Mark G. HRANICKA v. CHESAPEAKE SURGICAL, LTD., et al.
No. 83, Sept. Term, 2014.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
June 18, 2015.
116 A.3d 507
thеless, “[i]t is the policy of this Court not to reverse for harmless error and the burden is on the appellant in all cases to show prejudice as well as error.” Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91, 854 A.2d 1180, 1185 (2004) (citing Rippon v. Mercantile Safe Deposit Co., 213 Md. 215, 222, 131 A.2d 695, 698 (1957)). As such, we decline to determine whether the Circuit Court erred by ordering the WSSC to produce, in this judicial review proceeding, additional documents from the agency‘s preliminary investigation of the claim. Generally, supplementation of an agency record while on judicial review is not permitted, except where agency bias or improper ex parte communications are asserted. See Montgomery Cnty. v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 484-85, 654 A.2d 877, 883-84 (1995); c.f.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER.
Sean E. Smith (Julie D. Murray, Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondents.
Robert J. Zarbin, Esquire, James K. MacAlister, Esquire, The Zarbin Law Firm, Upper Marlboro, MD, for Amicus Curiae brief of Maryland Association for Justice in support of Petitioner.
Amy L. Ticer, Esquire, Bonner, Kiernan, Trebach and Crociata, LLP, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae brief of The Maryland Defense Counsel, Inc., in support of Appellee‘s brief.
Argued before: BARBERA, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD and WATTS, JJ.
WATTS, J.
We decide whether an employee‘s workers’ compensation claim is time-barred under
We hold that an employee‘s claim is time-barred under
BACKGROUND
First Claim
This case arises out of a workers’ compensation claim filed by Mark G. Hranicka (“Hranicka“), Petitioner, as a result of an injury sustained during a motor vehicle accident on January 6, 2010. On January 14, 2010, Chesapeake Surgical, Ltd. (“the Employer“), Respondent, prepared а “Workers Compensation—First Report of
On January 14, 2010, Hranicka completed and executed a C-1 Claim Form, which was filed on paper with and date stamped by the Commission on January 28, 2010, and assigned claim number “W016210.” On February 3, 2010, the Commission issued a “Notice of Employee‘s Claim” and assigned a “consideration date” of February 24, 2010, for Respondents to contest the claim. Respondents contested the claim before the consideration date deadline, and the case was set for a hearing before the Commission. On May 20, 2010, at the hearing, the parties appeared before the Commission, and Hranicka requested that his workers’ compensation claim be withdrawn. On May 24, 2010, the Commission ordered that the workers’ compensation claim be withdrawn.
Second Claim
Nothing further concerning Hranicka‘s workers’ compensation claim occurred until 2012. On January 17, 2012, Hranicka electronically submitted to the Commission a second C-1 Claim Form, identifying the date of the accident as January 6, 2010. The Commission‘s online program recorded the date and time of the electronic submission at the bottom of the second C-1 Claim Form, underneath the signature and date lines, as “Received: 1/17/2012 11:26:13 AM.” On January 20, 2012, Hranicka executed two forms: (1) the second C-1 Claim Form, which he had electronically submitted on January 17, 2012; and (2) an “Authоrization for Disclosure of Health Information.” On January 24, 2012, the executed second C-1 Claim Form was filed on paper with and date stamped by the Commission, and assigned claim number “W032036.” On that same day, January 24, 2012, the authorization form was filed with the Commission. On January 27, 2012, the Commission issued a new “Notice of Employee‘s Claim” and assigned a consideration date of February 17, 2012, for Respondents to contest the claim. The new “Notice of Employee‘s Claim” stated that Hranicka‘s C-1 Claim Form was received on January 24, 2012, the date on which the paper copy was filed. On February 12, 2012, Respondents contested the claim, contending that the claim was time-barred by
On May 31, 2012, the Commission conducted a hearing at which Commissioner Cynthia S. Miraglia (“Commissioner Miraglia“) presided. During the hearing, Commissioner Miraglia stated:
[Hranicka]‘s claim form came in on the 17th. When an electronic claim is filed, we accept the claim for statu[t]e [of limitations] purposes. But you cannot file an electronic signature because of the concern of privacy and security. So the claim is—for limitation[s] purposes on the 17th. However, we don‘t have a final notice until we get in the signed claim forms.
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But just for everyone‘s edification, when an electronic claim form comes in to the Commission, that date is the date we use for limitation[s] purposes. Now, if you never send in a signed copy, then, obviously, then we‘re at another issue. But in this case, they clearly did.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Commissioner Miraglia determined that the claim was not time-barred, and on June 12, 2012, issued an order stating the same.
