44 Ga. App. 1 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1931
Lead Opinion
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
The suit not being one to recover upon the contract represented by the assignment, the contents of which were alleged in the petition and a copy of which appeared as an exhibit, but being a suit by the assignee against the assignor, based upon the assignor’s alleged act in collecting from his debtor and converting to his own use a fund which he had assigned to the assignee, the
The defendant in his plea having- admitted an indebtedness to the plaintiff in an amount equal to the sum which he had assigned to the plaintiff, but alleging that the indebtedness was dis-chargeable in bankruptcy, and it appearing that the defendant had, by a written assignment, assigned a portion of his wages or salary already earned during a designated period while working “in the capacity of fireman” and due him by the G. S. & F. Ry. Co., and it appearing that the defendant, during this period, worked for the G. S. & F. Ry. Co. only in the capacity of a brakeman and earned wages or salary while working in this capacity only, it is inferable that it was intended by the assignment to assign the wages or salary earned by the defendant while in the employ of the G. S. & F. Ry. Co. during that period, whatever the capacity in which the defendant worked, whether as a brakeman or as a fireman.
While the testimony of the defendant as a witness in his own behalf is perhaps, under the ruling in Jackson v. Bloodworth, 41 Ga. App. 216 (152 S. E. 289), sufficient to authorize the inference that the transaction between him and the plaintiff was an
A bona fide bill of sale or assignment of past-earned wages or salary, whether of an entire fund or of only an interest therein, confers upon the assignee a -right, whether legal or equitable, to enforce, in a proper proceeding, the collection of the sum assigned.
While an assignment of “an undivided interest in my account for wages or salary, . . said interest amounting to” so many dollars, would perhaps be an assignment of an entire debt, where the evidence shows that the entire debt was equal in amount to the amount of the interest assigned, yet where, as here, the evidence is silent as to the amount of the entire debt, an assignment of “an undivided interest,” etc., it seems would be prima facie evidence of an assignment of but a part of the debt. This is not in conflict with the ruling in Etheredge v. Wilson, 41 Ga. App. 432 (153 S. E. 230), to the effect that, as against demurrer, an assignment of this description contained in the petition in that case did not appear to bo a partial assignment. Whether the assignment was of' an entire debt, or. of a par]; thereof only, it is unnecessary
If the assignment in the case under consideration, which was only of an “undivided interest” in the defendant’s “account for wages or salary already . .' earned” by him from the first day of June, 1928, to the third day of July, 1928, in the capacity of a fireman for Georgia Southern & Florida Railway Company, did not constitute an assignment of the entire debt passing the title to the assignee, it constituted a partial assignment only, which conveyed to the assignee, Bibb Brokerage Corporation, only an equitable interest in a portion of the wages or salary thus assigned. Rivers v. Wright, 117 Ga. 81 (43 S. E. 499); Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Union Investment Co., 128 Ga. 74 (57 S. E. 100). It is therefore assumed that the assignment was of the latter description.
Upon this assumption the legal title to the entire salary or wages earned by the defendant during the period covered by the bill of sale or assignment, including the assigned portion of the fund, remained in the defendant; and the plaintiff as assignee, having only an equitable interest therein, had no right, in the absence of an acceptance of the assignment by the debtor, to enforce collection from the debtor. The defendant, the assignor, however, had the legal right, as the holder of the legal title, to collect from the debtor the railway company the entire fund, including the portion thereof which had been assigned. Upon collecting the money a duty rested upon the assignor to immediately pay over to the assignee, out of the fund collected, a sum equivalent to the amount which had been assigned. The assignor, having possession and holding the legal title to the fund collected, the equitable title to a portion of which was in the assignee to whom the assignor was under a duty to pay over the money immediately, stood, as respects this portion of the fund, in the relationship of a trustee therefor for the benefit of the assignee. It is immaterial that the assignee’s interest did not
In 5 C. J. 967, it is stated, citing authority, that if “the assignor does collect the chose, the monies in his hands arising therefrom will be held as trust funds belonging to the assignee; and so a judgment thereafter recovered by the assignor against the debtor will be for the use of the assignee.”
