Hoyt v. . ThompsonHoyt v. . Thompson
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Paige
Lead Opinion
The bill contains distinct averments in relation to both the assignments to the state of Michigan of the debt against the Long Island Railroad Company — that they were made by the president and cashier of the Morris Canal and Banking Company, without the authority of the directors of that company. In regard to the first assignment, which bears date December 9th, 1840, the allegation is, that the agent of the state of Michigan prevailed upon the executive officers of the Morris Canal and Banking Company,
Laying out of the question everything in relation to the insolvency of the company when the assignments were made, they are represented by the bill to be the acts of the president and cashier, without the authority of the directors. This is admitted by the demurrer, and thus the naked question is presented to us, whether the president and cashier of the Morris Canal and Banking Company could, of their own will, and without the authority or consent of the board of directors, dispose of the property of the corporation.
The president and cashier, and other executive agents of a corporation, are sometimes permitted by the directors, without express authority, to do acts not within the sphere of their official duties or agencies, and are thus held out to the public as having authority to do such acts. In such case, the corporation will be bound by the acts of its agents, on the ground of implied authority. But upon the bill and demurrer in the
The Charter of the Morris Canal and Banking Company is made part of the bill. By its third section, the management of the concerns of the company was vested in fifteen directors, to be selected from the stockholders, and the directors were to choose a president from among themselves. The 8th section gives to the president and directors, or a majority of them, the power to elect all engineers, treasurers, collectors, cashiers, toll-men, clerks, agents, c. necessary in their judgment for conducting the affairs of the company.
But the powers and duties of the president and cashier are not prescribed by the charter; no power is conferred upon them to mortgage, assign, or dispose of the property of the corporation. This is a part of the management of the concerns of the company which is confided expressly to the directors, but not to the president and cashier. In no case has it been held that these officers have the power to do an act like that in question, without the assent and authority of the directors. In Leggett v. N.J. Manufacturing and Banking Company, (Sax. Ch. Rep. 542,) it was held that a mortgage of real estate, executed by them under the corporate seal, but without the authority or concurrence of the board of directors, was not a valid instrument. The management of the concerns of that company was committed, as in the present case, to a board of directors, and the powers of the president and cashier do not appear to have been defined by the charter. The value
In Massachusetts, it has been held, that neither the president nor the cashier of a bank has the power, in virtue of his office, to transfer the negotiable funds of the bank, without express authority from the directors. This, however, must be erroneous, if the transfer be made in the usual course of business, and in good faith. But it is safe to say, that when the sale, assignment or transfer of the property of the corporation requires the use of the common seal, it cannot be made without the assent and authority of the board. A great proportion of the failures and bankruptcies of corporations, and of the frauds committed by them upon those who have dealt with them, have resulted from the usurpation, by their executive officers, of the powers which by the charters are entrusted to the directors; and although in many cases the corporations have been held bound by such acts, this has been on the ground that these officers have been permitted by the directors to take the entire management into their own hands — and thus held out to the public as authorized agents for that purpose — or on the ground of subsequent ratification of the act, and that such ratification is equal to an original authority. Upon the pleadings in this case there is no room for implying an authority on either of these suppositions.
A deed formally executed under the corporate seal, bears upon its face the presumption that it was executed by competent authority from the corporation. But this presumption may be repelled, and the deed avoided, by showing that the seal was affixed without authority. The assignments in question to the state of Michigan, upon the facts shown, are not voidable merely; but absolutely void. They appear on their face to convey a title; but on the facts stated and admitted, they convey nothing; and without reference to the insolvency
The next inquiry will be, whether the plaintiff, under the laws of New Jersey, acquired a title to the debt due from the Long Island Railroad Company to the Morris Canal and Banking Company. The plaintiff, in his bill, sets forth the statute of New Jersey passed in February, 1829, by which it is declared to be unlawful for incorporated companies after becoming insolvent, or suspending their ordinary business for want of funds, to make any sale, conveyance, assignment, or transfer of any of their property or effects. And by which the court of chancery of that state is authorized to restrain them from so doing, by injunction, and “to appoint a receiver “or receivers; or three trustees, with full power and authority “to demand, sue for, collect and receive, and take into “their possession all the goods and chattels, rights and “credits, moneys and effects, lands and tenements, books, “papers, choses in action, bills, notes, and property of every “description whatever, belonging to the said company, at the “time of their insolvency or suspension of business as aforesaid; ”and to sell, convey, and assign all the said real and personal ”estate, c.”
