HUBBARD BROADCASTING, INC., Petitioner, v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and United States of America, Respondents, Santa Fe Cablevision Company, Intervenor.
No. 20924.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Oct. 11, 1967. Decided Oct. 27, 1967.
385 F.2d 979
The recent Supreme Court opinions in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed. 2d 84 (1966), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967), warn that however beneficent the original intent, the promise of the juvenile courts has not, for the most part, been realized. These cases establish that the juvenile is entitled to many of the constitutional protections which shield his adult counterpart. The child cannot be denied these rights in the name of flexibility and informality; nor can the broad discretion imparted by the phrase “in the best interests of the child” cloak arbitrary treatment.
But nothing in these decisions indicates that certain stages of the juvenile process cannot or should not consist of non-accusatory proceedings which result in a disposition favorable to the child. The Court explicitly said in Gault that nothing in that decision would “compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process.” 387 U.S. at 21, 87 S.Ct. at 1440. Certainly, then, the child can be accorded additional rights and privileges beyond those to which the adult defendant is entitled, and judicial conduct which might unfairly disadvantage the District in the prosecution of an adult is not necessarily unfair where the accused is a juvenile and the objective is not to punish but to protect the child. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 375, 236 F.2d 666, 670, 60 A.L.R.2d 686 (1956); Slaughter v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun. App., 134 A.2d 338 (1957). Though the judge could not have made a final determination of “involvement” on the basis of the informal hearing held here, it was not an abuse of discretion to conduct such a hearing to determine simply whether he should allow the case against the juvenile to proceed at all.
Reversed.
Mr. Robert L. Heald, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Frank U. Fletcher and Edward W. Hummers, Jr., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for petitioner.
Mr. Joseph A. Marino, Counsel, F.C.C., with whom Asst. Atty. Gen., Donald F. Turner, Mr. Henry Geller, Gen. Counsel, Mrs. Lenore G. Ehrig, Counsel, F.C.C., and Mr. Howard E. Shapiro, Atty., Dept. of Justice, were on the brief, for respondents. Mr. John H. Conlin, Associate Gen. Counsel, F.C.C., also entered an appearance for respondent Federal Communications Commission.
4Mr. Vernon L. Wilkinson, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. James A. McKenna, Jr. and Robert W. Coll, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for intervenor.
PER CURIAM:
This is a petition for review of a memorandum opinion and order of the Federal Communications Commission released February 17, 1967. In its opinion and order, the Commission waived the evidentiary hearing provisions of
This case is governed by our recent decision in Channel 9 Syracuse, Inc. v. F.C.C., 128 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 385 F.2d 969 (Nos. 20,843 and 20,915, decided September 26, 1967). Both cases were considered by the Commission at approximately the same time and raise similar questions as to factual specificity in petitions for waiver and the articulation by the Commission of its reasons for granting the petitions. The differences in the cases are a matter of degree, and we do not find the degree of difference sufficient to justify a different result. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission‘s order. Once again, however, we remind the Commission that, although we defer to its expertise in its assigned area, “in the emerging field of CATV, with respect to petitions for waiver of evidentiary hearings, the Commission should require greater factual specificity in petitions for waiver and in the proof, and its decisions should more clearly articulate the public interest considerations on which it determines to waive” its rules and regulations. Channel 9 Syracuse, Inc. v. F.C.C., supra, 385 F.2d p. 975.
Affirmed.
WILBUR K. MILLER, Senior Circuit Judge (dissenting):
I think the Commission‘s order should be reversed on the authority of Channel 9 Syracuse v. F.C.C. When that opinion
WILBUR K. MILLER
Senior Circuit Judge