On June 18, 2012, Respondents filed with the Commission a “Request for Rehearing,” arguing that the Commission‘s June 12, 2012, decision was “incorrect as a
Respondents appealed and, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that using the electronic submission date of the claim form for purposes of the statute of limitations instead of the date that the claim form is filed on paper with and date-stamped by the Commission is inconsistent with the Commission‘s regulations and incorrect as a matter of law.2 Hranicka filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. See Hranicka v. Chesapeake Surgical Ltd., 440 Md. 461, 103 A.3d 593 (2014).
DISCUSSION
Hranicka contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred concluding that the Commission could not generate a procedural rule to relate claims back to their electronic submission dates for purposes of the statute of limitations.3 Hranicka argues that
Hranicka contends that, given the remedial nature of the Workers’ Compensation Act and the principle that the Act should be construed liberally in favor of employees, any ambiguity concerning the filing date should be construed in his favor. Hranicka asserts that, because Resрondents knew of the claim as early as January 6, 2010, when the accident occurred, and because Respondents admitted in the circuit court that they were not prejudiced between the electronic submission and the paper filing, electronic submission of the claim was sufficient.
Respondents respond that the Court of Special Appeals correctly held that Hranicka‘s workers’ compensation claim is time-barred.4 Respondents contend that
Generally, in an appeal from judicial review of an agency action, we review the agency‘s decision directly, not the decision of the circuit court or the Court of Special Appeals. See Cosby v. Dep‘t of Human Res., 425 Md. 629, 637, 42 A.3d 596, 601 (2012) (citations omitted). “We must respect the expertise of the agency and accord deference to its interpretation of a statute that it administers[;] however, we may always determine whether the administrative agency made an error of law.” Watkins v. Sec‘y, Dep‘t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 377 Md. 34, 46, 831 A.2d 1079, 1086 (2003) (citations and internal quotation marks оmitted). The Commission‘s decision “is presumed to be prima facie correct[.]”
We have explained that “[a]n agency‘s interpretation of a regulation is a conclusion of law[,]” and that “a great deal of deference is owed to an administrative agency‘s interpretation of its own regulation.” Crofton Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Dep‘t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Nursing Home Appeal Bd., 413 Md. 201, 215, 991 A.2d 1257, 1265 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “[d]espite the deference, it is always within our prerogative to determine whether an agency‘s conclusions of law are correct. Accordingly, we determine whether the [agency]‘s conclusions are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Id. at 215, 991 A.2d at 1265 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When we construe an agency‘s rule or regulation, “the principles governing our interpretation of a statute apply[.]” Christopher v. Montgomery Cnty. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 381 Md. 188, 209, 849 A.2d 46, 58 (2004) (citations omitted). Thus, we look to the regulation‘s “plain language [as] the best evidence of its own meaning[,]” and “[w]hen the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends there.” Id. at 209, 849 A.2d at 58 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, “if a covered employee fails to file a claim within [two] years after the date of the accidental personal injury, the claim is completely barred.”
Under
A. Claim for Benefits.
(1) To initiate a claim for benefits, an employee shall file a claim form with the Commission.
...
(4) The employee shall sign the claim form certifying that the information submitted on the claim form is accurate.
(5) When completing the claim form, the claimant shall sign an authorization for disclosure of health information directing the claimant‘s health care providers to disclose ... the claimant‘s medical records that are relevant[.]
...
(7) The Commission shall reject and return to the claimant a claim form that does not contain a signed authorization for disclosure of health information.
(8) Date of Filing.
(a) A claim is considered filed on the date that a completed and signed claim form, including the signed authorization for disclosure of health information, is received by the Commission.
(b) For any claim form that has not been rejected or returned as incomplete ..., the Commission‘s date of receipt is determined by the date stamp affixed on the claim form.
(9) Electronic Submission.
(a) A claim that is submitted electronically is not considered filed until the signed claim form, including the signed authorization for disclosure of health information, is received by the Commission.
(b) The Commission‘s date of receipt is determined by the date stamp affixed on the claim form.
(Emphasis added).
Other regulations contained in the “General Administrative” chapter of Subtitle 9 of Title 14 of COMAR discuss the Commission‘s electronic system and electronic submissions.