In 2 R. C. L. 620, it is stated, referring to an assignment of a part of a debt, that “the interest of the assignee is sometimes designated as being that of a cestui que trust or that of one holding an equitable lien on the fund in question, but it is more accurate to state that the assignee of a part of a debt acquires not only a lien on the fund, but an equitable interest in the fund itself.” In Warren v. First National Bank, 149 Ill. 9 (38 N. E. 122, 25 L. R. A. 746), it is said, “while a part of a debt or chose in action is not assignable at law, it may be assigned in equity, and in such case a trust will be created in favor of the equitable assignee of the fund, and will constitute an equitable lien upon it.” In Phillips v. Edsall, 127 Ill. 535 (20 N. E. 804), it was held that “A part of a debt or chose in action is not assignable at law, but can be enforced in equity; and in such case, a trust will be created in favor of the equitable assignee in the fund, and will constitute an equitable lien upon it.” In 3 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), § 1280, it is stated: “If B is indebted to A, or has in his hands a fund belonging to A, and A assigns such debt or fund to
Where an assignor receives the money from the debtor, after the assignment, he holds the money as trustee for the assignee. Perry on Trusts (5th ed.), § 438, citing Fortescue v. Barnett, 3 Mylne & Keen, 36; Ellis v. Amason, 2 Dev. Eq. (17 N. C.) 273. See Harris v. Campbell, 68 Tex. 22 (3 S. W. 243, 2 Am. St. R. 467), where it was held that the assignee of part of a debt “acquires a right of action in equity against the debtor and not only a lien upon the fund, but a property in the fund itself.” See elaborate note in 2 Am. St. R. 472 et seq.
Whether the assignment created a technical or an express trust in the assignor as trustee, or whether it created an implied trust, it is immaterial to a determination of the question as to the as
Where the trustee, as in the case of the assignor who had collected from the debtor a fund which had been assigned, was under a duty to immediately pay it over to the assignee, and therefore had no duty to perform with respect to the fund which had .been collected except to immediately turn it over to the assignee, the trust immediately became executed upon the trustee’s receipt of the money, and the legal title to the fund, or so much of the fund, collected which had been assigned, became, by the statute of uses, immediately vested in the assignee who was the beneficiary of the trust. Civil Code (1910), §§ 3736, 3737; Bowman v. Long, 26 Ga. 142; Walker v. Watson, 32 Ga. 264. These code sections apply to personalty as well as to realty. Civil Code (1910), § 3656. See eases collected in 12 Enc. Dig. Ga. R. 340 et seq. The assignee therefore could, on his legal title, recover at law in assumpsit against the assignor upon an implied contract by the assignor to pay over the fund to the assignee (Perry on Trusts (5th ed.), § 843); or the assignee could recover in a tort action against the assignor for a misappropriation by the assignor of the assignee’s money by reason of the assignor’s having converted it to his own use by hisfailure to pay it over to the assignee, who holds the legal title thereto, and is entitled to receive it. Milltown Lumber Co. v. Carter, 5 Ga. App. 344 (63 S. E. 270); Atlanta Finance Co. v. Lunsford, 32 Ga. App. 787 (124 S. E. 813); Spurlock v. Garner,
This is nojt a suit by the assignee to impress a trust upon the money in the hands of the assignor, but is a suit to recover of the assignor for a breach of duty with respect to a trust fund. The cestui que trust need not follow the property, but may sue the trustee. Roberts v. Mansfield, 38 Ga. 452. The trustee is under an implied contract to pay. Perry on Trusts (6th ed.) § 843; 3 Story Eq. Jur. (14th ed.) §§ 1697, 1698. The following cases therefore are distinguishable: Ober v. Cochran, 118 Ga. 396 (45 S. E. 382); Citizens Bank v. Haynes, 144 Ga. 490 (87 S. E. 399); United States Bank v. Glanton, 146 Ga. 786 (92 S. E. 625, L. R. A. 1917F, 600).