The plaintiff avers, that Richards and Selden, being judgment creditors of the Morris Canal Company, in New Jersey, filed their bill against that company, in the court of chancery of that state, alleging its insolvency; and in January, 1842, obtained a decree for an injunction, and for the appointment
Against its validity, it is objected, on the part of the defendants: First, That it had been assigned to the state of Michigan by the Morris Canal Company, before the time, when, in the bill filed by Richards and Selden, that company was alleged to have become insolvent; and therefore, that the receivers appointed in that suit have neither title in themselves, nor authority to assign it to the complainant in this suit. But if I am right in the view taken of the conveyance to Michigan, this objection fails on the ground that no title passed to that state; and that the Morris Canal and Banking Company remained the owners of this property when the bill of Richards and Selden was filed.
A further objection made to the plaintiff‘s title is, that the property of the insolvent corporation was not vested in the receivers by force of the statute; but that they were created the agents of the company, and substituted in the place of the directors, for the purpose of settling its affairs. And secondly, as a consequence of their proposition, that the receivers cannot sell or dispose of the property in their own name, but must convey it in the name and under the common seal of the corporation; and we are referred to the case of Willink v. The Morris Canal and Banking Company, (3 Green Ch. R. page 400,) as an authority for those propositions.
It is true that the chancellor of that state, in some observations not necessary to the decision of the question before him, said in that case, that the property of the corporation does
But it is insisted that the assignment by the receivers in New Jersey, admitting it to be valid in that state, has no extra territorial force, and does not operate in this state. Whether it would be valid as against creditors of the corporation proceeding by attachment against it in the state of New York, or as against previous purchasers of the corporation, are questions which do not arise on the record in this case. There is no conflict between the plaintiff‘s title on the one side, and attaching creditors or purchasers on the other side. We
If the defendants are right in their position, that the assignment to the complainant is inoperative in this state, because it was effected by operation of a law of New Jersey, and not by the voluntary act of the corporation, the consequence is, that although the debt against the Long Island Railroad Company belongs in the state of New Jersey to the plaintiff, it belongs in this state to the Morris Canal Company, and that that company must bring the action in this state to recover it. But here a difficulty arises. The order appointing a receiver of the property of an insolvent corporation is accompanied by an injunction restraining the directors of the company from collecting its debts or paying over the avails; and this injunction is general, without reference to the state or country where the debtors may reside. The object of the proceeding in New Jersey is to take everything out of the hands of the corporation, and to put everything into the hands of the receiver.
A suit by the corporation for its own benefit here, is a breach of the injunction in New Jersey, and the suit cannot be brought without incurring the penalty. But suppose the corporation should sue in this state, notwithstanding the injunction in New Jersey, on what ground is it that a foreign corporation can maintain a suit here? The principle that the statutes of foreign states have no extra-territorial force here, if strictly applied, is as fatal to the action by the corporation, as it is to the action by the receiver‘s assignee.
The corporation is no less the creature of the statute of New Jersey, than is the transfer by the receivers to the plaintiff.
