105 Ala. 440 | Ala. | 1894
Hubbard, Price & Co., the defendants to this bill and appellants here, are cotton brokers in New York city, engaged in buying and selling for commissions cotton in the New York Exchange, for customers, for future delivery, and on the spot. Calvin Sayre, the husband of appellee, in 1887, resided in Montgomery, Ala. John S. Ernest was the southern agent and representative of Hubbard, Price & Co. In 1887, Ernest entered into arrangements with Sayre for the carrying on by his principals, in New York, of cotton speculations for Sayre, consisting of buying and selling cotton futures. The operations began, and during that year,
It is contended by appellants’ counsel that, under the provisions of the present married^ woman’s law of this State,(Code, §§ 2341 et seq.), a wife — the husband joining with her — may convey her separate property upon no other consideration than the payment of the husband’s
We have carefully considered the decisions of this court, in the cases of Holt v. Agnew, 67 Ala. 360, and Perryman v. Greer, 39 Ala. 133, and are convinced that the principles there declared are applicable, under the consitutional and statutory provisions above copied. These provisions, as we have seen, authorize the wife, generally, to dispose of her property by the joint deed of herself and husband. Unlike the former statute, which authorized such dispositions for reinvestment only, and hence only for the use and benefit of the wife, there is in the present statute, no expression of a purpose or consideration, for or upon which the capacity is conferred, or limitation of any kind upon its exercise, except the requirement of the assent and concurrence of the husband manifested by his joining with her in the conveyance. The fact that, in changing the law, provisions which secured the proceeds of a sale still to the use of the wife, by requiring their reinvestment in other property for her, were omitted, is indicative of the legislative in
There is neither allegation nor proof of fraud or undue influence in the present case. If the transaction be regarded as a contract between husband and wife, within the meaning of section 2349 of the Code, in respect of which the relation of trust and confidence is declared to exist, it appears that the wife acted willingly, with full knowledge of all the facts. The deed itself discloses that its consideration was the payment of the husband’s debt arising on cotton contracts or for cotton purchased prior to its date. We see no element of a suretyship by the wife for the husband.
The decree of the chancellor must be reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.