The suggestion that- the assignee’s rights can not be adjudicated in a suit, whether in law or in equity, unless both the assignor and the debtor are parties, is untenable. Where the assignor has collected the money from the debtor who had had no notice of the assignment and had not assented thereto, and the debtor has been eliminated from the transaction and the matter has been reduced to a situation involving only the rights of the assignor and the assignee as respects each other, the assignee has no right enforceable against the debtor, either in law or in equity, and it is no answer to a suit by the assignee against the assignor, after the latter has collected the money from the debtor, that the debtor is not a party to the suit. It is a matter solely between the assignor and the assignee, and the assignee’s rights in the matter, whether in' a suit at law or in equity, can be adjudicated in a suit against the assignor alone. The following decisions, which are relied upon in support of the proposition that the assignee in a partial assignment has no legal title which is enforceable in an action at law against the assignor only, are distinguishable: Rivers v. Wright, 117 Ga. 81 (43 S. E. 499); Western & Atlantic Railroad Co. v. Union Investment Co.; 128 Ga. 74 (57 S. E. 100); Gleaton v. Bank of Arlington, 40 Ga. App. 291 (149 S. E. 438); Timmons v. Citizens Bank, 11 Ga. App. 69 (74 S. E. 798). In none of these eases was the suit brought by the assignee against the assignor alone. In Rivers v. Wright the suit was by the assignee of a partial assign
We are not unmindful of the decision of the other division of this court in Etheredge v. Wilson, 41 Ga. App. 432 (153 S. E. 230). It was there held, Judge Bloodworth dissenting, that, in a suit by an assignee against the assignor aloue, the debtor not being a party, to recover a sum of money representing the amount which the assignor had, by a partial assignment of his wages, assigned to the assignee, without the assent of the debtor, and had after-wards collected from the debtor and failed to pay to the assignee, the plaintiff “showed no such title in the money alleged to have been assigned as would support the action for conversion,” and that the plaintiff had only an equitable title, and not a legal title, in the fund and could not recover. In that case no specific ruling was made respecting the character of the relationship between the assignor and the assignee, but it was held merely that the assignee of a part of a debt acquires no title enforceable in an action at law. This necessarily held that the assignee had no legal title, but that his title was purely equitable. The ruling in that case is perfectly consistent with the proposition that the nature of the relationship between the parties was that of trustee and cestui que trust; but it is respectfully submitted that the court, in there holding that the assignee had no legal title, or had no title that was enforceable in an action at law, seemingly failed to give effect to the provisions of the statute of uses in force in this State, as codified in sections 3736 and 3737 of the Civil Code of 1910, and recognized in decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia, among them being Bowman v. Long, 26 Ga. 142, and Walker v. Watson, 32 Ga. 264, where the legal title which is vested in a trustee becomes, upon the execution of the trust, immediately vested in the cestui que trust..
A proposition announced in a single decision, and that by only
The assignee could, on his legal title, recover at law against the assignor.
While the petition purports to allege a tortious conversion by the defendant of the plaintiff's property, it nevertheless alleges facts which entitle the plaintiff to recover for a breach by the defendant of an implied contract to pay over the money to the plaintiff. “The nature of an action is not determined by the designation of the pleader. ‘It is, in fact, immaterial by what name he calls his suit, or whether he gives it any name at all,' The character and classification of an action depends upon the intrinsic contents of the petition, its recitals of fact, the nature of the wrong sought to be remedied, and the quality of the remedy invoked.” Pennington v. Douglas &c. Ry. Co., 3 Ga. App. 665 (60 S. E. 485); see also Atlanta Finance Co. v. Lunsford, 32 Ga. App. 787 (124 S. E. 813); Information Buying Co. v. Morgan, 39 Ga. App. 292 (147 S. E. 128). A suit in assumpsit lies for money had and received. Whitehead v. Pede, 1 Ga. 140, 145; Cragg v. Arendale, 113 Ga. 181 (38 S. E. 399).