Upon review of the applicable COMAR regulations, even after giving deference to the Commission‘s interpretation of them, we hold that, pursuant to
It is clear that, under the Workers’ Compensation Act and COMAR, an employee must “file” a claim, and not simply “submit” a claim through the WFMS, to seek benefits for accidental personal injury. See
It is inconsequential that
regulation‘s meaning ends there, and we need not address the regulation‘s history. See Christopher, 381 Md. at 209, 849 A.2d at 58 (We look to a regulation‘s “plain language [as] the best evidence of its own meaning[,]” and “[w]hen the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends there.” (Citations and internаl quotation marks omitted)).7
We reject Hranicka‘s contention that the Commission‘s website provided instructions from which a claimant would have believed his or her claim had been filed once the claimant electronically submitted the claim form and sent a signed claim form within ten days. In January 2012, the Commission‘s website made clear that, to file a claim with the Commission, the electronically submitted claim form needed to be printed, signed, and mailed to the Commission; in other words, at the time of Hranicka‘s electronic submission, the Commission‘s website unmistakably instructed
[ ] This is the current Employee Claim Form that is required to submit your claim to the Commission.
...
[ ] The Online Employee Claim Form C-1 MUST be completed online on your PC—using Formatta Filler. The form MAY NOT be printed blank and completed offline by hand or reused for another claim; such forms are returned. The completed/submitted form must be printed ON WHITE PAPER—via the SUBMIT button on page 1 of the form—must display the date stamp at the bottom of the form, must be signed where indicated on page 1 and page 2 by the injured worker and must be mailed to the Commission in a timely manner (within 10 business days) to file your claim.
“Employee Claim Form C-1 Online—MD WCC WebForm Instructions” (Jan. 5, 2012), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120105021510/http://www.wcc.state.md.us/WFMS/C1_WebForms.html.8 The Commission‘s website stated that “Maryland Law requires that an Employee Claim Form C-1 signed by the injured worker be sent (mailed/delivered) to the Workers’ Compensation Commission to file a claim[,]” and that “[i]f you fail to send the signed form to the [Commission], [the Commission] will send you a notice that your signed Employee Claim Form C-1 has not been received and you[r] claim is not filed.” Id. In January 2012, at the time Hranicka electronically submitted the claim form, the Commission‘s website also stated, in no uncertain terms:
If you fail to send your signed form to the [Commission] within 10 days, you will receive a notice from the [Commission] stating that your submitted data will be deleted and your claim WILL NOT BE FILED if you do not mail a properly completed and signed form to the [Commission].
If you do not respоnd as instructed on the Notice, your claim information will be deleted, your claim will NOT be filed.
Id. As of March 6, 2012—the next date after January 5, 2012, that the Commission‘s website was archived and saved—the above-quoted language on the Commission‘s website had not changed; i.e., the Commission‘s website‘s instructions on January 17, 2012, when Hranicka electronically submitted his claim form, were the same as they had been on January 5, 2012. See “Employee Claim Form C-1 Online—MD WCC WebForm Instructions,” (Mar. 6, 2012), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120306171751/http://www.wcc.state.md.us/WFMS/C1_WebForms.html. In our view, the instructions on the Commission‘s website, as they existed at the time Hranicka submitted his claim form electronically on January 17, 2012, are consistent with, and reinforce, the regulatory language that provides that electronically submitting а claim form does not constitute filing of the claim itself.9
authorization for disclosure of health information.” The same instructions were provided on the website in January 2012. See “Employee Claim Form C-1 Online—MD WCC WebForm Instructions,” (Jan. 5, 2012), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120105021510/http://www.wcc.state.md.us/WFMS/C1_WebForms.html (“The completed/submitted form must be printed ..., must be signed where indicated on pаge 1 and page 2 by the injured worker and must be mailed to the Commission in a timely manner (within 10 business days) to file your claim.... All claim forms submitted to the Commission MUST be signed personally by the injured worker [and] mailed as soon as possible.... An incomplete claim form that does not include the signed Authorization for Disclosure of Health Information ... will be rejected and returned to the claimant.“). In other words, electronically submitting the claim form is not tantamount to “signing” the claim form or “signing” the authorization for disclosure of health information form—two requirements for filing a claim—and the online form does not provide for electronic signatures, but instead requires the claimant to print the completed/submitted claim form and sign; i.e., an original signature is required.