It is a conceded principle, that the laws of a state have no force, proprio vigore, beyond its territorial limits. But the laws of one state, are frequently permitted by the courtesy of another to operate in the latter for the promotion of justice, where neither that state nor its citizens will suffer any inconvenience from the application of the foreign law. This courtesy or comity is established not only from motives of respect for the laws and institutions of foreign countries, but from considerations of mutual utility and advantage. Until the decision of the case of Abraham v. Plestoro, in the court for the correction of errors, (3 Wend. 358,) it had been uniformly held in this state, that in virtue of this comity, the assignees of a foreign bankrupt were entitled to sue for
The case of Abraham v. Plestoro, above referred to, is supposed by the defendants to have established in its strictest sense, and without qualification, the doctrine that a foreign assignment in bankruptcy is absolutely inoperative and void in this state, but I think this a mistake. The point there decided seems to be correctly stated in the reporter‘s marginal note. It is this, “that an assignee under a foreign commission “of bankruptcy, is not entitled before judgment to an injunction “to restrain the bankrupt from receiving property which “was on the high seas, on its way from England to New York “at the time of suing out the commission.” The facts were, that Abraham, being largely indebted in England, left that country, bringing his property or a considerable portion of it
It is impossible, therefore, to say, that the case of Abraham v. Plestoro was decided on grounds affecting the question now under consideration. It remains entirely uncertain, whether the decision turned upon the point that the foreign assignment was inoperative here; or on the ground that although the assignee may sue the bankrupt‘s debtor here, he cannot sue the bankrupt himself; or on the ground that the assignment was provisional merely, and therefore imperfect; or on the ground that a foreign assignee, before judgment, is not entitled to an injunction; or on the question whether the proper remedy was not at law.
I have not overlooked the case of Johnson v. Hunt, (23 Wend. 87,) in which a different view of the case of Abraham v. Plestoro was taken, and so far as the decision in that case was founded on that view, I feel myself compelled to dissent from it, and to adopt the principle I have quoted from the opinion of Mr. Justice Platt, in Holmes v. Remsen; adopting at the time what is said by him and by chief justice Taney, in 13 Peters, 590, to the effect that from the intimate political union, and the extensive commercial intercourse between the
It is satisfactory to know that the construction above given to the case of Abraham v. Plestoro, and my own conclusions upon the point now in question, are in conformity with the opinion expressed by Mr. Justice Story, in his treatise on the Conflict of Laws, sections 419, 420, 421. In § 420, speaking on this question, he says, it is impossible not to feel that the general current of American authority is in favor of the assignees. “In most of those cases in which assignments under “foreign bankrupt laws have been denied to give a title “against attaching creditors, it has been distinctly admitted “that the assignees might maintain suits in our courts under “such assignments for the property of the bankrupt. This “is avowed in the most unequivocal manner in the leading “cases in Pennsylvania and New York already cited, and it “is silently admitted in those in Massachusetts. And unless “the admission can be overthrown, it surrenders the “principle; for no one will contend that the assignees can “sue either in law or equity in our courts, unless they possess “some title under the assignment.”
The case of Harrison v. Sterry, (5 Cranch, 312,) presented only the question of preference between the assignees of a foreign bankrupt and attaching creditors at home; and although the language of the court was general that “the “bankrupt law of a foreign country is incapable of operating “a legal transfer of property in the United States,” its meaning as an authority must be qualified by the facts to which it was applied. It was unnecessary for the purpose of that case to state the qualification of the rule asserted; and for that reason probably it was omitted. It was well said by an English chancellor that “it is always unsatisfactory to abstract “altogether the reasoning of the court in any reported case
The only remaining question is, whether the assignment to the plaintiff by the receiver in New Jersey, is void, by the common law of that state for champerty.
It was thought in the court below, that under the terms of the statute already quoted, the receivers had no authority, expressed or implied, to sell any portion of the property of the company, which they had not reduced to possession. In this opinion I am unable to concur. The power to sell is general; and by no means limited by the terms of the statute, to property in the possession of the receivers; it extends to all the estate and effects previously enumerated, and by the generality of its words, embraces the choses in action, rights and credits of the corporation, whether the evidence of the right to recover was in the possession of the receiver or not.