Construing the petition either as one alleging a cause of action ex contractu on the defendant's contract, whether express or implied, to pay to the plaintiff money collected, or as one alleging a cause of action ex delicto for a conversion by the defendant to his own use of property in his possession belonging to the plaintiff, the verdict apd judgment for the plaintiff, in the sum sued
Section 17 of the national bankruptcy act of 1898 as amended provides that “a discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts except such as [among others] are liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations, or for wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another . . or were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy, 591. Whether the debt created by the defendant’s failure to turn over to the plaintiff the latter’s portion of the fund after the defendant had collected 'it constituted a liability for the wilful and malicious injury to property and was, under the authority of Covington v. Rosenbusch, 148 Ga. 459 (97 S. E. 78), exempt from discharge in bankruptcy, it is not necessary to decide. The ruling in that case had reference to a situation where the assignor had, by an assignment of a chose in action, conveyed the legal title to the assignee. It was there held on the authority of McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U. S. 138 (37 Sup. Ct. 38, 61 L. ed. 205), that the collection of the money by the assignor from the debtor constituted a wilful and malicious injury to property within the meaning of section 17 of the national bankruptcy act of 1898 as amended, and was therefore exempt from discharge in bankruptcy. In the case here before this court the assignor, since he, and not the assignee, had the legal title to the debt assigned, had a right to collect it from the debtor. In so doing his act constituted no injury to the assignee’s property. The question presented, therefore, is whether the act of the assignor, after collecting the money from the debtor and converting it to his own use, constituted such a debt as is exempt from discharge in bankruptcy.
The defendant as the assignor, when he had collected the wages or salary which he had assigned to the plaintiff, stood in the position of a trustee holding the legal title to the portion of the fund, the equitable right to which was in the plaintiff, the assignee, as the beneficiary thereof, and was under a duty to pay it over immediately to the plaintiff as the beneficiary, and upon the failure of the assignor as trustee to do this he misappropriated the money to his own use, and thereby committed a breach of the trust.
In Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U. S. 676 (4 Sup. Ct. 576, 28 L. ed. 565), in which it was held that a pledgee of securities for the payment of a debt, who failed to return them upon the discharge of the debt, because in the meantime he had pledged them over to another as security for his own debt, did not thereby create a debt while acting in a “fiduciary character,” and which was exempt
In Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U. S. 365 (11 Sup. Ct. 313, 34 L. ed. 931), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, where the bankrupt had been appointed an attorney in fact to receive a certain sum of money and to pay annually a certain sum of money as interest, to be paid according to his discretion, but under certain limitations designated, although the duties imposed were denominated as a “trust,” the bankrupt, in performing these duties, was not acting in a “fiduciary character,” and that the debt arising out of this relation was not exempt from bankruptcy under the bankruptcy act of 1867. The court stated that a trust in its technical sense was not created, but that the relationship was merely that of debtor and creditor, that “within the meaning of the exception in the bankruptcy act, a debt is not created by a person while acting in a ‘fiduciary character’ merely because it is created under circumstances in which trust or confidence is reposed in the debtor, in the popular sense of those terms.” The court cited with approval Chapman v. Forsyth, and also cited with approval the case
In Bracken v. Milner, 104 Fed. 522, decided in 1900 by the circuit court of the western district of Missouri, that court, in a well-
While none of the above authorities, with the exception of Bracken v. Milner, 104 Fed. 522, adjudicate what situation constitutes a fiduciary relationship, yet, in determining what situations are not fiduciary in the sense of the several bankruptcy acts, they indicate what 'constitutes such a relationship.