We are unpersuaded by Hranicka‘s reference to the existence of the Maryland Electronic Courts (“MDEC“) Project and similar electronic court case filing systems in other jurisdictions, for the proposition that workers’ compensation claim forms may be filed electronically. MDEC was implemented after extensive study and substantial amendments to the Maryland Rules. Although this Court certainly endorses and supports the advent of electronic filing in Maryland courts, the Commission has not promulgated regulations implementing or governing a procedure for the electronic filing of workers’ compensation claims. Absent such regulations, this Court is unable to determine that submission of a claim through the WFMS is the equivalent of electronic filing of a claim, and that the datе of an electronic filing may be used for purposes of the statute of limitations. As a practical matter, without implementing regulations, it is unclear how the Commission would handle the required filing of authorization for disclosure of health information forms using an electronic filing system; as discussed above, these forms are required for filing a claim with the Commission. See
Here, it is undisputed that Hranicka was injured in a motor vehicle accident on January 6, 2010, that he suffered a disability lasting longer than three days, and that the Employer was made aware of the injury and subsequently submitted to the Commission a “First Report of Injury or Illness,” which the Commission received on January 21, 2010. In other words, because the Employеr‘s report was not submitted within ten days after receiving notice of Hranicka‘s disability, pursuant to
In agreement with the Court of Special Appeals, we conclude that the clear language of
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.
BARBERA, C.J., GREENE and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurring, in which BARBERA, C.J., and GREENE, J., join.
I reluctantly concur in the judgment.
Not all claimants have counsel. Perhaps in light of that, the Legislature has directed the Commission to “adopt reasonable and proper regulations to govern the procedures of the Commission, which shall be as simple and brief as reasonably possible.” Maryland Code, Labor & Employment Article (“LE“), § 9-701(a) (emphasis added). That is easier said than done, as this case illustrates.
The Commission has adopted an electronic filing system. In regulation it portrays that system as one of three alternative ways of filing forms and documents with the Commission.
Commission‘s other regulations and website reveals that (1) a claimant in fact has no choice but must use the electronic filing system to submit a claim form and (2) that submission of a claim form on that system is not the filing of a claim. In other words, a claimant must submit the claim both electronically and in hard copy to “file” it before the expiration of the two-year period of limitations set forth in
It is also confusing that, while a regulation defines the date for a claim to be the “date stamp affixed on the claim form,”3 the Commission actually “affixes” two different dates to the form—one placed in a special box on the bottom of the form as part of the electronic filing process, and a second date, apparently placed on the hard copy when it is physically received at the Commission. The electronically-affixed date apparently is not the “filing date,” although it is the date that the Commission‘s website insists must appear on the filed сopy.4
This leads me to second the sentiment expressed by Judge Kehoe in his concurring opinion in the unreported decision of Court of Special Appeals in this case:
In today‘s world, and identifying just a few of the myriad of transactions that routinely take place over the Internet, millions of individuals purchase health and motor vehicle insurance, make banking transactions, buy goods and services, apply to colleges, and file tax returns by doing essentially what Mr. Hranicka did in this case—filling out a form on an Internet webpage and then clicking a “submit” or “send” icon. I am not at all surprised that Mr. Hranicka failed to grasp that submitting a claim form to the Commission is not the same thing as filing a claim with the Commission.
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I understand that the Commission, for reasons of its own, prefers claim forms to be submitted both electronically and on paper. I concede that a thorough reading of the webpage will eventually lead to the realization—counterintuitive
to many individuals in this era of Internet commerce—that “submitting a claim form” is different from “filing a claim” and that, until a signed paper copy of the claim form is received by the Commission, no claim is filed. But I am at a loss to understand why the Commission has chosen to bury this critical information in the fine print on its website.
Chesapeake Surgical, Ltd., et al. v. Hranicka, No. 0327 (Sept. Term, 2013) (concurring Opinion by Kehoe, J.), at 1-2.
It appears that, subsequent to the Court of Special Appeals decision and perhaps in light of it, the Commission revised its website to make the instructions concerning the filing of a hard copy of the electronic submission more prominent.
At the hearing before the Commission in this case, Commissioner Miraglia outlined a very sensible approach under which the date of electronic submission of a claim is considered to be the filing date unless the claimant fails to follow through with the claimant‘s signed form and authorization for disclosure of health information. This approach is similar to the treatment of electronic submissions under this Court‘s rules for electronic filing in the courts. See
Nothing prevents the Commission from revising its regulations to adopt the approach exрressed by Commissioner Miraglia. Indeed, it might well help the Commission carry out the General Assembly‘s direction to adopt procedures “as simple and brief as reasonably possible.”
Chief Judge BARBERA and Judge GREENE have authorized me to state they join in this opinion.