The manifest object and policy of the statute, forbids any other construction. The design of it was to take from the hands of the directors, upon the presumption of their having mismanaged their trust, every valuable thing belonging to the corporation for the purpose of converting it into money, for the payment of debts. And the power of selling the choses in action, rights and credits of the corporation, was given for the benefit of creditors. Their interest requires that the affairs of insolvent operations should be brought to a speedy conclusion, and that the delay consequent upon the slow process of collecting doubtful debts, and litigating contested claims, at the expense of the fund in the receiver‘s hands, should be, as far as possible, avoided. In many cases this can be best done by a sale. Among the many cases cited in the learned opinion of the superior court, not one is found in which the doctrine of champerty has been applied to a case of this kind, or of the like nature. It does not apply to judicial sales of any description. In Tuttle v. Jackson, (6 Wend. 224,) the chancellor who delivered the opinion in the court
The receiver‘s sale, according to the allegations in the bill, was a judicial sale; and it would be treating the authorities of a sister state with great disrespect, to say that a sale made by order of one of its highest courts, in a matter in which that court has jurisdiction, was made in violation of its own law.
In this state every species of property belonging to a debtor, may be reached, and applied to the payment of his debts upon a judgment creditor‘s bill; and this may be done by a sale of the property. (1 Paige, 641, Edmonston v. Lyde.) Such sale is free from all objection on the ground of champerty.
The decree made in the superior court, should be reversed, and the decree of the special term of the supreme court affirmed with costs to the plaintiff, of the appeal from the special term, but without costs of appeal to this court.
Concurrence Opinion
The ground upon which the decision of this cause was placed by the superior court, cannot, in my judgment, be sustained. The purchase of the debt due to the Morris Canal and Banking Company from the Long Island Railroad Company, by the plaintiff, did not involve the offence of either maintenance or champerty. It was a purchase of the whole demand, and the purchaser brought this suit not to support or maintain the title of another, but to support and maintain his own title. The plaintiff entered into no agreement to maintain or assist another with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend a suit in which he had
The plaintiff and defendants both claim under the Morris Canal and Banking Company. It is insisted, on the part of the plaintiff, that the defendants have no title to the debt of the Long Island Railroad Company, because, — 1. The alleged assignment to the state of Michigan was not executed or authorized by the board of directors of the Morris Canal and Banking Company, but was made by the executive officers of the company without any authority, and so known to be by the state of Michigan. 2. It was void, because made after the insolvency of the Morris Canal and Banking Company, with full notice of such insolvency on the part of the state of Michigan, and in fraud of the statute of New Jersey.
The plaintiff claims under an assignment from the receivers of the Morris Canal and Banking Company, appointed by the court of chancery of the state of New Jersey. A bill was filed by Richards and Selden, judgment creditors of the Morris Canal and Banking Company, in the court of chancery of New Jersey, alleging the insolvency of the company, and praying for an injunction and receiver under an act of that state, of 1829, which provides that when an incorporated company becomes insolvent, it should not be lawful for the directors of the company to sell or assign any of its estate, c., and authorizes the court in a suit commenced by a judgment creditor after the insolvency of the company, to appoint receivers, c., with full power to collect and take into their possession the debts, c., and goods belonging to the company at the time of its insolvency, and to sell the real and personal estate, and pay the proceeds into court to be distributed under the order of the court among the creditors of the company.
The statutes and laws of a country have no intrinsic extra-territorial force. They bind only its own citizens, and citizens of other countries while within its jurisdictional limits; and they bind directly only property within these limits. They do not affect or bind property out of its territory, or persons not resident therein, whether natural born citizens or
Previous to the case of Abraham v. Plestoro, (3 Wend. 548,) the law on this subject was in this state unsettled. Chancellor Kent had decided that a statutory assignment made under a foreign bankrupt law, passed to the assignees of the bankrupt his title to property in this state; but Justice Platt had expressed a contrary opinion. (4 John. Ch. 460, 20 John. 254.) Since the decision, however, of that case by the court of errors, and the decision in Johnson v. Hunt, (23 Wend. 87,) the doctrine that a statutory assignment under a bankrupt or insolvent law of a foreign nation or sister state, does not operate a transfer of property in this state, or of debts due by debtors residing within it, or by corporations chartered under its laws, and doing business within the limits of the state, may be regarded as settled law. A similar doctrine has been advanced and is now considered as an acknowledged rule of jurisprudence by the supreme court of the United States, and by most of the state courts of the Union. (Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 289; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Whea. 213; Plestoro v. Abraham, 1 Paige, 236; Holmes v. Remsen, 20 John. 254; 2 Kent, C. 406-7.) The question has generally arisen between the foreign assignees in bankruptcy, and domestic creditors who had sued out an attachment against the personal property of the bankrupt in the state where it was situated. But the principle is not confined to attaching creditors, it embraces sales under judgment and execution; voluntary transfers by the debtor in satisfaction of claims of creditors, or to bona fide purchasers for a valuable consideration; and all other transfers of the property or liens on the same which are valid under the lex loci rei sitae. (Story on Confl. sec. 414; 20 John. 261; 23 Wend. 94, 95, 99.)