In the following cases it was held that debts created by the conversion or misappropriation of funds by persons acting as trustees, executors, presidents of corporations, presidents and directors of banks, receivers,' and other fiduciaries, were debts created by the misappropriations of' persons acting in fiduciary capacities: Culp v. Robey (Tex.), 299 S. W. 846 (trustee); In re Messmore’s Estate, 290 Pa. 107 (138 Atl. 81) (executor); In re Bloemecke, 265 Fed. 343 (president of corporation); In re Metz, 6 Fed. (2d) 962 (president of corporation); Boyd v. Applewhite, 121 Miss. 879 (84 So. 16) (director of bank); Floyd v. Layton, 172 N. C. 64 (89 S. E. 998) (president of bank); Morris v. Covey, 104 Ark. 226 (148 S. W. 257) (executor); Brown v. Hannagan, 210 Mass. 246 (96 N. E. 714) (executor); Field v. Howry, 132 Mich. 687 (94 N. W. 213) (receiver); In re Harper (D. C.), 133 Fed. 970, aff. 141 Fed. 626 (vice-president of bank); South Atlantic Guano Co. v. Childs, 211 Ala. 637 (101 So. 445) (consignee where title to money was in consignor by the contract of consignment); Delve v. Devere, 164 N. Y. Supp. 608, aff. 180 App. Div. 898 (167 N. Y. S. 1095) (broker entrusted with money to buy stock); Wilcox v. Leverett, 128 S. C. 377 (123 S. E. 101) (agent to sell fertilizer collecting the purchase money which belonged to principal); Mathieu v. Goldberg, 156 Fed. 541 (factor after a demand of him for return of goods by consignor); Williams v. Va.-Car. Chem. Co., 182 Ala. 413 (62 So. 755) (person entrusted with a note “as trustee” for
In the case of Mott Iron Works v. Toumey, decided by the appellate division of the Supreme Court of New York in the year 1904, 94 App. Div. 216 (87 N. Y. Supp. 1020), a building contractor, in consideration of the sale and delivery to him of materials for use by him in performing his contract, gave to the person for whom he was doing the work an order to pay to the material man a sum of money for the materials and charge the money to the contractor, which order the contractor delivered to the materialman, agreeing with the latter to collect the money from the owner of the building. It was held that “the parties intended that the money represented by the order should become the property of the materialman when collected by the contractor, and that the failure of the contractor to turn over such money to the materialman constituted a misappropriation or defalcation by the contractor when acting in a fiduciary capacity, which is excepted from the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy by subdivision 4 of section 17 of the bankruptcy law.” The court in the opinion stated, “it was the particular money that was represented by the order that the defendant undertook to collect and pay to the plaintiff. The order' provided that the money was to be paid to the plaintiff, and was to be charged to a specific account which would be due to the defendant on the completion of his contract, against the drawee, and the defendant undertook to collect this amount specified in the draft or order, and to turn the money when collected over to the plaintiff. Upon the collection of the amount of the draft by the defendant the identical money collected would, under this agreement, be the money of the plaintiff and to which the plaintiff was entitled; and the defendant having collected that money, under his agreement with the plaintiff, as representing the plaintiff, his refusal to turn the money over to the plaintiff in accordance with his obligations was the breach of a fiduciary obligation, and his refusal to account for the money thus received as the money of the plaintiff was a misappropriation or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, which is excepted from the effect of. a dis
In the following cases it was stated that “fiduciary capacity,” in section 17 of the national bankruptcy act of 1898, has reference to “technical” or “express trusts,” and that the fiduciary relationship must have preceded the debt: Clair v. Colmes, 245 Mass. 281 (139 N. E. 519); Young v. Clark, 7 Cal. App. 194 (93 Pac, 1056); Lewis v. Shaw, 106 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (122 App. Div. 96); First National Bank v. Bamforth, 90 Vt. 75 (96 Atl. 600); Ehrhart v. Rork, 114 Ill. App. 509; Reeves v. McCracken, 69 N. J. Eq. 203 (60 Atl. 332), aff. 73 N. J. Eq. 729 (69 Atl. 247); In re Burchfield, 31 Fed. (2d) 118.
