not, however, been so often considered that there are -varieties of unconstitutionality. This fact is illustrated by the two branches of argument presented in this case.
The common and ever-recurring question arising under those laws regulating laws, which we call Constitutions, is whether a given act seeks to produce a result forbidden by the fundamental law. The much rarer and less important problem is whether the lawmakers have used the constitutional tools in the manner constitutionally prescribed.
The exercise of judicial power in respect of the first question in any of its protean forms is a matter of great seriousness, for it often amounts to a denial of the legislative will on subjects l'ong considered and solemnly determined. The second form of unconstitutionality is far less important, for it is usually no more than a declaration that by carelessness or inadvertence something has been done in such slovenly shape that it must be done over.
For every reason, therefore, it seems best to first consider the objection to this statute based upon the statement that it is a bill for raising revenue originating in the Senate, and if that objection be “good beyond rational doubt” (International Mercantile Marine Co. v. Stranahan [C. C.] 155 Fed. 428), to go no further. I am perhaps saved from inquiry whether the Cotton Futures Act is a “bill for raising revenue” by the agreement of counsel on this point. They have all asserted that, though every one who has studied the investigations, reports, and discussions preceding and producing the passage of the act knows that nothing was further from the intent or desire of the hrainakers than the production of revenue, nevertheless the result of their efforts is a revenue bill within the constitutional meaning.
This familiar paradox results from McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 59, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78, 1 Ann. Cas. 561, and the doctrine that the motive or purpose of Congress in adopting a statute cannot be judicially inquired into. As in the case cited the Legislature desired to suppress the sale of colored oleomargarine, so here it desired to destroy every form of contract for future delivery of cotton, except that marked out by the statute. In both instances the object was sought to be attained by a tax intended to be prohibitive; in both the statutes are by title called tax bills, and to both the same treatment must be accorded, viz.: They are revenue bills, because Congress gives them that label and provides the machinery of levy and collection. It is immaterial what was the intent behind the statute; it is enough that the tax was laid, and the probability or desirability of collecting any taxes is beside the issue.
I do not think the abrogation, or lapse of the formal “joint rule” is a matter of any importance. The custom is admitted, its importance is obvious, for the President must officially know to which house to return any bill he does not approve. Const. art. 1, § 7, subd. 2. The language of Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 671, 12 Sup. Ct. 488, 36 L. Fd. 285, et seq., regarding the signature of bills by the presiding officers of the Senate and House is entirely applicable. The “orderly conduct of legislative proceedings” requires some method of authenticating or certifying the house of origin, and it is not for the courts to cavil at the method thereof, practiced without interruption since the establishment of the government.
But the complaint also shows (2) that section 110 was a bill which prescribed a form of contract for cotton futures quite similar to that laid down in the act as passed, and put forward as the sanction of the law proposed, exclusion from the mails of all matter relating to the business of those exchanges not using the statutory contract. The Senate passed this form, but the House struck out everything after the enacting clause and substituted the act as subsequently concurred in by the Senate. In substance the House put forward the same form of contract, it desired the same result, and for the same reasons as did the Senate, but it changed the sanction (so to speak) from a prohibition under penalty by virtue of the postal monopoly to a destructive excise under the taxing power.
All this being shown by the complaint, defendant urges that the bill which originated in the Senate was not a bill for raising revenue; that the taxing element was introduced in the House and there originated; that the certificate of the secretary of the Senate is a mistake, and the existing act did not originate as stated — all of which is evident from the journals of Congress as pleaded by plaintiffs themselves.
Unless there he some distinction between the signature of bills by "he presiding officers of the two houses, and the certification by the recording officer of one house, there is no logical difference between the point in this case and that decided in Field v. Clark, supra. If a court cannot and should not consult the legislative journals to’ ascertain whether something has been omitted .from or smuggled into the bill voted for, if it is bound to accept the certification implied from the signatures of the presiding officers, a fortiori is it bound to accept the merely administrative or parliamentary opinion asserted in the certificate of origin. I hold as matter of law that this court must accept the statement of the records in the office of the Secretary of State that the Cotton Futures Act originated in the Senate.
If as matter of fact the relations between the houses in respect of this statute were reversed, and the Representatives had preferred a mail prohibition and the Senate a prohibitive tax, it is, I think, obviously true that, if the certificate showed origin in the House, the same argument made here to show House origin could be made to show Senate origin. Thus the congressional opinion of congressional procedure and the meaning of amendments would be set aside, and judicial opinion substituted therefor. A refusal by the courts to ‘‘go behind the returns” as made by the only authorized congressional officers is a piece of good sense which makes for decency and peace. If, however, I were authorized to decide from the journals whether this bill originated in one house or the other, the same result would be reached. I would agree with the certificate on the engrossed act.
Amendments by substitution are a well known method of expediting legislation. In this instance a bill had passed the Senate; if the House had in form rejected that bill, returned it whence' it came,
There can be no such difference logically. Any and all violations of constitutional requirements vitiate a statute, and it has been so held in three states. Succession of Givanovich, 50 La. Ann., Pt. I, 625, 24 South. 679; Succession of Sala, 50 La. Ann., Pt. II, 1018, 24 South. 674; Perry Co. v. Selma, etc., R. R., 58 Ala. 546; Thierman Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 740, 97 S. W. 366. It has not heretofore been found necessary to condemn an act of Congress for this kind of careless journey work, though it has sometimes required a good deal of mental strain to demonstrate that some piece of legislation originating in a Senate was not a “bill for raising revenue.” Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 17 Sup. Ct. 766, 42 L. Ed. 134; United States v. James, 13 Blatchf. 207, Fed. Cas. No. 15464; Dundee, etc., v. Parrish (C. C.) 24 Fed. 197; Geer v. Board of Commissioners, 97 Fed. 435, 38 C. C. A. 250.
Defendant has urged upon the court that in Rainey v. United States, 232 U. S. at page 317, 34 Sup. Ct. at page 431, 58 L. Fd. 617, the Su
It is not seen how the court can disregard the information furnished by the Congress itself. The Cotton Futures Act is not, and never was, a law of the United States. It is one of those legislative projects which, to be a law, must originate in the lower house. For this reason alone the plaintiffs may take judgment.
It is most unsatisfactory to feel compelled to- ground decisions upon so technical a point; but,, such as it is, this finding disposes of the case, and I must leave undiscussed the argument equally able and interesting upon the other and permanently important branch of litigation.
Note. — In the following cases arising in states containing the same constitutional limitation, effort has been made to show that a given statute was not a bill for raising revenue: Mumford v. Sewall, 11 Or. 67, 4 Pac. 586, 50 Am. Rep. 462; State v. Wright, 14 Or. 365, 12 Pac. 708; Northern, etc., Trust v. Sears, 30 Or. 388, 41 Pac. 931, 35 L. R. A. 188; Elvers v. Hudson, 36 Mont. 135, 92 Pac. 462; Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 289; Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1, 33 Am. Rep. 450; Harper v. Commissioners, 23 Ga. 566; Colorado, etc., Co. v. Clayton, 54 Colo. 256, 130 Pac. 330; Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 22 Okl. 761, 98 Pac. 1002; Sheppard v. Dowling, 127 Ala. 7, 28 South. 791, 85 Am. St. Rep. 68; Commonwealth v. Bailey, 81 Ky. 395; Day Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 526, 4 S. W. 865. See, also, the Opinions of the Justices in 126 Mass. 557, and 70 N. H. 642, 50 Atl. 329.