If the statutory assignment under the foreign bankrupt or
Voluntary assignments stand upon entirely different principles from involuntary legal assignments. A voluntary assignment has no relation to place. An involuntary legal assignment has the strictest relation to place. The latter made under the legislative authority of a nation can only operate upon property within its own territory. A voluntary conveyance by a party made according to the law of his domicil, will pass his personal estate whatever may be its locality; abroad as well as at home. (Story on Confl. sec. 411, 20 John. 258; 3 Wend. 566.) The control of the owner of personal property has no respect to its locality. He can dispose of it wherever it may be. But the control which the law can exercise over property is limited to the territory of the government by which the law is enacted. This creates a solid distinction between a voluntary conveyance of the owner, and an involuntary conveyance by the mere authority of law. (Story on Confl. sec. 411; 23 Wend. 96.)
The statute of New Jersey under which the receivers of the Morris Canal and Banking Company were appointed, was clearly a statute in the nature of a bankrupt law. It was a general act relating to all incorporated companies, and was enacted to prevent frauds by such companies. It provides that whenever an incorporated company shall become insolvent, it shall not be lawful for any of its officers to sell or assign any of its real or personal estate; and also provides for
But it is insisted on the part of the plaintiff, that the assignments to the state of Michigan were unauthorized by the directors of the Morris Canal and Banking Company. It is necessary to examine this objection; for if it is well founded, and the state of Michigan acquired no right or title to the debt in question under their assignments, the plaintiff may, on the principles of international comity, be allowed, as the representative of the Morris Canal and Banking Company or of its receivers, to maintain his suit for the recovery of the debt due by the Long Island Railroad Company, on the ground that there is no conflict between him and the creditors of the Morris Canal and Banking Company, or bona fide purchasers claiming under that company.
The plaintiff alleges in his bill that the treasurer of the state of Michigan, notwithstanding his knowledge that the Morris Canal and Banking Company had no power to sell and assign any of its property and effects, prevailed on the executive officers of that company, without the knowledge, assent or approbation of the majority of the directors of the company, to assign the debt due by the Long Island Railroad Company to the state of Michigan, as a collateral security for a debt due to such state by the Morris Canal and Banking Company, and that such assignment was executed by the president and cashier of the latter company, under the common seal of such company. The bill also alleges that the said officers of the Morris Canal and Banking Company, on the 26th April, 1841, assigned to the state of Michigan as a further security for the debt so due to that state by the said
But the plaintiff in his bill alleges with reasonable distinctness, that the first assignment, and expressly that the second assignment, was executed without the authority of the directors of the Morris Canal and Banking Company. If the assignments had been made to the state of Michigan for a new consideration paid at the time, or if the state had relinquished any security then held by it, so as to entitle it to the character
As the defendant Thompson had notice of the defect of the title of the state of Michigan at the time he purchased, he is entitled to no other rights than those possessed by the state.
Upon the ground, therefore, that according to the allegations of the bill, the two assignments to the state of Michigan were executed by the president and cashier of the Morris Canal and Banking Company, without the authority of the directors of that company, I am of opinion that the judgment of the superior court should be reversed, and that the demurrer to the bill be overruled, with liberty to the defendants to answer the bill. My brethren concur with me in the opinion that the judgment should be reversed upon this ground. They also concur with me in the opinion that the purchase by the plaintiff of the debt due by the Long Island Railroad Company did not involve the offence, of either maintenance or champerty. As to the other questions discussed
Judgme