While without the debtor’s consent, an assignment of a part of a debt may not constitute an equitable assignment enforceable by the assignee against the debtor (5 C. J. 925 and Georgia cases there cited), it certainly, as between the assignor and the assignee, confers upon the assignee an equitable right in the portion of the fund assigned, which the assignee can, whether in equity or in law, enforce against the assignor. “The assignment of a debt does not in equity require even the assent of the debtor in any manner
That which is now recognized as a legal assignment of a chose in action was not a legal assignment at common law.. At common law a chose in action was not assignable, and where an assignment was attempted, the legal title did not pass, but the assignee’s right under the assignment was recognized in equity... In 2 R. C. L. 598 it is stated that “at the ancient common law a chose in action was incapable of assignment, equity at an early day assumed to recognize assignments of choses in action and other valuable rights including mere expectancies or possibilities, and things not having a potential existence, provided such assignments are fairly made, are supported by a sufficient consideration, and do not contravene any recognized rule of public policy. This gave rise to the doctrine of equitable assignments, which have been defined as executory agreements or declarations of trust, which a chancellor exercising a sound discretion will execute or not, according to the circumstances of the case.” See also 5 C. J. 837. In Lord Coke’s time it was declared that an equitable assignment is a declaration of trust. Coke on Littleton, 232, b, note 1. See also Lord Carteret v. Paschal, 3 P. Wms. 197. Gibson, C. J., in Pierce v. McKeehan, 3 Pa. 136 (45 Am. D. 635), said that “an equitable assignment is an executory agreement or declaration of trust.” See also Hartman v. Dowdel, 1 Rawle (Pa.), 279; Bury v. Hartman, 4 S. & R. (Pa.) 175; Tritt v. Colwell, 31 Pa. 228; Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185 (18 Am. R. 178); Morrison v. Deaderick, 10 Hump. (Tenn.) 342; 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2d ed.) 893, 1014, 1095.
No formal words are necessary for the creation of a trust. It is provided in section 3728 of the Civil Code of 1910 that “when
One of the duties imposed upon a trustee, incident to the trust, is to account to the cestui que trust for the property, upon the trustee’s execution of the duties of the trust. The trustee’s retention of the property after the trust has become executed, and the conversion of it to his own use, is a violation of this duty, and the obligation upon him to account to the cestui que trust for a violation of this duty is created while acting in the capacity of trustee. The fact that upon the trustee’s execution of all thq duties incumbent upon him under the trust, the legal title to thq .property becomes, by statute (sections 3736 and 3737 of the Civil Code of 1910), divested from him and vested in the cestui que trust, should not alter this situation. The duty incumbent upon the trustee to deliver the property to the cestui que trust arises by reason of the fact that the trustee has executed all of his duties under the trust, and not by reason of the fact that by the statute of uses the legal title to the property has, upon the execution of the trust, become vested in the cestui que trust. The same circumstances which impose upon the trustee the duty to deliver the property to the cestui que trust, viz., the execution by the trustee of the powers under the trust, also operate under the statute to divest the legal title from the trustee and to vest it in the cestui que trust. The only change in the situation as to the status of the parties brought'about as a result of the statute of uses is the vesting of the legal title in the cestui que trust coincident with the trustee’s execution of the powers under the trust. Irrespective of whether, upon the execution by the trustee of his duties under the trust, the legal title to the property ipso facto becomes by the statute vested in the cestui que trust, the obligation of the trustee to account to the cestui que trust is nevertheless a debt created by the trustee while acting in his capacity as trustee.
A failure of a trustee to pay over to the cestui que trust monies belonging to him and due under the terms of the trust, consti
In determining the question as to whether a debt arising out of a fiduciary relationship is dischargeable, or exempt from discharge, in bankruptcy, there seems to be a distinction between a debt which is created by the transaction which creates the fiduciary relationship, and a debt which arises out of a fiduciary relationship already in existence at the creation of the debt. It seems that debts of the latter character, and not of the former, are exempt from discharge in bankruptcy. Cronan v. Cotting, 104 Mass. 245 (supra); Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U. S. 365, 378 (supra); Bloomingdale v. Dreher, 31 Fed. (2d) 93.
The fiduciary character of the defendant was created independently of the transaction out of which his indebtedness to the plaintiff arose. It was created either when the defendant assigned a portion of his salary to the plaintiff or when he afterwards collected it and obtained possession of the money. The indebtedness arose afterwards, and arose by virtue of the defendant’s failure to pay over the money to the plaintiff and retaining it for his own use.
The debt, therefore, was created while the defendant was acting in the fiduciary capacity of a technical trustee created under an express trust, the trust having been declared in writing by the ’defendant, the holder of both the legal and equitable title to a chose in action, by an assignment conveying to the plaintiff all the defendant’s right and title in and to a portion of the debt represented by the chose in action, the legal result of which, in the absence of the assent to the assignment by the debtor, conveyed to the plaintiff only an equitable title in the chose in action to the extent of the amount of the debt assigned, leaving the legal title to the chose in action in its entirety in the defendant, who, .as respects the portion .of the debt .assigned, was a trustee for the
The words “fiduciary capacity,” as used in section 17 of the bankruptcy act of 1898, extend back and qualify “fraud,” “embezzlement” and “misappropriation,” as well as “defalcation.” Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176 (25 Sup. Ct. 9, 49 L. ed. 147); Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U. S. 183 (27 Sup. Ct. 493, 51 L. ed. 762). Any debt, therefore, which the bankrupt created while acting in a fiduciary capacity, is exempt from discharge in bankruptcy, where it ivas created either by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation. The decisions in Glasco v. Cooper, 17 Ga. App. 690 (87 S. E. 1095), and Stovall v. Coker, 18 Ga. App. 126 (88 S. E. 907), holding that a debt created by the act of the assignor in collecting from the debtor the fund which had already been assigned to another did not arise by virtue of the assignor’s acting in a fiduciary capacity, had no reference to a situation where the assignor at the time acted in the capacity of a technical trustee holding legal title to the fund collected. In each of these cases the assignee brought spit against the assignor for collecting and converting the fund. In neither of them Avere the questions determined elaborately treated. Both cases were disposed of by short syllabi. In Stovall v. Coker, the court followed Glasco v. Cooper. In each ease the assignors assigned so many dollars “on my account for salary as wages” in one case, and so many “dollars of my salary” in the other ease. From an inspection of the records in these cases it appears that the evidence in each case was silent as to the total amount of wages earned. The language of each assignment is perfectly consistent with the assignment of an entire debt, conveying the legal title thereto to the assignee. In Covington v. Rosenbusch, 148 Ga. 459 (supra), Where the total amount which the assignor had earned during the-period covered by the assignment did not appear, but where the assignment was of “$62.00 of my salary,” it Avas held that the assignor had sold, transferred, and assigned “his title and right to possession of a stipulated amount of salary due him by his employer, . .” and that “the instrument of transfer [rvas] an assignment of title.” See also this case cited in Spurlock v. Garner, 38 Ga. App. 614 (144 S. E. 819).
We therefore conclude that the obligation of the defendant constitutes a debt created by his misappropriation while acting in a fiduciary capacity^ and is, under section 17 of the national bankruptcy act of 1898 as amended, exempt from discharge in bankruptcy.
The act of the defendant in making an assignment of past-earned wages for a specified period, and his admission in the plea that, but for certain defenses interposed, he is indebted to the plaintiff in the amount sued for, which is equivalent to the amount of the wages assigned, are sufficient to authorize the finding that at the time of the assignment there was due the defendant from his employer wages in the amount indicated 'in the assignment. The foregoing evidence, and the evidence to the effect that the assignment was a bona fide sale of the defendant’s wages and was not a device to evade the laws against usury, and the evidence to the effect that the defendant had collected all the wages due him by his employer, and had not paid to the plaintiff any portion of the money so collected, are sufficient to authorize the inference that the defendant 'is indebted to the plaintiff in the amount sued for.
The judge of the municipal court of Macon did not err in finding against the defendant’s plea in bankruptcy, and in finding for the plaintiff in the amount sued for; and the judge of the superior
Judgment affirmed.
Rehearing
ON MOTION TOR REHEARING.